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To my Mother 
Preface for the Initiated Reader 1 
I. NEED FOR INTRODUCTORY WoRK 
Throughout the nineteenth century Blackstone's Commen-
taries was used everywhere in the United States as a first 
book for legal study. Doubtless this work served very well 
in the period immediately following the Revolution. Black-
stone gave an exposition of the English law as it stood right 
after the middle of the eighteenth century. Our law had its 
origin in English law, and the prime task of American 
lawyers and judges was to adapt that law to our conditions. 
But by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, 
almost everyone had come to see that Blackstone was no 
longer a suitable text for the use of American law students, 
for two reasons: First, a century and a half of development 
had so transformed the American scene that the study of 
Blackstone had become a study of historical antiquities; or 
perhaps one should say, a study in comparative law--a 
comparison of English law in the eighteenth century with 
American law in the twentieth. Second, one of the most 
characteristic features of American law was our constitutional 
organization; written constitutions and the judicial power of 
review over legislation permeated everything that the Amer-
ican lawyer did and must know; Blackstone knew nothing 
of these institutions. For these and perhaps other reasons the 
use of Blackstone was everywhere abandoned. r, 
1 This Preface is intended for the information of the person already trained 
in the law-lawyer, judge, or law teacher. I shall also have occasion now and 
then in the later chapters to include some side remarks for the ear of the 
initiated reader. These will be put in special footnotes indicated by an asterisk 
and introduced with the initials: I.R. The ordinary footnotes, which are in-
tended for the beginning law student and which accompany the text, will be 
numbered in the usual manner. 
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Since then, there has been a great deal of talk about the 
need for some kind of introductory book to fill the place 
once occupied by Blackstone. But until very recently all this 
talk was like the common talk of the weather-nobody did 
anything about it. This was remarkable in view of the fact 
that in all other important fields of human knowledge such 
as economics and sociology one finds a plenitude of intro-
ductory treatises, and in view of the further fact that in civil 
law countries of Europe and South America the study of 
law invariably begins with some kind of introductory course. 
Indeed, it is always a matter of astonishment to civilian 
lawyers who come to this country to study American law 
and who ask to be referred to an elementary text on the 
subject, to be told that there is no such book. 
Of the American student's need for an introduction to 
the legal system there can be little doubt. For the last 
several decades the beginning student has been projected 
into the midst of the law as a person might be thrown into 
the river, and told to swim. He started reading cases and 
discussing legal problems without any preliminary explana-
tion of the character or operation or aims of the legal system. 
If any explanation at all was given, it was furnished quite 
informally and one-sidedly by individual instructors at the 
commencement of particular courses such as Contracts, Torts, 
Crimes, etc. That some students lost heart and failed because 
of the lack of introductory assistance is not improbable; it 
is certain that many remained confused and bewildered 
throughout a large part of their first year's work.2 
2 Compare the following from the preface to DoWLING, PA'ITERSON and 
POWELL, MATERIALS FOR LEGAL METHOD vii (1946): 
"Both teachers and students in American law schools have long regretted 
the groping and confusion of beginning students when thrown simultaneously 
into three to five courses presenting, principally through collections of cases, 
as many different branches of substantive and procedural law. The instructor 
in each of these courses has heretofore found it necessary either to 'break in' 
the student by devoting much time to what is here called 'legal method,' or 
to plunge ahead in his subject with the hope that the student would somehow 
or other, by the end of the course, acquire a minimum understanding of legal 
PREFACE FOR THE INITIATED READER ix 
In the last few years different law schools have attempted 
to meet the need for some sort of introductory work on 
law, among them the school to which I am attached. The 
present volume is the fourth version of my efforts to produce 
a suitable book of this character. A substantial part of the 
material was delivered two years ago in a series of public 
lectures, known as the Cooley Lectures. Revised and en-
larged, it is now published as the third volume in the annual 
series which bears that name. 
2. wHAT KIND OF INTRODUCTION 
As these materials are not quite like others that I have 
seen, I feel that it is incumbent on me to refer briefly to 
possible types of introductory courses which are, or which 
might be, adopted; and to give the reasons for the particular 
approach that I have chosen and for the particular materials 
here offered. 
A study of the history of legal institutions may be under-
taken by way of introducing the beginner to the study of 
law. Such historical study is very useful to the lawyer and 
therefore has a proper place in any legal or prelegal cur-
riculum.3 In fact I see no objection to the inclusion of 
method. Either of these practices is believed to be wasteful of effort and likely 
to delay unduly the progress made by the great majority of students in the 
class. The institution of a course on Legal Method and the preparation of this 
volume as the basis for such a course, are founded on the belief that the job 
of introducing the student to the study of law can be more efficiently done 
by concentrating upon it at the outset." 
3 On the subject of historical introductions I can not refrain from referring 
to Holmes' Common Law (t88t), a book frequently recommended in bibli-
ographies for prelegal, and legal, reading. I defer to no one in my admiration 
for this author, and yet I believe this book is equally unsuited for perusal by 
prelegal students and by beginning law students. The Common Law was 
written seventy years ago. Its good analytical passages are blended with much 
antiquarian material in a way to make the book confusing and difficult for the 
beginner. Its use for an introduction to law is to my mind like starting piano 
lessons with Beethoven's A ppassionata Sonata. Furthermore, even as legal 
history the Common Law is no longer satisfactory. No legal historian today 
would express the views, or choose the material for discussion, which Holmes 
did. All historians recognize that history needs to be rewritten every few 
decades. Finally, Holmes' views regarding the role of historical study changed 
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historical study of this sort in the first year of the law course 
if room can be found for it there. My only question is 
whether historical study provides the beginning law student 
with what he needs most. I am convinced that it does not. 
What is needed at the outset of legal study is a general 
picture of the legal system, an analytical and functional view 
of the American "system as is." 
The sociology of law, laying special emphasis on the 
development and social background of the legal system, has 
also been used to introduce first year students to the study 
of law. No doubt a knowledge of sociology, like a knowledge 
of history, is important to the lawyer. The law student will 
profit immensely from prelegal preparation in sociology. The 
law teacher should be able and ready to make applications of 
sociological doctrine to legal materials whenever the oppor-
tunity for so doing arises.4 Furthermore, I believe whole-
heartedly in including in the second or third year of the law 
curriculum a course or seminar which will treat the relations 
of law and society. But all this does not add up to the 
conclusion that the legal neophyte needs to begin his work 
in law with sociological material. Before he can appreciate 
the sociology of law he ought to have acquired at least a faint 
general picture of the legal system itself. 
Even more questionable than the use of legal history 
and of sociology of law as ways of introducing the student 
to legal study, is the use of legal philosophy for this purpose. 
radically in the course of his life. At the time when he wrote the Common Law 
he was more or less imbued with an attitude which stressed history for its own 
sake. Two decades later he looked at the study of history functionally; he 
could warn of the danger of antiquarianism and declare that legal history 
is not important except as it gives us light for the conscious and intelligent 
development of our law. Only so far as man knows nothing better is he bound 
to adhere to the past; in Holmes' classical phrase (in a speech delivered in 
1895), "Historic continuity with the past is not a duty but only a necessity." 
Collected Legal Papers 139 (192.0), Certainly we can not blame the illustrious 
author for the uncritical use which later generations of teachers have made 
of his early work. 
4 In this sense I have introduced some essential sociological background in 
the material which follows. 
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To put legal philosophy at the start of the law course is to 
put the cart before the horse. While I appreciate the impor-
tance of sound theory and careful analysis and while 
I appreciate that every lawyer will have a philosophy 
of law whether he knows it or not and will be well advised 
to make his philosophy explicit, I do not believe that it is 
advisable for the law student to begin with a consideration 
of legal philosophy. Philosophy and criticism of legal ideas, 
so far as they are to be introduced into legal study, belong 
well along in the student's training rather than at the begin-
ning.5 
3· THE MATERIAL HERE PRESENTED 
What is the nature of the material here presented? How 
does it differ from the types of introductory material just 
mentioned? 
First, it is descriptive of the American legal system as it 
now exists, not of past law and not of legal systems in general. 
Second, it portrays the legal system as an operating insti-
tution. I have made use of two basic ideas: acts and patterns 
for action, both sufficiently familiar to the beginning student. 
I have analyzed the operation of the legal system in terms 
of acts of individuals and officials and in terms of standards 
intended to control these acts. Too often legal writers of the 
past have analyzed in terms of high order abstractions which 
eliminate all elements of human activity and the guidance of 
human action. Acts and guidance are, to my mind, the most 
important features of a legal system. 
Third, I have given a large place to the discussion of 
language in relation to law. Language is the lawyer's primary 
5 Like the study of comparative law, which introduces conceptions of other 
legal systems and presupposes an existing fund of legal conceptions with which 
to make comparisons, a critical study of general theory presupposes a fund of 
general ideas to be criticized and analyzed. By the time we reach section 7-45 
of this course--where a brief excursion into legal philosophy is made--the 
student will have acquired such a fund of ideas. 
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tool. He works with it at every turn. A realistic discussion of 
the operation of our legal system must be based on an under-
standing of the communicative processes. 
Fourth, I have given a considerable amount of space to 
a discussion of the ways in which statutes are made and 
interpreted. This has been dictated partly by what I think 
is the very real need of every student to achieve an early 
acquaintance with these processes and partly by the conviction 
(which many teachers share) that existing curricula put a 
one-sided emphasis on common law and are calculated to give 
a distorted notion of the lawyer's field of work. 
Fifth, technical ideas and technical terminology have been 
avoided as far as possible. I have drawn on the notions of 
common experience wherever I can and have made use of 
concrete cases to exemplify all major assertions. Illustrations 
have been drawn mainly from the early part of the student's 
first year casebooks. The illustrative material has been chosen 
with an eye to bring out essential connections between this 
survey course and the rest of the law student's courses. And 
the arrangement of the material itself has been dictated quite 
as much by considerations of convenience in teaching as by 
notions of logical relationships. In short, I have tried to give 
the student a better perspective of his chosen field; I have 
told a story as little complicated as possible, but I hope not 
so incomplete as to be misleading. 
Sixth, there is need to impart a vast deal of plain informa-
tion about our legal system and how it operates. For this 
reason I have cast the main part of this book in the form 
of an expository text. Much of what I say is so familiar to 
lawyers and teachers that it is quite taken for granted; as, 
for example, what a lawsuit is, how statutes are enacted, and 
what the judge's normal functions are. Just because the 
lawyer takes such matters for granted and because the layman 
does not know them, the lawyer has difficulty in explaining 
to the layman what a concrete legal situation really involves. 
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The law teacher, if he does not leave the student entirely 
to his own resources, throws in a bit of background here and 
there, in disconnected and unsystematic form, as the dis-
cussion of particular cases demands. The law student at the 
beginning of his course is in essentially the position of a 
layman. Much that the law-trained man takes for granted 
the student does not know. I believe that all this assumed 
background material should be brought together in a uni-
fied picture and explained in familiar terms, so that the 
beginner can see what he is doing and where he is going. 
Finally, I have coupled with the textual material a variety 
of problems for discussion. This is in line with the problem 
method which we use consistently in legal instruction. The 
problems take the form of queries suggested for the student's 
consideration, of excerpts from various writers which are 
posed for critical discussion, and of briefly stated cases 
(though a few cases are stated in full). Problems are as 
necessary as the text. A bare text without problems does not 
take hold of one's mind. Problems are needed in order to 
develop an appreciation of the meaning of the text and 
to furnish exercise in its application. On the other hand, a 
casebook of the usual type seems to me impractical for the 
purpose of an introductory course. It does not furnish, or 
allow time to present, the much needed general picture of 
the legal system.6 
The material here presented can be covered fully in about 
thirty classroom hours. It can be covered in as little as 
fifteen hours if the last chapter is omitted and if parts of the 
other chapters are pruned to a substantial degree. The mate-
rial can be used independently as a separate course; or it 
can be used, as it is here at the University of Michigan Law 
School, in conjunction with other introductory work such as 
6 Some introductory materials recently published are open to objection on 
this account; they contain little, if any, descriptive material, restrict the range 
of discussion too narrowly, and force the instructor to stick too closely to the 
traditional method of case analysis. 
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instruction in legal bibliography and instruction in the history 
of the forms of action. 
4· FoR WHoM INTENDED 
As already indicated, Our Legal System and How It 
Operates has been prepared primarily for the use of begin-
ning law students. However I think it might also serve, in 
the hands of a properly trained instructor, as a textbook for 
juniors or seniors in college; I have never used it for this 
purpose, but I see no reason why it would be more difficult 
for the student to grasp than the standard treatise on 
economtcs. 
The mature general reader, if he is curious about the legal 
system and desirous of obtaining general impressions of its 
nature and operation, may also find this book worthy of 
perusal. 
The practicing lawyer or judge will find in this intro-
ductory book nothing of interest except the mode of analysis 
and the approach. If he has not been doing an extensive 
amount of "reading and using the newer jurisprudence," he 
may profit from a reinterpretation of familiar material in 
terms of this jurisprudence. Particularly he may find this 
a useful introduction to the items on legal theory which are 
suggested in the bibliography and which commonly assume 
that the reader is already familiar with the theoretical field. 
The law teacher will see in this textbook chiefly an attack 
on a pedagogical problem.7 He will be concerned to see 
whether I have developed, out of familiar stuff, a useful 
teaching tool. On this score I have nothing to add to what 
7 The teacher will note, for example, that I have put the discussion of Legal 
Policies and Policy Making at the conclusion rather than at the beginning of 
the course. Logically I might begin (and I do, with advanced students of legal 
method) with a discussion of legal policies, but pedagogically I am con-
vinced-after trying both modes of arrangement-that the appreciation of 
the student develops more naturally if he is introduced first to the structure of 
the law and the acts and activities of the persons who make the legal wheels 
go around. 
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I have already said in this foreword and what will be obvious . 
from a perusal of the text itself. 
5· DEBTS 
My general debts to Dewey, Pound, Holmes, Wigmore, 
Dickinson, Llewellyn, and others will be apparent to all who 
have read in the field of legal theory. However, I have not 
felt that it was necessary, as a rule, in a series of elementary 
lectures such as these, to acknowledge specific debts by cita-
tions. The lectures are intended for the information of 
persons unfamiliar with the field; citations would not be 
especially useful to them and would only clutter up the text. 
At various points in the book I have inserted bibliographies; 
these embrace the items to which I am chiefly indebted. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: Scope of Lectures-Use of 
Language in Law 
SUBJECT MATTER AND METHOD 1 
Sec. r-or. Purposes and program. The general purpose 
of these lectures is to furnish you, who are beginning the 
study of law, with an over-all view of the legal system and 
with certain general notions of the way it operates.* This 
purpose is not unlike that which is served in the field of 
economics by an introductory textbook on that subject. In 
1 Throughout this work two types of footnotes will be found: first, notes 
intended for the beginning student which will be numbered in the usual man-
ner; second, special footnotes intended for the initiated reader (i.e., lawyer 
and legal scholar), which will be indicated by an asterisk and be introduced 
by the initials I.R. 
* (I.R.) General Bibliography. The following items are suggested for 
further reading. It is not recommended that the beginner read anything beyond 
the text of these lectures until after he has completed the first year of legal 
study. 
Arnold, Thurman W., The Symbols of Government, New Haven, Yale Univ. 
Press (1935). 
Cairns, Huntington, Law and the Social Sciences, New York, Harcourt, 
Brace (1935). 
Cardozo, Benjamin N., The Nature of the Judicial Process, New Haven, 
Yale Univ. Press (192.1). 
Cohen, Morris R., Law and the Social Order, New York, Harcourt, Brace 
(1933). 
Columbia Associates, An Introduction to Reflective Thinking, Boston, 
Houghton Miffiin (192.3). 
Dewey, John, How We Think, Boston, D. C. Heath & Co. (1933). 
Dickinson, John, "Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision," 
79 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 833 (1931). 
Dickinson, John, "Legal Rules: Their Application and Elaboration," 79 
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1052. (1931). 
Frank, Jerome, Law and the Modern Mind, NewYork, Brentano's (1930). 
Frank, Jerome, "Are Judges Human?", 8o U. of Pa. L. Rev.· 17, 2.33 
(1931). 
Fuller, Lon L., "American Legal Realism," 82. U. of Pa. L. Rev. 42.9 
(1934). 
Fuller, Lon L., The Law in Quest of Itself, Chicago, Foundation Press, 
(1940). 
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this sense these lectures might properly have carried the title, 
Introduction to the Study of Law. 
But different kinds of introduction are possible. In treat-
ing law or any other subject matter, different features may 
be studied, different aspects marked out for special considera-
tion. I shall start with the legal system as a going concern, as 
an operating mechanism; and put about equal stress on its 
structure and its functioning.2 My two main objectives will 
be to show you how the legal system is put together and 
what makes it tick; or, if I may borrow a comparison from 
medicine, to give you a combined anatomical and physio-
logical treatment of the law. And I have sought to suggest 
Holmes, Oliver W., Collected Legal Papers, New York, Harcourt, Brace 
(19zo). 
Lerner, Max, The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes, Boston, Little, Brown 
& Co. (1943). 
Llewellyn, Karl N., The Bramble Bush (1930); republished with an addi-
tional chapter, New York, Oceana Publications (1950). 
Llewellyn, Karl N., "A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step," 30 Col. 
L. Rev. 431 (1930). 
Llewellyn, Karl N., "On Reading and Using the Newer Jurisprudence," 40 
Col. L. Rev. 581 (1940). 
Llewellyn, Karl N., "The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The 
Problem of Juristic Method," 49 Yale L. J. 1355 (1940). 
Paton, George W., A Textbook of Jurisprudence, Oxford, Clarendon Press 
(1946). 
Pound, Roscoe, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, New Haven, Yale 
Univ. Press (19u). 
Pound, Roscoe, "The Theory of Judicial Decision," 36 Harv. L. Rev. 
641, 8oz, 940 (19z3): 
Pound, Roscoe, Law and Morals, Oxford Univ. Press ( 19z6). 
Pound, Roscoe, Social Control Through Law, New Haven, Yale Univ. 
Press ( 194z) . 
Radin, Max, The Law and Mr. Smith, Indianapolis, Dobbs-Merrill Co. 
(1938). 
Radin, Max, Law as Logic and Experience, New Haven, Yale Univ. Press 
(1940). 
Stone, Julius, The Province and Function of Law, Sydney, Associated Gen-
eral Publications Pty. (1946); reprinted, Boston, Harv. Univ. Press 
(1950). 
In addition to the above general bibliography the reader's attention is di-
rected to special lists of suggested reading appended to various sections below. 
2 The reasons for this choice of subject matter have been stated in the 
Preface; the justification for it will, I hope, be made out by what follows. 
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in the title, Our Legal System and How It Operates, some-
thing of this twofold emphasis.3 
Our discussion will be confined to the typical American 
legal system-the system which one finds in any of the states 
in the United States.4 We are not going to embark on a 
consideration of law in general or legal systems in general. 
This would take us too far afield and cover too much ground. 
Legal systems vary with differing forms of political organiza-
tion. They vary with changing social conditions. Law has a 
different character in Russia from what it has in the United 
States; it is not quite the same in nature in France or in Italy 
or even in England as it is here. Sufficient unto the day are 
the difficulties and peculiarities of our own system. It is 
strongly colored by the American constitutional system and 
by American social conditions. Its study will require us to 
take account of American governmental organization and of 
characteristic American attitudes. We shall be especially in-
terested in the ways in which our peculiar constitutional 
organization and our attitudes affect the making, the enforce-
ment, the application, and the interpretation of law. 
In courses such as Contracts, Property, Torts, Criminal 
Law, Procedure, Equity, Constitutional Law, and Business 
Associations, you will examine specific parts of our law; you 
will treat the detailed rules, methods, and problems of 
limited fields. By contrast, in the present course we shall 
examine together certain processes which characterize the 
8 Other adequate and accurate titles would have been Introduction to Legal 
Method and Introduction to Legal Processes. My objection to these titles, and 
reason for rejecting them, was that they are more abstract, and therefore less 
familiar and suggestive to the ordinary reader than the title which I have 
chosen . 
. 
4 Hereafter I shall refer sometimes to the American legal system and some-
times to American legal systems in the plural. By the American legal system 
I shall mean the legal organization characteristic of all the states in this coun-
try. When I use the plural I mean to stress the peculiarities of each state's law 
and legal organization; there are differences as one passes from state to state, 
but in the main our interest centers on the features of likeness common to all. 
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American legal system and cut across lines between specific 
fields. These are the processes by which the behavior of 
persons are controlled, the processes by which law is made 
and formulated, the processes by which law is applied and 
interpreted, and the processes by which controversies among 
persons are adjudicated. The discussion of these various 
processes should give you a perspective of the legal system 
as an operating whole and an understanding of the function-
ing of its parts. 
In order to lay before you our general program, I cannot 
do better than to give the titles of the chapters which will 
follow, and append a word of explanation as to each and a 
list of subtopics to be covered. 
Chapter r. Introduction: Scope of Lectures-Use of Lan-
guage in Law--This chapter will be devoted, after a few 
more preliminary remarks about the subject matter and 
method of our course, to a discussion of the role of com-
munication in the operation of the legal system. 
Subtopics: Subject Matter and Method 
Place of Language in Legal Work 
Chapter 2. Standards for the Individual's Acts-The stand-
ards which are prescribed by the lawgiver, to guide the acts 
of the individual, are to be the chief subject of discussion in 
this chapter. 
Subtopics: Standards for Acts 
Significance of Standard Acts 
Effectuation of Standards 
Uses of Standards to Guide Action 
Chapter 3· Standards for Official Acts-This chapter will 
deal with various official acts and the standards applicable 
to them, in particular with executive acts and with the 
processes of criminal prosecution and civil action. 
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Subtopics: Official Acts and Their Significance 
Effectuation of Standards for Officials 
Use of Standards for Officials 
7 
Chapter 4· Legislation-In this chapter the processes of 
creating explicit standards of all types will be dealt with, as 
well as the significance of these standards in various respects. 
Subtopics: The Legislative Process 
Standards for the Lawmaker 
Subsidiary Lawmaking 
Lawmaker's Statement of Standards 
Significance of Legislation 
Chapter 5· Interpretation of Legislation-In this chapter, 
the need for interpretation of standards and the resources 
and methods of the interpreter, will be treated under the 
following subheads: 
Subtopics: Role of Interpreter 
Sources and Standards of Interpretation 
Typical Interpretive Problems 
Chapter 6. The Common Law-This chapter will deal with 
the case law and the ways in which it is created and changed; 
it will cover among other items the doctrine of precedent . 
. Subtopics: The Creation of Law by Decisions 
"Common-Law" Rules for Using, Finding, 
Interpreting, and Changing Standards 
Chapter 7· Legal Policies and Policy Making-The subject 
matter of discussion here will be the policies of the state and 
law; the chapter will furnish an inventory of the major 
policies of government today. 
Subtopics: Policies Regarding the Individual 
Policies Regarding the Community 
Policies Regarding Organized Groups 
Determinants of Policies 
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Sec. I-o2. Is this course practical? No one of you needs 
to be "sold" on the importance of a course in Contracts or 
a course in Property. Some of you may also perceive right 
off the value of a course such as we are embarking on. But 
some of you, like many Americans and Englishmen, have 
a strongly developed feeling of suspicion, or at least of doubt, 
about matters theoretical; you may react uneasily to my 
suggestion of a program for this course. In fact, the list of 
chapter titles may sound somewhat abstract, and accentuate 
your feeling of doubt,l I hasten to say that I sympathize 
with your feeling up to a certain point, and that I wholly 
endorse the demand for the practical. I am just as much 
irked as any of you may be, by sterile academic discussions 
of theories that have no relation to the work of the lawyer, 
and I am just as determined as any of you might be to cut 
my cloth to the practical pattern. 
But the practical-minded individual is sometimes prone to 
go even further than a doubt about theory; he may assume 
tacitly that the general or theoretical is necessarily opposed 
to the practical and is, therefore, to be rejected by the prac-
tical man. I remember hearing, when I was a student many 
years ago, some young fellows tell of an excursion through 
the "red-light district" in Detroit. According to their story, 
they entered a certain house of prostitution and created a 
"rough-house"; the "madam" in charge quelled the dis-
turbance and said she would have them know she was running 
a "decent house." To one who starts with the assumption 
that theory and practice are opposed, the suggestion that a 
study of legal processes has practical value may sound like 
1 The list of chapter titles has been included because I felt that it would be 
helpful to give you a quick, though dim, glimpse of our course as a whole. 
I hesitated to do this for the very reason suggested in the text. The titles 
probably sound to you more abstract than the material which they represent 
will be found to be. Partly they sound abstract because they stand for un-
familiar material; on this basis the chapter titles in a casebook on Torts or 
Crimes also have an abstract ring. 
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a contradiction of similar character. But the assumption of an 
opposition is quite untenable, as I shall show in a moment. 
It is an assumption and never explicit opinion. It is an 
assumption only made by the unthinking. No one who stops 
to think things out ever expressly adopts this position. 
Why, then, should theory and practice ever be assumed 
to be opposed? The blame for this perverse assumption has 
lain on both sides. Too much theorizing has been of a useless 
character, theorizing for its own sake, theorizing unchecked 
by practice. A good deal of legal theorizing has been of this 
character-"pretty poor stuff"-as Justice Holmes called it. 
And such theorizing has tended to give all theoretical activity 
a bad name and to make the practical-minded person look 
upon all of it as irrelevant and idle. On the other side, the 
assumed opposition between theory and practice has been 
fostered by a superficial view of men of action: they are in 
a hurry to get things done or at least to get to the task of 
doing. They want to learn how to do things and not spend 
time in discussing how they are done. What they fail to 
realize is that all important activities are reduced to standard 
methods and that the minimum "know-how" which they seek 
to obtain is nothing but theory under another name. 
Actually, theory and practice are essential to one another 
and cannot be separated. On this, all thinkers and writers of 
today would agree. Practice is essential to prevent theory 
from becoming mere dreaming, essential to bring and hold 
it down to earth, so to speak. But theory represents the 
general ideas which organize experience. Theory is essential 
to good practice. Without general ideas to bring phenomena 
together, man would be forever floundering in a morass of 
particular experiences; he would not see the forest for the 
trees. To use another figure, general ideas are like the com-
pass and the map which enable the traveler to traverse the 
forest without losing his way. 
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You will not penetrate far into the legal forest before you 
sense its endless variety and complexity. You will start grasp-
ing for means of putting things together. The multitude of 
rules is quite overwhelming, and the variety of fact situations 
which can arise is infinite. You will soon come to realize that 
you cannot memorize all of the rules, and you cannot possibly 
foresee all the bewildering array of fact situations to which 
your stock of rules may become applicable. You will learn 
that the most you can do is "to learn to think like a lawyer." 
You will find that the way to get about in the legal forest 
is not to memorize the characteristics of the particular trees 
but to develop methods of laying out and blazing paths. You 
will discover that the way to increase your grasp of the law 
is not to remember particular cases and how they were de-
cided, but to develop an understanding of the methods of 
deciding them, of the broader principles on which they were 
determined. In the course on Contracts you will lay out paths 
through a part of the law; in the course on Property, paths 
through another part. In this course, I am trying to provide 
you with a larger legal map which will enable you to see 
the forest all together and to recognize the paths by which 
to pass from one part of it to another. 
Justice Holmes has spoken regarding the importance of 
legal theory in the following terms: 2 
"We have too little theory in the law rather than too 
much. . . . Theory is the most important part of the dogma 
of the law, as the architect is the most important man who 
takes part in the building of a house. The most important 
improvements of the last twenty-five years are improvements 
in theory. It is not to be feared as unpr:actical, for, to the 
competent, it simply means going to the bottom of the sub-
ject. For the incompetent, it sometimes is true, as has been 
2 This and other quotations from Holmes found in this section are taken 
from his epoch-making essay, "The Path of the Law," 10 HARV. L. REV, 
457 (1897). 
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said, that an interest in general ideas means an absence of 
particular knowledge. . . . The danger is that the able and 
practical minded should look with indifference or distrust 
upon ideas the connection of which with their business is 
remote." 
It is important to notice, apropos of Justice Holmes' last 
remark about remoteness of theory, that this is not a course 
in Jurisprudence. Our chosen field of discussion is not remote 
from the work of the lawyer. The study of the structures 
and processes of the American legal system is as closely 
related to the practice of American law as are the study of 
anatomy and the study of physiology to the practice of 
medicine. Anatomy and physiology represent aggregates of 
theories regarding the structure and functioning of the human 
body. Without these general ideas the physician could not 
treat a disorder in a particular area, such as the stomach, 
intelligently. His thinking would not go beyond that of the 
layman who thinks of the stomach as a thing by itself and 
who can only deal with such a phenomenon as an acid stomach 
as an isolated affair to be relieved by some such immediate 
remedy as the administration of baking soda. The physician 
sees his problem in its wider relations. He asks what causes 
this acid condition: a temporary situation such as nervous 
overstrain or an eating spree? Or a more serious and con-
tinuing disturbance of gastro-intestinal functions? And what 
can be done about it, beyond providing a temporary pal- · 
liative? Obviously, the doctor cannot analyze his case in this 
way without an ample fund of theories about bodily struc-
tures and functions. And the position of the lawyer is no 
different. He must understand the structure and functioning 
of the legal body if he wants to work effectively as a lawyer. 
He may learn how to draw a simple deed or contract-some 
stenographers and realtors can do this-but he will not be 
a successful draftsman and will not be able to take care of 
difficult problems of drafting without an adequate grasp 
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of legal policies and legal ways and means. He may learn 
how to look up the law and write a brief on a legal point, 
but he will not be able to present hard and novel cases 
properly unless he has a real appreciation of the judicial 
process, of how judges work, of how they reach and how 
they justify their conclusions. He may learn to apply clear 
and unambiguous statutes to simple cases, but he is not pre-
pared to deal with statutes which raise doubts and difficulties 
of application, without a comprehension of the processes by 
which statutes are made and the methods by which they are 
interpreted. In short, an understanding of the basic legal 
processes is essential, if one expects to be a legal architect 
rather than a legal mechanic, fit to do only routine jobs. 
In conclusion, regarding the practical value of our course, 
I shall only add that I have tried to select material and 
problems which have importance to the lawyer. I accept the 
test of practical value, for theorizing as well as for other 
forms of activity. I can not demonstrate here and now that 
I have always made successful choices. To do this would 
require me to rehearse everything that is to be covered in 
the course. A large part of the proof of the pudding will 
be in the eating. But, as a token of my sincerity of purpose, 
I shall welcome at any time such questions from you as: 
"-w:hat relation does this topic in our course have to a law-
yer's work?" "Why are we discussing this problem or that?" 
I not only regard such questions as proper; I feel that you 
should be propounding them constantly; and I shall do my 
best to give satisfactory answers if you cannot find answers 
for yourselves.3 
Sec. I-03· Material and method of study. A few words 
of explanation are in order, before we start on our main 
3 If some teacher finds it impossible to guess why I included this or that, 
he can either skip it with a profane reflection on the author, or write a letter 
to inquire. 
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undertaking, relative to the form of the material contained 
in these lectures, the organization of the material, and the 
use which you are expected to make of it. 
The major part of the material here presented was orig-
inally delivered orally in traditional lecture style. I have 
retained the personal forms of address-"you," "we," and 
"I," which are common in lectures-because they make the 
text less formal and easier to read. However I have put the 
text itself in printed form, so that you can go over it before 
class and as often as you find necessary. This saves classroom 
time and allows you to prepare properly. When the class 
begins I shall assume that you are already familiar with the 
text, and shall conduct the discussion on the basis of this 
assumption. 
After you have studied the text, devote an ample amount 
of time to the problems and queries stated tor your con-
sideration. These will be the principal subject matter for 
discussion in class and should be carefully weighed and 
answered beforehand. They are intended tc give you an 
opportunity to apply the general statements made in the 
text. There is no way of developing appreciation of the 
meaning of general statements, comparable to actual exercise 
in their application. 
What I aim to do in this course, as all the teachers in 
the law school aim to do, is to stimulate you to think in legal 
terms. I want you to develop an inquiring mind as regards 
all legal problems. Formulate your own opinions about what 
you read. Ask yourself, "Is that so, and Why?" Cultivate 
an "I'm from Missouri" attitude. Read critically, not pas-
sively. I do not want to give you exercise in memorizing 
a picture of the legal system. I do want you to understand 
the system, and understanding is an achievement. If you 
succeed in understanding, whatever needs to be remembered 
will stick without any special effort in that regard. 
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PLACE oF LANGUAGE IN LEGAL WoRK 
Sec. I-04· Lawyer uses language. The man of the law 
works with language at every turn. Whether he be lawmaker, 
practitioner, judge, or scholar, his every move requires com-
munication. Now he is using language in drafting a statute; 1 
now in framing a deed, will, contract, or pleading; now in 
eliciting the testimony of witnesses or making an argument to 
the jury; now in instructing the jury or issuing an order; now 
in writing or reading an opinion; now in reporting a case or 
referring to a case already reported; now in interpreting 
a statute; now in preparing and writing a treatise or article 
on some special branch of the law. As one educator remarks, 
"The law appears-at least to a layman like myself-to be 
a highly verbal profession." 2 And another author writing 
recently observes half facetiously: 
"When Hamlet was asked by Polonius what he read he 
made the oft-quoted response, 'Words, words, words.' The 
reply would have been equally apt if the old man had asked 
him for a definition of the law. The painter works with a 
great palette of colors, the etcher with lines and lights and 
1 I speak here of the legislator as a lawyer, for, while many members of our 
legislatures are not lawyers, almost all drafting is done by lawyers or passes 
their critical scrutiny. For our purpose this means that all the language used 
in statutes can be treated as language chosen or used by lawyers. 
2 The remark is made by Professor Crawford in discussing the kind of tests 
necessary for measuring legal aptitude. His statement continues: 
. "Ability on the part of the lawyer to express what his client intends to 
express in terms which are unequivocal and which, throughout as long as may 
be necessary, will be distinctly understood by others, necessitates a mastery of 
language on his part. This in turn demands a highly developed and precise 
use of words. Therefore, the test itself (legal aptitude test) is largely com-
posed of verbal material and measures ability to use words in connection with 
such mental processes and problems as involve analysis, analogies, and the 
application of general principles to specific questions. By this means we attempt 
to measure not only the level of an individual's potential ability; but also 
whether he can use that ability in the way a law student is expected to do. 
We have found that mathematical and scientific thinking or the three-
dimensional thinking required of the engineer is quite different from that 
which is related to this ability for legal studies." "Use of Legal Aptitude Test 
in Admitting Applicants to Law School," 1 BAR EXAMINER 151 at 154 
(1932). 
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shadows, the musician with majestic chords or lilting melo-
dies, but the lawgiver must confine himself to words, words, 
words. 
"Words, words, words. The legislator puts his law into 
words. To know the law, the populace must know the mean-
ing of those words. If words had an exact meaning legal 
troubles would end instead of beginning at this point. But 
since few if any words have exact meanings, being among 
the most slippery and evasive inventions of man, courts must 
be set up to interpret the words of the lawgiver and tell the 
puzzled populace-by means of more words-what the law-
givers mean by the words their laws make use of. And then, 
with many more words, the lawyers try to help the courts 
in their quest of truth by calling attention to previous words 
used by that and other courts in the interpretation of words 
of a like nature promulgated by lawgivers at some earlier 
time in even more words, words, words." 3 
In view of his almost continuous use of language, you will 
readily see how the man who labors in the vineyard of the 
law needs to give careful attention to the communicative 
process. As well might the medical student omit to consider 
the nature of available medicines and surgical instruments 
as for the prospective lawyer to fail to scrutinize his verbal 
tools and to learn about the uses to which they may be put. 
Sec. I-os. Communication analyzed in terms of verbal 
acts. The common man is accustomed to take the communica-
tive process wholly for granted; he does not try to analyze 
it. It is like the air he breathes; he uses it constantly; yet 
never notices its character, its limitations, or its defects. When 
some important feature of the communicative process is 
called to his attention, he is in about the same condition as 
M. Jourdain in Moliere's play, who was surprised to learn 
that all his life he had been speaking prose.1 The result of 
3PARTRIDGE, THE COUNTRY LAWYER 151 (1939). 
1 This reference to M. Jourdain has become a commonplace of late. So far 
as I can discover, Bentham was the first to refer to this example. See WORKS 
(Bowring's ed.) VIII, 122 (1843). 
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this lack of analysis is that the common man-and I might 
add, some of his more learned brethren, too-is forever dog-
ged by a horde of verbal monsters, some prehistoric and many 
mythical. He is plagued by many needless verbal puzzles 
which vanish when the communicative process is broken down 
and its functions are understood. As Cardinal Newman has 
well said: 
"Half the controversies in the world are verbal ones, and, 
could they be brought to a plain issue, they would be brought 
to a prompt termination. Parties engaged in them would 
perceive, either that in substance they agreed together, or 
that their difference was one of first principles. . . . When 
men understand what each other mean, they see, for the most 
part, that controversy is either superfluous or hopeless." 2 
Accordingly I shall begin with the assumption that commu-
nication is not the simple, single process that it is usually 
supposed to be; and our first job will be to subject it to 
further analysis. 
Communication, like legal control, can be analyzed in 
terms of human acts; and this is the mode of analysis which 
I shall adopt in regard to both. This will bring out the func-
tional aspect of communication as it will the operative side of 
the law. It will have the advantage, too, of reducing the proc-
ess of communication and the process of legal control to 
common terms: acts. And since legal control is almost wholly 
exerted through words, this is an important point. 
Each communicative act, each use of language, I shall call 
a verbal act. This expression is shorter than "use of language" 
and has the virtue of emphasizing the fact that each use is 
an act. "Verbal act" will be employed, accordingly, in a very 
general sense to include every distinct use of language, spoken 
or written, and to include every use of language whether 
small or comprehensive. The sudden cry of "Fire" is a verbal 
2 OXFORD UNIVERSITY SERMONS 200. 
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act in this sense; as is the statement, "It's a fine day today," 
and the command of a father to his small son, "Willie, get 
my pipe." A letter is a verbal act and so is a speech. In the 
legal realm, the question put orally to a witness is a verbal 
act, and the response elicited from the witness is also such an 
act. In the same class fall written transactions such as con-
tracts, deeds, and wills. Likewise, the passage of a statute is 
a verbal act, and the rendering of a judgment or an opinion 
in a lawsuit. And finally, the production of a large and im-
portant treatise such as a lawbook must also be regarded as a 
verbal act. Each of these acts represents, according to com-
mon understanding, a separate and distinct type of activity. 
Each of them bears a specific type name in ordinary speech 
and usage. Each of them represents a separate and distin-
guishable use of language. In these respects each of these acts 
meets the specifications of our definition of verbal act. 
Sec. r-o6. Parties to communication. Communication may 
begin and end with a statement by a speaker, S.1 He uses 
language in a verbal act; he addresses his act to a hearer, H. 
It is in this sense that we speak of S's act as communicative. 
But the verbal act of S may originate in a question by H 
which calls for an answer, or S's use of language may be sand-
wiched into an extended series of diverse statements such as 
a conversation. And the roles of speaker and hearer are con-
stantly shifting. Everyone is now speaker, now hearer. The 
specific role of an individual in any protracted body of dis-
course changes from moment to moment. 
Moreover, communication need not occur in a simple one-
one exchange between a speaker and a hearer as it does in 
the ordinary face-to-face conversation. Quite often the par-
1 Henceforth S will be used to indicate speaker; H to indicate hearer. These 
two parties will be taken to typify the parties in communication. Either may 
represent a plural meaning though the singular form be used. And speakers 
will be understood to include writers, and hearers to include readers. 
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ticipants in discourse are numerous. The speaker may share 
his role with several or many persons. Thus the members of 
the legislature speak as a group when they enact a statute. 
And S may address his message to large, indefinite and mixed 
groups of hearers. An orator may address a large audience; 
a writer may address his book to an indefinite audience; and 
a witness tells his story for the benefit of a mixed audience 
including judge, jury, parties, attorneys, miscellaneous on-
lookers, and perhaps finally an appellate court. Nevertheless, 
effective analysis requires simplification of material, and ex-
cept where some complex situation needs to be indicated, I 
shall treat communication as if it were merely a two-party 
affair in which S meets H face-to-face to transmit a message. 
Sec. r-o7. Speaker's purposes. The speaker may act ver-
bally for many reasons. His purposes for speaking or writing 
may be as varied as his purposes for any other kinds of 
activity. He may intend to influence the behavior of other 
persons whom he addresses; he may want to impart informa-
tion; he may seek to obtain information; he may aim to make 
a prediction, and so on. In the following discussion, I shall 
divide the speaker's purposes into two main kinds and sub-
divide each kind into further types: 1 
I. The purpose to control others (sec. I -o8) ; 
2. The purpose to give or obtain information (sec. I-II). 
1 Associative and expressive uses of language. To make our discussion com-
plete we ought to consider at least two more functions of language, but 
as these two functions have very little relation to legal work, I shall dispose 
of them with a brief reference. 
Language may be used as Dewey says "to enter into more intimate sociable 
relations" with others. This kind of use is illustrated by the type of conversa-
tion which frequently goes on between persons who have nothing in particular 
to say. Thus, A says to B, "It is a fine day," and B answers, "Yes, very fine." 
For all practical purposes these remarks have no other meaning than "Let's 
talk." A great deal of our waking time and conversation consists of such 
interchanges of remarks, designed to keep up social contact, or to maintain 
"phatic communion," as Malinowski calls it. 
Language may also be used to express one's feelings. Everyday expressive 
uses are found in exclamations of pain, joy, surprise, and so forth. The expres-
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Sec. I-o8. Directive acts. Verbal acts are done by S to 
control others, to influence their activity, to give them direc-
tions as to what he wants them to do or not to do. S's act 
may vary in tenor from a blunt command to a mild request 
or even an expressed desire for action. When a father says 
to his son, "Willie, get my pipe," or "Willie, don't make so 
much noise," he is making a directive use of language. He 
undertakes to control Willie's behavior by an order. But con-
trol of behavior is no less attempted when Willie pleads with 
his father for a soda. 
In law, frequent and important use of directive acts is 
made. Indeed verbal acts of this sort constitute the primary 
and basic legal uses of language, i. e., to control and influence 
people. These legal uses range all the way from the unquali-
fied mandates of statute and judicial order to requests and 
petitions, as where a litigant requests relief from a judge and 
where a group of citizens petitions the legislature for the 
enactment of desired legislation. 
Sometimes directive acts are very narrow and specific. A 
particular speaker may address a particular hearer and tell 
him just what to do. This kind of situation is exemplified by 
the case already mentioned where the father directs Willie 
to get his pipe. Similar specific orders also find a place in the 
operation of the legal system; specific directions are given by 
specific officials to specific individuals directing them to do 
or to refrain from doing specific acts. For example, the police-
man may order the speeding motorist to "Pull over to the 
curb"; or a judge may issue an order to his bailiff to eject a 
particular person from the courtroom; or the judge may 
command the defendant in a case which he has heard, to do 
or to refrain from doing certain acts. 
sive use of language is especially important in the field of art; it is repre-
sented by the employment of language in poetry, song, and drama, though 
in all these uses the expression of feeling is always coupled with the purpose 
to influence others or to convey information to some extent. 
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But some directives are general in character and scope, and 
these are the most important for our present purpose. They 
a.re the directives which fix general standards of behavior: 
laws, rules, regulations, principles and doctrines. Among 
them are general or natural principles such as principles of 
morality, which appear among us without the stamp of enact-
ment by any particular authority. Others, such as the Ten 
Commandments, appear as the mandates of a Divine Legis-
lator. Others are the declared rules or policies of such par-
ticular groups as labor unions, e. g., not to cross a picket line. 
And finally, there are the standards of behavior in which we 
are primarily interested, the general directives which we call 
in the aggregate, law. These are the rules, regulations, prin-
ciples, and doctrines promulgated for the guidance of indi-
viduals and officials by various organs of the state. 
Speakers who issue general directives and the hearers who 
receive them are often far removed from one another in time 
and place. An outstanding instance of this sort is the enact-
ment of legislation. The speaker in this situation is an official 
agency endowed with authority to declare standards of be-
havior, a lawmaker.1 He promulgates directions and addresses 
them to a distant and indefinite group of persons. He usually 
"speaks his piece" at a place far from most of the persons to 
be controlled; he acts at the state capitol, and his message is 
transmitted through various channels until it reaches the 
members of the group to which it is directed. And the mem-
bers of this group are not only not named by individual or 
proper names, they are usually addressed as "anyone who" 
and constitute a fluctuating and changing group. Moreover, 
the legislative message is always put in permanent, i. e., 
written or printed, form. The lawmaker's verbal act is in-
tended to exert a continuing influence. You and I receive 
1 The lawmaker may also issue specific orders such as the command of the 
father to Willie. He may, for example, order a particular official to make 
a certain payment. Compare sec. I-Io, problem 6. 
INTRODUCTION 21 
today the legislative mandates of lawmakers who spoke a 
century or even several centuries ago. 
Sec. I-09. Distinguish control by force and by verbal acts. 
Lumley, a well-known sociologist, divides the methods em-
ployed in social control into two: 1. the physical force method, 
and 2. the symbol method.1 Physical force has to be used in 
the control of inanimate objects. It may also be used in the 
control of human beings; in fact, there are some situations 
in which physical force is the only feasible means of control-
ling them. Thus, a mother has to employ physical force when 
she wishes her small child to have a bath. She has no choice 
but to pick up the child, carry it to the tub, and do the scrub-
bing. In like manner, legal control of behavior may some-
times have to be exerted through physical force; the police-
man may have to restrain the violent acts of a wrongdoer by 
physical suppression. 
The symbol method, on the other hand, involves the use 
of language or other symbols to induce or deter acts of the 
person controlled. When the child is old enough, it can be 
told to take a bath. When the individual can read he can be 
directed by published rules to do or not to do certain acts. 
The symbol method represents a great saving in the energy 
of persons who exercise control and causes much less social 
friction than the use of physical force. Legal control is almost 
wholly symbolic; it employs words, and words belong to that 
most important of all symbol systems, language. The stand-
ards of the law are stated exclusively, as I have already 
pointed out, in verbal form; and most official acts which are 
done in the effectuation of legal standards are verbal acts. 
Sec. I-IO. Problems. I. Suppose a city installs a traffic light 
on one of its streets for the purpose of regulating the move-
ment of vehicles and pedestrians. Which of the two methods 
of control does this involve? 
1 MEANS OF SociAL CoNTROL 14 et seq. ( 19z5). 
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2. Suppose a policeman gives a driver a ticket for a traffic 
violation which directs him to appear in police court at a spe-
cific time to answer the violation charged. Which of the two 
methods is employed? 
3· Suppose that a policeman arrests a man for an act of 
physical violence on the street and conducts him to the police 
station. Is this an instance of symbolic control or control by 
physical force? 
4· A law provides that persons are obliged to appear and 
testify regarding matters pending in court whenever they are 
summoned for this purpose by a formal subpoena issued by 
the court. What type of directive verbal act is represented by 
this law? 
5. A court issues a subpoena under the law aforesaid re-
quiring W to appear and testify regarding matters involved 
in a lawsuit between P and D. What type of directive is 
involved here? 
6. In I 53 I there occurred in England a number of deaths 
by poisoning, afterwards known as the Lambeth Poisonings. 
These were traced to food served by the Bishop of Rochester. 
The English Parliament, having apparently satisfied itself 
that the Bishop's cook, Richard Roose, had wantonly put 
poison in a vessel of yeast, passed an act declaring that Roose 
and any other poisoner be adjudged a traitor and be executed 
by being boilc::d to death. Roose was accordingly boiled at 
Smithfield a few days after the act was passed.1 What type 
or types of directive act were involved in this Act of Parlia-
ment? 
Sec. I-I I. Informative acts. Man, like other animals, 
learns by direct experience. This is his original mode of 
obtaining information. Beginning as an infant each individual 
uses eyes, ears, and other sense organs to inform himself 
regarding his surroundings, animate and inanimate. And man 
1 FAY, HANGED BY A COMMA 77 (1937). 
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has the faculty of speech, a faculty which other animals do 
not have; this faculty opens up to him another mode of 
obtaining information. Without speech, organic life is indi-
vidual and detached; experience remains the property of the 
organism which has it. Learning must be direct, and educa-
tion is nonexistent. By the use of language the speaker can 
transmit reports of his experiences and, what is important for 
our immediate purpose, the hearer can share in the expe-
riences of the speaker. Every human being, as speaker, trans-
mits information of his experiences in this manner. Every 
human being, as hearer, receives an even larger amount of 
information regarding the experiences of others. The primary 
advantage is on the side of the hearer. The area of his contacts 
with the world is widened. He transcends the immediate lim-
its of his senses. He has verbal experience of many things 
beyond the range of direct observation. Through S's verbal 
report, H can hear about the plan which S is now entertaining, 
and view the fight that S saw last year. He can learn of the 
opinion expressed by Lord Coke centuries ago regarding the 
natural rights of Englishmen. All these are matters which 
can be reported to H by speech, orally or in writing, but 
which could not be directly perceived by him. 
Informative verbal acts may be divided into two main 
kinds: those by which information is imparted and those by 
which it is obtained. The first kind will need to be subdivided 
into several subtypes. 
Three subtypes of verbal act impart information about spe-
cific situations. First may be mentioned the statement of 
present fact. S says to H, "It is raining outside." Similarly 
the bailiff tells the judge that a witness is waiting to be called; 
or the defendant's lawyer writes to the plaintiff's lawyer to 
say that the defendant is willing to make a settlement. Sec-
ond, the informative act may concern a past occurrence and 
may properly be called a narrative use of language. S tells 
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about a historical event or about a previous happening in his 
personal experience as where a witness relates what he saw 
at the scene of a crime. Third, S may make a prediction of a 
future occurrence. He may foretell a specific future event 
and in this sense make a predictive or prophetic use of lan-
guage.1 S says it is going to rain tomorrow, or he prophesies 
a bad end for X; the attorney tells his client that he expects 
the judge to decide their case in favor of the other side. These 
three subtypes of informative act are sufficiently familiar and 
call for no further comment. 
A fourth, and very important, informative use of language 
is represented by the general assertion. This is a summation 
of experience, either of the speaker's personal experience or 
of experience which has been reported to him by others. The 
general assertion may be a simple summation in popular 
terms of the result· of common experience, observations of 
natural phenomena, "Water runs down hill," or reports re-
garding typical human behavior, "Every man has his price." 
Or such assertion may be worked out and formulated on the 
basis of systematic and carefully controlled observation in the 
form of what we call scientific laws. Boyle's Law regarding 
the relation of pressure and volume of gases and Newton's 
Law of Gravitation are assertions of this scientific kind. These 
two laws relate to natural phenomena. But scientific assertions 
may also be made regarding human behavior; they express 
the observed constancies of habit and reaction among human 
beings. The construction of these generalizations constitutes 
the main objective of the modern sciences of psychology and 
sociology. In the legal field we encounter not a few general-
izations regarding the behavior of individuals and officials 
and their reaction to the methods and processes of legal regu-
lation. Whether these generalizations deserve the scientific 
1 This does not necessarily mean that the speaker uses the future tense. 
Predictions often take the form of a statement of present expectation or of 
present purpose to act. And, of course, predictions like assertions may be gen-
eral as 1vell as specific. 
INTRODUCTION 25 
label or whether they are still on the level of common expe-
rience, we need not decide. In any case, we are constantly 
using and developing generalizations regarding the course of 
legal affairs. 
The general assertion refers to common or scientific knowl-
edge and not to a specific event. In this respect it differs from 
the specific informative acts first mentioned. But a general 
assertion like any other may be made by a particular speaker 
to a particular hearer on a particular occasion. Thus S may 
say to H on a particular occasion, "Every man has his price." 
The information transmitted is general and so is the asser-
tion; but the communicative act is particular. Similarly, in a 
lawsuit in which a patient is suing a doctor for malpractice and 
is claiming that the fracture of his leg was not treated prop-
erly, another doctor may testify regarding approved medical 
procedures in treating fractures. He may say that good prac-
tice requires that the doctor take X-rays in case of known or 
suspected fracture. This statement about approved practice is 
a general assertion, and yet it is made on a particular occasion. 
It is to be used along with proof that the defendant doctor 
set the plaintiff's fracture without taking an X-ray (a spe-
cific occurrence) to establish the defendant's negligence and 
the plaintiff's right to recover. 
However the general assertion does not have to be ad-
dressed to a particular hearer. Like the general directive 
referred to in section r-o8, the general assertion may be 
addressed to a more or less undefined audience. This is the 
case with many statements regarding common experience and 
popular usage. It is the case with most scientific work; indeed, 
with most serious writing.2 Aristotle addressed his remarks to 
mankind in general, and the information which he gathered 
2 It is possible for a speaker to address a specific statement of fact on a 
particular occasion to an undefined audience but this is not too common. One 
thinks of such cases as statements made over the radio and statements and 
predictions made in historical writing. 
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and formulated is still being read and used by men of today. 
Lord Coke wrote about the English law as it stood more than 
three centuries ago, and his general assertions are still quoted 
and cited in judicial opinions of the present. 
No less important than statements of present fact, narra-
tive statements, predictions and general assertions, are inter-
rogations, a fifth type of verbal act. Interrogations are the 
means through which a speaker seeks information. The first 
four types of informative act are used to give information to 
others; questions are used to obtain it for oneself. Questions 
are used when the speaker's information is doubtful, incom-
plete, or entirely lacking on some subject. It matters not 
. whether the doubt or lack arises from the questioner's simple 
want of knowledge, as where he asks, "What time is it?" 
or whether the doubt or lack attaches to some prior statement 
which another party has made, where the father who tells 
Willie to get his pipe is met by the response, "Which pipe?" 
or "Where is it?" or "What did you say?" All these questions 
express the need for further information. A similar need 
may impel the lawyer to ask his client about the way in which 
the latter conducts his business or about the way in which 
business is usually conducted in the field where the client is 
engaged. This information may be obtained from the client, 
in other words, rather as a result of the lawyer's qu~stions 
than as a consequence of voluntary informative statements 
by the client himself. In the trial of a case, the evidence which 
is presented to the jury is almost all obtained by means of 
interrogation of witnesses. Moreover, the judge may ask 
questions of lawyers and parties from the moment when he 
asks counsel whether they are ready to start the trial up to 
the very conclusion of the case. So that you must see that 
both in ordinary life and in legal work the use of interroga-
tions to elicit information is hardly less common or important 
than the use of declarations to impart it. The two forms of 
use are complementary to one another. Strangely enough, 
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however, students of logic and language have devoted almost 
all their attention to the role of declarations and have given 
very little notice to the role of questions. 
Sec. r-r2. Problems. Consider the following items in 
relation to the foregoing discussion of directive and informa-
tive uses of language.* 
r. Cook: 
"The object of any science is to obtain general statements 
which will accurately describe those aspects of past events 
which have been noted and also serve as aids in forecasting 
future events. In the field of the so-called natural sciences, 
such general statements are called 'laws of nature' or 'natural 
laws'-the law of gravitation, the law of falling bodies, etc. 
"The phenomena which furnish the subject matter of legal 
science consist primarily of the conduct of certain societal 
agents-judges and similar officials. The records of the past 
conduct of these societal agents are found in the law reports. 
On the basis of these records and his knowledge of the be-
havior-patterns of the existing societal agents-members of 
the present Supreme Court of the United States, of the New 
York Court of Appeals, etc.-and using a logical technique 
fundamentally similar to that of other scientists, the student 
of law endeavors to formulate general statements which will 
summarize as accurately as possible these past phenomena and 
also serve as an aid in forecasting future phenomena-i. e., 
future decisions of whatever group of societal agents he is 
at the time interested in. . . ." 1 
What uses of language are made by the legal scientist, 
according to Cook? 
* (I.R.) There has been much recent discussion of the general distinctions 
here suggested, notably in the writings of Holmes, Pound, Cook, Frank, 
Dickinson, Llewellyn, and Fuller. Obviously I cannot expect the beginner 
to go far into this subject; I only want him to make a start in noting 
differences between statements made in the operation of the legal system and 
statements made about the operation of the legal system. 
1 
"The Present Status of the 'Lack of Mutuality' Rule," 36 YALE L. J. 
897 (1927). 
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2. Dickinson, after referring to scientific laws, says: 
"Human laws, on the other hand, are designed precisely 
for the purpose of producing relations in the real world which 
would not otherwise exist. Their object is not to describe the 
operation of forces, but to set them in motion. They are 'ad-
dressed to voluntary agents who may obey or disobey them.' 
In so far as human laws are applied and obeyed, they thus 
introduce, and are intended to introduce, a new factor, an 
active causative element, into an existing situation; for a dif-
ferent chain of physical consequences will follow on the 
judicial act applying them from that which would result if 
they were not applied or were altered. 
"Thus jural laws are not, like scientific 'laws,' descriptive 
statements of verifiable relations between persons or things-
relations which exist and will continue to exist irrespective of 
whether human choice and agency enter into the situation. 
Rather they are prescriptions of specific consequences to be 
attached by judicial-i.e., human-action to particular rela-
tions, which would not follow from those relations without 
the interposition of human volition; and more remotely, 
through the supposedly deterrent or persuasive effect of these 
consequences, they operate, and are intended to operate, to 
actively promote certain kinds of physical relations in which 
it is supposed that human beings should stand, as contrasted 
with others in which it is equally possible as a matter of phys-
ical fact for them to stand." 2 
How would you relate the distinction which he makes-
between scientific and human laws-to our discussion of direc-
tive and informative verbal acts? 
Can you reconcile what Dickinson says here with what 
Cook says about legal science? What use of language does 
legal science make? 
3· Suppose that a person sticks his finger on a hot stove 
and observes the painful effect which follows. Can he derive 
a directive statement from this experience? An informative 
statement? What does this suggest? 
2 
"The Law Behind Law," 29 CoL, L. REV. 285 at 2.89 (1929). 
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4· In drafting a statute the lawmaker acts upon known 
principles of behavior. For instance, he may act upon the 
observations of economists regarding the buying behavior of 
persons who "play the stock markets." What does this suggest 
as regards the relation and the distinction between scientific 
laws and human laws? 
5. Which use of language predominates in this book, judg-
ing by what you have seen of it so far? The informative or the 
directive? 
6. "Judges follow precedent"-informative or directive? 
7. "Judges ought to follow precedent"-informative or 
directive? 
8. Suppose a lawyer advises his client of the danger of 
criminal liability in a particular line of conduct. Would you 
classify this advice as directive or informative? 
9· How would you classify a client's request for advice? 
Does the answer to this question suggest any difficulty about 
our classification of interrogations? 
Sec. I-IJ. The mixed message. Unfortunately for simplic-
ity's sake, the various types of verbal act which we have 
discussed are not always found in pure form. Indeed, it is 
probably safe to say that actual verbal acts are more often 
complex than simple. They are compounded from different 
directive and informative elements. 
Both directive and informative elements may be combined 
in the same verbal act, even in the single sentence or smallest 
verbal act; and more often in larger complex acts such as a 
statute or legal treatise. For example, the father may say to 
Willie, "Fetch my pipe; it's in the library," or "Fetch my 
pipe from the library." Either way his statement is a com-
pound of direction and information. Such compounds are very 
common in legislation. A typical statute begins with a recital 
of mischiefs, such as the prevalence of certain harmful activ-
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ities (informative element), and concludes with the prohi-
bition of them (directive element). 
Also, different directives may be coupled together in one 
verbal act. These directives may be of different types. A 
specific and a general directive may be joined in one provi-
sion. This was done in the Parliamentary mandate to boil the 
Bishop of Rochester's cook (sec. I-I o); the penalty was pre-
scribed for the cook specifically and for any other person who 
might subsequently commit the same offense as he had. And 
even more important, directives may be addressed to different 
persons in one statute, just as if a hunter were to try to bring 
down two ducks with one charge of shot. A typical instance 
of this sort is the statute which issues a command to A, B, 
and C and also gives directions to officials as to what they 
are to do if A, B or C fails to do what is commanded, In 
fact, this is probably the most common form which legislation 
takes. 
In parallel fashion various informative elements are often 
linked with one another in verbal acts. A speaker gives one 
general assertion as the reason for another. The average man 
is hostile to railroads; therefore, the average jury finds for 
the plaintiff in suits against railroads for personal injuries. 
Or a speaker may make a compound declaration in which he 
includes a general assertion and a specific prediction based 
upon it; he may declare that juries usually find for the plain-
tiff in the manner just stated (general assertion), and that he 
expects the jury to do just this in a particular pending case. 
Other combinations of elements are possible; these are 
enough to make the general point. Any verbal act must be 
analyzed. It cannot be safely assumed that it is wholly direc-
tive or informative. The mixed message is very common in 
actual practice. 
Sec. I-I+ Verbal acts in discourse. The verbal act may 
not only be itself a complex affair as was pointed out in the 
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last section, but any verbal act may form a part of a larger 
body of discourse. Usually, in fact, the statement of one 
speaker does not stand isolated and alone. It is coupled with 
the verbal acts of other persons in larger bodies of discourse 
and cannot be understood or interpreted apart from the dis-
course of which it is a part. The question by S is followed 
by an answer by H. The father's command to get his pipe is 
followed by Willie's question, "Where is it?"; this in turn 
by the father's reply that it is in the library. Verbal acts, as 
one might say, are woven together in a continuous process 
of communication. This process comprises a series of verbal 
acts all of which are connected together in execution. Con-
sider, for instance, the following trivial conversation between 
students, a typical example of the connectedness in the process 
of communication: 
S: "Where are you going?" 
H: "lam going to class." 
S: "What class?" 
H: "Professor Jones' lecture in Zoology." 
S: "What sort of fellow is he?" 
H: "He is a funny old bird. His lecture is always pretty 
dull." 
Here you can readily see how the separate statements 
which make up this conversation are woven together in one 
piece. Each new statement is tied into what had gone before. 
No statement stands alone. For instance, the meaning of the 
word lecturer in the last sentence of this series depends upon 
the verbal expressions which have gone before. The same 
observation applies to other elements in the series of state-
ments, such as the word "he," "class," etc. Two parties par-
ticipate alternately as speaker and hearer; the joint product 
of their verbal activity is regarded as a unity or whole. This 
composite whole also bears a type name-a conversation. 
Substantially similar observations might be made regarding 
a lawsuit. This also is a continuous process of communica-
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tion, a unified body of discourse. But, at the same time, it 
includes a number of subordinate steps or distinguishable 
verbal acts: the summons, the declaration, the answer, the 
demurrer and other pleadings, the testimony of witnesses, as 
well as written evidence, the instructions, the arguments of 
counsel, the verdict, the judgment and other orders, the 
various steps on appeal, the appellate court's opinion, etc. 
While each of these verbal acts may be regarded as separate 
for some purposes, we do also commonly regard them as 
parts of a whole. They have a coherence with one another, 
i.e., in relation to a single controversy between X and Y, 
which makes us treat them as a single entity, a complex legal 
conversation, which we know as a lawsuit. 
We shall have frequent occasion to refer later to bodies 
of legal discourse. Most important legal processes can be 
regarded as extensive legal conversations. The process of law-
making, the process of interpretation, the process of adjudica-
tion, and the process of expounding law in textbook form 
can be so regarded and will be treated and analyzed in these 
terms. But I have said enough for the present; I merely 
wanted to point out to you here how verbal acts are tied 
together in discourse and, correspondingly, how larger bodies 
of discourse are built up as aggregates of individual state-
ments. 
Sec. I-Is. The indirect message. Doubtless the original 
form of communication is the direct message delivered face-
to-face. This form is still much used and very important but 
is seriously restricted in range. The range of communication 
is widened if messages can pass indirectly from speaker to 
hearer through intermediaries.1 Mediation may be accom-
plished at the instance of the speaker when he delivers to 
1 The telephone, telegraph, and radio have widened the scope of person-to-
person communication, though such communication is hardly face-to-face and 
usually involves the aid of intermediaries. 
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R a message which R in turn is to transmit to H; or where 
Ron his own initiative reports to H the words said by S; or 
where H sends R to S for a message. These cases differ as 
regards the person who takes the initiative in transmitting 
the message; they are alike in that an intermediary figures in 
the process. The fact that R can mediate between S and H 
enhances the possibilities of communication both in space and 
time. Spatially, it enables S's message to reach H even when 
these parties are too far apart for direct communication to 
occur. Temporally, a similar widening of range is made pos-
sible. The learning and traditions of one age are passed on 
to succeeding ages, by word of mouth, through number less 
intermediaries. 
With the invention of writing, and later of printing, 
another form of indirect communication is established; and 
communicative range is further expanded both in space and 
time. Moreover, the durable quality of writing and printing 
makes possible a degree of certainty and definiteness which 
oral communication seldom has.2 For example, Aristotle's 
words are still available to us, though more than two millen-
nia have passed since he lived, and available just as he wrote 
them. In written and printed form human knowledge is accu-
mulated and stored for the benefit of those who want to use 
it.3 These means of indirect communication have played a 
tremendous role in building, transmitting, and storing our 
social heritage of knowledge. Legal traditions and ideas are a 
part of this heritage and have come down to us for the most 
part in written or printed form.4 
2 And very recently sound recording has been added to the means of per-
petuating what is said. 
3 The writings themselves are ordinarily transmitted by third parties so 
that written communication also involves the intervention of intermediaries. 
4 For the present purpose it seemed necessary to distinguish printing and 
writing, as printing is a relatively modern invention. Writing and printing 
have also had quite different significance socially and historically. However 
for ordinary purposes writing is used to include printing and I shall follow 
this common usage from this point on. 
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However, this widening of communicative range is fraught 
with certain perils. The dangers of communicative failure, 
which are present even when S communicates with H face-
to-face, are greatly multiplied. When a manuscript is handed 
down as Aristotle's work, there is always the chance that it 
is not what it purports to be. When a letter is sent by mes-
senger or by mail, it may be lost in transit; a face-to-face 
message could not miscarry in this way. When S's message 
is reported by R to H, especially when the message and the 
report are both oral, the dangers that R will misunderstand 
the message and that he will misstate its true tenor are added 
tc the normal dangers of misunderstanding in direct com-
munication. And when statement is piled upon statement, as 
where A says that B says that C says such and such a thing; 
or direction is piled upon direction, as where father tells 
Willie to tell mother to tell Johnnie to mow the lawn, we 
can easily lose ourselves in the very maze of our own dis-
courses, to paraphrase a remark by Hooker.5 Legal transac-
tions and legal discussion have not always escaped these 
pitfalls as we shall see in later chapters. 
Sec. z-z6. Problems. Consider the following items in rela-
tion to the discussion of the five preceding sections. 
I. Suppose A is called for jury service and says to the 
judge, "My wife is ill and I would like to be excused." 
Analyze the mixture of statements involved here. 
2. A witness, on a trial of D for robbery of P, says, "Then 
I heard D say to P, 'Stick up your hands.'" Analyze. 
3· "In general, the law admits the testimony of a witness 
only as to what he has himself observed; it does not permit 
him to testify in reference to what others have told him or 
to what he has heard them say. This is the so-called 'hearsay' 
rule. Behind this rule are two basic reasons: first is a sound 
distrust of rumor and second-hand report. Second is a specific 
purpose to subject all testimony to the check of cross-exam-
5 HooKER, ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY, V, chaps. z, 4 (1662). 
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~nation; the story of many a witness sounds different after it 
has been tried by this acid test. All students of methods of 
proof agree that there is a solid foundation for the hearsay 
rule, as a general proposition." 1 
What do you find in section I-I 5 to justify this legal rule? 
4· The paragraph above quoted continues, "Nevertheless 
the rule has had to give way in practice to a long list of 
exceptions." Of these I shall mention only two: 
"Pedigree exception: No person knows of the time of his 
own birth or his parentage and relationships, except by sec-
ond-hand report. Likewise of the birth, parentage, and rela-
tionships of others. Statements made to a witness by deceased 
members of the family are admissible to establish said facts. 
"Scientific matters: Every physician or other learned per-
..;on, obtains his knowledge largely from books; so far as he 
testifies on the basis of this learning he is giving a second-hand 
report of the experience of others, nevertheless he is per-
mitted to testify on this basis." 
How would you explain or excuse these exceptions? 
5· Suppose S makes a New Year's resolution, e. g., "I'll 
never touch another drop." Can this be viewed as a directive 
use of language? If so, who issues the direction? To whom 
is it addressed? Whose behavior is to be controlled by it? Can 
the resolution be viewed as an informative use of language? 
If so, to whom is the informative verbal act addressed? 
Sec. r-r7. Summary. Communication lies at the heart of 
the legal processes. Verbal acts are done to direct others and 
to convey or obtain information. The legislature communi-
cates its directives to the populace in verbal form. Most of 
the acts which officials do are verbal acts. And the lawyer 
spends most of his time in doing or guiding or interpreting 
verbal acts. You must see therefore why I think it is impor-
tant for the legal neophyte to become "language conscious." 
1 The passages quoted in this problem are taken from the syllabus of my 
lectures in MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 26-27. 
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You must understand also why I regard training in the use 
and analysis of language as most fundamental both in the 
preparation for legal study and in legal study itself. The 
lawyer must know his verbal tools: he must be a verbal artisan 
of no mean skill. 
CHAPTER 2 
Standards for the Individual's Acts 1 
Sec. 2-0I. Lawmaker's messages-coverage and analysis. 
The lawmaker, L, issues general directives to the community 
as the owner of a factory might issue instructions, blueprints, 
and models to guide the work of the men in his factory. These 
directives we call collectively "law" and severally "laws," so 
that law is a general term embracing a multitude of laws. 
Laws differ from one another in many respects, as we shall 
see later on.2 They are alike in that all are formulated by 
some determinate law-making agency, a lawmaker; they are 
alike also in that all laws are intended to guide the behavior 
of all or part of the members of the community.* 
The number of laws issued by L is very great, and the 
fields covered by them are many. From these facts it might 
easily be inferred that laws cover every kind of human ac-
tivity. This is not the case, however; actually the coverage 
is far from complete. L provides guidance only in limited 
1 Throughout the remainder of this book I shall often designate important 
parties by capital letters as follows: the lawmaker by L, the individual actor 
by A, the individual's counselor by C, the official by 0, and the law student 
and/ or legal scholar by S. 
Each one of these terms, and the corresponding letter, represents a class 
of persons and not a specific person. "The individual," "the individual actor," 
or "A" means a class of individuals, "the anyone who" is referred to in 
a general legal mandate. 
2 See especially cllapter 4· 
* (I.R.) In the early chapters I shall speak only of statutes. I shall take 
them as the prototype for all laws and avoid mentioning case law, as well 
as constitutional law, and administrative regulations. This restriction of ma-
terial is made for the purpose of simplifying the teaching job. I believe that 
the nature of legal standards can be adequately developed with statutory 
material and have organized the matter in chapters z, 3, and 4 on that 
assumption. While this method neglects differences in the ways in which 
standards are formulated and differences in the places where they are to be 
found, I do not believe that ignoring these differences at the start leaves any 
final misconception. All these differences are fully discussed later; and the 
simplification of treatment which results from disregarding them for the 
time being, is considerable. 
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areas of behavior. The greater part of what A does is left 
free from any legal constraint. Besides such activities as eating 
and greeting friends, the way A uses his land and what he 
does with his money, where he goes and what he says, fall 
almost wholly beyond the scope of legal provisions. For prac-
tical reasons or reasons of policy L does not attempt universal 
control of A's conduct; he leaves most of it unguided and 
untouched by his legal mandates. 
Almost all laws promulgated by the lawmaker are com-
plex; they are what we have called mixed messages; 3 they 
attempt to guide more than one type of act, and they may 
impart a great deal of collateral information besides. The 
usual statute, for example, contains not only instructions to 
A but also instructions to various officials, and it often con-
tains a statement of the reasons why the statute was passed 
and of the general objectives which it is intended to pro-
mote.** In order to compare the important parts of different 
laws with one another and to discuss the relations of laws 
to various types of acts, it is necessary to break down these 
complex legal structures into smaller common units. The 
3 See sec. r-r3 above, regarding the nature of the mixed message. Note 
how many different acts are forbidden by the following statute: 
"Any person who shall falsely make, alter, forge or counterfeit any public 
record, or any certificate, return or attestation of any clerk of a court, public 
register, notary public, justice of the peace, township clerk, or any other 
public officer, in relation to any matter wherein such certificate, return or 
attestation may be received as legal proof, or any charter, deed, will, testament, 
bond or writing obligatory, letter of attorney, policy of insurance, bill of 
lading, bill of exchange, promissory note, or any order, acquittance or dis-
charge for money or other property, or any acceptance of a bill of exchange, or 
indorsement, or assignment of a bill of exchange or promissory note for the 
payment of money, or any accountable receipt for money, goods or other 
property, with intent to injure or defraud any person, shall be guilty of 
a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than four-
teen ( 14) years." Mich. Stat. Ann. sec. 2.8.445· 
What features do these acts have in common? In what respects are they 
different? 
** (I.R.) And the matter which one finds in case law, constitutional provi-
sions, and administrative regulations, is equally mixed and heterogeneous. 
Compare note * above. 
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basic unit which I shall adopt for this purpose is the legal 
standard. 
The standard is a pattern for a particular type of action. 
It is a legally defined action picture, i. e., a standardized act. 
All legal directives, all laws, no matter how simple or how 
complicated, can be analyzed in terms of this legal unit. Their 
essential parts can be reduced to standards or combinations 
of standards. The advantage of treating the standard as the 
unit of law is that it corresponds with the unit of behavior 
which we have chosen, the act. Accordingly, we shall employ 
from this point on the legal standard as the unit of law and 
the act as the unit of behavior controlled by law. 
Sec. 2-02. Scope of chapter. In the next preceding section 
I have defined the legal standard. The remainder of this 
chapter and the two chapters to follow, will treat the rela-
tions of standards to human acts. The standards of which we 
shall speak fall into two main types. Some standards are 
prescribed by the lawmaker primarily for the guidance of 
the individual's acts; other standards are designed for the 
guidance of official acts.1 Standards of these two main types 
are, of course, very numerous; many types of human activity, 
individual and official, are standardized. Each of the main 
types will call for further subdivision into subtypes of stand-
ard acts. 
rhe present chapter will be devoted to standards for the 
individual's acts. These will be taken up and discussed under 
the following headings: 
Standards for Acts. 
Significance of Standard Acts. 
Effectuation of Standards. 
Uses of Standards to Guide Action. 
1 In addition to standards for the individual and standards for officials, we 
shall also have occasion to mention standards regulating the activities of 
groups such as the church, the club, the labor union, the professional association, 
etc. See sec. 7-2 8 et seq. 
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STANDARDS FOR AcTs 
Sec. 2-03. Kinds of standard acts. The traditional discus-
sions of law are carried on in a manner to suggest that the 
lawmaker is concerned with just two kinds of standard acts: 
prohibited acts and obligatory acts. He tells persons what 
they must not do and what they must do; he undertakes to 
restrain them from doing certain acts and to compel them to 
do others. The impression which one gets is that law consists 
merely of prohibitions and commands. For instance, Black-
stone's definition of law conveys this meaning; he says that 
a law is "a rule of civil conduct, prescribed by the supreme 
power in the state, commanding what is right, and prohibit-
ing what is wrong." 1 And similar definitions of law and of 
the standards which it prescribes are common in legal texts 
and judicial statements even in our own time. 
No doubt laws do prohibit some acts and make other acts 
obligatory, as I shall point out in the following sections; but 
it does not follow that legal prescriptions define only these 
two kinds of acts. On the contrary, I think we need to make 
room for at least four other kinds of legally defined acts: 
permitted acts, discretionary acts, effective acts, and ineffec-
tive acts. All these types of acts have always been important 
in fact. But it seems not to have been generally perceived by 
analysts and writers how important they are, nor how dif-
ferent essentially they are from acts which are prohibited or 
obligatory; nor to have been generally understood how much 
of our law actually formulates standards for effective and 
permitted acts. This traditional neglect makes it the more 
necessary to consider here all these types of acts and to com-
pare and distinguish them. Accordingly, in the six sections to 
follow I shall treat six types of standards for acts, or, if you 
prefer, six types of standardized acts: ( 1) prohibited acts; 
1 BL. CoMM. *z8 ( 1 765). [The * here represents star paging.] 
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(2) permitted acts; (3) obligatory acts; (4) discretionary 
acts; (5) effective acts; and ( 6) ineffective acts. 
Sec. 2-04. Prohibited acts. First among legally standard-
ized acts are those which the individual must not do, prohib-
ited acts. Here falls most of that large class of acts, commonly 
called crimes: such acts as killing a person, stealing another's 
goods, disturbing the public peace. These acts are legally 
regarded as injurious to the public; the basic legal aim is to 
protect the community against them;* and accordingly the 
individual, A, is forbidden to do them. A is confronted with 
detailed pictures of these acts which he is prohibited from 
doing and usually threats of punishment are coupled with 
their prohibition. 
Acts of A are also prohibited because they are harmful to 
some other person, B. A legal duty is imposed upon A to 
refrain from doing such acts. If A does a prohibited act of this 
sort, in violation of his duty, he is required to make compen-
sation to B for the harm done. Action contrary to standard 
is regarded as a private wrong, or in the terminology of the 
law, a tort. Typical tortious acts are the intentional injury 
of another's property, the injury of another's person through 
the negligent driving of an automobile, and the injury of 
another's reputation by an unjustified defamatory statement. 
Accordingly, legally prohibited acts may be divided into 
two grand types, crimes and torts. The standards for both 
* (I.R.) Here I use the expressions "legally regarded" and "legal aim"1 
I shall also employ from time to time such expressions as the "law forbids" 
and the "legal system provides." All these expressions are metaphorical and 
elliptical; they suggest that the "law" and "the legal system" are persons who 
have wishes and do acts. This suggestion can lead to misunderstanding; per-
sonification of an abstraction is always dangerous. However these forms of 
expression are terse and convenient; they carry about the same meaning as the 
lawmaker regards or aims or forbids or provides, and thus offer serviceable 
alternatives for the constant reference ·to the lawmaker. And "the lawmaker" 
is a personified abstraction, too, as we shall see later, so that whatever objec-
tions apply to these other abstractions apply to "the lawmaker." The actual 
factors involved in action by the "legal system" or by "the law" or by "the 
lawmaker" will be elaborated in chapters 3, 4, s, 6 and 7· 
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types of acts are alike in that they serve a negative function 
as regards the actor; they tell him what he must not do; they 
are patterns of action to be avoided. They differ from one 
another as regards the interests which are violated by A's 
act; the crime is a wrong to the public, the tort is a private 
wrong. They differ from each other in a parallel way as 
regards the actions which may be brought for violation of 
the prohibition; a crime is prosecuted by public authority; 
a tort is the basis for private action, by the injured party. 
However, it is important to notice that one and the same act 
may constitute both a crime and a tort; it may be both a 
public and a private wrong. A's act of striking B may be 
a criminal battery and a tortious injury to B. A's act of carry-
ing away B's goods may constitute theft and may also furnish 
ground for a private action by B against A. 
Our interest centers primarily on acts prohibited by law. 
Crimes and torts are acts of this sort. But parties may also 
prohibit acts by agreement or voluntary undertaking. If a 
valid contract is made by which A promises not to do a certain 
act, this promise establishes a specific pattern of action which 
A must not pursue. The contract restricts A's freedom of 
action; a failure to obey the restrictive provision is a breach 
of contract, and breaches of contract constitute an important 
type of legally prohibited act. Thus, a doctor may sell his 
practice in a particular town, a.nd agree not to treat patients 
there for a period of five years. The doctor, by his agree-
ment, puts shackles upon himself. His agreement is obviously 
an agreement not to act-a self-imposed prohibition. Inas-
much as this prohibition is legally enforced, it becomes a 
legal prohibition. 
Sec. 2-05. Permitted acts. Legal provisions may define 
acts which are permitted, as well as acts which are forbidden. 
For lack of a better name, the legal provision which thus 
expressly defines a permitted form of action may be called 
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a legal permission. It constitutes, you will notice, a type of 
provision just the opposite in effect from a legal prohibition. 
It expresses a position of the law which is essentially neutral 
toward what A does. Such a provision declares, for example, 
that A may do what he pleases with his own property, that 
he may move about in regard to his own affairs, that he may 
speak his mind about matters which he chooses to discuss, 
that he may defend himself against attack, and so on. The 
most basic of these permitted activities are defined in our 
constitutions. They are the liberties for which our ancestors 
fought and died: freedom of religion, freedom of speech, 
freedom of the press, freedom to acquire and hold property, 
freedom to engage in an occupation of one's own choosing. 
The legal provision which defines permitted action is some-
times couched in positive terms, sometimes in negative terms. 
When it takes the positive form, the provision may simply 
state that it is lawful for A to act thus or so; or the provision 
may employ the verb "may," as do the provisions which 
I have already cited, to indicate that A's activity is allowed; 
or if the provision declares the lawful character of A's activity 
in terms of nouns, it uses such permissive expressions as 
"freedo~," "liberty," and "privilege." When the legal pro-
vision defining permitted action takes the negative form, it 
declares that certain activities are not unlawful, not contrary 
to law, not forbidden or not prohibited. In actual use the 
negative form is less common than the positive. The reason 
for this is fairly obvious. Why go to the trouble of using a 
double negative "not unlawful" when a simple affirmative, 
"lawful," will do as well? 
Wide areas of A's activity are untouched by law as I have 
already pointed out.1 In these areas freedom from legal 
restraint is existent simply because restraint is not mentioned; 
and most free areas are free in this sense. Everybody from 
1 See sec. z-o 1. 
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the lawmaker (L) on down proceeds on the assumption that 
what is not forbidden is allowed; that what is not expressly 
prohibited is impliedly permitted. The absence of a legal 
provision is treated as tantamount to the definition of an area 
in which A may do what acts he pleases. Accordingly, one 
way in which L can establish areas of legal nonrestraint is to 
make no reference to them whatever and thus leave A's 
freedom to implication. 
Why, then, does L define any areas of free action in express 
terms? Why does he set up explicit standards for permitted 
acts? Why not leave them all to implication? Is any function 
served by express definitions of lawful or nonprohibited acts? 
The answer to these queries is found in L's general purpose 
to provide guidance for A's behavior.2 If A is in the middle 
of the wide ocean, he does not need to be told that navigation 
in any direction is possible and safe, but if A is in shallow 
waters or in the neighborhood of solid land he is well served 
by an instruction that navigation in a certain place or along 
a certain course is possible and safe. And guidance is furnished 
to A no less when he is told, "This is a safe channel to navi-
gate," than when he is told, "Over there are certain rocks 
which you must stay away from." By the same token A is no 
less guided when L declares, "Here is a course of action 
which you may freely take" than when he declares, "There 
is a course of action which is prohibited." Both are useful as 
guides to A. In areas where prohibitions are close by, A needs 
to be told what he can safely and properly do. For example, 
it is useful to tell him that he is permitted to kill another in 
the necessary defense of his own life. Ordinarily A may not 
2 Contracts often provide that certain acts are permitted. Such contractual 
provisions are inserted by parties for essentially the same reasons that dictate 
the establishment of legally permitted acts. The parties agree that A is to be 
allowed to do certain acts so as to avoid doubt or controversy in regard 
to A's freedom of action. Compare what is said in the last paragraph of 
sec. 2-04 regarding prohibitions established by contract. 
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kill another, but in this situation he is allowed to do so.3 
Again, in areas where officials are tempted or inclined to 
interfere with A's action, as in regard to free speech, free 
press, and free exercise of religion, the express mention of 
these freedoms is useful for other reasons. The declaration 
that these acts are free, serves as a direct admonition against 
official interference with them, and as an encouragement to 
A to stand up for his rights when, as, and if such interference 
occurs.* Accordingly, the answer to the general queries, with 
which this paragraph began, is that express standards for 
permitted acts, like all other forms of standards for acts, are 
intended to furnish guidance to actors, individual and official; 
and their practical value in this regard is beyond question.** 
3 In fact, the prohibition of killing is usually stated in such broad and 
general form that it covers every killing, so that it needs to be supplemented 
by this exception in order to give an accurate picture of the law. 
* (I.R.) The problem of drawing lines between the area of permitted action 
and the area of prohibited action is reserved for discussion in chapter 4· 
Problems connected with the generality of legal provisions-whether they 
define prohibited acts or define permitted acts-are reserved for discussion 
in chapters 4 and 5· To introduce these problems here would cloud unduly our 
examination of the permitted act as a type. 
** (I.R.) Indeed it can be argued that the creation of permissive standards 
is more natural and logical than the establishment of prohibitive standards. 
The former are positive standards, the latter negative. Permitted acts are 
those which it is lawful for A to do; prohibited acts are those which it is 
unlawful for him to do; and it is simpler and more usual to issue mandates 
in positive than negative form. 
Even if we accept this contention, it amounts to no more than the assertion 
of a rule of preferred usage. But negative terms and negative declarations are 
used and useful as well as positive terms and declarations. We do make in-
formative statements in negative as well as positive form; and we do find 
in the law and elsewhere standardized acts which the actor is not to do as 
well as standardized acts which he is expected to do. Actually prohibited acts, 
i.e., acts which we are assuming for the moment are negative, are to be found in 
legal provisions with greater frequency and in greater number than permitted 
acts are. We cannot say that one type of legal standard or one form of legal 
declaration is necessary, or that one type or form is more fundamental than 
the other. Both positive and negative standards and positive and negative 
declarations are usual and useful. Usage and utility are the only criteria we 
have. If a type of standard or a form of statement is usual and useful, I see 
no alternative but to make a place for it in our classifications. 
Another circumstance which militates against the argument which asserts 
a preference for positive standards, is the fact that the distinction between 
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Sec. 2-o6. Obligatory acts. Third among the types of 
legally standardized acts-and somewhat less common than 
the prohibited and the permitted act-is the act which the 
individual must do, the obligatory act. The standard act is 
commanded or, what amounts to the same thing, a legal 
provision declares that it is the duty of the individual to act. 
For example, A is told that he must register for the draft; 
that he must serve in the armed forces; that he is required 
to file an income tax return. Such an act is required for the 
general public benefit. The failure to perform this type of 
act is usually declared to be a public offense, or crime, and 
penalized more or less seriously.1 
In addition to the standard acts which A must do for the 
benefit of the public, he must perform certain acts for the 
benefit of other individuals. He must support his wife, B; he 
must care for and educate his child, C. In these particular 
cases, perhaps, we might properly say that A's acts are 
required both for the benefit of B and C and for the welfare 
positive and negative is a relative one; it depends entirely upon the viewpoint. 
Who shall say whether a permitted act is a positive or negative category? 
Who shall say whether the prohibited act is to be viewed as positive or 
negative? That the two are opposites is clear; this fact inheres in the difference 
in L's positions toward them-one act he disapproves, the other he does not 
disapprove; one act he restrains, the other he does not. But which of these 
positions is positive and which negative? Is approval or is restraint positive? 
May one not regard prohibited acts as controlled acts and permitted acts 
as noncontrolled acts? The point is that there is no positive or negative 
category outside of the attitude of the classifier. The belief in an intrinsic 
distinction of this type is merely a hangover from outmoded beliefs in 
necessary ideas. Certainly the mere form of words, whether positive or negative, 
is not decisive. Words shift from negative to positive connotations as usage 
changes, and vice versa. The word "independent" will serve as an example. 
Originally this word was a negative term opposed to the term "dependent," 
but today there is no doubt that independence is thought of as a positive quality, 
like self-assurance, of which it is the substantial equivalent. Both our terms, 
permitted and prohibited, are in a somewhat ambiguous condition; both are 
used today with connotations which are sometimes positive and sometimes 
negative. Which is stressed depends on the interests and approach of the 
user. And whether either or both were originally positive or negative terms 
does not seem very important now. 
1 So that the category of crime includes both the doing of acts which are 
prohibited and the failure to do obligatory acts. Prohibited acts are much 
the more common among crime pictures. 
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of the public.* However, there are obligatory acts which are 
owed strictly to other individuals. The most important acts 
of this sort are those which A has taken upon himself to 
perform pursuant to contract or other voluntary engagement; 
for example, acts of service which he has agreed to perform, 
or payments of money which he has promised to make. 
Contractual undertakings are legally enforced at the instance 
of the parties benefited. In this sense, the acts that contracts 
call for, fall both in the class of obligatory acts and in the 
class of acts owed to other individuals.2 
Sec. 2-07. Discretionary acts. Discretionary acts are those 
which A is not required by law to do, nonobligatory acts. 
They are opposed to obligatory acts as permitted acts are 
opposed to prohibited acts. When we say that an act is dis-
cretionary we mean that it is free from legal compulsion; 
when we say that it is permitted we mean that it is unre-
strained by law. A discretionary act is one which A is free to 
do or not do. If done, the act is voluntary; A is free to act 
or to sit back arid do nothing. For example, bringing a lawsuit 
is discretionary with the injured party; he may sue or, if he 
chooses, allow the injury to go uncompensated. Being a Good 
Samaritan is discretionary; the actor may help his fellow man 
in trouble or he may pass by on the other side. Supporting 
an indigent father or sister may be a moral duty, but in the 
eye of the law it is discretionary; the son or brother may 
furnish support or decline to do so.1 
Just as most areas of human activity are free from legal 
prohibitions, so most acts of which A is capable are untouched 
* (I.R.) I have not tried to make a neat distinction here between obliga-
tions implied by law and obligations arising from agreement. The aim is to 
do no more than make a beginning with problems of classification and division. 
Compare sec. z-o 5, note *. 
2 Compare what is said in the last paragraph of sec. 2-04 regarding pro-
hibitions arising from contract. 
1 Ordinarily the law makes a man responsible only for the support of wife 
and child; however, there is some modern legislation which makes him 
responsible for the care of other relatives. 
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by legal commands. These acts are discretionary because the 
law does not say anything about them. The absence of a legal 
command is treated as the recognition of an area in which A 
does not have to act unless he chooses to do so. Discretion 
is implied from the lack of command. 
Discretion may also be conferred by express provision, and 
the act of A which is thus expressly declared to be free from 
legal obligation is the discretionary act with which we are 
now concerned.2 In actual practice this kind of act is not as 
often mentioned as is the act which is expressly permitted; 
in fact it is not often mentioned at all. However, the dis-
cretionary act is not unimportant; and as we shall have to 
refer frequently to discretionary acts when we come to discuss 
the acts of officials, I introduce it here as one of our six kinds 
of acts.3 
Sec. 2-08. Problems. In section 2-03, I have divided 
standardized acts into six general types. Of these we have 
now considered four: I. prohibited acts, or those which A 
must not do; 2. permitted acts, or those wh~ch A may do; 
3. obligatory acts, or those A must do; 4· discretionary acts, 
or those A is not required to do. I believe it will facilitate 
understanding to discuss a few problems involving the appli-
cation of these four categories before we proceed with the 
remaining two types of standard acts. 
I. A statute provides for the punishment of any act of 
cruelty to an animal. Which type of standard act is involved? 
For whose benefit is such act banned? 
2. The law forbids the indecent exposure of one's person 
(nudism, exhibitionism, etc.). Where would you place this 
type of act? 
2 Discretion may also be expressly given by contract, as where X is given 
an option to buy a piece of real estate within a specified period of time. 
The consummation of the purchase rests in X's election; it is a discretionary act. 
3 See chapter 3 passim. 
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3· Suppose that the law provides that an individual or 
group of individuals of one sex may bathe in the nude in 
streams or lakes at places remote from dwellings or highways. 
How should such bathing be classified? 
4· The law allows a husband to recover damages from a 
third party who alienates his wife's affections. How would 
you classify the third person's act r 
5. The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging 
... the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances." What 
types of acts of individuals are defined by this constitutional 
clause? 
6. Consider the following statements of law governing the 
doctor-patient relation. How would you classify each of the 
acts indicated by the italicized words in terms of standardized 
acts? 
(a) The relation of doctor and patient commences when 
the patient calls the doctor and the latter undertakes the case. 
(b) There is no obligation on the doctor to serve patients, 
i.e., take cases; and this means that the doctor can arbitrarily 
decline to accept patients. 
(c) The general rule is well-established that before a 
do<.tor nay treat a patient or operate on him, the doctor must 
obtam 1 he consent either of the patient, if competent to give 
it, or oJ: someone authorized to give consent for him. If the 
doctor acts 'Without such consent, he will be liable for the 
resulting damages. 
(d) The doctor must care for his patient with reasonable 
skill and diligence while the doctor-patient relation continues. 
(e) The doctor-patient relation may be terminated at any 
time by the patient's dismissal of the doctor. 
(f) The doctor may not abandon the case at will; he can 
withdraw from the case by giving reasonable notice to the 
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patient of such intention and allowing a reasonable time for 
the latter to obtain another doctor. 
Sec. 2-o9. Effective acts. The lawmaker also defines 
many acts which A can do with the purpose and intent of 
producing legal effects. These standardized acts are estab-
lished for the use and benefit of A.* L tenders official aid 
to A if he calls for it in prescribed ways; he offers official 
services to A if A does certain acts.1 He tells A what aid he 
can expect from the legal system and what acts he must do 
to obtain that aid. 
Thus in the law of property, which you will pursue in 
your first year, you will find the definitions of various acts 
which are to be done in order to acquire property. The wild 
animal has to be killed or captured in order to obtain owner-
ship of it. By doing either of these acts, the legal actor, 
A, pulls about himself the mantle of legal protection which 
we know as ownership; he becomes entitled to the services 
of the agents of the legal system in protecting his control. 
You will find also in your study of the law of property that 
there are standard acts, such as gift and sale, by which the 
chattel can be transferred; gift and sale are acts of donor 
and seller which invest the donee and buyer respectively with 
the perquisites of ownership. Interests in land can also be 
acquired and transferred by acts; the commonest of these we 
* (I.R.) Some modern analysts speak of "juristic acts" or "legal trans-
actions" at this point. However, the lawyer does not use such expressions 
frequently; their vogue is limited to the technical fraternity of jurisprudence. 
As I find no settled expression in general use, I feel free to create one which 
more definitely connotes what I have in mind, i.e., acts done with foresight 
of legal consequences. For this purpose I have chosen "effective acts." This 
term also includes (as I want to do) such an act as filing a pleading, which 
I doubt if either of the other expressions would embrace. 
1 This aid need not be demanded in so many words, though often it is so 
demanded; but in any case the individual must indicate a need for legal 
assistance by doing the acts prescribed by law. These acts are the effective acu 
in which we are presently interested. 
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know as "taking possession," "making a deed," and "making 
a will." The legal system in all these cases presents A with 
model acts which he can do in order to produce legal effects. 
One might liken these legal acts to the order blanks which 
a mail order house furnishes to its prospective patrons for 
use in obtaining desired goods. The legal patron is furnished 
with a variety of formalized acts which he can use in calling 
upon the legal system to carry out his desires. 
Similar to the acts by which A can acquire or transfer 
property is a whole arsenal of useful acts which he may do 
in the transaction of business. Most of these can be lumped 
together under the caption of contractual acts. In the contract, 
two acts are usually involved; the offer by A and the accept-
ance by B. These two acts in combination constitute an agree-
ment which gives rise to contemplated legal effects, i. e., 
contractual obligations. Contractual acts have in view the 
performance of services, the subsequent transfer of goods, and 
many other objectives. Contractual arrangements may be sim-
ple as where two parties, A and B, make an agreement di-
rectly with one another; they may be more complicated as 
where P by contract appoints an agent, A, who in turn makes 
a contract with C for and on behalf of P. They may be even 
more complex as where an individual draws a check or bill 
of exchange-an act which involves a whole series of possible 
consequences and arrangements between himself, a bank~ a 
payee, indorsers, and other persons. An individual may par-
ticipate in the formation and operation of a corporation, in 
which case his acts join with the acts of many others to 
produce legal consequences which he alone could not produce. 
As to each of these types of situation, simple or complex, the 
legal system provides beforehand both what it is necessary 
for A and others to do and what the legal effects of their 
acts will be. More than upon any other factor, transaction 
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of business depends on the ability to act with foresight of 
results. This is where these standardized legal transactions 
fit into the business picture. Indeed, our commercial life could 
hardly go on if these standard legal transactions, coupled with 
standard and foreknown legal consequences, were not pro-
vided and available for use. 
And so I might go on through almost every branch of our 
law. The law of court procedure, for example, provides A 
with a variety of standardized pictures of acts which he is to 
perform in the prosecution of his claims and the assertion 
of defenses; he is told what he must do and what kind of 
paper he must file at each step of a lawsuit. But it is unneces-
sary to pursue the subject further. The law is replete with 
these standard acts which A can do with a foresight of legal 
results; with acts which A can do for the purpose of calling 
upon the agents of the legal system for their services in one 
respect or another. 
You will note how different is the position of the law 
toward these legally effective acts from its position toward 
an obligatory act or a prohibited act.2 The law which author-
izes A to dispose of his property by will, does not, for exam-
ple, command him to make a will or forbid him to die without 
making a will. A is told, instead, that if he makes a will, 
certain legal effects will follow. A legal provision informs A 
that, by doing a specified act, he can invest his property at 
his death in persons of his choice. Every legal provision 
establishing a standard effective act and defining its conse-
quences, follows essentially the same lines. The legal pro-
vision serves as a promise by the legal system that if the 
individual acts in the specified manner, certain legal conse-
quences will ensue. The primary objective of the legal 
provision is to offer certain services to a prospective actor, 
2 Compare what is said in sec. 2-11 regarding the positions adopted by the 
law toward different types of acts. 
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to instruct him regarding ways and means of obtaining 
desired legal results.** 
Sec. 2-Io. Ineffective acts. This is a category opposed, 
as its name indicates, to the category of effective acts.* 
Ineffective acts are attempted effective acts; they are under-
taken as effective acts but fail to take effect as intended.** 
The effective act must be undertaken for a lawful purpose, 
and the act must be done in the manner prescribed by law. 
Two reasons why an act may fail of effect correspond to 
these two major requirements.1 
First, the legal actor may act for an unlawful purpose and 
his act may be denied legal effect for this reason. This type 
of act may be called an illegal act. A contract by A according 
** (I.R.) Regarding the metaphorical and elliptical character of such 
expressions as the "position of the law" and "a promise by the legal system," 
see sec. 2-04, note *· 
* (I.R.) Some readers may challenge the need, or desirability, of creating 
the category of ineffective acts. Such a challenge is always proper. Some may 
even assume that this category is on a par with Hohfeld's "no-right" and 
that we are talking of a "no-act" here. These assumptions are, however, not 
correct. We are definitely interested in a real act which A does with the intent 
to produce legal effects. In other words the negative quality here attaches 
to the effectiveness, and not to the occurrence, of the act. Everything else 
aside there is some convenience in pursuing the classification of acts in terms 
of three primary categories and their three opposites, even though some of the 
opposites are not quite as frequently used as the three primary categories. I 
could, of course, discuss ineffective acts at the point where I consider the 
significance of acts (sec. 2-15 et seq.). But I think it is quite as natural and 
convenient to consider them here along with other categories of acts. In other 
words, there are certain types of acts which are intended to have legal effects, 
and do have; there are other acts which are intended to have legal effects, but 
do not have such effects, i.e., the illegal acts and the defectively executed acts 
mentioned in the text. 
** (I.R.) These statements are not accurate for all purposes; they do not 
take full account of cases where effectiveness and ineffectiveness depend on 
factors other than the actor's intent; cases of fraud and estoppel, for example. 
However, the statements are sufficient for the present purpose; they do cover 
the two types of ineffective acts which I want to discuss here, illegal acts 
and defective acts. 
1 Two other main types of ineffective acts are worth mention, though we 
have not the time to treat them here: 1. Acts by persons lacking in legal 
capacity; 2. Acts which are tainted in the doing by the actor's mistake or by 
fraud, duress, etc., practiced on him by another. 
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to which he is to pay B $ rooo for services is valid and 
binding on A if executed in proper form. But if the service 
which B is to perform is unlawful, then A's promise is illegal 
and he is not bound. Thus if A promises to pay B $ rooo if 
B will give C a thrashing, B cannot collect the $I ooo after 
he has administered the thrashing because the promise of A 
was made to achieve an unlawful purpose, and the courts will 
not enforce a promise directed to such an end. Similarly, 
if A and B enter into an agreement to monopolize a market, 
the purposes of both men are unlawful, and their contractual 
acts (offer and acceptance) are ineffective. The agreement 
will be unenforcible by either A or B, and probably both 
parties will be exposed to tort liabilities in reference to specific 
parties injured by their contract, and to criminal prosecution 
for the violation of statutes which prohibit such a contract. 
Second, A's act may fail of its intended effect because it 
is not done in the manner prescribed by law. This type of act 
may be called a defective act. If the law provides that certain 
contracts be written or that a will must be attested by two 
witnesses, A has no reason to be surprised or disappointed if 
his unwritten contract or his will attested by only one witness, 
is not given legal effect. The law has specified the terms and 
conditions on which his act will be effective; he must satisfy 
those terms and conditions; his act is ineffective by reason 
of defect in execution. Invalidity is inferred from failure to 
comply with explicit legal specifications. Ineffectiveness is 
implied from the fact that certain requirements are set up and 
are not met. However, the ineffectiveness of certain acts may 
also be expressly declared, not left to implication. Thus the 
Statute of Frauds provides that certain types of contracts 
are to be unenforcible unless they are in writing. Notice that 
it does not declare that contracts must be written, and leave 
to implication the conclusion that they will be unenforcible 
if they are not written; but rather it declares that unwritten 
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contracts are to be ineffective. Either way the unwritten con-
tract is a standardized ineffective act; in the one case by 
reason of an implication, in the other by virtue of an express 
prOVlSlOn. 
Sec. 2-I I. Distinction and interrelation of kinds of acts. 
In the foregoing sections we have talked of six kinds of acts; 
we ought not to conclude the discussion of them without a 
few words about how these kinds are distinguished and inter-
related. 
All these acts are alike in that they are the doings of our 
hypothetical individual, A. What is the basis on which we 
have distinguished one act of A from another and divided 
his acts into classes? The acts have been classified on the 
basis of differences in the lawmaker's attitudes toward them. 
These acts differ from one another only as respects the posi-
tion which L (or if you prefer, the law or the legal system) 
adopts in regard to them. One kind of act L disapproves and 
forbids, the prohibited act; another type of act he approves 
very strongly and commands A to do, the obligatory act; 
another type he assures A will evoke certain services from 
the minions of the law, the effective act; another type he 
approves and tells A he may do, the permitted act; and 
another type L leaves to A's judgment, the discretionary 
act; and a last type he refuses to support by the aid of the 
legal system even though effectiveness be the desire and 
intent of A in doing the act, the ineffective act. In short, it 
is important to realize that we have been classifying A's acts 
but classifying them in terms of L's attitudes toward them. 
Three of these classes are opposed respectively to three 
of the others: the prohibited act to the permitted act, the 
obligatory act to the discretionary act, and the effective act 
to the ineffective act. There is nothing inherent or necessary 
about the opposition of these categories; they merely rep-
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resent opposing attitudes of the lawmaker, a& for example 
in the case of prohibited and permitted acts, the one type 
he disapproves and the other type he does not disapprove. 
These categories are opposed simply because the lawmaker 
adopts contradictory attitudes toward them. 
However some of our categories overlap one another in 
large degree. The same act may be classified under two or 
more categories. We find acts which are effective, permitted 
and also discretionary; as, for example, the act of getting 
married, the act of enlisting in the army, or the act of making 
a contract, a deed, or a will. We find acts that are obligatory 
and effective, too, such as the filing of an income tax return, 
or the act of registration for the draft. We find acts which 
are prohibited and ineffective, e. g., the agreement to com-
mit a crime. And we even find acts which are prohibited but 
effective; as where A wrongfully takes B's goods, thereby 
becoming possessed thereof; A's act is effective to give him 
legal control as against third parties even if it is a wrong 
to B. The point I want to make is that you must not take 
these six categories as mutually exclusive of one another; 
some are and some are not. 
Also important is the fact that the categories of acts are 
often connected together in series. A's acts are joined with 
B's as they are actually done so that the state cannot prescribe 
standards for A's acts without reference to B's. Standards 
have to be developed to cover and include the acts of both 
A and B. Standards have to be stated in chains or sequences 
in which A's act and B's act are combined.1 For example, 
in the making of a contract, we find such a standardized 
combination of acts: an offer followed by an acceptance. 
Likewise, in the situation where B defends himself against 
attack by A; attack and self-defense represent a conjoint 
action picture in which the activities of two persons are 
1 On this matter of interconnected acts, see sec. z-z 7. 
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legally essential. And legal standards in both these instances 
are set forth in terms of sequences or combinations of acts. 
Finally, for fear that I have made these categories appear 
more formidable and solid than they really are, I want to 
add two admonitions: First, do not look upon the six cate-
gories as final or necessary. Another classifier might make 
up an entirely different set with as much justification as 
I have for these. The categories are modes of classification 
and nothing more; they are merely useful pigeonholes into 
which you can put various activities of A which are the con-
cern of the law. Second, do not try to memorize this list of 
categories as such, or try to keep in mind the definition of any 
category, or try to recall specifically which category is the 
opposite of which. Such efforts are unnecessary here as well 
as elsewhere in our course. If you read the text with care 
and attention and work out the problems in terms of the text, 
you will retain all that needs to be remembered about these 
types of standard acts.2 
Sec. 2-r2. Problems. I. Suppose A offers to work forB 
for ten days at ten dollars per day and B accepts this offer. 
This concludes a contract between the parties on the terms 
indicated. What kind of acts are involved in the making of 
the contract, i. e., the offer and the acceptance? What kind 
of acts are involved in the performance of the contract, i. e., 
the ten days' service by A and the payment of $100 by B? 
2. L, a landlord, executes a lease of a house for five years 
to T, a tenant, at $I 200 per annum. What kinds of standard 
acts are involved in the making of the lease? In the per-
formance of its terms? 
2 This admonition about memorizing has already been given (sec. x-o 3). 
If I did not know from long experience that students come to law school 
with a fixed notion that learning consists in memory work, and that this 
notion is very hard to eradicate, I would not regard it as necessary to repeat 
the admonition from time to time. 
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3· The law allows a husband to recover damages from 
a third party who alienates his wife's affections. How would 
you classify the third person's act? The husband's act of 
bringing suit? 
4· What is the difference in the actor's attitude toward 
legal effects when he commits a legally forbidden act such 
as theft, and when he does a legally effective act such as 
the making of a will? 
5. Under the rules of the common law the making of 
a bet is declared to be contrary to good morals, but is not 
punishable as a crime. The winner of a bet cannot be com-
pelled to repay what the loser has paid. Under these rules, 
how would you classify the loser's promise to pay? Is it an 
effective act? A prohibited act? An illegal act? 
Under the common law rules how would you classify the 
loser's act of payment? Is it illegal? Is it effective? 
Sec. 2-IJ. Individual's acts are physical and verbal. 
Before we leave the problem of classifying A's acts, I ought 
to refer again to what was said earlier about two ways of 
controlling people-by physical force and by verbal acts 
(sec. 1-09). The individual's acts may be divided in parallel 
fashion into physical acts and verbal acts. Both may be the 
subject of legal control. What is meant by physical act is 
sufficiently obvious and familiar. Among physical acts which 
may be legally important are such acts as striking another 
person or carrying away his goods, moving about in one's 
business and the operation of a factory on one's land. Verbal 
acts I have already defined as all uses of language, in speech 
or writing. The expression covers any form of statement 
made, question asked, or command given, by the individuaJ.l 
1 In sees. r-o8 and r-ro we discussed the use of verbal acts (laws and orders) 
to control A. Here we are interested in verbal acts by A himself which may 
call for the establishment of legal standards of action. 
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The division of A's acts into physical and verbal cuts across 
the sixfold division of standard acts which we have just 
considered: 2 
There are physical acts which are prohibited, such as strik-
ing another person. And there are verbal acts which are 
likewise forbidden, such as the publication of a defamatory 
statement. 
Both physical and verbal acts are to be found under the 
class of permitted acts. For example, freedom of locomotion 
involves freedom of physical activity, while freedom of 
speech involves permitted verbal acts. 
There are physical acts which are obligatory, e. g., furnish-
ing food for one's child. And there are verbal acts of like 
2 Physical and verbal acts are distinguishable as is indicated in the text, 
and it is often useful in legal discussion to distinguish them. But it is also 
important to remember that the two kinds of behavior, physical and verbal, 
are closely related to one another. First, behavior is often partly physical and 
partly verbal, and these parts are often interconnected and mutually qualifying. 
Thus physical acts may take a large part of their meaning from accompanying 
or preceding or succeeding verbal declarations. Suppose, for instance, S says 
to H, "Lend me a dollar." H forthwith hands S a dollar without remark. 
Here the physical act of H can only be understood in the light of S's request. 
And if S then says, "Thank you," his thanks too must be interpreted in 
reference to the verbal act and the physical act which have gone before. All 
these acts take color from one another. None of them can be interpreted apart 
from the others. Second, physical and verbal acts are largely interchangeable. 
They serve similar functions and can be substituted for one another to some 
extent. Consider again S's request for a loan. To this verbal act H may 
respond as aforesaid by the simple handing over of a dollar (physical act); 
or H may hand over a dollar with the statement, "Here is a nice new one" 
(physical plus verbal act) ; or H may reply, "I haven't a dollar with me; 
I'll give you one this afternoon" (verbal act promising a later physical act). 
Now all these combinations of physical acts and verbal declarations are 
substantially equivalent-provided, of course, that H hands over the dollar 
in the last case as promised. They all result in substantially the same legal 
obligation of S to repay the dollar at a later time. 
In short, we must recognize that physical and verbal acts are conceptually 
distinguishable, just as we may distinguish a leg from the rest of the body; 
but in actual human activity the two forms of behavior are not ordinarily 
separated any more than legs are usually found separated from bodies. In actual 
life situations, physical behavior and verbal behavior are woven together like 
the warp and woof of one fabric; no part of the whole can be appreciated 
without taking account of the rest. (Cf. sec. 1-14.) 
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character, e. g., registration for the draft and filing an income 
tax return. 
There are a few effective acts which are physical, though 
not many, e. g., the capture of a wild animal. The great bulk 
of effective acts is verbal. The making of a will is a verbal 
act; also, the making of a conveyance or a lease. The execu-
tion of a contract usually involves verbal declarations by two 
parties. And the steps which a party and his attorney must 
take in the course of a lawsuit are practically all verbal. 
Similar observations might be made about discretionary 
and ineffective acts-but it is not worth the pains to pursue 
the subject or to produce further examples. 
To the lawyer the verbal activity of A is far more 
important than the physical as has already been shown. 
Verbal acts engage most of the lawyer's attention in practice. 
And, I might add, these verbal acts are chiefly planned for 
legal effect; they are legally effective acts such as making 
wills, deeds, or contracts, or the incorporation of companies. 
The lawyer's main tasks are to guide the effective verbal 
acts of his clients and to perform such acts himself on their 
behalf. 
Sec. 2-I4· Problems. r. There is an old saying, "With 
sticks and stones you break my bones but words will never 
hurt me." Consider m this connection the provisions of 
a Texas statute: 
"Although it is necessary to constitute homicide that it 
shall result from some act of the party accused, yet, if words 
be used which are reasonably calculated to produce, and do 
produce an act which is the immediate cause of death, it is 
homicide; as, for example, if a blind man, a stranger, a child, 
or a person of unsound mind, be directed by words to 
a precipice or other dangerous place where he falls and 
is killed; or if one be directed to take any article of ~edicine, 
food or drink, known to be poisonous and which does pro-
duce a fatal effect; in these and like cases, the person so 
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operating on the mind or conduct of the person injured shall 
be deemed guilty of homicide." 1 
Obviously the acts here referred to are verbal. Would you 
regard them as informative verbal acts (sec. I-II)? As 
directive verbal acts (sec. I -o8)? 
Where would they fan~n our sixfold classification of acts? 
2. Commonwealth v. Randolph: 2 
"It may be conceded that the mere intent to commit 
a crime, where such intent is undisclosed, and nothing done 
in pursuance of it, is not the subject of an indictment. But 
there was something more than an undisclosed intent in 
this case. There was the direct solicitation to commit a mur-
der, and an offer of money as a reward for its commission. 
This was an act done, a step in the direction of crime; . . • 
It needs no argument to show that such an act affects the 
public policy and economy in a serious manner. . . . 
"The authorities in England are very full upon this 
point. The leading case is Rex v. Higgins, 2 East 5. It is 
very similar to the case at bar, and it was squarely held 
that solicitation to commit a felony is a misdemeanor and 
indictable at common law. In that case it was said by Lord 
Kenyon, C. J.: 'But it is argued that a mere intent to commit 
evil is not indictable without an act done; but is there 
not an act done when it is charged that the defendant so-
licited another to commit a felony? The solicitation is an 
act; . . ." 
What act is made criminal here? 
3· "No damages shall be awarded in any libel action 
brought against a reporter, editor, publisher or proprietor 
of a newspaper for the publication therein of a fair and 
true report of any public and official proceeding. . . ." 8 
What is the status of this type of defamatory statement, 
under the terms of this statute? 
lTex. Rev. Stat., Ch. 10, Art. 656 (1895). 
2 146 Pa. 83 at 94, 95 (189:z). 
3 Mich. Stat. Ann. sec. :z7.369. 
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4· Iddings v.lddings.4 
A will was read over to the testator and duly signed 
by him. The scrivener who drew the will made a mistake 
as to the meaning of the word "cancel" so that the will 
directed that the accounts of his children (for advances) 
were not to be cancelled; the testator had intended just the 
opposite meaning. On appeal the court held that evidence 
of the scrivener to prove this error was inadmissible. The 
court said: 
"But, if mistakes were to be corrected by the scrivener's 
recollection of his conversation with the testator, it would 
open such a door for perjury and confusion, as would render 
wills of very little use. The rule of law therefore, is that 
the writing is not to be altered, or explained by evidence 
aliunde . ... " 
What is the effective legal act here? Does the act operate 
as intended? 
SIGNIFICANCE OF STANDARD AcTs 
Sec. 2-zs. Act and significance. Thus far I have focused 
attention on standard acts of the individual; these are acts 
which are legally significant. I have directed only incidental 
or passing notice to the significance of these acts. It is now 
time to turn attention to the matter of significance.1 In what 
ways is the act of A important? What is the legal standing 
4 7 Serg. & R. Pa. I I I (I 89 I). 
1 From here on I shall often refer to the "legal significance" of A's acts. 
Significance seems to me the most appropriate word. However, there are other 
terms which are substantial equivalents and which are sometimes used herein 
as well as elsewhere--such as legal meaning, legal importance, legal operation, 
legal effects, legal consequences. Significance is preferred because it gives the 
idea tl: at A's acts have meaning to other persons, including officials; they 
do not operate on others as a physical force does. A's act of striking B operates 
physically on B, of course; but the physical character of the act and its 
physical effect are something different from its legal significance. The latter 
consists of the meaning of A's act, and its physical consequences, within the 
legal system-viz., what rights, powers, and privileges arise from the striking 
and what officials are going to do about the striking. 
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or legal meaning of his act? These are the questions to which 
we shall now turn. 
The legal system furnishes patterns for A's acts. Important 
acts which he may do are standardized. The significance of 
his acts is likewise standardized. The significance which is 
attached to what A does is patterned out and prescribed just 
as his acts are.* In fact, significant act and legal significance 
of the act, are but two sides of one coin. They are coupled 
together and imply one another. 
Standard Standard 
Act Significance 
We cannot think and talk of the one without taking the other 
for granted. Neverthless we can, at different times, stress 
one side or the other of this act-significance relationship; in 
the present and succeeding sections we shall keep our eye 
primarily on the significance side of this legal coin. 
Sec. 2-I6. Significance of acts-standard forms. The legal 
importance, or meaning, of A's acts is expressed in various 
standard forms, of which four are sufficiently common to call 
for specific mention: 
r. Significance in terms of relations to the other person, B; 
2. Significance in terms of effects on A himself; 
3. Significance in relation to the state (or legal system) ; 
4· Significance in terms of official ( O's) acts. 
* (I.R.) One reason why I have not used the terms act and consequence 
is that consequence is also used in a factual sense. If consequence is used, it 
becomes necessary to make and maintain a· distinction between factual con-
sequence and legal consequence. The failure to keep the two things apart 
results in great confusion in the consideration of causation problems. Factual 
causes and consequences (effects) are parts of standard action pictures. Legal 
consequences are the significance which we attach to these pictures. For 
example, the driving of a car may result in killing a pedestrian; in this 
sense it is the factual cause of his death and the death is a consequence of the 
driving. But the driving is not the legal cause and the death not the legal 
consequence of the driving, unless it appears that the driver was at fault 
in some way. If we use the term "significance" (instead of consequence) this 
kind of problem presents less difficulty of explanation and comprehension. 
Compare what is said in next preceding footnote. 
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Accordingly we can say that A's acts are significant in dif-
ferent respects or in different directions, and we can represent 
these different directions thus: 
{ 
Significance to B 
-----~Significance to A 
A's act -----~Significance to state 
-----~Significance to 0 
The first way of stating significance, in regard to B, will 
be discussed rather fully in the next several sections; the 
second, in regard to A himself, will be treated in section 
2-24; the third and fourth ways of stating significance, in 
regard to the state and in terms of acts of officials, will be 
developed in section 3-02. 
Sec. 2-r7. Significance of act--in relation to others.* To 
meet the need to discuss the bearing of A's acts upon other 
persons, our law has standardized the ways in which A's acts 
* (I.R.) On the subject matter of sec. 2-17 et seq., see generally: 
Corbin, Arthur L., "Jural Relations and Their Classification," 30 Yale L. J. 
228 (I92I). 
Corbin, Arthur L., "Legal Analysis and Terminology," 29 Yale L. J. I63 
(I9I9)• 
Corbin, Arthur L., "Rights and Duties," 33 Yale L. J. so1 (1924). 
Goble, George, "A Redefinition of Basic Legal Terms," 3S Col. L. Rev. S35 
(I9JS). 
Goble, George, "Affirmative and Negative Legal Relations," 4 Ill. L. Q. 94 
(I922). 
Goble, George, "Negative Legal Relations Re-examined," s lll. L. Q. 
36 (I922). 
Hohfeld, Wesley N., Fundamental Legal Conceptions 35 et seq. ( 1923). 
Kocourek, Albert, "Basic Jural Relations," 17 Ill. L. Rev. SIS (1923). 
Kocourek, Albert, Jural Relations ( 1927). 
Kocourek, Albert, "Non-Legal-Content Relations Recombated," s Ill. L. Q. 
ISO (I923). 
Kocourek, Albert, "Plurality of Advantage and Disadvantage in Jural 
Relations," I9 Mich. L. Rev. 47 (I92o). 
Kocourek, Albert, "Polarized and Unpolarized Legal Relations," 9 Ky. 
L. J. I3I (I92I). 
Kocourek, Albert, "Tabulae Minores Jurisprudentiae," 30 Yale L. J. 21S 
(I92I). 
Kocourek, Albert, "The Hohfeld System of Fundamental Legal Concepts," 
IS Ill. L. Rev. 24 (I92o). 
Kocourek, Albert, "Various Definitions of Jural Relation," 20 Col. L. Rev. 
394 (I920). 
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may have significance in relation to them. It has developed 
a standardized relational terminology. To connect A's doings 
with B, it employs such terms as duty, right, privilege, 
discretion, power, and liability. 
These are the common terms found in the legislative 
statement of the significance of standard acts; they are the 
common terms found in legal instruments, in orders, and in 
textbooks. Indeed, the greater part of all discussion of the 
legal significance of acts is carried on in these terms. For 
this reason, I shall devote the next several sections to the 
explication and illustration of the meanings of duty, right, 
privilege, discretion, power and liability. 
You will find that this discussion is closely linked with 
our previous discussion of standard acts. Duty and right 
are connected with prohibited and obligatory acts; privilege 
with permitted acts; discretion with nonobligatory acts; 
power and liability primarily with effective acts. However, 
the treatment of these terms will carry us considerably 
beyond the subject of acts, and will tie up acts with other 
persons as well as the actor. 
Sec. 2-I8. Actor's duty to another. The legal impor-
tance of A's act may inhere in the fact that it is one which 
A must do for someone else's benefit, or an act which he 
must refrain from doing on someone else's account. The 
common terminology here is that of duty to act or duty 
not to act. In other words, the significance of an act is stated 
in terms of an actor's legal duty to act or his legal duty to 
refrain from action. Terry, a well-known writer, thus defines 
the meaning of duty: "A person who is commanded or for-
Page, William H., "Terminology and Classification in Fundamental Jural 
Relations," 4 Am. L. S. Rev. 616 (1921). 
Pound, Roscoe, Introduction to Study of Law ( 1924). 
Pound, Roscoe, Outline of Jurisprudence, sth ed., 144 et seq. (1943). 
Radin, Max, "A Restatement of Hohfeld," 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1141, II53-
II56 (1938), 
Salmond, Sir John William, Jurisprudence, 6th ed. (1920). 
66 OUR LEGAL SYSTEM AND HOW IT OPERATES 
bidden by law to do an act is under a legal duty to do or 
not to do it. A legal duty is a condition of one who is so 
commanded or forbidden." 1 Terry further says that a legal 
duty implies these elements: ( r) a person on whom the 
duty rests; (2) a person to whom it is owed; (3) certain 
acts or omissions constituting the content of the duty.2 This 
connects up the duty with someone, "a person to whom it 
is owed"; it emphasizes the relation of A's act to another 
person. 
Accordingly, the legal meaning of obligatory and pro-
hibited acts can be, and often is, stated in the terms of an 
actor's duty to someone else. Legislatures, courts, draftsmen, 
and writers in declaring the significance of acts, probably 
talk more often in terms of duty owed by A to B than in 
any other terms. In this sense, acts which are beneficial to B 
and which A is obliged to do (sec. 2-o6), are acts which 
he is under a duty to do; and acts which are injurious to 
B and which A is prohibited from doing (sec. 2-04), are 
acts which A is under a duty not to do. The significance of 
A's acts in both these situations is commonly expressed m 
terms of duties owed by A to B. 
Sec. 2-z9. Right of another against actor. The importance 
of these same standard acts may also be expressed in another 
way. Their significance may be stated in terms of B's claim 
rather than A's duty. B has a claim that A perform an act 
or refrain from acting.* This mode of statement makes the 
1 PRINCIPLES OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW1 sec. I-o8 ( 18 84). 
2 Ibid. sec. I-Io. 
* (I.R.) According to this definition, a right is always a right to an act 
or an omission by some other person. A great deal of confusion would be 
avoided in the discussion of rights if we were in the habit of stressing this 
aspect of them. I do not believe my definition of right is, in any essential, 
opposed to that of Hohfeld or his followers. However, they are accustomed 
to define rights in a way which leaves them practically without content. 
Hohfeld speaks of a right as correlative to a duty and says that right is 
synonymous with claim. (FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35 et seq. 
( 19:z3) .) But he does not state what the nature of the claim is. This leaves 
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nonactor, B, the center of the picture. The claim, which we 
commonly call a right, belongs to him. For example, an act 
beneficial to B, and which A is under a duty to do (sec. 2--o6), 
can equally well be characterized by saying that B, who 
would be benefited by the doing of the act, has a right that 
A shall do it. A similar mode of expression in terms of rights 
may be adopted in stating the legal significance of an act 
injurious to B, and which the actor is forbidden to do 
(sec. 2--04). Here it is usual to say that B has a right that 
A shall not do the act in question. 
In fact, it is the common practice to state the significance 
of obligatory and prohibited acts in terms of both rights and 
duties at the same time. When B has a right, A has a duty. 
The significance of obligatory and prohibited acts is expressed 
in terms of a correlation between B's rights and A's duties. 
The imposition on A of a legal obligation to act for B's 
benefit is, at the same time, the creation of a claim on B's 
part to have the act done. The prohibition of A's action to 
B's injury is, at the same time, the creation of a claim or 
right on B's part to have the injurious act not done. The 
right or claim· on B's part is, by definition, treated as the 
invariable correlative of a duty on A's part, to act or not 
to act. 
completely unexpressed the very important and useful connections of rights 
with human acts. The effect is especially unfortunate in view of the tendency 
in all discussion of rights to treat them as independent things and to separate 
them from actual human activity. Even the reference, which is common in 
defining rights, to persons who have them and to persons who are subject 
to them, fails to counteract the devitalizing effect of the omission of all 
reference to action; and the same is true of the emphasis, in some discussions 
of rights, on their relation to things. All these modes of speaking of rights 
serve to hypostatize or reify them. What is needed is a form of expression 
which makes clear that the term "right" is merely a convenient mode of 
referring to human acts which ought, or ought not, to be done. These acts, 
of course, involve actors and persons affected by acts. They also involve 
things. But, starting with the general postulate that legal standards are norms 
for the guidance of human acts, it must be apparent that we are omitting 
something which is of the first importance when we state the significance of 
those standards in terms which entirely omit reference to human activity. 
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You will note from the above that we have tacitly defined 
right in two ways: (I) as a claim that A refrain from doing 
certain acts or that he perform certain acts; and ( 2) as the 
correlative of a duty. 
We may also say, paralleling the analysis of a legal duty 
given in section 2-I 8, that a legal right implies these ele-
ments: (I) apersontowhomtherightbelongs; (2) a person 
on whom the duty rests; (3) certain acts or omissions consti-
tuting the content of the right.** 
Sec. 2-20. Actor's privilege to act. In section 2-05 we 
spoke of permitted acts and pointed out that permissive legal 
declarations are functionally justified by the need to tell 
the prospective actor how far he may go in his actions. But 
other persons are also concerned with A's liberties of action. 
Such a permissive declaration merely asserts that a particular 
type of action by A is permitted. We can, however, relate 
this liberty of action to other individuals who are affected 
by A's act. In this sense, we say that A has a privilege, or 
liberty, of acting in relation to B. Essentially, then, the privi-
lege is merely a permissive declaration of law, stated in 
relation to other persons than the actor. Examples are the 
privilege of A to defend himself against attack by B; and 
the privilege of the doctor to operate on a patient who has 
consented to an operation.1 
The privilege, you will notice, has quite a different con-
nection with the actor than the right has, though the two 
notions are often confused in discourse. A privilege belongs 
** (I.R.) At this point, it would be logical to insert a discussion of the 
distinction between rights in personam and rights in rem (and also of Hoh-
feld's paucital and multi tal rights). However, this topic seems to me far 
too complicated for inclusion in an introductory course, and I have, therefore, 
decided to omit it. On this topic, see SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, 6th ed.1 
sec. 81 (1920), and HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNCEPTIONS 67 el 
seq. (1923). 
1 Sec. 2-o6, problem 6. See also sec. 2-141 problem 3, in which a privilege 
of defamation was involved. 
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to an actor, A; it is the freedom of A to act without treading 
on B's toes in the legal sense; it is an opportunity of A to 
act without justifiable objection by B.2 The right, by contrast, 
always belongs to a nonactor, B, and this right represents 
a restraint on A's freedom of action; it means that A must 
refrain from acting in a manner to injure the right-holder, B. 
This is a distinction which we shall have to refer to repeatedly 
in discussing the problems in section 2-2 5. 
Some writers have felt the necessity of conjuring up a 
correlative to match A's privilege to act.* They have said 
that A has a privilege to act and that B has a "no-right" 
that A shall not act. This kind of "no-right" seems to me 
both unnatural and unnecessary. There is no reason, of course, 
why we cannot say in an ordinary way that B has no right 
to object to certain lines of behavior on the part of A. But 
inasmuch as all we are trying to say is that an actor, A, is 
free to act without valid legal objection by B, I do not see 
any reason why we should not say just that, and dispense 
with this correlative cast in negative terms. 
Sec. 2-2 I. Actor's discretion to act. The important legal 
aspect of an act may be that it is not obligatory on the actor. 
It may be necessary to express the fact that an act does not 
have to be done. It may be necessary to indicate the absence 
of obligation on A to do an act for B's benefit. In speaking 
of acts in these terms, and developing their significance in 
this way, we are simply looking at the other side of the coin 
described in terms of discretionary acts.1 And the examples 
earlier mentioned also serve as illustrations of what is meant 
here. A owes no obligation to be a Good Samaritan, and a 
2 However, A may have a right against B and a privilege in regard to B 
at the same time. Thus A (as nonactor) has the right not to be struck by 
B (as wrongful actor), but A (as privileged actor) is allowed by law to defend 
himself against attack by B (a wrongful actor) • 
* (I.R.) This position is taken by Hohfeld and some of his disciples. See 
the items by Hohfeld, Corbin, and Goble cited in sec. z-17, note *· 
1 Sec. z-o7. 
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doctor owes no obligation to accept a patient who calls for 
his services.2 The reason it is worth mentioning these cases 
again is that there are times when it is useful to connect 
up A's discretion to act with other persons and point out the 
absence of obligation toward them. 
Sec. 2-22. Actor's power over another. The primary 
meaning of "power" is the ability to do an effective act which 
affects another. In this sense, power expresses the possibility 
of A's doing an effective act, the possibility that A's act will 
be effective when, as, and if, done. On the other hand, it 
expresses the idea that A's act will affect B. Accordingly, 
power is defined as the ability, by an effective act, to change 
the legal position of another person. The potential actor, A, 
is the center of reference; the other person is passive and 
is simply affected by what A does. Examples are the power 
to adopt a child; the power to bring a civil action, e. g., a 
suit for damages; the power of the owner of land to make 
an effective conveyance to another; the power of a principal 
to invest an agent with authority to act on the principal's 
behalf; the power of a principal to terminate the authority 
of his agent; etc. 
However, power is sometimes more broadly defined. It is 
used to include not only the ability to affect others by effec-
tive acts such as those mentioned, but also used to include 
the ability to affect others by wrongful acts, as by commission 
of a tort or a breach of contract.1 In this sense, A is said to 
have power to commit a battery by striking B, and to have 
2 Mentioned in sec. z-o8, problem 6. 
Suppose, however, that a doctor stops at the scene of a collision on the high-
way; that the principal person hurt is the wife of X; that the doctor declines 
to care for W because he has previously had a serious personal difference with 
X; that X draws a revolver and, standing over the doctor, compels him to give 
the needed medical service. The doctor not only has discretion about serving, 
but also has rights not to be coerced. Cj. sec. z-zo, note z. 
1 Llewellyn: Power refers to what A"· •• can do, and so affect what the 
court will do." THE BRAMBLE BusH 84 (1930), 
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power by refusal to perform, to breach his contract. The only 
point that needs to be noted about this broader use of the -
term power, is the necessity to make sure in any given case 
which usage is being adopted. Is the speaker employing the 
word power in the narrower sense of ability to do an effective 
act affecting another, or in the wider sense of the ability to 
do any legally significant act which affects B? 
A power in either of the senses just defined is a notion 
radically different from a right as defined in section 2-19, 
though right and power are often confused. Power is defined 
in reference to an actor, A. To say that A has a power is to 
assert that A can, by an act, produce legal effects; that he 
can do a legally significant act. Right is defined in reference 
to a nonactor, B; it expresses B's claim that another, A, 
refrain from acting or that he act positively in favor of the 
right-holder, B. This is a distinction which we shall have 
occasion to develop in discussing the problems in section 2-2 5. 
Sec. 2-23. Liability to effects of another's act. In discussing 
powers, I pointed out that B is often subject to the effects 
of acts which A does, and that we often want to speak of the 
fact that B's legal position will be affected when, as, and 
if A acts. The legal significance of A's act may be cast in 
terms of B's liabilities quite as well as in terms of A's powers. 
By a liability, I mean subjection to the effects of the act of 
another person; or, one might say, exposure to the effects 
of such an act. B's liability expresses the possibility of having 
his legal position altered by the effective act of another 
person. The liability of B is the correlative of the power 
of A, whose act can affect B. In other words, liability is the 
correlative of the power, by an effective act, to affect another's 
legal position. Examples are the liability of B, who has 
breached his contract with A, to suit by A; the liability of 
a tenant to the landlord's act of terminating the lease by 
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re-entry for breach of condition; and the liability of the 
judgment debtor to a levy of execution on the judgment 
by the judgment creditor. 
Liability, like power, may be given a broader definition. 
It may be defined, as I have defined it above, as the subjec-
tion to another's effective act, but it may also be defined 
more comprehensively to include also the subjection to 
wrongful acts of another, such as tortious acts and breaches 
of contract. In this sense, B is exposed to wrongful acts such 
as a battery by A, and B is also exposed to breaches of 
contract by the other party to a contract. However, though 
there is no reason why one cannot define liability in this 
wide sense to correspond with the wide use of power, I think 
it is rather unusual to use the word liability in this way. 
Sec. 2-2 4· Significance of act to actor himself. In the 
foregoing sections, I have discussed and defined terms in 
which we are accustomed to express the legal importance of 
A's acts to B. Within a somewhat narrower range, it may be 
important to express the legal significance of A's act to A 
himsdf. The terminology of rights and duties is hardly 
appwpriate for this purpose. That terminology is essentially 
relati,)nal. It presupposes at least two persons to be related 
to on'~ another. While we do sometimes say that a person 
owefo it to himself to do or not to do some act, this usage 
is rad1er a reference to moral considerations or is to be taken 
as a figurative use of terms. We do not seriously mean that 
A is at one and the same time the claimant of acts and the 
person bound to act. He does not have rights against himself, 
nor owe duties to himself. 
Similar observations apply to the use of the terms "privi-
lege" and "discretion." When these terms are used in a 
meaningful way, I believe a relationship to someone else is 
understood. A's privilege to act means his freedom from 
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objection by others, not his freedom from complaint by him-
self. His discretion to act refers to the fact that others have 
no obligatory claim upon him, not to the fact that he can 
act in a manner to affect himself. 
But when we speak of the significance of A's powers in 
regard to A himself, we introduce a new element. Power 
can be defined as A's ability by an act to affect the legal 
position of B-the definition given and used in section 2-22 
above. But power may be defined as A's ability by an act to 
affect his own legal position. This latter is the sense in which 
the term power is used when we speak of A's power to make 
a will, or his power to abandon the chattel that he owns. 
These are both acts which immediately and primarily affect 
the legal status of A himself. This usage of power consti-
tutes a third meaning to be added to the two already men-
tioned. And again, as I have said before, the chief point that 
needs to be noted about these three possible meanings of 
power is the necessity to make sure in any given case which 
usage is being followed. 
Sec. 2-25. Problems. Unfortunately, the terms we have 
just defined are used in all sorts of confusing ways. This 
holds equally of use by legislatures, courts, lawyers, scholars, 
and students. Of these terms, the term "right" is probably 
the most loosely and multifariously employed. "Right" is 
used not only in the strict sense defined in section 2-r9; it is 
also used in the sense of privilege (sec. 2-20) and of power 
(sec. 2-22). A similar confused use of "duty" is often found. 
The term is employed in the sense defined in section 2-r 8, 
but also in a sense which blends or confuses it with liability 
(sec. 2-23). 
Ambiguity and carelessness in the use of language are facts 
with which we must reckon in law as elsewhere. No matter 
how careful we may be in our own use of terms, we always 
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have to look out for careless and misleading use by others, 
just as we have to be on the lookout for others who drive 
carelessly on the highway. Both for the purpose of keeping 
your own use of terms clear and for the purpose of detecting 
loose use by others, it will be helpful for you to practice 
discriminating the six important conceptions which I have 
defined. Which of the six terms would you use in each of the 
following statements? 
I. Right of a creditor of A to repayment of $I oo which 
he has loaned to A. 
2. The claim of X, the owner of land, that Y, a third 
party, stay off the land. 
3· The obligation of Y to stay off X's land in the case 
last put. 
4· The right of X to transfer his land to Y. 
5. The right of L to lease his land to P. 
6. The right of a landowner to use and enjoy his land, as 
by building a house on it, plowing it, and walking over it. 
7· Every man's house is his "ca:stle" as the law declares. 
In this connection, Gray says: "; .. a householder has the 
right to eject by force a trespasser from his 'castle.'" Would 
you say right, power, or privilege here? 
8. Suppose that X, the owner of land, gives Y a license 
to come on his land to hunt. How shall we characterize Y's 
opportunity to hunt? How shall we characterize the giving 
of the Hcense? 
9· The ownership of land is a complex aggregate of rights, 
powers, privileges, duties, and liabilities. On the basis of the 
preceding examples and what you know generally, what 
rights, powers, and privileges of the landowner come to 
mind? Do you think of any duties which rest upon the land-
owner? Do you think of any liabilities which rest on the 
landowner as such? 
1 NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW, sec. 53 (1909). 
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IO. A does not have any duty to support his indigent 
brother. Which category? 
I I. The right of A to acquire ownership of wild animals 
by capture. 
I2. The right of a tenant from month to month to termi-
nate his lease by one month's notice. 
I3. It is sometimes said that either party to a contract has 
a right to breach his contract inasmuch as either is able to 
break the contract and pay damages for the breach. In this 
case, should one say that either party has a right to breach 
the contract? A privilege to breach it? A po1.-'Jer to do so? 
I4. The right of workmen to organize a union without 
interference by their employer. Should one speak of a privi-
lege to organize? A right to organize? A power to organize? 
IS. My right to swear out a warrant for the arrest of a 
suspected thief. Suppose, first, that I act justifiably on the 
basis of reasonable cause to suspect that X has stolen my 
watch. Then suppose that I swear out such a warrant without 
justifiable cause. Would you use the term "right" in this 
case? Power? Privilege? 
I6. Sec. 4 of the Restatement of Torts (I934) declares: 
"The word 'duty' is used throughout the Restatement of 
this Subject to denote the fact that the actor is required to 
conduct himself in a particular manner at the risk that if he 
does not do so he may become liable to another to whom the 
duty is owed for any injury sustained by such other of which 
that actor's conduct is a legal cause." 
Is the word "duty" used here in a sense which agrees with 
our definitions? Is the word "liable" so used? 
J7. It is said that the owner of a house is "bound" to make 
repairs on floors and walls of his house if he wants them to 
be made. How do you interpret the word "bound" here? 
Does this statement refer to a duty or something else? 
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18. Compare the statutory language quoted in section 
2-14, problem 3: "No damages shall be awarded in any libel 
action," with the language of the fourth section of the Statute 
of Frauds which declares that, "No action shall be brought 
. . . upon any contract or sale of lands . . . or any interest 
in or concerning them ... unless the agreement upon 
which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum, 
or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party 
to be charged therewith. . . ." 
The defamatory statement does not give rise to a cause of 
action, and the unwritten contract is not a basis for an action, 
either. Is this an adequate statement of the effects of these 
statutes? The effect of the one statute is to make the actor's 
act privileged. What is the effect of the other statute, i. e., 
the Statute of Frauds? 
19. Suppose A sues B for damages for false imprisonment. 
The evidence on the trial of the action shows that B locked 
A in a cellar overnight as a practical joke. The court and 
jury award damages in the amount of $500 to A. How 
would you analyze this result in terms of rights, duties, 
powers, privileges, etc., as between A and B? 
20. A undoubtedly has discretion (as well as power) to 
convey his home by deed to B. Now suppose that B by threats 
of bodily harm coerces A to make a deed to this effect; the 
deed to B would be ineffective and would be ordered can-
celled in a proper suit by A. How would you express this 
result in terms of legal right, power, and discretion? 
Sec. 2-26. Significance of circumstances-natural condi-
tiom. A's act is not an isolated phenomenon; it takes its 
place among the phenomena of nature. The law recognizes 
the importance of the natural and social conditions surround-
ing A's act. These conditions are considered both in fixing a 
standard for A's act and in fixing the significance of his act. 
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Standard and significance are part of the social machinery 
through which A's act is integrated and harmonized with B's 
needs and acts. The natural and social bearings of what A 
does, have to be reckoned with in deciding whether his act 
is to be socially approved, disapproved, or what not; they 
have to be reckoned with also in deciding what effects the 
act shall entail if it is done. Thus A, who drives an automobile 
on the highway, carries on an activity under given weather 
conditions and at a given place where others are driving. The 
legal provision, which declares that he must drive with rea-
sonable care under the circumstances, takes account of both 
natural and social conditions. And the accompanying legal 
provision, which declares that A shall be liable for damages 
to B if he fails to exercise reasonable care, likewise involves 
a reference to both weather conditions and conditions of traf-
fic. Both the standard for A's act and the significance of his 
act involve a consideration of factors outside the act itself. 
Accordingly we see that the act alone does not determine 
legal significance. We cannot look alone to what A does. We 
have to look also to the circumstances in which he acted. Legal 
significance is determined both by what A does and by other 
factors which we have called circumstances or surrounding 
conditions: 
A's Act 
Circumstances 
Among the natural circumstances which help to determine 
the significance of A's act are many common facts. The cir-
cumstance may be a previous natural event. Thus, the signif-
icance of A's act in selling grape juice or cider may depend 
not only on the act of sale, but on the question whether the 
juice or cider has previously passed through the natural proc-
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ess of fermentation; if it has, A's act constitutes a sale of 
intoxicating liquor and the violation of a prohibition law. 
The important natural circumstance may be a factual con-
dition accompanying the act, such as the weather conditions 
·previously mentioned; the liability of A to B for negligent 
driving may depend not only on the speed at which he was 
driving, but on the question whether it was raining at the 
timt:, so that the pavement was wet and slippery; or whether 
it was snowing, so that A's range of vision was reduced. 
And finally, the important circumstance may be the sub-
sequent occurrence of a natural event; this event may be 
essential to the operation of a previous act, as the testator's 
death is essential to the operation of the will he has executed. 
Or the event may change or vitiate the legal significance of 
an act which has already been done. If A is the owner of a 
music hall and enters into a contract to lease the hall to an 
artist for a particular concert, the contract gives rise to an 
obligation on A's part to do what he has agreed; but, if the 
hall be destroyed accidentally by fire before the date of the 
concert, the obligations of the parties under the contract are 
terminated. The significance of A's act in entering into the 
contract is affected (i. e., completely wiped out) by the sub-
sequent fire. In these three examples we see that the signif-
icance of A's act in a given situation may depend on a previous 
natural event, or on accompanying natural conditions, or on 
a subsequent natural event, as well as on the nature of the 
act itself. 
Sec. 2-27. Significance of another's acts. The significance of 
A's act may also depend on the acts of B, as I have already 
pointed out. Indeed B's acts raise legal problems more often 
than natural circumstances do, and in this sense his acts are 
more important to us from a practical viewpoint. 
B's previous act may be important in determining the 
effects of A's act. Thus if A fatally stabs B with a knife, 
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A's act is murder. But if it appears that before A stabbed 
B, the latter struck A a blow in the face with his fist, then 
A's act of killing B would ordinarily be adjudged manslaugh-
ter, not murder. The prior blow by B mitigates A's crime; 
it changes and qualifies the significance of A's act. In a similar 
way B's simultaneous activity may be important in determin-
ing the significance of A's act. The case of A's driving on 
the highway may be used again to illustrate this point. The 
legal standard requires A to drive with reasonable care under 
the circumstances. What is reasonable will depend largely 
upon the amount of traffic. This means the number of other 
persons who are driving. As a driver, A is bound to act in a 
manner which takes account of the driving which others are 
doing. And the subsequent act of B may be important too. If 
A and B have made a contract and if B subsequently breaches 
the contract, this breach by B excuses performance by A. It 
excuses the obligation of A to perform. In short, the acts 
of B prior to, simultaneous with, and subsequent to, the act 
of A, have a part in determining its effects. 
Another noteworthy angle of the relation of A's act to 
B's is this: legal significance often attaches to two or more 
acts only when they are coupled together in a certain way. 
A's act 
then 
B's act 
Legal 
~----~ Significance 
Thus, in the case of the killing above mentioned, the tem-
poral sequence of the acts is important. B strikes A first. If 
B had struck A after A gave the fatal stab, B's blow would 
not have mattered. Neither would the blow by B have had 
its mitigating effect if the sequence of events had been first 
a blow by A, then a blow by B, then the fatal blow by A. 
Here A would have been liable for murder because he struck 
the first blow as well as the one which was fatal. Another 
example of the same sort is the making of a contract. Nor-
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mally a contract is made when two acts are coupled in this 
order: offer by A and acceptance by B. Legal significance 
attaches to the combination of the two acts. 
Or sometimes the law requires that one or more acts occur 
together-simultaneously or essentially at the same time-
alone neither act will produce legal effects: 
A's act 
and 
B's act 
at same time 
Legal 
~----~ Significance 
As an illustration of this kind of legal provision, I refer 
you to the statute set out in the fourth problem of section 
2-28 below, which requires that all the witnesses to the 
execution of a will be present at the same time and attest 
together. If all are not present at the same time and acting 
together, the will is not effective and the testator's act and 
the attestation of it are utterly without legal force. 
Accordingly, we find that legal standards are often stated 
in regard to sequences, or combinations of acts: A's act, then 
B's act; or B's act, then A's act; or A's act and B's act 
together. And we find that, while legal significance may 
attach to A's act alone, often such significance only attaches 
to a sequence or combination of A's act with B's, or that the 
significance of A's act is different when it occurs in a sequence 
or combination with B's, from what it would be if it occurred 
alone. These points about the essential interrelations of acts 
and about their combined significance will be further devel-
oped by the problems which follow. 
Sec. 2-28. Problems. I. Suppose a statute provides that 
a person who makes a public offer to pay for a service to be 
rendered (e. g., to pay a reward to anyone who finds and 
returns a lost article) becomes bound to make compensation 
according to his offer, whenever another person meets the 
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conditions of the offer and renders the service requested. If 
B loses his watch, and A finds it and returns it an hour later, 
would B be bound under the above statute to pay a reward? 
Why? 
2. Suppose that A shot and killed B but it appears that 
B was attacking A with a pistol when A shot, so that A acted 
in the necessary defense of his own life. Here A would be 
exonerated completely. 
Analyze this case in terms of interrelated acts and their 
significance. 
Suppose B attacked A yesterday and A shot B today. 
3· A and B enter into a contract under which A is to 
perform some service forB at $IO per day for 10 days. B later 
defaults and A sues for damages. Consider this situation as 
a sequence of interdependent acts which form the basis for 
A's suit (see sec. 2-27). In other words, what acts must A 
prove, or do, in order to recover damages? 
4· ·A statute of the State of Michianna provides: 
Execution of wills. Every will must be in writing and must 
be executed and attested as follows: 
(I) Subscription. It must be subscribed at the end thereof 
by the testator himself, or some person in his presence and 
by his direction must subscribe his name thereto. A person 
who subscribes the testator's name, by his direction, should 
write his own name as a witness to the will, but a failure to 
do so will not affect the validity of the will. 
(2) Presence of witnesses. The subscription must be made, 
or the testator must acknowledge it to have been made by 
him or by his authority, in the presence of both of the attest-
ing witnesses, present at the same time.1 
(3) Testator's declaration. The testator, at the time of 
subscribing or acknowledging the instrument, must declare 
to the attesting witnesses that it is his will. 
1 Most states do not specifically require that the testator have all the attest-
ing witnesses present at the same time. ATKINSON, WILLS 295 (1937). But this 
is always the safe procedure to follow. 
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(4) Number of witnesses, attestation. There must be at 
least two attesting witnesses, each of whom must sign the 
instrument as a witness, at the end of the will, at the tes-
tator's request and in his presence. The witnesses should give 
their places of residence, but a failure to do so will not affect 
the validity of the will. 
Suppose the testator asks the attesting witnesses to sign 
first, which they do; and that the testator signs immediately 
afterward. Would his will be validly executed under the 
statute quoted? 
5· Aikens v. Wisconsin.2 
"Malicious mischief is a familiar and proper subject for 
legislative repression as are also combinations for the purpose 
of inflicting it, and liberty to combine to inflict such mischief, 
even upon such intangibles as business or reputation, is not 
among the rights which the Fourteenth Amendment was 
intended to protect. . . . 
"Section 4466a, Wisconsin Statutes of I 898, prohibiting 
combinations for the purpose of willfully or maliciously in-
juring another in his reputation, trade, business or profession, 
is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment so far as 
the section applies to such a combination made from solely 
malevolent motives. . . " 
Mr. Justice Holmes: 
"But if all these general considerations be admitted, it is 
urged nevertheless that the means intended to be used by 
this particular combination were simply the abstinence from 
making contracts, that a man's right so to abstain cannot be 
infringed on the ground of motives, and further, that it car-
ries with it the right to communicate that intent to abstain 
to others and to abstain in common with them. It is said 
that if the statute extends to such a case it must be uncon-
stitutional. The fallacy of this argument lies in the assump-
tion that the statute stands no better than if directed against 
the pure nonfeasance of singly omitting to contract. The 
statute is directed against a series of acts, and acts of sev-
2 195 u. s. 194 ( 1904). 
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eral, the acts of combining, with intent to do other acts. • . . 
When the acts consist of making a combination calculated 
to cause temporal damage, the power to punish such acts, 
when done maliciously, cannot be denied because they are 
to be followed and worked out by conduct which might have 
been lawful if not preceded by the acts. No conduct has such 
an absolute privilege as to justify all possible schemes of 
which it may be a part. The most innocent and constitution-
ally protected of acts or omissions may be made a step in a 
criminal plot, and if it is a step in a plot neither its inno-
cence nor the Constitution is sufficient to prevent the punish-
ment of the plot by law .... " 
Consider this decision in relation to our discussion in sec-
tion 2-27. 
EFFECTUATION OF STANDARDS 1 
Sec. 2-29. Standards do not per se control behavior. The 
legal standard is not self-effectuating. It is an expression of 
a pattern of action-it is a standard act which the lawmaker 
prohibits, commands, assures of effect, permits or leaves to 
the discretion of the actor. As such, the standard is a mere 
verbal formula, just words. It is not en-ough that the law-
maker formulate his standard, he must also think about how 
to make it effective in controlling the acts of A. The words 
of which the standard is composed have no effects on A 
per se. Words have no influence over things, and they do 
not control persons unless these persons understand them 
and are ready to be guided by them. 
1 By "effectuation of a standard" I mean the process of bringing about the 
kind of action which the standard is intended to secure. A command is 
intended to secure action of the type commanded so that the standard is 
effectuated when action of this type is done. A prohibition is intended to warn 
against action of the type forbidden, so that the standard is effectuated when 
action of this type is avoided. Another way of putting the same general idea 
is to say that effectuation is the process of making a standard operative in 
the actual activities of someone. These rough definitions will suffice for 
the time being; later we shall have to examine more closely the meanings 
of such expressions as "operative" and "effective." 
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Despite these obvious truths, men have always been prone 
to ascribe intrinsic or magical effect to words. They have been 
ready to suppose that words can exert direct effects on things, 
events, and human behavior. King Canute gave commands 
to the waves; spells and incantations have often been used 
to sway natural forces; and persons have been assumed to 
be pushed about by words as if words were physical instru-
ments instead of mere conventional symbols through which 
ideas are conveyed. 
While it is not common today to commit so gross an error 
as King Canute's, and most of us have passed beyond the 
belief in the efficacy of spells, it is not uncommon even now 
for the lawmaker, and other speakers as well, to forget that 
his message is intended to influence people, and that its effects 
in this regard will depend first and foremost on the attitudes 
and reactions of the people addressed. It is not unusual for 
those who propose or who enact laws to assume that all the 
lawmaker has to do is to declare, "Be it enacted that ... ," 
and that in some indefinite way the standard becomes realized 
in fact. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
The national prohibition law of recent unhappy memory 
illustrates the point I have in mind. This forbade the manu-
facture, possession, transportation, and sale of intoxicating 
liquor. It was hardly enacted before it was violated almost 
openly in many parts of the country. Why was this? Because 
the lawmaker had not given adequate consideration to the 
attitudes of the population and to means of enforcement. The 
law ran counter to the customs and desires of too many peo-
ple. The legal machinery of enforcement which was available 
was not equal to the task of eradicating the drinking habits 
and suppressing the thirst of a large proportion-in some 
areas, the majority-of the population. In reality the law-
maker had done little more than declare a prohibitive stand-
ard; he had implicitly assumed that his declaration would 
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somehow effectuate itself. He had not adequately considered 
the problem of enforcement.2 
Sec. 2-30. "Law in the books" and "law in action." Not 
only is the legal standard not self-effectuating but it is also 
never I oo per cent effective. There is always some discrep-
ancy between the "law in the books" and the "law in 
action."* Some murders are committed despite the threat of 
direst penalties. The law in the books expresses what the law-
maker wishes to achieve or avoid; the law in action always 
falls short of this ideal. The difference between the prohibi-
tion law and other laws which we regard as satisfactorily 
enforced is merely one of degree. If the gap between the 
legal standard and its enforcement is too wide we speak of a 
"breakdown" of law; if it is not too marked we consider the 
situation more or less normal. The point can be illustrated by 
referring to the legal norms which regulate driving on the 
highway. Many drivers, as we all know, exceed the legal 
speed limit and pass other cars on hills. The regulations 
covering these acts fall far short of complete enforcement. 
To make such traffic regulations completely effective would 
require a vast police force. It would cost more than the public 
is willing to pay, to provide enough policemen on urban and 
rural roads to supervise driving and to prevent all infractions. 
With present machinery of enforcement, the public has to be 
satisfied with a reasonable degree of observance of these 
standards, or perhaps with something less than that. 
2 I use effectuation as the broad general term for all methods of bringing 
about approved types of action; enforcement, which is a term more often heard, 
is narrower. Enforcement refers only to coercion of the actor by threats or by 
physical force. Effectuation includes the use of threats and physical force 
but also includes the use of rewards, and the creation of favorable habits. 
See sec. 2-40, note*, for further explanation of the terminology here employed. 
* (I.R.) The ideas here developed go back to Ehrlich and Holmes. They 
have been heavily stressed by Llewellyn and other so-called realists. The 
contrasting phrases, "law in the books" and "law in action," are Pound's. 
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And the discrepancy between standard and actuality is not 
limited to the commands and prohibitions of the criminal law; 
the standards relative to private injuries and benefits are 
likewise only imperfectly realized in practice. Personal in-
juries are suffered and not redressed. Contracts are broken 
and nothing is done. Property is damaged and compensation 
is never made. Perhaps the individual who causes the injury 
or commits the breach of contract can not be found or can 
not pay, or perhaps the amount involved is small and the 
injured party can not afford the trouble of a lawsuit. There 
is always a substantial discrepancy between the standard and 
its effectuation in real life. 
The lawmaker, therefore, will not expect the impossible. 
He will realize that commands are not always obeyed; that 
forbidden acts are done; that boundaries of permitted action 
are sometimes overstepped; that prescribed formalities for 
effective action are not always complied with. He will realize 
that persons who are subject to regulation often defy, or 
attempt to evade, applicable standards of behavior, or they 
fail to act in prescribed ways through carelessness or igno-
rance. The realization of these facts is the beginning of legis-
lative wisdom, but it is not the whole of it. While the law-
maker will not hope for perfection, he will try to hold to a 
minimum the discrepancy between his standard and its ful-
fillment. 
Sec. 2-3r. The actor's existing attitudes. The standard is 
a pattern of behavior addressed to A for his guidance. In 
preparing such a standard L must consider A's existing atti-
tudes as the maker of a wooden object must consider the 
grain of the wood on which he is about to work. A's attitudes 
are the springs of his action; they are at the center of the 
problem of controlling what he does. What are these atti-
tudes? How far can they be influenced or changed? What 
STANDARDS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL'S ACTS 87 
can A fairly be expected to know or do? How far is it neces-
sary to stimulate action along approved lines or deter action 
along disapproved lines? What devices are available for these 
purposes, and how will they operate on A? All these ques-
tions must be carefully considered and answered by the law-
maker who establishes standards with an intelligent appre-
ciation of what he is doing. 
If the attitudes of persons to be controlled run counter to 
a proposed standard, as the attitudes of a large part of our 
population were set against the prohibition law, L must con-
cern himself seriously with· problems of changing them. He 
must consider whether he will be able to induce action along 
desired lines, whether he has the means available to arouse 
adequate law-abiding motives, and whether in regard to the 
particular standard the benefit attained will be worth the 
cost of attaining it. 
On the other hand, if existing attitudes of persons to be 
controlled are in harmony with what L desires, the legal task 
of coercion or persuasion is reduced. If he can rely upon fa-
vorable habits or if such institutions as the church and the 
family inculcate and enforce essentially the same standard 
as his own, e.g., a prohibition of lying and stealing, L may 
have to concern himself only with the problem of creating 
motives for favorable action in a relatively small group. As 
regards most of the population, the standard will be realized 
in fact through existing habits. The problem of enforcement 
will be minimal. 
Indeed the task of enforcing legal standards without the 
aid of law-abiding habits and extralegal sanctions would be 
quite impossible. On the asset side of the law enforcement 
ledger must always be reckoned the fact that not all actors 
need to be coerced or persuaded, or at least that most stand-
ards do not require enforcement against more than a small 
number of persons simultaneously. Just as the bank relies 
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upon the fact that not all its depositors will want to withdraw 
their money at any one time, so the state counts on the fact 
that' it will not need to enforce its standards of behavior 
against more than a small part of the community at any one 
time. 
A reference once more to the fiasco of national prohibition 
will show what part established habits and extralegal factors 
play in the effectuation of legal standards. Even at the worst 
period of prohibition enforcement, most persons did not vi-
olate the law; they did not want to. They conformed because 
they were not accustomed to using, making, or selling intox-
icants, so that the law did not run counter to their habits; 
or because they lived in dry communities and were restrained 
by the opinions of their neighbors; or because they belonged 
to church groups which regarded the use of intoxicants as 
immoral. Or they obeyed the prohibition law on principle, 
regarding obedience to law as a moral or social duty. Habitual 
attitudes or extralegal sanctions were sufficient, along with 
legal disapproval, to keep these persons out of the way of 
the law's ban. The breakdown of this law did not mean, 
therefore, that no one whatever observed its mandates; it 
meant only that the lawmaker had failed to reckon with the 
hostile attitudes of a large dissident group. This was the 
group which needed to be controlled if the law was to be 
effective, and this was the group which set the law at naught. 
These observations sound obvious enough, and yet they 
have only too often been neglected or overlooked. As a result, 
the problem of effectuating standards has sometimes been 
conceived as a much larger problem than it is, i.e., as a 
problem of inducing all acts of all persons at all times. In 
this view, the job looks too big and L does not undertake 
all that he might. Or else L, if he is not critical, passes a 
law and overestimates his accomplishments; like the dog that 
chases the car down the street and comes back with his tail 
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in the air, L cheerfully assumes that he made all people do 
what many were going to do anyhow. But the opposite mis-
take is the more common; the problem is not perceived to 
be as large as it is. L fails to realize that he is enacting a 
standard of behavior which is opposed to the habits of many 
persons, which therefore needs to be backed up by strong and 
effective sanctions, and which breaks down in practice when 
these sanctions are not provided. 
Sec. 2-32. Problems. 1. In an earlier problem we spoke 
of a case where a city installs a traffic light on one of its 
streets for the purpose of regulating the movement of ve-
hicles and pedestrians (sec. I-IO). This was treated as an 
example of control by the use of symbols. What control 
factors lie behind this symbolic device and its use? 
2.. What is the point of these bitter words of Anatole 
France: "'The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich 
as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the 
streets, and to steal bread'"? 1 What does this mean as re-
gards legal prohibitions? 
3· In an address delivered in I 897 Justice Holmes said 
that if you want to know how the law (in our terms, legal 
standards) is going to operate you must look at it as the 
bad man does. 
"You can see very plainly that a bad man has as much 
reason as a good one for wishing to avoid an encounter with 
the public force, and therefore you can see the practical im-
portance of the distinction between morality and law. A man 
who cares nothing for an ethical rule which is believed and 
practiced by his neighbors is likely, nevertheless, to care a 
good deal to avoid being made to pay money, and will want 
to keep out of jail if he can .... If you want to know the 
law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who 
cares only for the material consequences which such knowl-
1 COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEAS 79 (1933). 
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edge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds 
his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside 
of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience." 2 
Do you agree? Why? 
4· Consider in this connection the following passage from 
an article by Llewellyn: 
". . . most pieces of law affect only a relatively small 
number of persons ever or at all, with any directness-or are 
intended to. Where that is the case, the organization, atti-
tude, present and probable behavior of the persons sought 
to be affected is what needs major consideration, from the 
angle of getting results (or of understanding results). In-
deed, the very identification of those persons may be a 
pre-condition calling for much study. Which is a somewhat 
absurdly roundabout way of saying that unless those matters 
are studied, the rules drawn, and the administrative behavior 
adapted to the persons in question, results will be an accident. 
'To the persons in question,' and, indeed, 'to those persons 
under the conditions in question.' It cannot be too strongly 
insisted that our attitude toward 'rules' of law, treating them 
as universal in application, involves a persistent twisting of 
observation. 'Rules' in the realm of action mean what rules 
do; 'rules' in the realm of action are what they do. The pos-
sible application and applicability are not without importance, 
but the actual application and applicability are of controlling 
importance. To think of rules as universals-especially to 
think of them as being applicable to 'all persons who bring 
themselves within their terms'-is to muffle one's eyes in a 
constitutional fiction before beginning a survey of the scene. 
To be sure, constitutions purport to require rules of law to 
be 'equal and general.' But most rules, however general as 
to the few they cover, are highly special, when viewed from 
the angle of how many citizens there are. And most rules 
'applying to' all who come within their terms (all those who 
stt up barber shops, or are tempted to commit murder, or 
to bribe officials, or to embezzle from banks or certify checks 
without the drawer having funds, or to adopt a child, or run 
2
"The Path of the Law," 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 at 459 (1897). 
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a manufacturing establishment employing five or more per-
sons) do not and will not, realistically considered, ever be 
'applicable' in any meaningful sense of the term, to most 
people in the community. Such rules are indeed open. Persons 
do move in and out of the sphere of their applicability. But 
that sphere is much more clearly seen, when viewed (as 
compared with the community) as narrow, as special, as 
peculiar." 8 
How are Llewellyn's observations related to our present 
topic? 
5. In this country the established practice is to pass vehicles 
which one meets by driving to the right; this practice is some-
times called a "rule of the road." Suppose a general traffic 
statute were being prepared, would it not be important from 
the lawmaker's point of view to know this prevailing practice 
and to adopt it? 
What would be the effect of adopting the English rule 
which requires drivers of vehicles to pass to the left? 
Compare the situation dealt with by Mussolini when he 
came to power in Italy; right-hand driving was customary 
in some parts of Italy and left-hand driving in other parts. 
In deciding to establish a uniform rule what facts should 
have hadweight with Mussolini? 
Se~. 2-33. Enforcement by physical force. When the law-
maker has given due attention to the existing attitudes of 
persons whom he wants to control, he will pass on to the 
problem of methods of shaping their behavior to his desires; 
he will consider the devices and incentives through which he 
can deter or stimulate their action. 
First, physical force may come in question. This includes 
physical restraint and physical compulsion. The application 
of force may be the only method available for controlling 
8 
"A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step," 3 o CoL. L. REV. 4 3 1 at 
459-460 (1930). 
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certain insane actors; force may have to be applied as a last 
resort to other recalcitrant actors. Some persons, like the wild 
bull, can only be prevented from doing harm to others by 
physical constraint or by extermination. Certain persons can 
only be induced to do what is legally required, by the appli-
cation of physical force. 
But the physical force method of enforcing standards is 
costly and narrow in application. Our society could not possi-
bly exist in its present form if only this method of control 
were available. As Lumley says, "But, with physical control 
as the only means for the management of human beings, the 
maintenance of a social order would be impossible. Let us 
follow the series through, for purposes of contrast-in a 
world with nothing but physical force to move men. If it is 
desired to take the culprit to jail, two or three policemen 
would have to be assembled at the spot, and be forced to pit 
their strength against that of the victim. But how would the 
two or three policemen be assembled? They would have to 
be forced there by others. They could not be called there. 
But who would the others be and who would push or drag 
them around to push or drag the several policemen to the 
required spot?" 1 
Sec. 2-3 4· Enforcement of prohibitions by penal threats. 
More serviceable and more widely used than actual physical 
force is the penal threat. Control by threat is symbolic con-
trol.1 The penal threat is conveyed by words 2 and usually 
accompanies a legally stated standard such as a prohibition 
or command. Let us consider first its use in connection with 
the prohibition. A is forbidden to do such an act as murder, 
robbery or arson and the prohibition is coupled with the 
1 LUMLEY, MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL I4-I5 ( I925). 
1 The distinction between control by force and control by verbal acts is 
discussed in sec. I-09 above. 
2 But compare the implied legal mandate and implied threat conveyed by 
a traffic light, sec. I-I o, problem I. 
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threat of penal consequences such as imprisonment or hang-
ing. It is not the mere prohibitory language that controls 
A's behavior; it is the penal threat that deters him from 
committing the prohibited act. The prohibitory standard tells 
him what he must not do and the threat of punishment sup-
plies a motive for not doing it. 
It is not to be inferred from the examples just given that 
only the prohibitions of criminal law are supported by penal 
threats. Penal threats are found in other parts of the law, 
in fact in every part. In the law of procedure, for instance, 
important prohibitions are coupled with penal consequences. 
I need only mention the fact that persons may be punished 
for disorderly conduct in court, and that a party may be com-
mitted for contempt in violating a prohibitory order of the 
judge, such as an injunction. Likewise in the field of tort, 
where A is prohibited from striking B or injuring B's goods, 
A is threatened with the exaction of compensation to B if 
he does either of these forbidden acts. From A's point of 
view, this exaction is a penalty with which he is threatened; 
it operates on A's motivation in a manner analogous to the 
threat of punishment for crime.3 
Sec. 2-35. Deterrent effect of penal threat. What is the 
nature of the penalties threatened? Penalties may vary widely 
in character and in the way they affect A. The penalty may 
be imprisonment; it may be death by hanging or otherwise; 
it may be the exaction of a fine; it may be the payment for 
damage which A has done to someone else; it may be the 
3 This, however, is looking at the matter only from A's point of view. 
From B's point of view and from the social viewpoint, the protection of 
B against injury is the main thing. The threat of loss to A if he acts im-
properly, and the requirement of payment for B's loss, are both means directed 
to one end: the protection of B. The threat and the exaction of payment 
are simply two stages in this protection. One stage represents the effort to 
prevent improper action by A; the other stage represents an exaction of 
compensation if A does act improperly. Compare what is said in sec. :&-35 
about the effect of penal threats and their execution. 
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performance of some disagreeable act such as repairing dam-
age or making an apology; 1 it may consist in a loss of certain 
legal advantages such as civil rights; and so on.2 But all 
penalties have one feature in common-a feature which ac-
counts for their motivating force upon A's behavior. All are 
detrimental consequences to A or his pocketbook; all are 
consequences which A will presumably wish to avoid. 
The purpose of the threat is to create motives in A which 
will make it unnecessary for the threat to be carried out. If 
the threat of penalty is effective, of course the penalty is 
not imposed. The thing threatened is a mere substitute for 
performance along desired lines. If the threat operates as 
intended, this substitute does not have to be exacted. 
However, the threat does have to be executed sometimes, 
or at least the probability of its execution must be real; if 
not, the penal threat loses its motivating force on A's action. 
This force depends on three factors: First, it depends on what 
is threatened-the nature of the penalty. A threat of death 
obviously will have a stronger effect in deterring or coercing 
A's act than a threat of a short term of imprisonment or a 
small monetary fine.3 Second, the remoteness of. the penalty 
in time is important. If the penalty will be exacted imme-
diately it will be more influential on A's behavior than if it 
is to be exacted a long time from now. It is common knowl-
edge that some of us take plenty of chances on eternal damna-
1 In certain European countries the unsuccessful defendant in an action for 
defamation is required to publish an apology. 
2 This list is not exhaustive. Many other penalties have been used at some 
time or some place in world history. Of these, loss of bodily members, killing 
in cruel fashion, selling into slavery, would no longer be tolerated; in fact, 
· they would conflict with various provisions of our constitutions. 
3 The law proceeds on a quantitative calculus of penal consequences which 
is often of doubtful validity-at least of doubtful accuracy from the viewpoint 
of psychological science. I can put these questions to make the point. Does the 
threat of five years' imprisonment for theft deter the bum in the same degree 
that it deters a respectable citizen 1 How much more deterrent effect has 
a ten-year term in prison than a five-year term? Is its motivating force 
twice as great? What about the deterrent effect of a threatened $zooo fine 
as compared with a threat of a fine of half that amount? 
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tion because that seems a long way off. Third, the certainty 
of the exaction of the penalty is important in determining 
its force. Where there are enough policemen patrolling the 
streets and the speeder is very likely to get caught and pun-
ished, the deterrent effect on speeding is at a maximum. 
Sec. 2-3 6. Deterrent effects of taxation and other gov-
ernmental measures. The lawmaker is not confined to out-
and-out prohibitions. He may endeavor to discourage rather 
than forbid certain acts by A. A common method of checking 
activity by A is to impose high or discriminatory taxes upon 
it. The power to tax, like the power to penalize, may be used 
to deter action. Taxes may be made so high as to be prohib-
itive; as the great Chief Justice Marshall once said, "The 
power to tax is the power to destroy." But more often dis-
favored acts are visited with discriminatory taxes.1 Examples 
are the taxes with which the production and sale of oleomar-
garine until recently have been burdened both by our federal 
and state governments. 
Restrictive regulations are often used as checks on disfa-
vored activities. There can be no doubt, for example, that the 
liquor business has long been a problem child for the law-
maker. Even when he does not go so far as to prohibit the 
manufacture, sale or possession of intoxicating liquor, he 
closely regulates dealings in this commodity. The lawmaker 
1 If a real prohibition is intended, taxation usually seems too indirect 
a method of achieving the end desired, though this has not always proved true. 
The federal government has used special taxes in order to drive notes issued 
by state banks out of circulation. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533 (1869). 
And the Congress of the United States once attempted to use its taxing power to 
prevent the products of child labor from using the channels of interstate 
commerce. The Supreme Court held this exercise of power invalid; its conclu-
sion, however, was rested primarily on the ground that Congress could not bar 
such products from interstate shipment. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 2.59 
U. S. 20 ( 1922). Today, as a result of the Court's broader conception of 
Congressional power, either the tax or the prohibition on the products of child 
labor would be sustained. There can be no question that generally our state 
and federal governments can employ taxes to restrict or prevent acts which 
they are empowered to prohibit. 
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permits sale only by licensed persons to particular persons 
and at particular times and places; he controls the manufac-
ture with equal care. These limitations on sale and manu-
facture reflect a continuing frown of the lawmaker and 
achieve in large degree the same results as a complete pro-
hibition.2 
All of which leads to the conclusion that we greatly over-
simplify when we treat prohibited acts as a neat clear category 
standing by itself. Prohibited acts shade over into disfavored 
acts. The lawmaker does not always speak with a full and 
certain voice; he does not always impress an unqualified "no" 
on behavior by A. Certain of A's acts may be not forbidden 
but handicapped by discrimination or discouraged by restric-
tion. 
Sec. 2-37. Problems. 1. A statute provides: 
"If any person drawn or summoned as a juror, shall take 
anything to give his verdict, or shall receive any gift or 
gratuity whatever, from any party to a suit, for the trial of 
which such person shall be drawn or summoned, in addition 
to any criminal punishment to which he may be subject by 
law, he shall be liable to the party aggrieved thereby in ten 
times the amount or value of the thing which he has taken 
or received, in addition to the actual damages sustained 
thereby." 
What prohibited act is involved here? What three methods 
(acts) of effectuation are mentioned? 
2. It is often said that certainty of punishment for crime 
is more important than severity of punishment. Thus it might 
be argued that it is more important that most traffic offenders 
2 Of course these limitations themselves usually take the form of prohibitions, 
e.g., a prohibition of sale after certain hours or a prohibition of sale to 
minors. But my point is that the liquor business is permitted although it is not 
favored. These subordinate prohibitions are, as regards the liquor business, 
restrictions on the way it is carried on. At the same time they indicate an 
unfriendly legislative attitude toward this line of activity. 
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be caught and fined $5 than that an occasional offender be 
caught and fined $so. Do you agree? Explain in terms of 
motivation by threat of penalty.1 
3· "In England the punishment for suicide was at one 
time forfeiture of goods and an ignominious burial, but both 
modes of punishment have been done away with. In the 
United States the person committing suicide is not punished, 
and it has been held that suicide is not a crime on that ground. 
This reasoning makes the existence of a crime depend on the 
punishment, whereas the punishment should depend upon 
the existence of the crime. Where suicide is a crime, the mere 
fact that the offender by this act places himself beyond the 
reach of punishment no more serves to make his act not a 
crime than would the fact that one after killing another 
person should commit suicide and thus make his punishment 
. 'bl " 2 unposs1 e .... 
Was there any effective threat of penalty in the old 
English law? Is there any effective threat now, in the English 
law or in ours? 
What do you think of this author's arguments pro and 
con on the question whether suicide is still a crime: suicide 
is no crime because it is not punished, and suicide is a crime 
though not punished? How would you restate these argu-
ments in terms of standards and means of effectuation? 
4· A generation ago the nature and purpose of tariffs on 
the importation of foreign-made goods was much debated. 
On the one hand it was contended that these tariffs should 
be used for purpose of revenue only. On the other hand it 
was argued that these tariffs should be made sufficiently high 
to protect American industry and labor against competition 
with the products of other countries where living and working 
standards were relatively low. How would you restate this 
problem in terms of methods of effectuating standards? 
1 See sec. 2-35, last paragraph. 
2 MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 272 (1934). 
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Sec. 2-38. Enforcement of commands by penal threats. 
We have already discussed the use of penal threats to deter 
A from doing forbidden acts. Such threats are also used in 
an opposite sense, to coerce A to do obligatory acts. A is 
commanded to register for the draft or to file an income tax 
return, and is threatened with fine or imprisonment if he fails 
to do the act prescribed. Witnesses are required by law to 
appear and testify when properly summoned by court order. 
If the witness fails to appear or refuses to testify he may be 
punished by fine or imprisonment. If A assumes certain obli-
gations by contract he may likewise be penalized for failure 
to perform them. For example, if A agrees by valid contract 
to convey his farm Blackacre to B, his obligation to do so 
may be enforced by threat of exaction of damages for breach 
of contract or by threat of imprisonment for contempt if he 
refuses to comply with the court's order to make the con-
veyance promised.1 
Sec. 2-39· Government spending and the effectuation of 
standards. You will not see the processes of effectuating 
standards in proper perspective unless you see them in rela-
tion to the total functions of government. L has at his com-
mand the fiscal powers of the state, the power to tax and 
the power to spend public money, as well as the powers of 
creating standards of behavior and of providing machinery 
to make them effective. The fiscal powers are just as impor-
tant as regards the effectuation of standards as are the power 
to define standards and the power to create enforcement ma-
chinery. Indeed all these powers are interlocking and inter-
dependent in their operation. 
Tax monies furnish the sinews of enforcement and the 
means of effectuation in other ways. To make standards effec-
1 The damage remedy is much the more common as you will find in your 
courses in Contracts and Equity. Both remedies have a coercive tendency as 
regards A. Compare what was said in sec. 2-34, note 3, regarding the deter-
rent effect of the threatened exaction of compensation for tort damages. 
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tive, officials must be provided and paid.1 When a new stand-
ard of action, prohibitive or obligatory, is being considered, 
L must weigh its probable financial cost as well as its desir-
ability as such. If he is about to create a liquor prohibition 
law or to establish an income tax law, L will probably have 
to provide for an increase in the number of police and other 
officials in order to insure the effectiveness of this new stand-
ard of behavior. He will have to lay additional taxes to meet 
new costs. At some point the financial burden will be regarded 
as too heavy, and the legislative proposal will be modified 
or abandoned. And the matter is not always thought out thus 
clearly beforehand. A law is sometimes passed with vicious 
looking teeth in it; but, when L considers the machinery of 
enforcement he is seized by a fit of economy. As a result the 
funds necessary to administer its provisions and police its 
operation are not forthcoming and the law falls flat. Which 
all goes to show the essential dependence of law enforcement 
on financial considerations and of lawmaking powers on fiscal 
powers. 
In everyday life prizes and premiums play an important 
part in the motivation of behavior. Probably offers of reward, 
and other advantages to the actor, are as common devices for 
obtaining socially desirable conduct as threats of penalties. 
Willie is induced to act as often by promise of a soda as by 
fear of a spanking. To some extent L also offers rewards 
for legally approved behavior, and here again his fiscal 
powers become important because it is through them that 
he obtains the means of so doing. He offers a reward to 
persons who furnish information regarding the criminal con-
duct of others; he offers bonuses and subsidies to persons who 
produce certain kinds of goods, e.g., wheat, cotton, or pota-
toes; he offers special advantages to persons who enlist in 
1 We have already noted how taxation may be used to achieve the same 
objectives as prohibitions coupled with penalties (sec. z-36). This fact also 
shows the close interconnection of fiscal and regulatory powers. 
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the armed services; and he offers tax exemptions to certain 
charitable enterprises such as hospitals and colleges. These 
are all ways of effectuating standards of approved behavior. 
This type of "bought" behavior is closely related to be-
havior which is made legally obligatory. Both are socially 
needed types of action. The one type is induced by benefits 
offered, the other by penalties threatened. Obligatory acts are 
those that are deemed by L especially important and which 
are therefore commanded and coupled with strong sanctions. 
Where L does not feel that it is necessary or feasible to en-
force unqualified commands, he leaves the act to A's discre-
tion and offers a premium to A for doing the act. Which 
mode of inducement is used will depend on various circum-
stances. Thus, if service in the armed forces is deemed suffi-
ciently pressing, men may be required to enter the forces by 
compulsory draft coupled with penalties for failure to reg-
ister and serve. But, in times of less pressure, men may be 
induced to enlist by promise of high pay and other advan-
tages. Again, though it may be important that the farmer 
raise certain crops it would hardly be practical for the gov-
ernment to command him to raise them and threaten him 
with penalties for failure to do so. Instead the government 
allows him to raise what crops he will but offers him a subsidy 
for raising the crops desired. Accordingly we must realize 
that obligatory acts do not stand as a class apart. They are 
one type of act which L views as socially desirable; they 
stand alongside other types of favored acts which L tries to 
induce A to do by assuring him of special benefits. 
Sec. 2-40. Indirect methods of effectuation--education. 
The control of the purse also gives L many ways of con-
trolling behavior indirectly. Social welfare measures may be 
undertaken. Slums may be cleared and housing provided at 
public expense; parks and playgrounds may be established 
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for wholesome recreation; old age pensions and unemploy-
ment compensation may be set up to guarantee the individual 
against financial need; the public health may be protected 
in various ways; medical service may be provided for indigent 
individuals. All such measures tend to reduce the pressures 
toward illicit behavior, due to economic need or unhealthy 
living conditions. 
But more important than other measures which L may 
adopt is a system of education at public expense. We have 
already spoken of the importance of law-abiding habits in 
the community. The state, through schools and other public 
agencies may take a hand in building such habits into the 
individuaP This at least is the theory of our prevailing 
system of popular education. It is intended to implant in the 
child both available knowledge and approved behavior pat-
terns. Of chief interest to us are the latter; the child can be 
brought up with sound attitudes and ideals, with settled 
notions of sportsmanship, honesty, democracy, and considera-
tion for his fellows. All these attitudes and ideals contribute 
directly or indirectly to law-abiding behavior. In this sense 
education is to be viewed as a long-range method of con-
trolling behavior, as contrasted with penal threats and offers 
of reward which are used in the immediate inducement or 
deterrence of action.* 
1 To be sure, the state with all its devices plays only a secondary part in the 
training of the child. Parents play the leading roles; and are backed up by 
such social institutions as the church. And when we speak of good habits we 
must not forget that threats of penalty and offers of reward have a place 
in habit formation. When sound behavior has become habitual, penalties and 
rewards become virtually unnecessary. But the course of proper training li~ 
"the course of true love never did run smooth"; in the process of habit 
building, penalties and rewards and physical force have always had a part. 
* (I.R.) "Effectuation" and "enforcement''-a note on terminology. Effectu-
ation of standards is commonly treated in terms of enforcement, and enforce-
ment is taken to mean deterrence or compulsion by force or by penal threats. 
This treatment of the subject requires a word of caution because it results in 
a wholly penal conception of the effectuation of standards. It gives an incom-
plete view of the motivation of A's acts and of the ways of making standards 
operative. It involves a tacit assumption that A's acts are controlled exclu-
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Sec. 2-4r. Maintaining standards for effective acts. By 
and large, standards for effective acts are established by L 
in order to serve the needs of A. These standards are methods 
by which A can achieve desired results. L examines the usual 
attitudes and objectives of A and tries to furnish convenient 
methods of satisfying A's desires.* A wants to acquire chat-
tels and L provides standard acts through which A can 
acquire them. A wants to transmit his property to relatives 
and friends at death, and L establishes a testamentary act by 
means of which this desire can be accomplished. A wants to 
obtain advantages through the co-operative acts of other per-
sons, and L makes this possible by providing standard forms 
sively by force or threats and that legal standards are effectuated wholly by 
these means. As a matter of fact, the lawmaker must rely largely on existing 
law-abiding habits of A as well as legal threats, to motivate A's action (sec. 
2-3 r). He may also rely on the offer of rewards or benefits to stimulate 
the action of A in desired directions (sec. 2-39). And finally, throughout 
a large and important area of human behavior, the lawmaker may rely on 
long-range training to direct A's behavior into desirable channels (sec. 2-40). 
All these devices must be added to penal threats and physical force when we 
are listing the means and methods of controlling behavior, and all fall outside 
of a penal theory of effectuating standards. 
You will see, therefore, that a purely penal conception of the effectuation 
of standards is open to objection; it gives an incomplete and even misleading 
view of the motivation of behavior and of the methods which are used by the 
legal system to effectuate standards. You will also see why I prefer to speak, 
as a general matter, in terms of effectuation rather than of enforcement of 
standards. Enforcement is an adequate and convenient term when we want 
to refer to effectuation through force or threats; but it is not as broad a term 
as effectuation; and enforcement can not be safely used where it might be 
understood to include the whole ground covered by the broader term. 
The penal theory of the operation of the legal system has been associated 
with, if it is not an outgrowth of, the old notion that the exclusive functions 
of the law are to command and to prohibit. This long-standing association 
of penal theory and legal function was one reason why I went to so much 
pains to point out earlier that law is concerned with effective and permitted 
acts as well as prohibited and obligatory acts. When we see this, we are 
also ready to appreciate the roles of existing habits and the creation of new 
habits and the role of premiums and rewards, as well as threats of penalties, 
in the effectuation of legal standards. 
* (I.R.) To be sure, forms for effective acts are sometimes antiquated and 
obstructive rather than helpful. They are not always framed or maintained 
with the clearly conceived purpose of serving the needs, or following the 
habitual practices, of the typical actor. However, the existence of nonfunctional 
or obstructive forms represents mainly a blind retention of the traditional, 
without critical consideration of its utility. The retention is not strictly in ten-
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of contracts and other legal transactions which A can use to 
obtain these desired advantages. 
Usually L does not undertake to induce A to do the effec-
tive act nor does he endeavor to discourage A from doing 
it. The act is ordinarily permitted and discretionary as well 
a& effective. Whether the act is performed or not depends 
on the existing self-interest of A and not on any legally stimu-
lated motivation. So far as the law prescribes the purpose 
for which an effective act may be done or the manner in which 
it may be done, the common sanction is failure of effect. If 
A attempts to accomplish an unlawful purpose through an 
effective act, as where he enters into a contract in unreason-
able restraint of trade, his contract is illegal and unenforcible. 
Likewise, the sanction for failure to comply with legal pro-
visions prescribing the way the act is to be executed, is ineffec-
tiveness. For example, if the law requires that A sign his 
will and have his signature witnessed by two persons, his will 
is a nullity if it is witnessed by only one person. In both the 
case of the illegal contract and the case of the defective will, 
A fails to comply with the terms and conditions under which 
legal services are tendered and the result is that the services 
are withheld. 
However, there is no reason in the nature of things, why 
the lawmaker must adopt an attitude of neutrality toward 
the act which is effective.1 There is no reason why he cannot 
combine effectiveness with sanctions of various sorts. There 
is no reason why he cannot make an act effective and forbid 
tional, but rather results from inattention or inertia. The statement of the 
text expresses what L should do in the establishment of patterns for effective 
action. Whether or not L's action or nonaction always produces this result 
is another question. If a discrepancy exists it is merely another instance of 
the discrepancy between the ideal and the actual in the legal processes. 
1 In general, the legal system also adopts a "hands-off" policy toward 
permitted, discretionary, and ineffective acts; it does not punish or reward 
them; it does not seek to deter A from doing them nor does it try to encourage 
him to act. The legal attitude is neutral or indifferent. For this reason it does 
not seem necessary to discuss further the relations of sanctions to these types 
of acts. Nothing essential would be added to what is said in this and the 
preceding sections about the operation of sanctions. 
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it too, or why he cannot make A's act effective and also com-
mand A to do the act. If the lawmaker sees fit he can declare 
an act effective and at the same time try to deter or encourage 
the actor who does it. This is all to say that effectiveness is 
but one of several types of consequences which L may attach 
to the doing of an act and that the several types of conse-
quences are not mutually exclusive.2 In fact, in earlier 
sections it was pointed out that effectiveness and other con-
sequences are not infrequently combined. I refer again to the 
following: 
(I) The wrongful seizure of another's goods which is 
effective for certain purposes even though it is prohibited; 
( 2) Filing an income tax return and registration for the 
draft, which are effective acts and at the same time oblig-
atory; 
(3) Enlistment in the army which is an effective act but 
which is favored by special inducements such as high pay, 
etc.; 
( 4) Engaging in the liquor business-a series of effective 
acts-which may be discouraged by various restrictions and 
tax burdens. 
Sec. 2-42. Problems. I. Consider the provisions of section 
1092 of the Civil Code of California (enacted I 872): A grant 
of an estate in real property may be made in substance as 
follows: 
"I, A B, grant to C D all that real property situated in 
(insert name of county) County, State of California, bounded 
(or described) as follows: (here insert description, or if the 
2 In a similar way the legal policy of indifference toward discretionary, 
permitted and ineffective acts is not invariable (see sec. ~-II above). For 
instance, a discretionary act may be rewarded by a subsidy or benefit which 
encourages the doing of the act. And an act which is declared ineffective 
may also be punished, as where a contract in restraint of trade is unenforcible 
and visited with criminal penalties as well. 
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land sought to be conveyed has a descriptive name, it may 
be described by the name, as for instance, 'The Norris 
Ranch.') 
"Witness my hand this (insert day) day of (insert month), 
18-. 
"A B." 
How would you interpret these provisions in relation to the 
discussion in section 2-2 7 above? 
2. The 4th section of the Statute of Frauds enacts that: 
"No action shall be brought ... upon any contract or 
sale of lands . . . or any interest in or concerning them . . . 
unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, 
or some memorandum, or note thereof, shall be in writing, 
and signed by the party to be charged therewith .... " 1 
This section obviously makes writing and signature by the 
party to be charged requisites of a binding contract for the 
sale of land. 
What is the effect of the lack of these formalities? 
Would you regard this effect as a penalty for not using 
writing? 
3· P swept manure from the street into piles intending 
to haul it away on the following day. D, however, hauled 
it away before P returned to get it. In a suit to recover the 
value of the manure the court held that P had taken posses-
sion thereof in a sense sufficient to be entitled to recover the 
value of the manure from D.2 
How would you characterize P's act of sweeping the ma-
nure into piles? How does the law figure in the problem? 
Suppose P had only decided that he would sweep up and 
haul away the manure the next day; and that D had swept 
it up and taken it away as he did, knowing of P's decision. 
Would the result have been the same? Why? 
1 This is a celebrated statute first enacted in England in 166o and adopted 
in substantially the same words by the various states of the United States. 
2 Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. soo (1871). 
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4· Informers are frequently offered inducements by law 
to furnish information leading to the conviction of criminals 
or to the recovery of taxes and other money due to the gov-
ernment. For example, at the present time, the federal gov-
ernment offers to pay a certain percentage of the amount 
recovered from A who fails to make a correct income tax 
return, to B who gives information leading to such recovery. 
Note here that four important acts are involved: 
( r) The legislative act of creating a standard applicable 
to A. 
( 2) The act of A (filing a return) required by the legal 
standard. 
(3) The offer of a reward to B for giving information. 
( 4) The act of B in giving information. 
What is the ultimate act which government is trying to 
induce? Would you regard the offer of a reward to B as a 
method of enforcement? How does this offer appear to B? 
How does this offer differ from a subsidy offered to the 
farmer for raising certain crops? 
Why not simply command everyone (B) who has informa-
tion regarding tax evasion, to furnish it to the proper author-
ities? 
5. When A drives his car recklessly and collides with a 
car which is being driven properly and carefully by B, what 
standard is involved? Suppose that B's car is damaged to the 
extent of $25, but that it will cost him $50 for fees and costs 
to pursue a lawsuit to a conclusion? How would you criticize 
this situation in terms of motivation of acts? Of effectuation 
of standards? 
6. Consider the following provisions of the Michigan stat-
utes regarding wagers: 
"All notes, bills, bonds, mortgages, or other securities or 
conveyances whatever, in which the whole or any part of the 
consideration shall be for any money or goods, won by play-
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ing at cards, dice, or any other game whatever, or by betting 
on the sides or hands of such as are gaming, or by any betting 
or gaming whatever, ... shall be void and of no effect, 
as between the parties to the same. . . ." 3 
"Any person who by playing at cards, dice, or any other 
game, or by betting or putting up money on cards, or by 
any other means or device in the nature of betting on cards, 
or betting of any kind, shall win or obtain any sum of money 
or any goods, or any article of value whatever shall, if the 
money, goods, or articles so won or obtained be of the value 
of fifty dollars or less, be guilty of a misdemeanor. If the 
money, goods, or articles so won be of the value of more than 
fifty dollars such person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, 
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more 
than one year, or by a fine of not more than five hundred 
dollars." 4 
"Any person who shall lose any sum of money, or any 
goods, article, or thing of value, by playing or betting on 
cards, dice or by any other device in the nature of such play-
ing or betting, and shall pay or deliver the same or any part 
thereof to the winner, and shall not, within three (3) months 
after such loss, ... , prosecute with effect for such money 
or goods, the winner to whom such money or goods shall 
have been so paid or delivered, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor, punishable by a fine not exceeding three (3) times 
the value of such money or goods. Such loser may sue for 
and recover such money in an action for money had and 
received to the use of the plaintiff .... " 5 
What is the general standard sought to be effectuated 
here? Can each of these sections be regarded as making pro-
vision for a method of effectuation? 
7· Thompson v. Commonwealth.6 Opinion of the court 
by Judge Bennett: 
"The appellant was convicted of the crime of robbing J. R. 
Barnes. The money that the appellant is accused of robbing 
3 Mich. Stat. Ann. sec. 18.933. 
4 Mich. Stat. Ann. sec. 2.8.546. 
5 Mich. Stat. Ann. sec. z8._547· 
6 13 Ky. L. R. 916 (1892). 
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said Barnes of, was won by Barnes from the appellant that 
evening at an unlawful game; and the appellant, thereafter, 
presented his pistol on Barnes and compelled him to return 
him the money thus won. 
"Under our statute the title to the money won by Barnes 
did not pass to him or from the appellant; nor did the right 
to its possession pass to Barnes as against the appellant. 
"It is a uniform rule that a person is not guilty of stealing 
that that belongs to him and to which he has a right. Robbery 
is larceny, accompanied by violence, and putting the person 
from whom the property is taken in fear. Here the fact that 
the appellant was entitled to the money, and Barnes' posses-
sion of it was not rightful as against the appellant, stripped 
the appellant's act of feloniously taking the property of 
another with the fraudulent intention of permanently depriv-
ing the owner of it. 
"The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion." 
What method of effectuating an antiwagering standard 
does this decision allow? 
8. Suppose the state adopts a policy of trying to reform 
the persons confined in its prisons. Where would its efforts 
along this line fit into our scheme of methods for effectuating 
standards? 
UsEs OF STANDARDS TO GumE AcTION * 
Sec. 2-43. Uses generally-use by lawmaker (L). We 
have now examined the standards applicable to A's acts and 
the ways in which these standards are effectuated. There 
remain for consideration the intentional uses of these stand-
ards to guide action. How are they used and by whom? How 
does the lawmaker use them? How does the actor, A, use 
them? What do officials do with the standards? And the legal 
* (I.R.) The uses of standards to guide action will be discussed further 
in chapter 3, "Standards for Official Acts." The division of material between 
that chapter and this is largely dictated by considerations of convenience in 
teaching. 
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counselor? And the student of Law? The discussion of these 
questions will occupy us in the next several sections. 
The discussion of the use of standards to guide action will 
follow closely what has already been said about the use of 
language for the purpose of guidance. This is not r-emarkable 
inasmuch as standards are patterns in verbal form and any 
use of a standard is a use of language. The creation of a 
standard is a directive use of language and the other uses 
to be considered are all responses or reactions to what the 
lawmaker has declared as a standard.1 First, then, of the law-
maker's use of standards. 
The lawmaker, L, is in the position of a speaker. He issues 
verbal directives for the guidance of others.2 He uses stand-
ards instrumentally, to control the behavior of others. He 
creates them as one might devise tools for particular purposes. 
He sets them up in order to achieve results which he wishes to 
bring about.** These observations hold equally of all stand-
ards; whether for obligatory, prohibited, effective, permitted, 
discretionary, or ineffective acts. All standards alike are re-
lated to a maker as his handiwork; all are employed to guide 
the activity of others, by furnishing them with verbal patterns 
to follow. 
Sec. 2-44. Use of standards by A and his counselor (C). 
The standards with which we are now concerned are ad-
dressed to the individual actor, A. He is in the position of 
hearer, and is intended to shape his acts by reference to the 
1 In addition to standards, which are directive uses of language (sec. r-o8), 
we shall also have occasion to speak of habit patterns, which are informative 
uses of language (sec. r-II). These observed patterns of behavior are used 
primarily in predicting the acts of others. Their discussion does not fall 
strictly within our title, "Uses of Standards to Guide Action"; but an under-
standing of their role is essential to our present job. See sec. ~-46 below. 
2 This is not the place to go into the ways in which standards are created; 
the modes of their creation are reserved for detailed discussion in chapters 
4 and 6. It is only essential for you to note at this point that a standard 
is produced by a lawmaker for the guidance of others. 
** (I.R.) See sec. ~-or, note * above. 
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standards. In this sense they are standards for A's use; they 
cover, in more or less detail, important acts which he may 
do or think of doing. They are patterns which he can use 
in planning action of any kind. They tell him when and how 
he must act; they tell him what he must not do, what he 
must do, what he can do effectively, and so on. 
When A is planning to act he will probably think first of· 
safe lines of conduct; he will use standards for prohibited 
acts as criteria of what he must avoid, and use standards for 
permitted acts to determine how far his range of activity is 
free, and in that sense, safe. When he wants to know whether 
he must act or not, the standards for discretionary acts will 
be instructive. When he is undertaking obligatory action he 
will be anxious to fulfill legal requirements in all respects; 
he will use the standards as models with which to compare 
his own proposed act to make sure that it satisfies all requi-
sites. And when he is aiming to do an effective act, he will 
treat the standards for effective acts, and their opposites, as 
check lists against which to measure the act he is doing so 
that he will omit nothing essential to its effectiveness. 
But the legal system presents a vast arsenal of standards 
applicable to A's conduct, an arsenal so large that it is quite 
impossible for him to be familiar with them all. Many of 
these standards are set forth in technical legal terms which 
A cannot understand. Many of them are very complicated 
or indefinite in nature so that A does not know how to inter-
pret or apply them. The result of all these factors together 
is that A frequently cannot apply the appropriate standards 
without assistance. He cannot act safely and effectively on his 
own and he cannot determine for himself the significance 
of acts that he has done. Whether he is trying to plan action 
or to determine the consequences of action already taken, he 
must be aided by an expert in the law, a legal counselor. 
This legal counselor, whom I shall henceforth call C, is 
a man trained in the art of dealing with legal standards. He 
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is familiar with many more of the established standards than 
the ordinary man is. Yet C does not know all the standards 
that are in the law books; not even learned judges do, nor 
professorial oracles of legal doctrine; there are far too many 
standards to be known and remembered by anyone. C's value 
to his client lies quite as much in his mastery of legal method 
as in his knowledge of the law. He knows how and where to 
find the relevant legal standards; he knows how to read a 
statute and how to analyze a case; he knows how to interpret 
and apply standards to cases; and he knows the standards 
and methods by which courts and other official agencies 
operate. In short, C is familiar with the legal processes; he 
can "reason like a lawyer" and find his way about in the 
legal labyrinth. 
With his knowledge of legal standards and his experience 
in their use, C is prepared to aid A in planning action. He 
steers A's activities along safe and effective lines. He warns 
A away from the rocks, and shoals of forbidden action; he 
advises A as to the best ways of bringing about desired results. 
For instance, such questions as these may have to be deter-
mined: Is it better to organize A's business in the form of a 
partnership or in the form of a corporation? What advantages 
and what dangers are involved in each form of organization? 
Or again, is it better for A to convey Blackacre to his son 
by deed in A's life, or by will to him at A's death? Is it better 
to convey to the son outright, or to set up a trust and allow 
the son to have only the income therefrom? The answers to 
such questions will depend largely on relevant legal stand-
ards and the way they are applied. The answers will involve 
the weighing of A's general objective successively with ref-
erence to possible standard acts and their consequences, and 
the making of a choice between acts on the basis of what will 
most nearly accomplish A's objective. 
Frequently A requires more than the advice of a lawyer; 
he has to have the latter's help in the actual doing of acts 
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which will conform to standard. He may require the lawyer 
to do acts on his behalf, and he may require the lawyer to 
draft papers for him. When A embarks upon a lawsuit, he 
needs the knowledge and skill of an advocate who will draw 
and file pleadings on his behalf and carry his case through 
the intricacies of legal procedure. When A wants to join with 
others in the organization of a corporation, he requires the 
services of a legally skilled draftsman to prepare the neces-
sary papers for himself and his associates to execute. Even 
when A knows that he wants to dispose of his estate by will 
and knows whom he wants to make his beneficiaries, A needs 
for safety's sake to have a lawyer draw the instrument in 
assured legal terms and form. 
But only too often A does not plan his action in reference 
to applicable standards; he fails to evaluate his act before-
hand in terms of legal patterns of conduct. He drives at a 
reckless rate of speed and strikes and injures B, and then 
worries about consequences. He enters into a contract with X 
without proper advice or deliberation, and later comes to 
appreciate the improvidence of what he has done. In such 
cases, standards first enter A's calculations when he realizes 
that he has landed in trouble and tries to take stock of his 
situation. Is he liable to B for damages? Has he any defenses? 
Is the contract with X binding? Legal standards furnish A 
with answers. Moreover, standards furnish him with patterns 
for further possible acts by which he can extricate himself 
from his present difficulties, such as settling or litigating the 
respective claims of B and X. 
And incidentally, it is of special interest to us as lawyers 
that it is just at this point-where A must have answers to 
questions like these-that he is apt to call on his legal 
counselor to help him, to decide on the significance of what 
he has done or to suggest ways of getting out of trouble with 
as little pain as possible. When he is threatened with prosecu-
STANDARDS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL'S ACTS 113 
tion or lawsuit or bankruptcy, A calls upon C. C gives his 
opinion on the facts as A states them, and decides whether 
A has failed to do what he should, has done a forbidden act, 
has exceeded the limits of permissible action, or has executed 
a legally effective contract.1 If the answer to any of these 
queries is in the affirmative, C must decide what the effects 
of A's acts are and then advise him what to do. When this 
point is reached, C finds himself once more engaged in plan-
ning future acts. He is using his know ledge of legal standards 
and legal procedures as a basis for guiding A's acts. Usually 
such a situation presents to C and A a choice of courses of 
action. In the case of the collision, A may plead guilty to a 
criminal charge or may elect to go to trial. He may admit 
his liability for damages for reckless driving and pay the 
injured party; he may decide to fight the case, especially 
if there is doubt as to the facts; or he may deny liability but 
try to make a settlement of some kind. A may have to con-
sider similar alternatives with reference to an improvident 
contract: performance, defending a lawsuit by the other 
party, or even bankruptcy. C advises A in his choice in the 
light of the consequences which are applicable to the various 
alternatives. 
Sec. 2-45. Use of standards by 0. The standards which we 
are considering are addressed immediately to A, the indi-
vidual, and are intended to guide his behavior. But these 
standards are also of great interest to official agencies (which 
we shall designate generically by "0"): the policeman, the 
prosecutor, the court. Their official acts are largely concerned 
with steering or pushing A's activities ~long approved lines 
of behavior. By the same token their acts are tied to his acts 
and involve important uses of the standards applicable to his 
acts. 
1 In such a case, C must size up the situation in terms of existing standards 
in about the same way that the judge does. See the next following section. 
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First, the standards which are applicable to A's acts also 
define the occasions when O, the agent of the social giant, is 
to move. In this sense, the standards which are directed 
primarily to A carry secondary messages to 0; the latter is 
to act if A acts in certain ways. When A commits a crime, 
0 must see that he is punished; when A commits a tort, 0 
must aid A's victim to obtain compensation; when A does an 
act which the legal system has undertaken to make effective 
at his behest, 0 must carry out A's verbally expressed desires 
according to the legal assurance which was given. 
The use which the court makes of standards applicable to 
A's act may be taken as typical of the use of such standards 
by officials generally.1 The court must decide whether A's 
act fits a particular standard and hence calls for action on 
its part. The court uses the standard as the doctor uses the 
standardized picture of disease in medical diagnosis.2 The 
doctor checks off the features of his patient's condition against 
the list of symptoms which constitute a disease syndrome 
such as typhoid. He notices perhaps just one symptom, e. g., 
a fever, belonging to the typhoid picture; this suggests that 
the rest of the symptoms may also be present. He then 
examines the patient to determine whether the other symp-
toms can be found, and if they can be, he proceeds with 
treatment for typhoid. If he fails to find the other symptoms, 
he compares the case with another disease picture, and an-
other, until he finds a standard picture which it fits. And the 
court proceeds in a similar way. It compares a presented case 
with a legally established behavior pattern to see if it fits.3 
1 As we have not yet clcussed the separate functions of judge and jury, 
I speak here of the court as a unit embracing both. The functions of judge 
and jury will be treated in chapter 3· 
2 See CoLUMBIA AssoCIATES, AN INTRODUCTION To REFLECTIVE THINKING 
31-32. (192.3). 
3 An appreciation of the jucjicial method of applying standards to cases, 
here analyzed and illustrated, should be helpful to you in understanding the 
cases which you read in your casebooks. Most of what appears in a judicial 
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Suppose, for example, that A is charged with larceny (theft) 
of an automobile. It is shown that he took an automobile 
which he saw standing on the street to use it for a "joy ride" 
of an hour or two. Can he be held for the crime charged? 
Larceny is defined as the act of taking and carrying away the 
goods of another with intent to deprive the owner perma-
nently thereof; this definition fixes a standard criminal act 
for the court to apply. A, in our supposed case, would not 
be guilty of larceny, because one of the elements of the crime 
is lacking; he did not intend to deprive the owner perma-
nently of his automobile. However, the prosecuting authori-
ties might find another standard pattern of crime which A's 
act would fit, e. g., unlawfully driving away an automobile, 
and might then prosecute him for the latter offense. When 
and if the court finds that A's act fits a legally prescribed 
pattern, it acts: it metes out to him the legally specified 
consequences of what he has done, quite as the doctor applies 
the remedy which the patient's case demands. 
So much for the first and most general use which 0 makes 
of a standard applicable to A's act: to decide whether an 
occasion is presented which calls for action by himself. But 
there is a second important use which 0 often makes of this 
kind of standard.4 He uses it in planning what he shall do 
as well as in deciding whether he shall act. He treats the 
standard as the delineation of a goal for his own action. This 
is just another way of saying that 0 recognizes it as his task 
decision is an exposition of the reasons for applying or not applying a particu-
lar standard to a presented case. 
Thus far we have referred chiefly to the standards which are found in stat-
utes; many of the standards which decisions involve are found in the case law 
rather than the statutes. We shall have a great deal to say about the case law 
later on. But for the moment we are interested only in the method of apply-
ing standards and this method is essentially the same whether the standards 
be found in the statutes or in the case law. 
4 Other incidental uses of standards applicable to A's act will be mentioned 
in chapter 3· These uses seem to be less closely associated with A's act than with 
O's, and are therefore reserved for discussion along with official acts. 
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to effectuate the standard. It means that the remedy that 0 
gives follows the lines of the standard applicable to A's act. 
Consider again, for example, a case previously mentioned, 
where A agreed by a valid contract to convey his farm Black-
acre to B.5 If A refuses to convey, his obligation may be 
enforced by a court's order to make the conveyance agreed. 
In this case the court shapes its act, i. e., order to perform, 
so as to bring about the obligatory act which a legal standard 
imposes upon A. This standard marks out for the court what 
it shall put in its order; and the order is an act which makes 
the standard effective in this particular instance.* Suppose, 
for another example, that 0, a policeman, arrives on the 
scene when A is robbing B. 0 stops the robbery and takes 
A into custody. 0 does not have to wait until a robbery is 
complete; he is entitled to act when a robbery is in process; 
he acts to prevent its consummation.6 In this sense the stand-
ard fixes the objective of O's act (as well as the occasion for 
it) and this objective in turn defines the kinds of acts which 
0 can appropriately do, such as arresting A, or frightening 
him away, or pursuing him, or killing him if necessary. 
Not all remedial acts by 0 are so obviously tailored to a 
standard applicable to A's acts as are the two remedies just 
mentioned. Most remedies are mere substitutes for what a 
standard calls for, as where A is required to pay money 
damages for a barn of B which A has wrongfully destroyed. 
The property is gone and nothing can restore conditions 
5 See sec. 2.-38. 
* (I.R.) My purpose in citing remedial examples in this and the following 
paragraph, is very limited. For this reason I do not attempt to state all the 
"ifs" and "ands" of the law applicable to the remedies mentioned. 
6 This case is also interesting because the standard has to be applied to an 
act by A which is underway rather than complete. This change in the facts 
makes no real change in the use which 0 makes of a standard. The stand-
ard is used as a basis of comparison with A's activity whether that activity 
be complete or only begun. The difference in the time at which the standard 
is applied to A's act does not affect the method of applying it to measure 
the quality of A's conduct. 
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which should now exist.7 However, so far as 0 acts to enforce 
or effectuate a standard, 0 is necessarily guided by what the 
standard provides. He must consider the standard in order 
to devise a suitable substitute. He must consider the nature 
and value of B's barn which would now be standing but for 
A's violation of a standard, in order to decide how much A 
must pay B by way of damages. To take another example, 
a legal standard requires A to support his child according 
to its need and his own financial ability. If A fails in his duty 
to provide shelter and necessaries for his child, a court will, 
in a proper suit by those who furnish these things, compel 
A to pay therefor. The court's judgment in this case is 
intended to achieve as nearly as may be the results which 
the legal standard requires. The amount of bills chargeable 
to A will be measured by reference to the child's needs and 
to A's ability to pay, just as the legal standard measures A's 
obligation to support. In other words, the remedy follows 
the lines of the standard of activity required of A.8 
Sec. 2-46. Use by A of standards applicable to B--reliance 
on B's habits. Our ubiquitous individual, A, frequently has 
occasion to apply standards to the acts of another individual, 
B. This results from the fact that B's acts affect A in various 
ways and he must determine the significance of B's acts in 
7 Similar observations hold of criminal penalties (see sec. :z.-3 5 above). 
The imposition of a penalty does not restore, in fact it does not even approxi-
mate, the status quo ante. The murderer's victim cannot be revived by anything 
that is done to the murderer. And yet the size and character of the penalty 
is always affected in some degree by the character of the standard which is 
violated. This is true whether we are concerned with the penalty imposed by 
law or the penalty imposed in the individual instance by the sentence of 
a court. 
8 Many of A's acts affect other persons. For this reason, the standards appli-
cable to his acts are important to them as well as to officials and to A himself. 
These persons use the standards in essentially the same way that officials use 
them in deciding whether to act and what to do. 
Compare sec. :z.-46, where I mention the reverse situation, in which A ap-
plies standards applicable to B's acts. 
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relation to his own undertakings. When A applies standards 
to acts done by B, he uses the standards in essentially the 
same way as officials use them who are deciding whether to 
act and what to do. A, who is loaning money to B, asks and 
answers the question whether B has executed his promissory 
note in due and proper form; A, who has been injured in 
a collision with B, asks and answers the question whether B's 
conduct fits the standard for a negligent act in order to 
determine whether to sue B for damages; and so on. 
But A's concern with acts of B is not confined to acts which 
B is doing or has already done; it is not confined to questions 
whether B's actual acts measure up to prescribed standards. 
A often wants to figure out what B is going to do at some 
future time. He needs to predict the future behavior of B. 
As a basis for prediction, A relies not so much on standards 
as on another kind of behavior pattern, the pattern which 
summarizes and describes B's habits of action.1 A knows, as 
we all do, that human behavior manifests certain constancies 
which enable him to forecast the ways of future action. These 
constancies are the observed patterns of the past behavior of 
B. When A is in possession of such observed patterns of 
behavior, he is in a position to prophesy the lines which B's 
future action will take. He knows what to expect from B.* 
Of course, A may, and sometimes does, use the prescribed 
standards of the community as a basis for predicting B's 
behavior. This A is able to do because he can assume that 
1 Notice that here we are returning to a distinction earlier made-the 
distinction between directive and informative uses of language. (sees. 1-o7 to 
r-u.) There we looked at this distinction primarily from the speaker's view-
point. Here we are interested in A's utilization of directions and information 
as guides for his action. 
* (I.R.) This section, regarding actual behavior of B and A's forecasts 
of B's behavior, parallels a later section (3-32) relative to O's behavior. The 
statements of the text are intended to express the views of a miscellaneous group 
of modern writers often lumped together under the name "realists." In sec. 
3-32, note *, will be found a short bibliography of items representing and 
discussing the realist viewpoint. 
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B, 1 ke other members of the community, has habits which 
conform to these standards. Thus, A may take for granted 
that B will pay his debts, and drive with proper care. But 
what A must not forget in such a case is that he is resting 
his calculations on assumed law-abiding habits of the com-
munity, and that he is also assuming B's habits are like those 
of the rest of the community in this regard.2 
If standards covered every act which B might do, and if 
standards were always effectuated to the letter, A might in 
all cases rely upon legal standards as bases of predicting B's 
conduct. A might simply look to the applicable legal stand-
ards and say, "This is what legal standards prescribe forB, 
and I expect him to behave accordingly." But most of B's 
conduct falls beyond the range of coercive legal standards. 
Most of the acts which he may do are neither prohibited 
nor obligatory; they are privileged, or discretionary, or both. 
When A wants to formulate a prediction of what B will do 
in this nonregulated area, A can only rely on B's habits and 
B's declarations. Thus, if A as host issues a dinner invitation 
to B, he relies upon the verbal acceptance of his invitation. 
B is not legally obliged to come, even if he has promised to.8 
2 Constancies of observed behavior may be: 1. patterns which describe 
behavior of persons generally (any B), or 2. patterns which describe the 
behavior of a particular person (specific B). Of the first type is the observation 
that businessmen usually pay their debts. Of the second type is the observation 
that a specific B is a conscientious person and always inclined to perform 
his duties. Both types of pattern put the observer in a position to predict future 
action by a specific B. Both are patterns based on past conduct. Both are 
general, the one a generalization of the conduct of the many, the other 
a generalization of B's modes of behavior. 
Also included in the factors on which A relies are the habits of officials. 
Just as A assumes that B, like the rest of the community, habitually performs 
according to standard, so he makes this kind of assumption about 0. He 
assumes that O's habits of action conform to prescribed standards. This factor 
will be considered later, in sec. 3-32. 
3 See sees. 2-o5, 2-07 and 2-11, regarding the unregulated areas of indi-
vidual action. We have already considered the importance of the actor's 
motives for action in these areas. At the moment we are interested in bases 
of prediction, and are therefore concerned with B's habits rather than his 
motives. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that motives other than those legally 
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However, A knows that guests usually make a practice of 
coming when they say they will. He knows that B is accus-
tomed to keep his promises, and he has B's declaration of 
intention to come. And again, if A is a dealer in men's suits, 
and is about to lay in a stock for sale to the spring trade, he 
procures a stock based on his knowledge of the buying habits 
of his clientele. He makes his best guess as to what, and how 
much, that clientele will want. As none of his clientele is 
obliged to buy from him, A can only count on their habits 
of so doing.4 
Furthermore, even where legal standards are applicable, 
B does not always conform to them. There is always some 
divergence between prescribed standards and the forms which 
B's behavior actually takes. Indeed, A, who is planning action 
and trying to forecast what B will do, may find observatiom 
of B's past behavior more useful in making these calculations 
than he does the prescribed patterns of the law. Thus, if A 
is a banker and about to loan money to B, he probably counts 
more on what he knows about the habits of businessmen 
like B in paying their debts, or on what he knows of B's 
character in particular, than he does on the abstract legal 
requirement that B must repay the loan. 
What is said of the basis for A's predictions and calculations 
applies no less to those of his counselor. The counselor draws 
heavily on his fund of experience with the actual behavior 
of clients, witnesses and opponents. Trying· cases, drawing 
papers, advising clients, are not just matters of knowing 
induced may determine B's conduct. B may not want to accept, or may not want 
to go after he has accepted; but social pressures such as fear of group 
disapproval or of deprival of business may coerce performance. Whatever 
the reasons, A may count on his coming. 
4 Popular and business journals are replete with prognostications of future 
behavior of groups and individuals. Typical is the following calculation of 
future buying behavior which is taken from Newsweek for December u, 
1950: "A General Electric official said, 'The company expects a 25-30% 
drop in next year's demand for electrical appliances. Higher taxes and prices, 
credit restrictions, and less residential building would cause the decline.' " 
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legal standards, or knowing where to find them. The success-
ful pursuit of his professional tasks involves knowledge of 
people; it involves experience in dealing with people. It 
involves the ability to predict what people will do. It is 
hardly less important that the counselor be acquainted with 
business practices and with the actual ways of life in his 
community, than that he have knowledge of the legal stand-
ards which are applicable to them. 
Sec. 2-47. Use by student of law (S). We have now 
examined characteristic uses of standards by lawmaker, by 
actor, by officials, and by legal counselor. To these uses, which 
may be regarded as uses by actual participants in the legal 
drama, we must add the uses of another class of interested 
persons who view the operation of the legal system from the 
outside, somewhat as the theatergoer views the play. This 
class of observers of the legal scene includes many persons.1 
But I propose to notice only a limited group of them-
students of law, whom I shall designate henceforth by the 
letter S. I have picked the student group for attention because 
it includes both you and the more experienced students who 
serve as your instructors. S's methods of using standards are 
those which you will employ as you work alone. S's methods 
are those which you will employ as you and your instructors 
1 Other serious and significant groups of observers of the legal scene are 
legal scientists, legal scholars, and legal historians. Their work is most im-
portant; but their uses of standards present no features not illustrated by the 
uses herein discussed. In fact, in most essentials, the uses which scholars and 
scientists make are like the uses of the student, and the uses of the historian 
are like applications to past acts which are made by A and 0. 
Observers include also the ordinary citizen when he is not immediately in-
volved in a legal problem. They include writers and readers of detective 
fiction who see in legal standards and their applications merely dramatic 
opportunities, opportunities to portray distortions of law, technical hardships, 
and clever evasions. This attitude toward legal standards is well expressed 
in the following publisher's blurb attached to Arthur Train's Tutt and Mr. 
Tutt: "Come Right In! Here Is Your Ringside Seat! Any law case in the 
hands of Ephraim Tutt, America's best loved lawyer, is as much fun as 
a ringside circus." 
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analyze decisions together, and apply standards in your vari-
ous law courses. 
Standards are used by S in two distinctive ways; both 
underscore the fact that he is a nonparticipant in the operation 
of the legal system. First, S considers how others have ap-
plied standards to actual cases. He observes and talks about 
cases which others have already disposed of. However S is 
not a mere passive spectator. Though he is outside the legal 
drama, he is by no means indifferent to what transpires in it. 
He follows the applications of standards which judges and 
others make, and does this critically. S may be likened to 
the drama student who thinks about the action of a play and 
decides how he would have acted the various roles if he were 
playing them.2 S reads the reported case, such as you have in 
your casebooks, and notes how the judge applied standards 
to the facts of the case. S then acts in the sense that he makes 
imaginative applications of standards to the case himself. This 
imaginative application of standards to cases gives S necessary 
exercise in the use of standards. He develops skill in the 
methods of using them and develops his critical faculties as 
regards their use. This reworking of the work of others 
prepares him for the day when he will be an actual partici-
pant in the operation of the legal machine as counselor, as 
advocate, as judge, or as lawmaker. 
The second distinctive use which S makes of standards is 
the hypothetical use. He deals with hypothetical acts, hypo-
thetical applications of standards, and even hypothetical 
standards. He propounds hypothetical cases and tries to find 
appropriate standards to apply; he makes up supposed case 
2 The lawmaker, the actor, the judge, and others can also put themselves 
in imagination into other roles than those which they are playing. As Hamlet 
could tell the players how they should speak their lines, any player can project 
himself into another role. But the fact remains that the legal players are 
primarily concerned with doing legally significant acts. They do not often 
find time to look at the operation of the legal system from the outside as 
S does. 
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after supposed case to see whether each case fits some existing 
standard; and he also engages in debate about what the 
standard ought to be rather than what it is. All this means 
that Sis interested in possible applications of possible stand-
ards to possible acts, and not merely interested in actual 
applications which he sees others make to actual acts.3 This 
kind of speculation is not mere idle play, however; it is not 
a pointless use of standard pictures and imaginary cases. 
Practice in applying standards to cases is the core of legal 
training; and a potent legal imagination is the most valuable 
instrument that a lawyer can have. Practice gives readiness 
to deal with the ordinary or easy case as it arises; and imagi-
nation represents the capacity to deal with the novel or diffi-
cult case. Working with hypothetical cases and hypothetical 
standards greatly expands S's range of practice; he handles 
hypothetically many times the number and variety of cases 
that he finds reported in decisions. And working in this specu-
lative way develops his legal imagination. For these reasons 
the neophyte in law should give full rein to his curiosity as 
regards possible standards and their uses, and labor with all 
the manifold acts and standards and applications that his 
ingenuity can muster. 
Beyond these abstract exercises in the use of legal stand-
ards, the lawyer's training must include practical experience 
in preparing pleadings, in trying cases, in advising clients, in 
3 The hypothetical use of standards is quite characteristic of S. For this 
reason I have treated this type of use in connection with S. However speculation 
is not limited to students of law; all persons who plan action make speculative 
applications of standards as they plan. The judge, for example, makes such 
applications as he ponders the decision to make in a particular case; he thinks 
out possible applications and their consequences; he weighs the arguments for 
applying this standard or that to the case. In his own planning the actor like-
wise considers the possible applications of standards to what he is about to do. 
And the counselor makes similar speculative applications. But the thinking 
of all these persons is normally limited by the needs of particular situations. 
They confine themselves to consideration of standards applicable to actually 
presented cases. S is not so restricted; he is not tied down, by time or purpose, 
to actual cases. He can and should venture as far as his imagination will carry 
him into the outer reaches of legal possibilities. 
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using the library, in drafting instruments. His training must 
include experience with business usages and with various 
kinds of people. The necessity for training in these respects 
has been suggested in the preceding sections where I have 
mentioned the work and the functions of the counselor.4 
However, I think it will be better to reserve the discussion 
of these practical phases of a lawyer's training for a later 
point; they raise questions which we are not yet ready to 
treat. Sufficient it is for the present to stress the law student's 
need to learn the traditional methods of using legal standards, 
of applying standards to cases and of fitting cases to standards. 
Whatever additional learning may be necessary, a familiarity 
with these methods is basic in the making of a lawyer. 
Sec. 2-48. Problems. The last several sections have indi-
cated the ways in which standards are used by lawmaker, 
actor, official, counselor, and law student. Consider the 
standards which are involved in the following problems, in 
relation to the materials of these sections. 
I. A statute provides: "Whoever shall wilfully and ma-
liciously wound or inflict bodily harm upon any person, either 
with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be guilty 
of a felony." D is charged thereunder with wilfully and 
maliciously wounding P. The undisputed evidence at the 
trial shows that D set fire to a haystack on the farm of X 
with the intent to injure X; that P was a tramp who was 
sleeping in said haystack; and that P received serious burns 
as a result of D's act. 
Is D liable for the crime charged? How is the statutory 
standard used in answering this question? Whose use of the 
standard is the focus of our interest here? 
Suppose another statute of the state provides: "Whoever 
shall wilfully and maliciously destroy or injure the personal 
4 See sees. :.-44 and 2.-46. 
STANDARDS FOR THE INDIVIDUAL'S ACTS 125 
property of another, shall be guilty of a felony." Would D be 
liable under this provision? Would he be liable for the 
wounding of P? 
2. State v. McGowan: 1 
"The statute of this state prescribes the punishment of 
arson, but it does not define the crime. We look to the com-
mon law for'its definition. 
"Arson, by the common law, is the wilful and malicious 
burning of the house of another. The word house, as here 
understood, includes not merely the dwelling-house, but all 
outhouses which are parcel thereof. I Hale 570. 4 Bla. Com. 
221. 2 Russ. on Crimes 551. 
"This information charges the accused with burning a 
dwelling-house and the question in the case, is, whether the 
building, which was in fact burned by him, was a dwelling-
house, within the meaning of the common law on this sub-
ject? That it was a dwelling-house, as distinguished from a 
building of any other kind, is certain. 
"The building is described to be one built and designed 
for a dwelling-house constructed in the usual manner. It was 
designed to be painted, but was not yet finished, in that 
respect, and not quite all the glass were set in one of the 
outer doors. The building had never been occupied, and it 
was not parcel nor an appurtenant of any other. 
"We think this was not a dwelling-house in such a sense, 
as that, to burn it, constituted the crime of arson. In shape 
and purpose, it was a dwelling-house, but not in fact, because 
it had never been dwelt in-it had never been used, and was 
not contemplated as then ready for the habitation of man. 
"Arson, as understood at the common law, was a most 
aggravated felony, and of greater enormity than any other 
unlawful burning, because it manifested in the perpetrator, 
a greater recklessness and contempt of human life, than the 
burning of any other building, and in which no human being 
was presumed to be. Such seems to be the spirit of the English 
cases on this subject, and especially the late case of Elsmore 
v. The Hundred of St. Briavells, 8 B. & C. 461. In that case, 
1 zo Conn. 244 (r8so). 
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Bayley, J ., in speaking of the building therein described, says, 
'It appeared to have been built for the purpose of being used 
as a dwelling-house, but it was in an unfinished state, and 
never was inhabited. There can not be a doubt, that the 
building in this case, was not a house in respect of which 
burglary or arson could be committed. It was a house in-
tended for residence, though it was not inhabited. It was 
not therefore a dwelling-house, though it was· intended to 
be one.'" 
Where did the court find the standard defined? Why was 
it not applicable to the case before the court? 
Suppose a statute had penalized the act of setting fire to 
a building. Why would this have been important? 
3. Suppose you are an attorney practicing in the state of 
Michianna. The statute quoted in section 2-28, problem 4, is 
in force there. You are asked by John Smith to draw a will 
for him leaving all his estate to his wife, Sarah. You take 
down from the shelf your book of legal forms and draw the 
following will according to a form therein contained. In what 
respect is this will insufficient to show execution according to 
the requirements of the statute? 
I, John Smith, a resident of the city of Ypsi-Ann, county of 
Washtenaw, state of Michianna, and residing therein at 205 
Green Street, being over the age of tw;enty-one years and 
of sound and disposing mind and memory, and not acting 
under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence of any person 
whomsoever, do make, publish and declare this my last will 
and testament, in the manner following, to wit: 
I. I direct that my executor hereinafter named pay and 
discharge all of my just debts and expenses. 
2. I hereby give, devise and bequeath unto my beloved 
wife, Sarah, all my property and estate, both real and 
personal, of whatsoever nature or wheresoever situated, 
to have and to hold the same absolutely. 
3· I hereby nominate and appoint Bank of Ypsi-Ann the 
executor of this, my last will and testament. 
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Lastly, I hereby revoke all former wills and codicils to 
wills heretofore by me made. 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal 
this 10th day of September, 1950. 
John Smith 
The foregoing instrument, consisting of one page, was at 
the date hereof signed, sealed and published by said John 
Smith, and declared by him to us to be his last will and 
testament who at his request have signed our names as wit-
nesses hereto. 
Richard Jones 
Residing at 1010 Main Street, Ypsi-Ann, Michianna 
Henry Brown 
Residing at 91 5 First Street, Y psi-Ann, Michianna 
4· Cochrane v. Moore: 2 
Action to try the right to one-fourth of the proceeds of 
the sale of a horse called Kilworth. The plaintiff Cochrane 
claimed the entire proceeds under a bill of sale. The defend-
ant Moore claimed a one-fourth interest in the horse by 
virtue of a prior transaction in which Benzon, the then 
owner of the horse, purported to give said interest to Moore. 
The relevant facts, as they appear in the judgment of 
Lopes, L.J ., and in that part of the evidence to which he 
attached credence, are shortly as follows: 
"The horse was in June, 1888, the property of Benzon, 
and was kept at the stables of a trainer named Yates, in or 
near Paris, and on the 8th of that month was ridden in a 
steeplechase by Moore, a gentleman rider. In consequence, 
as it appears, of some accident, the horse was not declared 
the winner, and on the same day, according to the view of 
the evidence taken by the learned judge, Benzon by words 
of present gift gave to Moore, and Moore accepted from 
Benzon, one undivided fourth part of this horse. 
"A few days subsequently Benzon wrote to Yates, in whose 
stables the horse was, and told him of the gift to Moore. But 
2 L. R. [x89o] 25 Q. B. D. 57· 
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he did not inform Moore, nor did Moore know of any com-
munication to Yates of the fact of the gift." 
In the following month Cochrane made several large 
advances of money to Benzon by way of loans, and finally 
Benzon executed a bill of sale of Kilworth and other horses 
to Cochrane by way of security for repayment of the money 
which Cochrane had advanced. 
"It is proved by the evidence of the witnesses, whom the 
learned judge believed, that, before the execution of the bill 
of sale, Benzon, with the assistance of a friend, Mr. Powell, 
was going through the list of horses to be included in the 
schedule, and that when Kilworth was mentioned Powell 
spoke of Moore's interest in the horse, and that thereupon 
a discussion arose as to what was to be done with it, and that 
Cochrane undertook that it should be 'all right.' After this 
the bill of sale was executed by Benzon. 
"On these facts, it was argued that there was no delivery 
and receipt of the one-fourth of the horse, and, consequently, 
that no property in it passed by the gift. The learned judge, 
has, however, held that delivery is not indispensable to the 
validity of the gift." 
In the Court of Appeal Lord Justices Fry and Bowen and 
Lord Esher, M.R., were unanimous in holding that the 
attempted gift from Benzon to Moore was ineffective for the 
lack of delivery. Fry, L.J., reviewed the authorities and con-
cluded that according to the old law no transfer of a chattel 
whatever was effectual without delivery, and that on that 
doctrine of the old law two exceptions had been grafted: one, 
the case where the chattel is transferred by deed and the 
other, the case of a contract of sale, where the intention of 
the parties is that the property shall pass before delivery. 
He declared that in these two exceptional instances title may 
pass without delivery but in all other cases, including the 
case of the oral gift, delivery is essential to the transfer of 
title. 
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However, the Court of Appeal did support Moore's claim 
to a one-fourth interest in the horse and dismissed Cochrane's 
appeal from the judgment of Lopes, L.J ., on the theory that 
"what took place between Benzon and Cochrane before 
Benzon executed the bill of sale to Cochrane, constituted 
the latter a trustee for Moore of one-fourth of the horse 
Kilworth." 
Here the Court of Appeal mentioned four possible efiec~ 
tive acts. What were they? The court considered two verbal 
acts done by Benzon. What were they? 
The court chiefly discussed oral gift; it came to the con-
clusion that Benzon had not made a good gift of the 
one-fourth interest in the horse to Moore. Why not? 
However the court held that Benzon had created a valid 
trust in Moore's favor. Do you think Benzon intended to 
create a trust? (Of course you have not yet learned what 
a trust is; but it is not necessary that you should know more 
than that a trust is an arrangement under which one person 
holds property for another's benefit.)* 
Not all courts would conjure up a trust as this court did. 
If you were a legal counselor today for a party (like Benzon) 
who wanted to make a present of a one-fourth interest in a 
horse to another (like Moore), what would you advise your 
client to do? 
Sec. 2-49. Summary. The foregoing chapter has been 
centered on the acts of the individual, A, and the standards 
which the lawgiver establishes to guide A's acts. 
* (I.R.) 
"In the early days, before the evolution of the informal contract, if any 
one of the formalities requisite for the consummation of a contract under seal 
was not observed, no contractual obligation whatsoever resulted, regardless 
of the intention of the parties. In the modern law this is not always so, since 
an undertaking which fails to become a contract under seal, or deed, for 
want of observance of some necessary formality, may nevertheless have the 
force of an informal contract, if the requisites for the formation of such 
a contract be present." GRISMORE, LAW OF CoNTRACTS, sec. 79. 
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In the first subtopic we considered the various kinds of 
acts which are standardized by the lawgiver, and the signifi-
cance of these acts. Six kinds of standard acts (or standards 
for acts) were described: prohibited, permitted, obligatory, 
discretionary, effective, and ineffective, acts. And two ways 
of stating the significance were discussed in some detail. In 
the first of these ways, the significance of A's acts was cast 
in terms of relations of A and B: duty, right, privilege, 
discretion, power, and liability. We spent a substantial 
amount of time in applying these various relational con-
cepts as they are much used in all forms of legal discussion. 
In the second way, the meaning of A's acts was put in terms 
of their effects upon A's own legal status. 
In the second subtopic we dealt with problems of effectuat-
ing standards established to control A's behavior. These were 
found to be chiefly problems of habituation and motivation. 
The lawgiver's aim must be either to play upon habits or 
motives which A is known to have, or to create habits or 
motives which will result in action along lines which the 
lawgiver approves. 
In the third subtopic, we looked at standards from the 
point of view of application. We considered what the law-
giver uses standards for, how A and his counselor use them 
to guide A's actions, and what uses are made of standards 
by various officials and by the student of the law. The 
methods of using standards in the cases herein presented, are 
typical of methods of applying standards to acts and of fit-
ting acts to standards. And finally, I have suggested to you 
that both A and his counselor must rely on established habit 
patterns of others in their calculations. Success in applying 
standards in real life depends on the ability to predict the 
behavior of people; it involves a wide acquaintance with 
pe~ple, their habits and modes of living, as well as familiar-
ity with legal standards and their. use. 
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This second chapter constitutes the first major division of 
our examination of the structure and operation of the legal 
system; it is intended to serve as the foundation for all of 
the rest of our study. 
CHAPTER 3 
Standards for Official Acts 
Sec. 3-or. Regulative function of government-analysis. 
To regulate the behavior of the individual, A, is the primary 
function of government.1 The regulative process involves on 
the one hand activities of A whose conduct is controlled; and 
on the other, activities of officials in a complex governmental 
organization intended to control A's behavior. We began our 
study of the regulative process by analyzing it first in terms 
of A's acts and of the significance of his acts to B and to A 
himself. These and other aspects of A's acts were covered in 
the last chapter. But A's acts may be significant not only in 
relation to B and to A himself; they may be significant also 
to the state and to officials.2 In other words, significance in 
the latter respects represents two other ways in which A's 
acts are meaningful. They call for attention before we move 
on to the main topic for discussion in this chapter, "Standards 
for Official Acts." 
Sec. 3-02. Significance of A's acts in relation to state and 
to officials. The significance of A's acts to the state can be 
represented in relational terms similar to those which were 
used when we were discussing the acts of A and their signifi-
1 Hereafter, I shall speak of "the state" or use the term "government" when 
I wish to refer to government in general; I shall speak of "the federal govern-
ment," or "the states," or use the name of a particular state, e.g, state of 
Michigan, when I want to make a distinction between the specific parts of our 
federal system. 
2 In sec. 2-16, we noted in passing that the significance, or operation, of 
A's act can be expressed in several ways: 
1. Significance in relation to the other person, B. 
2. Significance in regard to A himself. 
3. Significance to the state (or legal system). 
4· Significance to officials. 
The first and second of these ways of stating significance were considered in 
sees. 2-1 7 to 2-2 5. The third and fourth ways, significance to the state and 
significance to officials, now call for discussion. See sec. 3-02. 
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cance to B. The state can be treated as another individual 
which is affected by A's acts, or by A's acts in combination 
with B's: 
Standard Act Standard Significance 
Of A Rights, powers, etc., of A 
(or of A and B) and of the state 
Thus A is said to owe to the state a duty not to be cruel to 
animals, and the state is regarded as holding a corresponding 
right that A refrain from this type of action.* And a man 
and woman, M and W, owe a like duty to the state not to 
cohabit without the sanction of marriage. Certain acts of A 
may be regarded as obligatory in relation to the state; for 
example, A is obliged to register for the draft and to file an 
income tax return. Indeed, similar rights of the state and 
duties of A can be taken to be the legal meaning of each 
and every criminal act defined by law.1 A's freedom of 
religion and freedom of speech are outstanding instances of 
A's privileges in regard to the state. And all of A's powers, 
e. g., his power to make a will, or his power to maintain a 
lawsuit, involve acts by which A calls upon the state for its 
* (I.R.) General usage decrees that we speak of a duty of A not to be 
cruel to animals, and of like duties not to commit other crimes. But there is 
no agreement as regards the corresponding rights and their allocation. Some 
writers ascribe the rights to the state; others ascribe the rights to the public; 
others refuse to speak of, or allocate, any rights whatever corresponding to 
these duties. Actually, the matter is merely a problem of definition. If one 
defines duty as the invariable correlative of a right, then if A owes a duty 
not to commit crimes, corresponding rights must be conjured up and allocated 
to someone, i.e., to the state or to the public. Some definers prefer one of these 
allocations, and some the other. On the other hand, if one does not define 
duty so narrowly, but recognizes duties which are owed to no one in particular 
(i.e., if one defines duty independent of any correlative right) then one has no 
real trouble with the placement of these cases; they are simply cases in which 
there is a duty without a correlative right. See on this point, SALMOND, JuRIS-
PRUDENCE sec. 72 (6th ed., 1920); POUND, INTRODUCTION TO STUDY OF 
LAW sec. 6 (1924); and PATON, JURISPRUDENCE 217 (1946). 
1 Usually, however, we speak in such a case of a crime against a particular 
state, such as the state of Michigan, or a crime against the federal government. 
The crime is created and defined by the law of a particular government, and 
is prosecuted in its name. 
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aid. The state makes A's act effective upon his demand. In 
the case of A's contract with B, the state attaches legal effect 
to their conjoint acts. Under its own promise and under-
taking, the state makes itself liable or subject to A's and B's 
calls for assistance. 
The significance of A's acts can also be expounded in the 
form of fixed relations between A and various officials (0). 
The operation of his act can be spelled out in terms of official 
duties, powers, liabilities, etc., which attach to it. The mean-
ing or bearing of A's act is indicated in some such form as 
this: if such and such an act is done by A, then such and 
such an act must be done by 0 (duty), or can be done by 0 
(power), with such and such effect. Indeed, this is a favorite 
mode of statement with lawmakers; most statutes take this 
form: 
Standard Act Standard Significance 
Of A Duties, powers, etc., of 0 
But either the action picture or the picture of legal signifi-
cance may be complex. As in other cases already mentioned, 
the essential action picture may consist of B's act as well as 
A's. A may make a defamatory statement about B, but this 
defamatory statement has no special meaning to courts and 
other officials unless and until B brings suit. Only when suit 
is brought does 0 have the various powers and duties in-
volved in adjudicating B's claim for relief. And the standard 
significance of A's acts is, even more often, complex. It 
consists of duties and powers not of one official, but of many. 
For example, if A kills X, his act imposes duties on a number 
of officials, and invests them with powers to act. One official 
agency is bound to charge A with crime. Another is bound to 
arrest him. Another is bound to try him. And each of these 
agencies has powers in acting in regard to A, and A is subject 
to liabilities correlative to these official powers. 
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Finally, it ought always to be remembered that there is 
no reason why the significance of A's acts must be stated 
solely and exclusively in any one of the four ways that I have 
mentioned: in relation to B, in relation to A himself, in 
relation to the state, or in relation to officials. They can be 
combined; and we have a more complete view of the signifi-
cance of A's acts if we do combine them. For instance, the 
significance of A's tortious act in striking B is better under-
stood if we see not only what it means to B but what it means 
to officials who may be involved in a suit by B against A. 
Likewise, the legal operation of A's breach of contract in-
volves both claims and powers of B and powers and duties 
of officials. Moreover, it is quite common to express the 
significance of A's acts in hybrid form. For example, A's 
criminal acts are usually spoken of in terms of duties to the 
state, but the processes of prosecution are more often ana-
lyzed and described, not in terms of powers of the state, but 
rather in terms of duties and powers of speci:6.c officials. 
Sec. J-OJ. Scope of chapter-official acts. But one can 
begin with an analysis of the regulative process at the other 
end. Instead of starting with the acts of A, one can take the 
acts of government as a starting point. In this sense, one can 
treat the state as an actor and expound the significance of 
the state's acts to A in terms of the conventional legal rela-
tionships: rights and duties, powers and liabilities, etc.1 
Standard Acts Standard Significance 
Of State Rights, duties, privileges, 
powers, liabilities of A 
and of the state 
1 As lawgiver, the state speaks as an entity. It speaks to A as one person 
addressing another. And in its declarations it relates itself to A and declares 
what it wants A to do, not to do, etc. See sec. z-1 1. The state speaks in the 
same manner as an individual person who says to another, "I want you to 
remember that you owe me $ 10." 
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There are many clauses in the federal and state constitutions 
wherein acts of the federal government and acts of the states 
are referred to.2 And there are likewise clauses in which their 
powers and duties are declared. For example, the Federal 
Constitution provides that "The United States shall guaran-
tee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government, and shall protect each of them against In-
vasion; ... " 3 and provides that "No Title of Nobility 
shall be granted by the United States"; 4 and declares, "No 
2 In the United States, the function of regulating the behavior of A is 
divided between the federal government on the one hand, and the several states 
on the other. Accordingly, when relations between government and A are 
stressed, these are most often stated as relations of A to the federal government, 
or relations of A to a specific state, such as the state of Michigan. 
Each state has its sphere of action, and corresponding powers, defined by its 
own constitution; its sphere and powers are also limited to an important 
extent by the Federal Constitution. The federal government has its sphere 
and powers fixed by the Federal Constitution. 
The state's powers are general and varied. The state controls almost all 
matters which fall in the fields of contract, property, tort, crime, and personal 
and domestic relations. The state also possesses extensive powers of taxation; 
it lays taxes on property, on incomes, on transfers (sales), on inheritances 
and on licenses and franchises. In fact, the state issues the great bulk of the 
laws and fiscal regulations which the legal practitioner is called upon to use 
and apply in this practice. 
Among the matters subject to state regulation is the practice of law. The 
state in which a lawyer practices establishes standards of education and conduct; 
it provides for the issuance of a license and for the forfeiture of the license for 
misbehavior. To be sure, a lawyer rriust also apply for admission to practice 
before the federal courts; but the admission to practice therein is usually 
a mere formality; if he is a state practitioner in good standing the federal 
courts admit him to practice as a matter of course. 
By contrast with the state, the federal government is one of limited powers; 
it exercises only those powers which are specifically granted to it by the 
Federal Constitution or which are necessary and proper for the execution of the 
granted powers. The federal powers of greatest importance are the regulation 
of interstate and foreign commerce, the collection of taxes and expenditure of 
public funds to provide for the general welfare, the control of money and 
currency, the establishment and maintenance of armed forces, and the control 
over foreign affairs. But the limits on federal powers are rather apparent 
than real. While it is true that federal powers are formally specific and limited, 
they are not so in practical operation. In actual fact the owners of the federal 
government are so far-reaching that they touch almost very aspect of the 
life of the country; especially its control over commerce and its vast fiscal 
powers give the federal government such dominance in the economic sphere 
as tends to throw the state's activities into the shade. 
3 Art. IV, Sec. 4· 
4 Art. I, Sec. 9, Cl. 8 
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state shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation; 
grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin money; . . ." 5 
And the Fourteenth Amendment provides that, "No state 
shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law." This provision is at once an expression 
of a type of prohibited state action, a declaration of a duty 
of each state not to take this kind of action, and an implied 
assertion that this kind of action, if attempted, will be ineffec-
tive. The same can be said of the Fifteenth Amendment 
which provides that the right of citizens of the United States 
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, 
or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition 
of servitude. These constitutional clauses are prohibitions of 
governmental action which can be regarded and interpreted 
in terms of governmental duty to refrain from action, and 
of corresponding claims or rights which can be asserted by A. 
But it is not necessary to list further examples. Much of the 
material in the remainder of this chapter can be regarded as 
illustrative of acts of government which are obligatory or 
effective in regard to A, or which are prohibited for his 
protection.6 
However, when we talk of the state generally, or of the 
federal government, or of a state government, and say that 
any of these entities performs acts or owes duties, or has 
powers, or holds rights, we must realize that we are speaking 
in terms of rather "high order" abstractions. Government 
is an organization of people-a very important organization, 
to be sure-but still an organization of human beings. Gov-
ernment does not act in the ordinary sense; only individual 
human beings do acts. The acts of government are the acts 
5 Art. I, Sec. ro, Cl. 1. 
6 However, for the most part, the Federal Constitution refers not to acts 
and powers of the United States but to acts and powers of particular organs 
or officials of the United States, such as Congress (to regulate commerce), the 
Senate (to ratify treaties), the President, and the Supreme Court. Such acts 
and powers come properly within the scope of the following sections where we 
deal with acts and powers of officials. 
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of particular officials. These officials act on behalf of govern-
ment or in its name. Governmental control is control of one 
man's activity by another's activity, control of some persons 
by others. A government acts through its lawmaking organs 
to establish standards of behavior for individuals and officials. 
It acts through other officials to effectuate these standards, 
and it acts through its courts to administer justice in con-
troversial cases. Hence, it is clearer and more realistic, and 
is, in fact, more common, to analyze and represent regulative 
function of government in terms of acts and powers of offi-
cials rather than in terms of acts and powers of the state 
or of the federal government. And this is the method of 
exposition I shall adopt throughout the remainder of this 
chapter. 
Accordingly, I shall now turn to an examination of the 
acts of officials and the standards which regulate them. The 
persons who perform public functions are as much in need of 
guidance as the ordinary man is. I shall deal with their acts 
and the standards which guide them in a manner parallel in 
all essentials to our treatment of standards for the indi-
vidual's acts. This subject matter will be taken up under the 
following heads: 
Official Acts and Their Significance 
Effectuation of Standards for Officials 
Use of Standards for Officials 
OFFICIAL AcTs AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE 
Sec. 3-04. Official acts-standards-kinds of acts. Acts of 
officials are standardized. The standards are verbal patterns, 
and similar in most respects to standards applicable to the 
individual's acts. It will not be necessary, therefore, to repeat 
here, in full detail, what has already been said about the 
standardization of acts.1 
1 See sees. z-o 3 to z-1 4, inclusive. 
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We classified the acts of the individual, A, into six kinds: 
prohibited and permitted, obligatory and discretionary, effec-
tive and ineffective.2 We can classify official acts on the same 
bases, and in the same manner. However, we find that the 
relative importance of these kinds and the relative frequency 
of acts of these respective kinds are not the same in regard 
to O's acts as in regard to A's. 
Whereas the number of acts which A is prohibited from 
doing is very large, embracing most crimes, torts and breaches 
of contract, the number of acts which the official, 0, is ex-
plicitly forbidden to do is relatively small. And whereas 
permitted acts of the individual loom large in any discussion 
of his significant acts, the permitted activities of 0 are, by 
contrast, not too frequently mentioned. Partly no doubt, this 
reduced attention to prohibited and permitted acts of officials 
is due to the fact that 0 is supposedly a properly bred animal 
and not expected to stray off the reservation as often as a 
member of the common herd might. But partly, the small 
number of expressly forbidden and permitted official acts is 
due to the fact that 0, as an individual, is subject to the same 
general rules of law as A, so that the standards provided for 
A also cover the bulk of possible deeds and misdeeds by 0. 
2 In speaking of the individual's acts, I distinguished between physical and 
verbal acts. Official acts may be divided and classified in the same terms. 
Most official acts are verbal. Now and then an official act may require the 
use of physical force; the policeman may suppress by physical force a person 
who is committing an assault on another. Much more often the policeman acts 
verbally, as when he arrests A by declaring to him: "You're under arrest; 
come with me." There is a threat of physical compulsion behind the invitation 
to the arrestee to come along to the police station; this does not alter the fact, 
however, that the normal activity of the officer is verbal. The prosecutor like-
wise carries out his functions almost wholly through verbal acts; he questions 
suspects; he interrogates possible witnesses; he frames a written charge and 
a sequence of other written papers; and he does all the oral acts which are 
involved in the trial. Similarly, the chief executive acts almost invariably in 
oral or written form. The jury's verdict is, of course, a verbal act. Practically 
all the acts of the judge are verbal; these include rulings on motions, orders 
to parties, orders to witnesses, orders to attorneys, and the final judgment 
or sentence. So that we can say that, all up and down the line, official 
activity is predominantly verbal activity. 
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The number of acts which are obligatory on 0 is relatively 
large. You will remember that we were able to mention only 
a few acts which A must perform, outside of those which he 
undertook by contract to perform. But officials perform many 
obligatory acts. The sheriff is bound to serve process upon 
the defendant when it is delivered for service by the plaintiff 
or his attorney; the policeman is required to arrest the 
speeder whom he catches in the act of reckless driving; and 
the judge is bound to instruct the jury at the proper time 
and pass sentence on a convicted defendant, and so on. And 
the discretionary or nonobligatory character of certain official 
acts is also not infrequently recognized in legal provisions. 
Discretion is very common where 0 is given authority to 
do an effective act. He is left free to exercise this authority 
when, as, and if he thinks proper. 
Moreover, standards. defining official acts which will be 
effective are, like the similar standards defining effective acts 
of the individual, numerous and very important. The con-
stable can levy on the goods of a judgment debtor with 
certain effects; the policeman can arrest A with specified 
legal consequences; and the judge can render judgment in 
a civil case with predetermined legal results. And ineffective 
acts are also frequently defined in provisions relating to 
officials. This is due to the fact that O's acts are limited by 
a great number of constitutional and statutory provisions, 
so that it often becomes important both to 0 and to other 
persons to know whether a certain act of 0 transcends the 
limits of his powers. The instances in which his acts are 
ineffective as well as those in which his acts are effective 
tend to become crystallized in standard forms. An arrest in 
a certain manner is effective; an arrest in another way is 
ineffective. A levy in a certain way is legally approved and 
fully operative; a levy of another type is invalid and in-
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operative; an instruction in certain terms is proper; an 
instruction in other terms is a ground for reversal. 
To sum up: whereas in regard to A, prohibited and effec-
tive acts are the types most commonly defined and most 
important in practice, in regard to 0 the most common and 
important standardized acts are the obligatory, the effective, 
and the ineffective. 
According to our American tradition, official acts and 
powers are divided on another basis. They are separated into 
three kinds: legislative, executive and judicial. This division 
is made in regard to the acts and powers of federal officials. 
It is made in regard to the acts and powers of all state 
officers. Certain persons constituting the legislature, make the 
laws; other persons who collectively compose the executive 
branch, enforce the laws; and other persons, the courts and 
their functionaries, adjudicate controversies regarding the 
laws. 
Despite certain inadequacies of this traditional threefold 
division, which I shall point out later,3 I shall use it in 
developing the ensuing analysis of official acts. I adhere to 
the traditional division of functions, first, because it is a classi-
fication which is adopted by our constitutions; second, because 
it is the classification which is ordinarily used in elementary 
and college courses in government so that you are already 
familiar with it; and third, because this classification works 
out conveniently for the purpose of dealing with the proc-
esses of regulation in which we are primarily interested. 
However, I do not intend to follow the conventional order 
of treatment. This would require us to begin with the legis-
lative process, then to discuss executive activities, and then 
to treat the activities and functions of the judicial branch.4 
Instead of following this order I shall deal first with the 
3 See especially sees. 3-20 and 3-21. 
4 The lawmaking process will be the subject of chapter 4· 
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activities of executive officials and then with the functions 
and activities of the courts. The activities of these two 
branches of government are closely interwoven with one an-
other; I shall not try to keep them neatly apart. They 
constitute together the official acts with which we shall deal 
in this chapter. 
Sec. 3-os. Significance of official acts. In the last chapter 
I spoke of the significance of individual acts in terms of fixed 
legal relations between the actor and other individuals. 
A similar analysis can be made of the significance of official 
acts in terms of standard relations between the official actor 
and the individual: 
Standard Acts Standard Significance 
Of 0 Rights, duties, privileges, 
powers, liabilities of 0 and 
of A 
This mode of stating significance is especially appropriate in 
regard to executive and judicial acts. These acts are chiefly 
concerned with the effectuation and enforcement of the stand-
ard applicable to A. As such, the standard applicable to A's 
act is merely an empty pattern.1 It is like the pattern for a 
dress or the architect's plan for a house. It is only the design 
for an act which may, or may never, be executed. Whether 
or not A does an act which fits the standard, depends upon 
A's motivation. The threat of penalty and other devices for 
controlling A's motivation are reducible in the last analysis 
to acts of officials, threatened or promised: the threats of 
penalties or threats of official activity, and the promises of 
benefit or assurances to A of beneficial acts by officials. 
Some of O's acts are done or threatened for the purpose 
of preventing prohibited acts by A. By physical force 0 
1 As I have already pointed out in sec. z-29 et seq. 
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prevents A from doing a physical injury to B. By the threat 
of arrest, to be followed by prosecution and punishment, 
0 preserves the public peace, and deters A from the com-
mission of thefts. By patrolling the highway 0 forestalls 
such acts as driving at excessive speed; the speeder checks 
his propensity to hurry in a locality where he knows that 
police officers may be encountered. It is a distinct advantage 
from everybody's point of view if prohibited acts can be thus 
prevented, rather than punished as a deterrent to others. 
Other official acts are done or threatened for the purpose of 
inducing performance of obligatory acts by A.2 Thus, A is 
induced to perform his contract by fear of the consequences 
which will ensue if he fails to perform the acts which he has 
bound himself to do. Where a statute requires the factory 
owner to install certain safety devices to protect his workmen 
from injury, the threat of prosecution or suit for damages 
may operate as an adequate incentive for the performance 
of his obligation. But probably more effective will be the 
expectation of periodic visits from a safety inspector whose 
business it is to make sure that proper safety devices are in-
stalled and in operation. Even though failure to install such 
devices is threatened with heavy penalties, common experi-
ence shows that some employers will take a chance on such 
consequences unless they are continuously checked by official 
inspection. Lesser penalties are far more effective than heavy, 
if the lesser penalties are backed up by regular inspection 
and the certainty that the penalties will be exacted.8 
2 I shall not dwell again on the use of rewards or subsidies to induce acts 
by A; this matter has been adequately covered in sec. z-39. 
8 Official action is no less essential to A's privileges and liberties. The 
founding fathers did not have a clear appreciation of the positive functions 
which government must serve. They were chiefly concerned to prevent abuses 
of powers such as had characterized the activities of the government of Great 
Britain. (See further discussion of this point in sees. 7-os, 7-u, and 7-17.) 
They did not realize how fully A's liberty, as well as his security, depends 
on governmental protection against aggressive acts by B. A's freedom of 
speech, for example, is not merely the privilege of speaking without inter-
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Other official acts may be regarded as essentially remedial 
in character. The acts which 0 does where A has already 
committed an injury to B are of this type. O's acts are 
intended to force A to compensate B for the damage which 
he has done. Similar observations apply to O's acts intended 
to compel A to pay damages to B for a breach of his contract 
with B. 
And many acts of 0 simply represent the performance of 
services which government has undertaken to render for A. 
Here, of course, fall all those official acts which are done by 
government agents when A calls upon them, by doing an 
effective act: the acts which 0 does by way of securing A's 
claims to property, the acts that 0 does by way of carrying 
out A's testamentary disposition, the acts which 0 does by 
way of recording and preserving deeds, mortgages, and so 
forth for the benefit of A. 
But an act of 0 does not ordinarily stand by itself. Seldom, 
and perhaps I should say never, are the functions of govern-
ment served by an isolated act of an official. An official act 
is normally a part of a complicated series of acts which are, 
in combination, significant. The series contributes to one 
common purpose or function. Thus, for example, as we shall 
see later, the enactment of a statute is not a simple single 
act. The process of putting a law on the books involves many 
distinguishable acts of different persons. A law is suggested, 
formulated, debated, adopted by each of the two houses of 
the legislative branch, and is then approved by the chief 
executive. All these acts enter into the legislative process; 
they culminate in the establishment of a statute. Then, after 
the statute is on the books, establishing, let us say, a speed 
regulation for those who drive on the public highways, this 
ference by the federal government and without interference by state govern-
ment, though both are important. To be fully secured, A's freedom to speak 
must also have governmental protection against interference by B, the other 
individual. 
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statute must be enforced; and here again we encounter a 
series of acts contributing to one general function, the func-
tion of enforcement. The policeman's act in arresting A for 
exceeding the speed limit is merely the initial step in a 
succession of acts which carry the process of enforcement 
through the courts. While we shall talk henceforth chiefly 
about separate acts of officials and about the standards appli-
cable to these acts, we must not lose sight of the important 
fact that any one of these separate acts is really just an 
clement in a complex series of acts, which have a combined 
significance. 
Furthermore, the relations of 0 and A do not exhaust 
the legal significance of O's acts. An official act may be 
important to other officials as well as to A. One official act 
may be a condition precedent to another, as is suggested 
by the material in the last paragraph. The jury cannot try 
and convict a man until he has been charged by the proper 
authorities, and the judge cannot sentence him until he has 
been properly charged and properly convicted. So that we 
could, if we wished to pursue our methods of analysis further, 
state the effects of the acts of 0 on the powers and duties 
of other officials. And by the same token, we might point 
out that the acts of 0 are important to the state itself. And 
we might express this importance in terms of duties which 
0 owes to the state, as well as powers and liabilities, operative 
between 0 and the state for which he acts. But I do not feel 
that it is necessary to pursue these lines of analysis further. 
My main point has been to show the various directions in 
which official action has legal import, and I believe that I 
have now sufficiently developed that point. 
Sec. 3-06. Acts of executive officials. In the last two sec-
tions, I have classified official acts and suggested the ways in 
which these acts may be significant. In this and the following 
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section, I propose to specify, more definitely, the officials who 
do acts on behalf of government, the acts which these officials 
do, and the ways in which their acts are significant. I begin 
with acts of executive officials. 
Inferior executive officials do many acts in the processes of 
effectuating standards applicable to A. The acts of police, 
sheriffs, constables, and other peace officers come first to mind 
in this connection. Their acts are involved in the enforcement 
of both prohibitive and obligatory standards. Their acts are 
involved also in the execution of a court's order or sentence, 
as when they serve papers for the court, seize and sell prop-
erty of a debtor, imprison or execute a convicted criminal. 
To these acts of peace officers in enforcing standards must 
be added executive acts which impose special obligations on 
A, such as the tax assessor's act in levying assessments on 
A's property. Then there are the acts of such officials as the 
register of deeds who makes and preserves records of con-
veyances by and to A. Also to be counted among minor execu-
tive acts are those of various officials who issue licenses to A 
on his application, such as the building permit, the license 
to drive a car, and the license to engage in the liquor business. 
Their acts make effective A's demand for the privilege of 
engaging in certain activities, a privilege which he would not 
otherwise enjoy. 
The acts of inferior executive officials are commonly gov-
erned by standards similar to the standards which are appli-
cable to the acts of individuals. Their duties and powers are 
set forth specifically and in detail. Thus legal provisions 
specify the situations in which an officer can make an arrest 
and the manner in which he is to make it; they determine 
what the effects of an arrest are to be, as regards the arrestee, 
the arresting officer, and interested third parties. In a similar 
way legal provisions prescribe every step to be taken in the 
levy and collection of taxes. They prescribe the way in which 
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a deed is to be filed for record and the way in which land 
records are to be kept, and they fix the consequences of re-
cording as regards the grantor, the grantee and other parties. 
Furthermore, the acts of inferior executive officials are 
largely controlled by general rules or specific orders of their 
superiors. In a police department, for example, many routine 
matters are regulated by general rules. The hours of duty 
may be fixed in this way as well as the occasions for making 
reports and the methods of making them. And the chief of 
the police department, or one of his lieutenants, may order 
an officer to investigate a particular case, send him out to 
stop a disturbance, or direct him to make a report on an 
investigation which he has already made. 
Nevertheless the control of the minor official's acts is never 
complete. The legal system does not attempt to control all 
of the acts of A, as I have already pointed out.1 Neither does 
it undertake to furnish the individual policeman with patterns 
for all the acts he must or may do. It would neither be prac-
tical nor desirable for the lawmaker or for his superiors to 
provide the policeman with complete standards to go by. It 
is not possible to foresee all the contingencies which the 
policeman will have to face. His acts have to be adapted to 
circumstances. Life is too complicated and variable to be fore-
seen and regulated to the last detail. Accordingly, the police-
man is left with a substantial degree of discretion or freedom 
of action. He is left to decide, for example, whether the fair 
speeder shall receive a traffic ticket or be let off with a warn-
ing. And generally speaking, as we proceed upward in the 
executive hierarchy the extent of discretion increases. 
The governor of a state is the chief executive of the state 
government; the President of the United States is the chief 
executive of the federal government. Each of these officials 
1 See sees. z-oi, z-os, and z-o7 regarding the extent to which A's behavior 
is left free from legal control. 
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is the principal law-effectuating agent of the government 
which he represents. He directs the operation of his govern-
ment from the top. However, we must not suppose that the 
executive branch in either of these governments is a well 
integrated hierarchy with complete and perfect control from 
the top. Rather the lines of control are loose and indefinite 
so that many parts of the executive branch have no effective 
superiors. Thus the mayor of a city or a local public prose-
cutor or the head of a government department may be subject 
to hardly any control from above, especially if he is an elec-
tive official and answerable only to local or state voters for 
his acts. 
In the ordinary case the acts of the chief executive affect 
the individual only indirectly through the activities of subor-
dinate officials to whom he issues general directions and spe-
cific orders. However, his effectuative acts are nonetheless 
important though their effects are indirect and though they 
are hardly noticed when affairs run along smoothly. The 
importance of his powers becomes apparent when it is neces-
sary to exercise the whole power of government to enforce 
the order of a court in a time of public clamor, or when the 
governor finds it necessary to issue a declaration of martial 
law. Such a declaration is made when serious disorder occurs 
or impends in a community. The executive issues his declara-
tion and sends a detachment of soldiers into the community 
to keep order. This declaration changes the whole status of 
law enforcement in the community affected. It confers en-
forcement authority upon the military commander and super-
sedes the authority of local officials to a very large degree; 
it works important changes likewise in the liberties and rights 
of individuals, to assemble together, to have access to the 
courts, and so on.2 
2 See 34 MrcH. L. REV. 417 (1936) for a discussion of the effects of 
a declaration of martial law. 
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The acts of the chief executive are controlled by standards 
just as the acts of his inferiors are. These standards are found 
in the constitutions and the statutes, state and federal. He is 
charged in general terms with the duty of enforcing the law. 
Typical is the provision in the -Federal Constitution which 
declares that the President "shall take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed." 3 Some duties of more specific char-
acter are imposed on chief executives by the constitutions; and 
somewhat more frequently specific duties are imposed by 
statutes; but duties of general character are more character-
istic. In fact, as we proceed upward in the executive hierarchy 
from minor officials to the governor or the President, duties 
are more and more broadly and generally expressed. 
Most of the standards which apply to the chief executive 
are cast in terms of power, rather than duty, to act. The 
executive is empowered to do this or that. Such powers, like 
executive duties, are commonly expressed in the most general 
terms. Typical are the two following sections of the Federal 
Constitution: 
"The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the 
several States, when called into the actual Service of the 
United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of 
the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, 
upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective 
Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Par-
dons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases 
of Impeachment. 
"He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds 
of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and, 
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other officers of the 
3 Art. II, Sec. 3· 
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United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise 
provided for, and which shall be established by law; ... " 4 
And as you will notice even the exercise of these very broad 
powers is left to the President's discretion. He has power to 
grant pardons, but is not required to do so in any case what-
ever. He "may require the opinion" of the head of a depart-
ment, but again this is a matter lying wholly in the President's 
good judgment. 
Sec. 3-07. Problems. 1. Suppose a policeman, 0, com-
mands a speeder, A, to pull over to the curb and stop. A 
stops as directed and 0 gives A a traffic ticket. How is O's 
act related to the standard applicable to A? Would you 
regard O's act as obligatory? As effective? 
2. The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
provides: 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or things to be seized." 
Translate this passage into standards applicable to the acts 
of enforcement officials. How do A's acts enter the picture? 
3· A statute provides: Sec. 1. Every register of deeds 
shall keep an entry book of deeds and an entry book of 
mortgages, each page of which shall be divided into six col-
umns, with title or heads to the respective columns, in the 
following form, to wit: 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (s) (6) 
Date of Grantors Grantees Township To whom Fee 
Reception where the delivered Received 
land lies after being 
recorded 
and date 
'*Art. II, Sec. ~, Cls. 1, s. 
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Sec. 2. ln the entry books of deeds, the register shall 
enter all deeds of conveyance . . . , and in the entry book 
of mortgages he shall enter all mortgages . . . noting in 
such books, the day, hour and minute of the reception and 
other particulars, in the appropriate columns in the order in 
which such instruments are respectively received, and every 
such instrument shall be considered as recorded at the time 
so noted. 
The statute then specifies the effects to be attached to the 
entry of deeds and mortgages in the entry books aforesaid; 
in particular, the statute provides that the entry of these in-
struments in the record books shall constitute notice of the 
instruments and their contents to all subsequent purchasers 
and mortgagees. 
The register of deeds, R, is obviously an executive official. 
Where do R's acts, here defined, fall in our sixfold classifica-
tion of standard acts? Are they prohibited? Obligatory? Ef-
fective? 
How would you classify A's act of filing a deed for record? 
What is the relation of R's act of recording to A's act of 
filing for record? 
4· The American League of the Friends of the New Ger-
many of Hudson County v. Eastmead et al.1 
Bigelow, V. C. (in part): 
"Complainant proposed to hold a meeting in Union City 
in a hall hired by it for the purpose, but the police acting 
under order of the city commission forbade the meeting. 
Complainant applies for an injunction to restrain police inter-
ference . 
. . . The defendants (i. e., the police) say, in effect, that 
if the meeting takes place speeches will be made extolling 
the present government of Germany and advocating measures 
to abridge the rights of Jews in the United States; that Jews 
will thereby be incited to riot, and that defendants forbade 
the meeting in order to avert disorder and possible bloodshed. 
1 II6 N. Y. Eq. 487 ( 1934). 
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The explanation does not, in a legal sense, excuse defendants. 
Our law does not prohibit the public expression of unpopular 
views. It is lawful to advocate, for instance, the establishment 
of a dictatorship in America, or a soviet form of government, 
or a hereditary monarchy, or the abolition of religious free-
dom, or other changes in our political, economic or social 
system, no matter how unwise or how shocking. If lawless 
elements in the community, instead of ignoring such propa-
ganda, or meeting it by sound argument, resort to riot, it is 
the duty of police to protect the lawful assemblage and to 
repress those who unlawfully attack it." (Injunction denied 
on other grounds.) 
What is the significance of the fact that complainant league 
is held entitled to hold a meeting and entitled to police pro-
tection in so doing? 
Would you say that the league has a right to hold a meet-
ing? A privilege to hold a meeting? If so, against whom is 
the right or privilege respectively available? 
5. In section 2-2 5, problem 20, we discussed the case of a 
landowner, A, who made a deed of his home to Bas a result 
of coercion exerted by B. The deed would be invalid; the 
court would order its cancellation in a proper action. How 
would you express this result in terms of A's relations to the 
court (0)? 
Sec. 3-o8. Courts-functions-questions of fact and law. 
Courts serve important functions in the processes of effectu-
ating standards applicable to A. Primarily courts deal with 
and settle cases in which the actual application of a standard 
is controverted. This is what is meant when it is said that 
courts are established to decide controversies. 
The questions which the court may have to determine are 
of two sorts: questions of fact and questions of law. When 
the court has to decide what A did on a particular occasion 
or whether he did a particular act or whether he had a spe-
cific intent when he acted, we say that the court has a question 
of fact to decide. Was A present when X was killed? Did A 
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strike the fatal blow? Did A drive at sixty miles an hour 
on a particular occasion? Did A hand a deed to B merely 
to look over, or did he hand it to B with the intent to make 
an immediately operative conveyance? These are all questions 
of fact. They all take the form of a dispute about whether 
an act of A actually occurred or whether some essential fea-
ture of the act actually existed. 
But the controversy may involve a question about the 
nature or scope of one or more standards, not about the facts 
of a particular case; it may involve a question of law. The 
controversy may turn on the question whether a particular 
standard is properly applicable to the act which has occurred 
or which is assumed to have occurred. Thus the question may 
be whether a particular act constitutes larceny, e.g., whether 
driving away an automobile to take a joy ride fits the stand-
ard for this prohibited act.1 Or the controversy may involve 
the question which of several standards is properly applicable 
to the act which has occurred or which is assumed to have 
occurred. Does the act with which A is charged constitute 
murder or manslaughter, i. e., which of these two prohibitive 
standards does his act fit? Or the controversy may involve 
the question of law, just what elements go into the standard 
itself. What are the elements of arson or the elements of an 
oral gift? The questions here relate to the essentials of the 
standard itself. The constitution of the standard is doubtful 
or uncertain in some respect. We have already dealt with two 
cases which illustrate this type of controversial question of 
law. In State v. McGowan the court had to decide whether 
a house, which had been finished, but which had not yet been 
occupied as a habitation, was a dwelling house for the purpose 
of the law of arson.2 The controversy turned on a doubt as 
to the meaning of one element in the definition of arson: what 
is a dwelling house. The court held that a dwelling house 
1 This case is discussed in sec. :1.-4 s. 
2 See sec. 2.-48, problem 2.. 
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must be inhabited. In so deciding the court settled a question 
of law; it made clear an uncertain feature of the standard 
for a prohibited act. In the other case, Cochrane v. Moore, 
the court also settled a question of law .3 It had to determine 
what are the essential elements of an oral gift. It held that 
this effective act requires something more than mere words 
of present gift; it requires also an actual handing over of the 
thing given, a delivery. In so deciding the court determined 
a controversy regarding the essential elements of a legal 
standard; it decided a question of law. 
Most actual cases involve both questions of fact and ques-
tions of law; the court may have to determine both what A 
has done and what legal standard covers what he has done. 
And usually the two kinds of questions are so intertwined that 
they have to be considered and weighed in connection with 
one another; both kinds of questions ordinarily have to be 
settled together in the decision of one case. 
Sec. 3-09. Trial courts-jurisdiction.* Courts can be di-
vided into two general kinds: trial courts and appellate courts. 
Both kinds handle controversial cases and both kinds deal to 
some extent with disputed questions of fact and law.1 The 
general distinction between the two kinds of courts is that 
the trial court gives the initial hearing and decision of a con-
troversy; the appellate court reviews the job which the trial 
court has done. It will be convenient to examine the work 
of each of these courts separately.2 I shall begin with the 
work of the trial court, and treat first its field of work. 
3 See sec. 2-48, problem 4· 
* (I.R.) See generally regarding the organization of American courts, 
Pound, Organization of Courts (National Conference of Judicial Councils, 
1940). Problems of the selection, tenure and supervision of judges will be 
discussed later in sees. 3-26 and 3-28. 
1 The distinction between trial jurisdiction and appellate will be further 
developed in sec. 3-1 8. 
2 The work of the trial court is covered in sees. 3-09 to 3-17; the work of 
the appellate court in sec. 3-18. 
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The trial court's field of work can be designated and de-
scribed in various ways. It can be called the role of the trial 
court, or the scope of its functions, or the extent of its powers. 
The common legal designation for this field, which I shall 
use from now on just because it is the common expression 
among lawyers, is the jurisdiction of the trial court. 
No court is ever invested with authority to try all cases 
whatsoever; its competence is always limited to the trial of 
certain cases; and this fact is what makes it necessary to talk 
about jurisdiction and its limitations. The limitations on 
trial jurisdiction are commonly defined in terms of territory 
(place), or subject matter (kinds of cases), or both.** 
In the states, the jurisdiction of the trial court is almost 
invariably limited to a specified district or area such as a 
county, a group of counties, a city, or a township. For this 
reason the trial court often bears the name of the County 
Court of X County, or the Circuit (or District) Court of the 
Second Judicial Circuit, or the Municipal Court of the City 
of Y. The trial court's jurisdiction is also usually defined 
in terms of subject matter. It may be given authority to dis-
pose of all types of cases within the area where it sits, or it 
may be authorized to deal only with specific kinds of cases. 
If the court is authorized to handle all kinds of cases, large 
or small, civil or criminal, legal or equitable, we call it a 
court of general jurisdiction; and most states establish one 
trial court of this type for every community so that the entire 
state is blanketed by a system of trial courts of general juris-
diction. Most states also establish some courts whose juris-
** (I.R.) Two other common jurisdictional distinctions are passed over 
without mention here: ( 1) the distinction between jurisdiction of the person 
and jurisdiction of subject matter; and (2.) the distinction between acts and 
transactions within the court's jurisdiction, and acts and transactions which 
fall outside it. The first of these distinctions is covered in courses on procedure; 
the second is treated in courses on conflict of laws and constitutional law. 
Both distinctions seem to me too difficult and refined for discussion in an 
introductory course. 
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diction is limited to the handling of specific types of cases.8 
The court may, for example, be authorized to try only crim-
inal cases; the Recorder's Court of Detroit is limited in this 
manner. Or the trial court's jurisdiction may be confined to 
the administration of decedents' estates and related matters. 
This is the limitation of jurisdiction characteristic of the 
county, probate, surrogate, or orphans' courts which one finds 
in most states. And almost everywhere one finds petty courts 
which have jurisdiction of small money claims (not over 
$ 1 oo, or some other fixed amount), of petty criminal cases, 
and of the preliminary steps in major criminal cases; the 
latter are usually called by such names as justice of the peace 
courts, justice courts, or municipal courts. Almost always, as 
I have already suggested above, the court whose trial juris-
diction is limited in terms of the kinds of cases to be handled, 
is also limited in terms of place, so that a county court which 
is restricted to the handling of decedents' estates can only do 
so within the bounds of a particular county. 
In the federal court system, trial jurisdiction of practically 
all matters is vested in the district courts of the United 
States.4 There is at least one district court in every state. In 
3 The supreme court of a state and other appellate courts are sometimes 
given jurisdiction to try limited types of cases. The following provision from 
the Michigan Constitution is typical: "The supreme court • . • shall have 
power to issue writs of error, habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, pro-
cedendo and other original and remedial writs, and to hear and determine the 
same .... " Art. VII, Sec. 4, Constitution of 1908. This jurisdiction is 
not very frequently exercised. 
4 The principal matters falling within the competence of the federal courts 
are: 
( 1) cases involving the application or interpretation of the Federal Con-
stitution; 
( 2) cases involving the application or interpretation of federal statutes 
(including crimes against the United States); 
(3) cases involving the application or interpretation of treaties of the 
United States; 
( 4) controversies between citizens of different states ("diversity of citizen-
ship"). Such cases are disposed of in a federal court but the law which is 
applied is the law of a particular state. 
However, trial jurisdiction in these four types of cases (with the exception 
of a trial of federal criminal charges) does not belong exclusively to the 
STANDARDS FOR OFFICIAL ACTS 157 
the less populous states, such as Nevada, the federal district 
is coterminous with the state. The more populous states are 
divided territorially into two or more districts. Michigan, for 
example, is divided into two districts and New York into 
four. 5 
On the whole it is agreed by writers on court organization 
that both the common kinds of limitation on trial jurisdiction 
can be obstructive of efficiency in the administration of justice. 
Territorial limitations and limitations on subject matter both 
tend to clog the wheels of the judicial machine. In the first 
place, such limitations involve a great deal of litigation about 
the question of jurisdiction itself. Which court is the proper 
one to try this case? Has this court jurisdiction to try it? 
Such questions consume an extraordinary amount of the time 
of courts yet they do not seem to add much to the output of 
justice if we can assume that all our courts are able to dispense 
the s2.me product. Second, as population shifts and as business 
needs change, the amount of judicial business to be handled 
in the various judicial districts and in the different types of 
courts also shifts and changes. The result is that frequently 
one trial court is overwhelmed by work and badly in arrears, 
while courts in neighboring areas and courts which handle 
federal district courts. Many cases of these types arise and are tried in the 
state courts; if they reach the federal system at all, they do so only by way 
of appeal to the Supreme Court. 
Certain minor matters are handled not by the district courts, but by United 
States commissioners. The latter issue warrants and take other steps involved 
in the preliminary stages of criminal cases. They occupy a position in the 
federal system roughly analogous to that of the justices of the peace in the 
states' systems. However, they are appointed by the district judge and are, 
therefore, quite directly answerable to him. 
The Supreme Court of the United States also has a very limited trial juris-
diction. The Constitution, in Art. III, Sec. 2, Cl. 2, provides: "In all cases 
affecting Ambassadors, or other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in 
which a State shall be a Party, the supreme Court shall have original Juris-
diction." The occasions for the exercise for this jurisdiction are, needless to say, 
very rare. 
6 Where a federal district contains a large city, such as New York City, 
Chicago or Detroit, there are several district judges over whom the senior 
judge in point of service presides. 
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limited kinds of cases, do not have enough to do. And the 
ups and downs of judicial work are often merely temporary 
so that they do not call for permanent additions to court 
personnel. Accordingly, it may be regarded as preferable to 
create just one court with the widest possible jurisdiction as 
to place and subject matter, and to provide that judges can 
be assigned freely to try cases in any place and to handle any 
type of case as the burden of work requires. 
However, there are real obstacles to the simplification of 
trial jurisdiction which has just been mentioned. The federal 
system of courts approaches the ideal inasmuch as all federal 
trial jurisdiction is vested in one district court which operates 
in a rather wide area. But the adoption of the same plan in 
the states is not so easy. The state constitutions often fix the 
jurisdiction of courts from the highest to the lowest. Where 
this is the case, the simplification of court organization and 
the reduction of the number of the different kinds of trial 
courts, can only be brought about by the cumbersome process 
of constitutional amendment.6 Moreover, there is a serious 
practical objection to the complete simplification which I have 
suggested, even if it is constitutionally feasible. The state 
courts have to dispose of a vast number of petty cases, civil 
and criminaV It is most important to bring the handling of 
such cases as close as possible to the persons affected and to 
make the handling of the cases simple, cheap and expeditious. 
The best way to meet these objectives apparently is to create 
an ample number of local courts to dispose of petty cases. 
If this is done the state will continue to have at least two 
6 Without constitutional amendment some degree of alleviation of congested 
dock- ·. s can be achieved by the statutory authorization of the assignment of 
judg<!s for work in districts and courts where help is needed. Usually the power 
to assign is vested in the chief justice of the supreme court or in some other 
presiding judge. 
7 The problem of handling petty cases is not so serious in the federal system. 
Most of the cases which are handled therein are important. While there is 
a certain amount of petty and routine criminal business to handle, this business 
is for the most part disposed of by United States commissioners. 
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types of trial courts: petty trial courts and trial courts to 
handle more important matters. The correctness of this solu-
tion is confirmed by the fact that in England and on the 
continent of Europe, where thoroughgoing court reorganiza-
tion has been undertaken in recent decades, this twofold 
scheme for handling trial work has been adopted. 
Sec. 3-Io. The public prosecutor-functions-criminal 
charges. In the last section I pointed out that each state is 
divided into judicial districts in each of which one finds a trial 
court of general jurisdiction and that the United States is 
similarly divided into judicial districts in each of which is a 
federal court of general jurisdiction. The next point to note 
is that in each of its judicial districts the state has an attorney 
who represents the public interests and that in each of its 
judicial districts the federal government has an attorney who 
acts as its representative. This legal representative is known 
variously as the state's attorney, the prosecuting attorney, the 
county attorney, the district attorney (the name used in the 
federal system), and known generically as the public pros-
ecutor. I shall refer to all of them henceforth by the generic 
name. The public prosecutor's primary function, from which 
he derives his name, is to prepare and prosecute criminal 
cases.1 
The criminal prosecution is brought in the name of the 
state or the federal government, as the case may be. It begins 
with the filing of a formal charge, although sometimes the 
formal charge is not filed until after the accused person is 
in custody.2 In many of the states and in the federal system, 
1 The prosecuting witness, or other person with information about a criminal 
act, may be responsible for the filing of a charge in the sense that he makes 
a preliminary complaint, or that he tells what he knows to the prosecutor 
or the police. 
2 Actually several steps often precede the formal charge: ( 1) the making 
of a sworn complaint by a prosecuting witness who has knowledge of a crime; 
( 2) the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the accused; ( 3) the actual 
arrest of the accused; (4) the production of the accused before the magistrate 
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the formal charge for the more serious crimes is known as an 
indictment. The indictment is found by a grand jury. This 
jury is a group summoned by the court to investigate possible 
public offenses and public grievances; it consists of not less 
than twelve nor more than twenty-three persons. The grand 
jury calls witnesses and examines evidence; it carries on its 
investigations with such assistance from the public prosecutor 
and other officials as it requires. If it finds that there is prob-
able cause to think that someone is guilty of crime, it draws 
up a formal charge and presents it to the court. As a practical 
matter the charge is usually drawn up for the grand jury, 
by the prosecutor, as the jury is composed of laymen. The 
grand jury serves two general functions. On the one side, 
the grand jury is intended to represent the government in-
terests by initiating criminal charges on its behalf; on the 
other side, the grand jury stands as a safeguard, since it is 
composed of laymen, against the filing of unfounded or 
improper charges against the individual. 
The Federal Constitution and the constitutions of many 
of our states require that serious criminal charges be initiated 
by indictment.3 The constitutions of other states authorize 
the prosecutor alone to initiate criminal proceedings by filing 
a formal charge, called an information.4 Sometimes this infor-
who issued the warrant for his arrest; (5) the commitment of the accused 
to jail until the grand jury meets and presents (or refuses to present) an 
indictment; ( 6) the fixing of bail so that the accused can be released pending 
indictment (and trial). These steps have to be taken before indictment simply 
because the grand jury is convened only a few times a year. For this reason 
criminal suspects have to be held in jail or on bail until the grand jury can act. 
3 The Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides: "No person 
shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on 
a presentment of indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of war 
or public danger; . . ." 
4 However, the information cannot be filed until the accused has had 
a preliminary examination before a magistrate (justice of the peace or judge). 
In this examination the magistrate must satisfy himself that the prosecution 
has sufficient evidence on which to hold the accused for trial. The preliminary 
examination is intended to protect the accused person against the filing of 
unfounded or improper charges (compare the next preceding paragraph of the 
text). 
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mation practice is made exclusive; sometimes either informa-
tion or indictment may be used. Even in the federal system 
and in states where indictment must be used for serious 
charges, the information can be used in the commencement of 
proceedings against minor offenders. The information practice 
is less cumbersome and less costly than indictment by grand 
jury; for these reasons the information is much more com-
monly employed wherever its use is permissible. 
In both the indictment practice and the information practice 
the real burden of investigating cases, of drafting charges, 
and of preparing cases for trial, rests upon the public pros-
ecutor. He furnishes the motive power for criminal law 
enforcement. Generally speaking, he decides what cases to 
push and what cases to drop; he decides what cases to call 
to the grand jury's attention, where the grand jury method 
is in vogue, and what cases to prosecute where he proceeds 
by information. He tries the cases; and, if persons are con-
victed, he has the primary responsibility of seeing that 
sentences are carried out. The prosecutor ordinarily cannot 
perform all these functions personally. He has to have assist-
ance of various sorts. In larger communities the prosecutor's 
office includes several assistant attorneys, a number of inves-
tigators, and a large staff of clerks. 
Another important function of the public prosecutor is to 
advise other officials in regard to legal problems which con-
front them. Frequently, doubts arise whether a particular 
official has power to do a certain act or whether one method 
of procedure is better or worse than another. These doubts 
usually hinge on matters of law, and officials are entitled to 
obtain the prosecutor's opinions for their guidance. In this 
way the prosecutor serves as counselor for officials, essentially 
as the ordinary attorney serves as counselor for the individual 
client. 
The public prosecutor is also commonly expected and 
required to draft public documents and technical legal instru-
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ments for the local officials in his district. If a deed or lease 
of county property is to be executed, or if a purchase of a 
site for a county courthouse is to be made the prosecutor 
will serve as the legal draftsman for the local authorities. 
Finally, the prosecutor brings lawsuits on behalf of various 
government units. In this capacity he may be called on to 
bring proceedings to collect property taxes or to condemn 
land for use as a highway. Similarly, he may bring action 
to enjoin or abate a public nuisance.11 In short, in any case 
where the public has proprietary interests which need to be 
protected, the local prosecutor is ordinarily the functionary 
who is obliged to act. He serves in such cases as the repre-
sentative of the public. He initiates action and carries the 
action through all its steps to a conclusion. 
The prosecutor is an executive official. His acts are gov-
erned by legal standards as other executive acts are. Nothing 
need be added to what was said in section 3-06 on this general 
subject, except to observe that the prosecutor is not a minor 
executive, but one well up in the executive hierarchy and 
one invested with a considerable degree of discretion.6 
Throughout this section I have treated the local public 
prosecutor as the prototype for all public attorneys. This 
emphasis on the local prosecutor is justified by the great 
practical importance of his functions. It is justified from 
your point of view by the fact that you will often be reading 
about what the public prosecutor does or can do. However, 
it would leave an incorrect impression if we passed over the 
functions of other public attorneys without any notice what-
ever. In the states, the local prosecutor is governed to some 
5 If a nuisance, e.g., smoke or noise, is injurious to an individual landowner 
he may bring a civil action to enjoin or abate. If the nuisance is injurious 
to the public, the action to enjoin or abate is brought by the prosecutor. 
6 To some extent, the prosecutor's discretion in the handling of cases, es-
pecially criminal cases, is controlled by the judge of the court in which 
a criminal proceeding is pending. However, this judicial control is rather 
remote; in actual fact the prosecutor has almost complete freedom to push 
or to drop the ordinary case. 
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extent by the orders of an attorney general.7 The latter is 
the principal law officer of the state; as such he gives opinions, 
drafts papers, and brings important actions on behalf of the 
state. His functions in these respects are parallel on a higher 
level, to the various functions which the public prosecutor 
performs locally. In the federal system, the district attorney 
i~ subject to a very real control by the Attorney General of 
the United States.8 The latter is the principal law officer of 
the federal government. He is a member of the President's 
cabinet. His office, called the Department of Justice, is 
charged with the care of most of the legal interests of the 
United States; it exercises a great variety of advisory, super-
visory, investigative (e.g., F.B.I.), and administrative func-
tions. I do not believe that it is necessary for our present 
purpose to deal specifically with all the functions of these 
central law offices of the state and federal governments. 
Sec. 3-r r. Criminal trial-jury and judge. You now have 
before you descriptions of the principal agencies involved in 
the enforcement of criminal law: executive officials, the courts, 
and the public prosecutor. It is time to give you a sketch of 
the criminal trial. 
The criminal trial more than any other legal proceeding 
has the features of drama. Ordinarily the act charged against 
the defendant involves human interest, and the trial itself 
is a great contest in which the defendant battles for his life or 
liberty against the power of the state. In this contest, which is 
co-operative as well as dramatic, the prosecutor, the defend-
ant, the defense attorney, the witnesses, the jury and the 
judge all participate and perform their appointed roles. The 
proceedings prior to trial and the trial, too, may be viewed 
as a series of acts or scenes. Filing the charge is an act; like-
7 And less directly by the orders of the governor. 
8 Indirectly, the district attorney is subject also to the orders of the 
President who is the immediate superior of the Attorney General. 
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wise the arrest of the accused; and the entry of a plea. The 
impaneling of a jury is a scene. The presentation of the 
evidence is a series of scenes in which each question put to 
a witness and each separate answer made is a distinguishable 
act. And, the concluding arguments of counsel, the judge's 
instructions to the jury, and the jury's verdict are acts which 
bring the legal performance to a conclusion. 
The jury and the judge play the dominant roles in the 
trial. The jury, properly called the petit jury, consists of 
twelve persons. Its function is to hear the evidence and decide 
whether or not the accused is guilty as charged. In other 
words, its function is to determine the facts. The jury is 
selected by various methods in different legal systems, but 
one essential feature is characteristic of the jury in all Anglo-
American countries: it is a body of laymen drawn from the 
general population. The jury is intended to introduce the 
elements of common sense and common fairness into justice, 
thus preventing the operation of the legal system from 
becoming over-technical; and is intended to check arbitrary 
acts of officials who might otherwise detain individuals with-
out sufficient cause or deny them their lawful rights. 
The judge may be likened to a player-producer. He acts 
in the play and has the general management of it. All the 
acts which the prosecutor, the defendant, the defense attor-
ney, and the witnesses do, are standardized and governed 
by legal regulations. The judge supervises their conduct to 
see that they follow the regulations. The judge decides 
whether each piece of evidential material is admissible, as 
it is offered by one side or the other. He rules on the 
propriety of questions asked by counsel on the two sides. 
And, after the evidence has all been presented and counsel 
have argued the case to the jury, the judge instructs the 
jury on the law applicable thereto.1 He says to the jury in 
1 This is the order of procedure at common law. In some states, however, 
statutes have changed the order of procedure; the judge instructs the jury 
prior to the argument of counsel. 
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effect: If you find such and such facts to be true as contended 
by the prosecutor, then you will find the defendant guilty; 
on the other hand, if you find such and such other facts to 
be true as contended by the defendant, then you will find 
him not guilty. Of course, the actual instructions go into 
more detail, but their essential purport is sufficiently indi-
cated by this skeleton form. 
The trial judge not only supervises all steps in the trial 
and instructs the jury, but he issues all the specific orders 
which need to be given during the course of the trial. For 
example, if the trial needs to be postponed, the judge gives 
the order for a continuance (postponement); if a witness 
fails to appear or refuses to answer questions, the judge 
issues the necessary order imposing penalties; if the evidence 
of the prosecution is insufficient to support a conviction, the 
judge directs the jury to return a verdict for the defendant; 
if the jury returns a verdict of "not guilty," the judge orders 
the defendant discharged; and if the jury returns a verdict 
of "guilty," the judge sentences the defendant according 
to law.2 In short, a criminal trial has some of the elements 
of a game in which two champions try to overcome one 
another. This is a feature which goes all the way back to the 
days of trial by battle. The judge controls the contest. He 
acts as a sort of referee as between the two primary contest-
ants, the attorney for the prosecution on the one hand and 
the attorney for the defense on the other. His job is to see 
that the contest is carried on according to the rules. 
Sec. 3-r2. Problems. I. In framing his instructions to the 
jury, how far is the judge concerned with questions of fact? 
How far with questions of law? Who decides the questions of 
fact? The questions of law? Consider here the matter in 
sections 3-o8 and 3-1 I. 
2 According to the practice in some states, the jury fixes the penalty in regard 
to some or all types of crime. 
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2. A statute provides: 
"Any person having knowledge of the commission of any 
offense punishable with death, or by imprisonment in the 
state prison, who shall take any money, or any gratuity or 
reward, or any engagement therefor, upon an agreement or 
understanding, expressed or implied, to compound or conceal 
such offense, or not to prosecute therefor, or not to give 
evidence thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." 
Why should the agreements here specified be prohibited 
and punished? 
Suppose A is clerk in a bank; he embezzles $IOOO. His 
defalcation is discovered and his father offers to repay the 
$1000. Can the bank properly accept this offer? 
3· In the Sixth Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
is a provision that "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel 
for his defense." 1 
What is the practical basis for such a guarantee? Viewed 
from the standpoint of enforcement of standards, how does 
this guarantee operate? 
4· The 5th Canon of Professional Ethics adopted by the 
American Bar Association declares: 
"It is the right of the lawyer to undertake the defense 
of a person accused of crime, regardless of his personal 
opinion as to the guilt of the accused; otherwise innocent 
persons, victims only of suspicious circumstances, might be 
denied proper defense. Having undertaken such defense, the 
lawyer is bound, by all fair and honorable means, to present 
every defense that the law of the land permits, to the end 
that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by 
due process of law." 
1 This provision applies only to criminal trials in the federal courts. 
However, there are similar provisions in the constitutions or statutes of most 
of our states; and the lack of counsel in a state prosecution may constitute 
a violation of the "due process" clause of the Federal Constitution. Powell 
v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932); Betts v. Brady, Warden, JI6 U. S. 455 
(1942); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947). 
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According to this canon how far can a lawyer go in defense 
of his client? 
Statutes of limitation commonly bar the prosecution of 
crimes (except murder and a few others) after a certain 
period of time has elapsed (e.g., three years). Should a 
lawyer plead such a bar on behalf of a client whom he knows 
to be guilty? 
5. In section I-I o, problem 6, we discussed the case of 
the Lambeth Poisonings, involving one Roose, the Bishop 
of Rochester's cook. The English Parliament passed an act 
declaring that Roose and any other poisoner be adjudged 
a traitor and be executed by being boiled to death. Roose 
was accordingly boiled at Smithfield a few days after the 
act was passed. 
As applied to Roose such an act would be unconstitutional 
in the United States, both because it is an ex post facto law 2 
and because the legislative branch cannot thus usurp judicial 
functions. What other constitutional guarantees would this 
enactment violate? 
Sec. 3-1]. Bringing civil action. The civil action occupies 
a prominent place among methods of law enforcement. A, 
who is harmed by the act of X, or threatened with harm, 
calls upon the courts for aid in maintaining his rights. The 
outstanding feature of this method of law enforcement is that 
it is initiated by an aggrieved party, A. One whose rights 
are violated or threatened with violation calls upon the 
state's tribunal for a remedy or protection. However, A is 
not obliged to maintain his rights; he is empowered to take 
action to protect himself. He can, if he chooses, allow the 
actual or threatened injury to go unredressed. The legal 
system relies upon A's self-interest as a motive for action. 
2 An ex post facto law is one which makes an act criminal after the act 
h"s been committed. 
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The legal system does not guarantee complete and perfect 
protection to him; it comes to A's assistance when he calls 
for help. From the point of view of A, the legal system 
performs a service function. From the point of view of the 
state, A, by setting the wheels of justice in motion, serves 
as an agent of enforcement. 
On the principle of party presentation, stated in the pre-
ceding paragraph, the legal system leaves to the aggrieved 
A full responsibility for taking each step in the legal pro-
cedure for effectuating his claims. He must discover the 
witnesses and other evidence necessary to support his case 
and produce them in court. He must call upon the agents 
of the law to compel witnesses to appear, if they are unwill-
ing; and he must require persons to produce papers which 
are needed. Only rarely does the judge or any other official 
do any act on his own motion, by way of enforcing A's claims. 
A must present his own claims and take each step in pursuing 
them to a conclusion. But, while we speak of party presenta-
tion as characteristic of our legal system, A, who is an ordi-
nary layman, is not able to carry on his suit without assistance. 
Usually he must have the aid of an expert, a lawyer. The 
actual presentation of the case is made by the lawyer at the 
instance of A. The lawyer brings the action and leads his 
client through the procedural mazes which baffie the ordinary 
citizen and even bewilder the conscientious law student at 
the start. 
Sec. 3-q. Trial of civil action. The private action at law 
is triable by jury. In fact the action cannot be tried without 
jury unless both parties waive jury trial, inasmuch as jury 
trial is guaranteed by the federal, as well as the state, consti-
tutions. The role of the jury in a civil action is similar to its 
role in criminal cases. The jury hears the evidence and finds 
its verdict in a similar way. The jury's activities are subject 
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to similar judicial control. The judge rules on the admis-
sibility of evidence and makes all the necessary orders during 
the trial. He instructs the jury essentially as he does in a 
criminal case. The judge also gives the final judgment. And, 
if there is an appeal, he makes the requisite orders regarding 
the appeal and the preparation of the record for appeal. 
All the acts of jury and judge are covered by legal stand-
ards. These fix the functions of the jury and the powers 
and functions of the judge. They determine what evidence 
may be used by the parties and how it is to be admitted. They 
control the manner in which the judge is to instruct the 
jury. They determine when and how a judge is to enter a 
judgment or decree; when he is to take a case from the jury, 
direct a verdict, or set aside a verdict for error or for other 
reasons. These standards you will become familiar with in 
your courses in procedure. 
No one can truly assert that the jury is an efficient agency 
for the trial of civil cases. It is ordinarily composed of persons 
whose knowledge and experience are quite inadequate to the 
exigencies of cases involving complex business deals and 
difficult problems of scientific fact. Nevertheless jury trial 
in civil cases will probably be with us for a considerable while 
to con, e. The civil jury had a prominent place in the processes 
of est :tblishing our civil liberties, especially freedom of 
speed ; and for this reason is secured by our constitutions. It 
seem~ quite unlikely that sufficient political support can be 
must( red in the foreseeable future to bring about the con-
stitu6onal amendments which would be required to abolish 
jury trial in civil actions.1 
However, jury trial can be waived as I have indicated 
above. If this is done, the case is tried by the judge alone; 
he decides both matters of fact and matters of law. The 
1 Most of the legal systems of the world have either never employed the jury 
in civil cases or else they have abandoned its use long ago. Only in the 
Anglo-American systems of law has the civil jury retained its vogue. 
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practice of waiving jury trial is a relatively recent devel-
opment in trial procedure. This practice has reached a point 
in many parts of the country where most civil cases are now 
tried without jury. 
The American legal systems have evolved from the system 
which prevailed in England prior to the Revolution. In the 
English system of prerevolutionary days certain types of 
civil cases were not tried by jury but by the judge alone. 
The principal cases which I have in mind went by the name 
of "suits in equity." 2 This is not the place to develop the 
early history of equity in England or its later history in the 
United States. Suffice it to say that equity cases did not fall 
within the jurisdiction of the English law courts, where jury 
trial prevailed, but belonged in the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Chancery, where cases were tried without jury by a judge 
known as the Lord Chancellor. The distinction between cases 
for law courts and cases for equity courts, and the distinction 
between the modes of trial therein, have been maintained 
down to the present day both in England and the United 
States. So that even now equity cases are tried by the judge 
alone as they have always been tried in the English practice. 
Equity cases constitute an important section of civil cases. 
You will hear a great deal more about equity cases, equity 
actions, and equity procedure in your various courses, and 
I shall have a few more words to say about them in the 
next section. 
Sec. J-Is. Redress in civil action. In our legal system 
money damages are the normal form of redress. The judg-
ment of the court in a civil action condemns the defendant 
2 In the English ecclesiastical, admiralty and probate courts of pre-revolu-
tionary days cases were also tried without jury. This method of trial still 
prevails in the admiralty courts on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United 
States we have no ecclesiastical courts. In the probate courts of the United States 
jury trial is often provided for by statute, but in some states probate cases 
are still tried without jury, 
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to pay a certain amount by way of compensation. If the 
defendant has done a personal injury to another, if he has 
trespassed upon another's land, if he has carried away or 
misappropriated another's goods, he must pay damages. In 
parallel fashion if he has failed or refused to perform his 
contract obligations, he must pay damages. The damages 
given are intended to make the injured party whole in an 
economic sense; they are intended to restore him to the same 
position, as regards total assets, as he would have occupied 
if the wrong had not occurred or if the contract had been 
performed. 
But the private action is not ended with the final judgment. 
As any lawyer knows, there is a difference between getting 
a judgment and collecting it. So it is important to look beyond 
the judgment to the means of realizing on it. To collect the 
damages which have been adjudged to him the judgment 
creditor must have execution levied on the goods or other 
property of the judgment debtor. This means that the cred-
itor, or an enforcement officer, must find property on which 
to levy execution. The execution involves the seizure and 
sale of the debtor's property to obtain money to satisfy the 
judgment. If no property is found the creditor realizes noth-
ing. The seizure and sale are carried out by a constable or 
other official on the court's order at the behest of the judg-
ment creditor. Accordingly the normal legal remedy in a 
civil action can be summed up in two phases: judgment for 
money damages and levy of execution on property of the 
judgment debtor. 
In a few situations our legal system undertakes to give 
the complaining party specific redress rather than money 
damages. This means that it undertakes to give him what 
he actually wants, not merely money in place of it. Three 
instances of specific redress, frequently called specific relief, 
will suffice for illustration: 
172 OUR LEGAL SYSTEM AND HOW IT OPERATES 
First is the redress obtained in the action of ejectment. The 
plaintiff who has been ousted from the possession of land 
asks to be restored to possession. If the court gives judgment 
for the plaintiff, it orders the sheriff to put the defendant 
out of possession and to put the plaintiff into possession. This 
is an obvious instance of giving the plaintiff what he asks for. 
Second, a proceeding for an injunction may be brought in 
certain cases. Injunctions fall within the jurisdiction of an 
equity court. They constitute one of the classes of equitable 
actions which I mentioned in the next preceding section. 
Consider for instance a case where a man maintains a factory 
on his land which discommodes his neighbors by the produc-
tion of smoke or excessive noise. On such facts a neighbor 
who is injured may apply to the equity judge for an injunc-
tion. After the judge hears the case and finds that the plaintiff 
is entitled to this remedy, the judge issues a restraining order 
to the defendant. The order prohibits him from continuing 
tc produce smoke or noise to the discomfort of his neighbor. 
What is also important for our present purpose is that this 
order is enforced by threat of imprisonment for contempt 
if the defendant does not desist. Of course, it is only rarely 
that a defendant will persist in the face of such an order. The 
judge is authorized to proceed summarily in case of a viola-
tion of his order, as any defendant knows. He will therefore 
abate his own nuisance as the court commands him to do, and 
the complaining party obtains the relief that he wants. 
Third, a court of equity may issue a positive order, not 
merely a restraining order, commanding a defendant to do 
a particular act. Typical situations in which positive orders, 
called mandatory injunctions, are issued are (I) the case in 
which a defendant is adjudged to be bound to convey land 
according to a land contract, and ( 2) the case where he is 
ordered to remove an offending structure which encroaches 
upon the land of another. In both these cases the court orders 
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the defendant himself to do the act which should be done. 
In one case the order commands him to make the conveyance 
as per contract, and in the other it requires him to remove 
the structure in question. These mandatory orders, like the 
injunctions first spoken of, are enforced by threat of imprison-
ment for contempt; they secure to the plaintiff the relief to 
which he is entitled. 
Sec. 3-r6. Judicial control of persons, estates, etc. In addi-
tion to their jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions and civil 
actions, courts are commonly invested with extensive author-
ity ( 1) to care for persons who need care, ( 2) to change and 
determine the status of persons, and (3) to manage and 
dispose of estates of various kinds. This authority, you will 
observe, does not ordinarily involve litigation of any kind; 
it does not necessarily involve the settlement of any con-
troversy of law or of facts. It falls outside of what we nor-
mally consider the judicial role. It calls for the doing of 
supervisory and administrative acts. 
As instances of jurisdiction to care for persons I might 
mention the general protection which courts extend to infants 
(minors) and to incompetent persons (the insane, etc.). This 
kind of jurisdiction is usually vested in, and exercised by, 
probate courts.1 They appoint a personal guardian for the 
infant who is an orphan or whose parents are unfit or incom-
petent to care for him; and they exercise supervisory control 
over the acts of the guardian. They remove the child from 
the custody of unfit parents. They place the neglected child 
or juvenile delinquent in an institution or in the custodial 
care of a proper person. They supervise the care, training, 
and education of children who are under guardianship, in 
custodial care, or in institutions. Similarly these courts appoint 
personal guardians for incompetent persons and exere1se 
1 See sec. 3-09 in regard to the character of probate courts. 
174 OUR LEGAL SYSTEM AND HOW IT OPERATES 
supervision over the guardians and over the institutions and 
individuals who have such persons in custody. 
Courts also exercise authority to change or determine the 
status of persons. For example, a judicial proceeding is 
requisite in order to declare a person to be incompetent or 
insane, and in order to commit him to custodial care. The 
adoption of a child has to be approved and accomplished 
through a judicial proceeding. Divorce and annulment are 
also judicial acts whose essential operation is to change per-
sonal status.2 
Instances of judicial management and disposition of estates 
are very common. I shall refer to a few of the more impor-
tant. First, I might mention the appointment by a probate 
court of a guardian to manage the estate of an infant or an 
incompetent person. Such a guardian has to be distinguished 
from the guardian of the person previously mentioned. This 
guardian has the control and management of property. How-
ever, one and the same individual may be appointed both 
guardian of the person and guardian of the estate of an infant 
or an incompetent. Second, the judicial administration of 
decedents' estates is worth noting. This is also an instance 
of the judicial management of property. Decedents' estates 
are actually managed and distributed by administrators or 
executors. But the latter have to be appointed by the probate 
court; they derive their legal authority from it; and they 
must get the court's approval for every important act which 
they do in the processes of collecting assets, converting them 
into money, paying debts, and distributing shares to the 
parties entitled. Third, courts of equity supervise the admin-
istration of trusts.3 The trustees are the primary actors but 
2 This jurisdiction is always invested in a court of general jurisdiction, not 
in a probate court. As regards this distinction, see sec. 3-09. 
3 Except in one state, courts of equity are no longer separate courts. Equity 
powers are exercised by the trial courts of general jurisdiction. See sec. 3-09 
above. 
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their acts are subject to judicial supervision. These courts 
also appoint receivers to take over the possession and manage-
ment of the estates of insolvent individuals and corporations. 
And finally, the United States district courts handle the 
estates of bankrupts. The courts, through trustees who collect 
claims due the bankrupt, take possession of the bankrupt's 
assets, and distribute his estate ratably to his creditors. In all 
the instances here mentioned courts appoint agents to manage 
and administer estates. Usually the agents are also subject 
to removal for cause by the appointing court. These agents 
are required to make reports of their actions from time to 
time to the courts which appoint them; and their management 
is subject to judicial control and supervision at all times. 
Sec. 3-17. Problems. r. Ricketts v. Darrel/ The defendant 
wrongfully took 7 3 8 rails and I 64 stakes belonging to the 
plaintiff and built a rail fence dividing the lands of the plain-
tiff and the defendant. The plaintiff brought an action of 
replevin to recover the possession of the rails and stakes. 
The court held that the plaintiff had brought the wrong kind 
of action and dismissed his suit. The court said: "The law 
affords him ample remedy if he rightfully chooses it; but it 
is no part of the duty of this court to instruct him as to what 
that remedy is." 
Consider the last statement made by the court. Where does 
it fit into our discussion of the civil action? 
2. Under statutes of the United States aliens may become 
naturalized citizens of the United States through a proceed-
ing in a state or federal court. The alien is eligible to apply 
for naturalization if he has filed a declaration of intention 
and lived in the United States continuously for five years. 
The admission to citizenship involves an application for 
1 55 Ind. 470 at 474 ( 1876). 
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naturalization by the candidate, a hearing by the court on 
this application, and a decree admitting him to citizenship. 
vVhere would you place this judicial jurisdiction to nat-
uralize aliens, among the types of jurisdiction mentioned in 
the preceding sections? 
3. Suppose H sues W for divorce and the court grants 
the divorce as prayed. How does the relief granted differ 
from the types of redress mentioned in section 3-1 5? 
4· In the last thirty years, statutes have been passed by 
most of our states and by the federal government providing 
for what are called "declaratory judgments."* A declaratory 
judgment is a binding declaration of legal relations as be-
tween parties, made where such relations are in controversy; 
the declaration is made on the basis of contentions of adver-
sary parties and counsel as the ordinary judgment is made. 
The declaratory judgment fixes the existence of relations 
arising out of a legal instrument or transaction, but does 
not embrace any relief beyond a binding determination of 
legal relations. The ordinary legal action springs from the 
fact that the party defendant has already committed a legal 
wrong for which the court is asked to provide a remedy, or 
that the defendant is threatening the immediate commission 
of a wrong which the court is asked to prevent. The declar-
atory judgment also falls in the field of preventive relief. 
However, it is intended to prevent damage by removing 
the uncertainty of parties regarding their rights, usually in 
cases where both parties are acting in good faith and without 
the purpose to commit wrong. There are many situations in 
which a legal declaration of rights can thus prevent damage 
-as where there is a bona fide dispute as to the existence 
of a marriage, as to the legitimacy or sanity of an individual, 
as to the title of property, or as to the construction of legal 
documents, such as contracts, deeds, leases or wills. In the 
* (I.R.) See generally on this topic, BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JuDGMENTS 
(2d ed., 1941). 
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absence of provisions for declaratory relief, persons must 
act at their peril in such cases; persons must act upon their 
own interpretation of their supposed rights and take the 
consequences. It is to remove uncertainty in these respects 
that the declaratory judgment has been adopted as a device 
of preventive justice in the civil law countries of Europe, 
in England, and in the United States. 
In arguing in favor of statutes to provide for declaratory 
judgments, Sunderland says: 
"In early times the basis of jurisdiction is the existence 
and the constant assertion of physical power over the parties 
to the action, but as civilization advances the mere existence 
of such power tends to make its exercise less and less essential. 
"If this is true, it must be because there is something in 
civilization itself which diminishes the necessity for a resort 
to actual force in sustaining the judgments of courts. And 
it is quite clear that civilization does supply an element which 
is theoretically capable of entirely supplanting the exercise 
of force in the assertion of jurisdiction. This is respect for 
law. If the parties to the action desire to obey the law, a 
mere determination by the court of their reciprocal rights 
and duties is enough. No sheriff with his writ of injunction 
or execution need shake the mailed fist of the State in the 
faces of the litigfl.nts. The judgment of the court merely 
directs the will of the parties, and the performance of duty 
becomes the automatic consequence of the declaration of 
right. 
"It is not to be assumed that the peaceful acquiescence of 
the highly civilized man in the legal findings of the court 
implies any loss of power in the court itself. Quite the con-
trary. The greater the ease with which the court's findings 
impose themselves on litigants the more the real power of 
the court is demonstrated. But the force behind the finding 
of the court has become a latent instead of an active force. 
This transition is possible, however, only when the existence 
of the force is so well recognized and so clearly understood 
that no one would think it worth while to put it to the test. 
The entire cessation of actual coercive measures on the part 
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of the court would therefore mark, not the disappearance, 
but the perfection of the rule of force. 
"The modern observer, noting this correlation between 
social progress and the decline in the need for outward dis-
play of force in the administration of justice, may well ask 
himself why we have not done better than we appear to have 
done. If the existence of force is enough, without its exercise, 
to sustain the court in its findings, why do we not show a 
realization of that fact in our remedial machinery? If the 
power of the state stands irresistibly behind our judicial 
decisions, why take so much pains to clothe them with the 
outward show of authority? Why display the sheriff and his 
writ with so much ostentation? We do not arm our traffic 
policemen with guns and cutlasses. Why insist that the court 
must always rattle the sabre? 
"To make a specific application of this general criticism, 
let it be asked why our judicial system does not provide a 
means for merely determining and declaring rights. If our 
civilization is not a sham, and the state is understood to be 
equal to the task of enforcing the decrees of its courts; a mere 
declaration may serve every purpose of an order, and the 
order will become unnecessary. A declaration by the court 
that A is entitled to the immediate possession of a chattel ip. 
B's possession, should be equally effective in A's behalf as a 
judgment that A do have and recover of B the possession 
of the chattel. A judicial declaration that a certain city ordi-
nance is invalid ought to serve equally well as an injunction 
against its enforcement. Furthermore, the remedial possi-
bilities in such declaratory judgments are much greater than 
in judgments for relief, and they open up an entirely new 
field for judicial usefulness as will hereinafter be pointed 
out." 2 
As regards the matter of redress or enforcement, how does 
an action for declaratory relief differ from the ordinary civil 
action? See sec. 3-I 5. 
In what important respects is the declaratory judgment 
like the ordinary judgment in a civil action? 
2 Sunderland, "A Modern Evolution in Remedial Rights-The Declaratory 
Judgment," 16 MICH. L. REV. 69 at 70 (192.0). 
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Sec. 3-z8. Appellate courts-jurisdiction. In section 3-oS 
I referred to the controversies of fact and law which it is 
the primary function of courts to determine. In section 3-o9 
I divided the jurisdiction of courts into two kinds: trial and 
appellate. Trial jurisdiction has been considered in the pre-
ceding sections, as well as certain administrative functions 
which courts perform. In the present section I shall speak 
as briefly as I am able about appellate courts and their juris-
diction.* 
The appellate court reviews the record of the work which 
the trial court has done. It does not hear the evidence in the 
case again.1 It examines the lower court's proceedings to 
determine whether they have been conducted according to 
legal standards. If they have been so conducted, the appellate 
court affirms the trial court's findings, judgment, or decree. 
If material error has been committed, the appellate court 
reverses the trial court's determination. It sends the case back 
* (I.R.) Manifestly I cannot deal with so large a subject in a brief space 
and make every statement complete and accurate to the last detail; I hope 
the informed reader will bear in mind that I am merely trying to give 
a general picture of our appellate courts-a picture which will aid the begin-
ning law student in his study of reported cases. 
For more detailed treatments of the organization and procedure of appellate 
courts, the reader is referred to POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS (National 
Conference of Judicial Councils) (1940); POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN 
CIVIL CASES (also a National Conference publication) (1941); American Law 
Institute, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1931)-the sections on appeal with 
full annotations; and also items cited in sec. 3-z6, note *, and sec. 3-:~8, 
note *· 
1 Appeal, as we are using the term, alwan involves the review of the record 
of a trial. Appeal presupposes that the case reviewed has been fully heard, 
both as to the law and the facts, by a court below. And review, or appeal, 
accordingly means the judicial examination of the record of what a lower 
court has done. 
However appeal is sometimes used in a different sense and one which can 
lead to confusion. For example, it is sometimes provided that an appeal can be 
taken from a petty court to a court of general jurisdiction where the case which 
was tried in the petty court is to be tried again. This provision for a trial 
de novo is called an appeal. As the case is heard fully, both on the law and 
the proof, on the second trial as well as on the first, the second trial is obviously 
not an appeal in the sense in which I have used that word; it is a second trial, 
just as I have called it, not a review. 
18o OUR LEGAL SYSTEM AND HOW IT OPERATES 
for a new trial or directs the lower court to give judgment 
for one side or the other; or, in the practice of some juris-
dictions, the appellate court itself enters judgment for one 
side or the other. 
The common errors which occur in jury trials are errors 
in rulings on the pleadings, errors in admission and rejection 
of evidence, errors in instructing the jury on the law, and 
errors in rulings on motions of the parties, e. g., motions for 
new trial and motions for directed verdict. The common 
errors in trials by the judge are errors in excluding evidence 
and errors in the judge's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. 
However, not all errors in the proceedings are fatal. Some 
errors may be committed which the appellate court regards 
as harmless or at least as too trivial to require the radical 
remedy of reversal. Other errors are committed but corrected 
by the trial court before the trial is over. And it must always 
be remembered that a party cannot ordinarily take advantage 
in the appellate court of an error in the proceedings below, 
unless he has entered a proper objection when the error was 
committed. He cannot quietly sit by, see an error committed 
in the proceedings below, and raise an objection for the first 
time in the court above. If he does not make a timely objec-
tion he waives the error. Furthermore, the party must call 
the error to the appellate court's attention in a proper manner 
and rely upon it for reversal.** The principle of party pres-
entation, i. e., the principle that parties must represent their 
own interests, applies in appellate proceedings as well as in 
trials. So that it is never safe to assume that the mere fact 
that error has occurred means that the proceedings of a trial 
court will be reversed. 
In each of our states there is at least one appellate court 
whose function is to review the proceedings of trial courts; 
** (I.R.) Ordinarily these propositions hold but there are some errors, u 
every lawyer knows, which can be raised for the first time on appeal. 
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sometimes there are several appellate courts, as I shall point 
out presently. The most important of such appellate courts 
is a supreme tribunal or court of last resort. This supreme 
tribunal is usually called the supreme court, but in some states 
it is known as the court of appeals or the court of errors and 
appeals. In the federal system the supreme tribunal is the 
Supreme Court of the United States.2 Every supreme tri-
bunal consists of several judges who sit together in the 
hearing and determination of appeals. The number of judges 
ranges in the different states from three to nine. In the 
Supreme Court of the United States there are nine justices. 
Some of the state judicial systems have only one appellate 
court, e. g., Michigan. This arrangement is ideal if it can be 
made to work. Under this system every party litigant has 
the benefit of a trial and then of the scrutiny of the trial 
record by an appellate court. But a single appellate tribunal 
often has difficulty in keeping abreast of all the cases in which 
review is sought. The court may fall far in arrears with its 
business so that justice is seriously delayed. Or the court may 
have to resort to "one man" opinions; this means that each 
case is really considered carefully by only one appellate 
judge. He goes over the record; he decides whether the 
case has been properly tried; he writes the supreme court's 
opinion. The scrutiny of the case by the other judges becomes 
more or less perfunctory and formal. This, of course, defeats 
the very purpose of having appellate tribunals composed of 
several judges. Litigants do not get the benefit of the collec-
tive opinion of an appellate bench, to which they are entitled. 
One way to meet the problem of handling the heavy load 
of appellate work has been to introduce intermediate appel-
late courts. This expedient has been adopted in the federal 
system and in New York, Illinois, and other states. It is 
2 While almost all of the business of the Supreme Court of the United Statea 
and of the supreme appellate tribunals in the. states is appellate in nature, each 
of these courts handles a certain amount of business in the first instance. This 
kind of business is referred to as original jurisdiction. See notes to sec. 3-09. 
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intended to take some of the load of appellate work from 
the supreme tribunal by making the determination of the 
intermediate appellate court final in a large proportion of 
cases. In the federal system the intermediate appellate court, 
called the court of appeals, seems to serve this function rather 
well. The United States is divided into ten circuits in each of 
which there is a separate court of appeals. This court has 
jurisdiction of most appeals from the district courts within 
its circuit; 3 and in most matters which come before it the 
determination of the court of appeals is final. It would cer-
tainly not be convenient to have all appeals heard by a single 
court sitting in Washington. 
However, there is serious doubt among procedural experts 
whether the intermediate appellate court is the best device 
for meeting the excessive load of appellate work in the state 
courts. The existence of an intermediate appellate court 
always raises a multitude of questions regarding jurisdiction. 
Which cases go to the supreme tribunal? Which cases are 
to be decided in the intermediate tribunal? In which cases 
is the determination of the intermediate court final? The 
determination of such questions is unnecessary if there is only 
one appellate court. And, in those cases which do go to the 
supreme tribunal via the intermediate court, the intermediate 
hearing simply presents an added appeal. It means that the 
case is heard twice by appellate courts. And this double 
hearing substantially increases the expense and delay of ju-
dicial business. 
An alternative for the intermediate appellate court, strong-
ly supported by experts on procedure, is to maintain a single 
appellate court, but to have it sit in several divisions, each 
division or branch to hear appeals. It is clear that, in a popu-
lous state like New York, one appellate court sitting as a 
unit, could not give due consideration to all the appellate 
3 A few cases are appealable directly from the district to the Supreme Court. 
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work of the state. Some division of the task seems to be 
necessary. If the appellate court is sufficiently large and is 
split up into divisions, it can handle as many cases as can 
bt handled by one supreme appellate court and several inter-
mediate appellate courts; but duplicative appeals can be 
avoided as well as unnecessary jurisdictional questions. The 
court can sit as a whole (in bane) in cases which it deems 
of sufficient public importance and in cases wherein the judges 
of a division find themselves divided in opinion. This divi-
sional method is essentially that employed in England. The 
supreme courts of ten of our states are authorized to sit in 
divisions, but so far this authority has not been exercised to 
any great extent. 
In most cases the party who seeks a review is entitled to 
the same as a matter of right; he can carry his case to the 
appellate court if he chooses. This fact vastly increases the 
load of appellate work; it means that many unnecessary and 
unimportant cases have to be considered along with those 
\Vhich are of real consequence. Congress has met this difficulty 
in regard to the Supreme Court of the United States by 
making the review of most cases discretionary with the 
Supreme Court. The party who asks for review must satisfy 
the court that his case presents points of sufficient merit or 
doubt to warrant review. If so, the court allows him to bring 
nis case before it for full hearing; if not, it denies the oppor-
tunity for a review. The result is that only a relatively small 
proportion of cases which are tried in the federal courts ever 
reach the Supreme Court. The great bulk of them is finally 
disposed of in the courts of appeals. 
Sec. 3-r9. Advisory opinions. From very early times, the 
judges of the high courts in England gave extrajudicial 
advisory opinions on questions of law to other governmental 
agencies (the King, the Privy Council, the House of Lords, 
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etc.). This practice was well established in England at the 
time of the American Revolution. But the framers of the 
Federal Constitution did not follow the English model; they 
expressly rejected a proposal to confer on Congress and the 
executive the authority to require advisory opinions of the 
Supreme Court. The powers of the judiciary were separated 
from legislative and executive powers. And the Supreme 
Court has consistently held that judicial power embraces only 
the adjudication of actual cases and controversies; it has held 
that the rendering of advisory opinions does not fall within 
the scope of judicial power.* 
This view of the scope of judicial power has usually been 
adopted by the supreme courts in the various states. How-
ever, the constitutions of a few states (Massachusetts, Maine, 
New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Colorado, Florida and 
South Dakota) impose upon the highest court of the state 
the obligation to render advisory opinions upon the request 
of the legislature or either house thereof, or of the governor. 
And two states (Alabama and Delaware) have sanctioned the 
advisory opinion by statute. But most states definitely would 
not uphold legislation of this type without explicit consti-
tutional authority.** 
Where the advisory opinion is allowed, the procedure for 
obtaining it is as follows: the executive, by a written request, 
or either house of the legislature, by resolution, propounds 
to the supreme court a number of questions relating to a 
proposed measure or action. Answers are given by the judges 
* (I.R.) Rayburn's Case, z Dall. 409 (179z); and Muskrat v. United 
States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). 
See generally regarding advisory opinions: Hudson, "Advisory Opinions of 
National and International Courts," 3 HARV. L. REv. 970 ( 1924), and 
Frankfurter, "A Note on Advisory Opinions," 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002 (1924). 
**Matter of the Senate, 10 Minn. 78 (1865); Reply of the Judges, 33 
Conn. 586 (1867); Opinions of the Justices, 64 N.C. 661 (187o); State v. 
Baughman, 38 Ohio St. 455 (1882); Re Board of Public Lands, 37 Neb. 425 
(1893); Matter of State Industrial Commission, 2.24 N.Y. 13 (1918). 
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of the supreme court, collectively or individually. While it is 
usually provided that the supreme court may require the aid 
of the attorney general or other counsel in reaching its con-
clusions, no satisfactory way of securing this aid has been 
devised and actually the aid of counsel is rarely asked or 
obtained. Furthermore, the court has no actual litigants 
before it so that it is not deciding a controversy. For these 
reasons, the court which gives an advisory opinion does not 
regard itself, or any litigant in a later case, as bound by such 
opinion. On the other hand, it is not to be expected that any 
court will lightly depart in subsequent litigation from an 
opinion earlier expressed in an advisory capacity. 
The principal argument opposed to advisory opinions is 
the impracticability of devising ways for presenting and 
submitting questions to the court for advisory opinion. As 
I have already indicated, courts have never succeeded in ob-
taining the assistance of adversary counsel for their guidance 
in deciding questions presented. Not only is the argument of 
counsel necessary in the sense that the court may overlook 
important considerations unless it has this aid, but also the 
court has to give its opinion in the abstract, without reference 
to any concrete facts. The validity of legislation is often 
conditioned by the factual situation to which it will apply. 
As Frankfurter says, "Constitutionality is not a fixed quan-
tity. In crucial cases it resolves itself into a judgment upon 
facts. Every tendency to deal with constitutional questions 
abstractly, to formulate them in terms of barren legal ques-
tions, leads to dialectics, to sterile conclusions unrelated to 
actualities." 1 And this holds true of any abstract question, 
alike whether a constitutional question or a question of the 
meaning of a statutory enactment or executive action. 
1 See Frankfurter, "Advisory Opinions," in I ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SOCIAL 
SciENCES 47 5 at 478. 
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A strong argument in favor of advisory opinions is that 
they make possible the prompt resolution of doubts about 
the validity and meaning of legislative and executive acts. 
If an act is to be later declared invalid, it is much better that 
the act should not be passed or done at all. Even more 
important is the fact that a substantial period of time nor-
mally elapses between the date when a statute is enacted or 
executive action is taken and the date when the supreme 
court passes upon the validity or interpretation of the enact-
ment or executive act. During this interval, costly and peril-
ous uncertainty regarding legal rights and relations prevails. 
For example, the National Industrial Recovery Act was 
passed in the early stages of the New Deal. The validity 
of the Act was doubted from the beginning, and many of 
its provisions were very obscure. The Act affected most of 
the important business enterprises in the United States, and 
most of these enterprises attempted to comply with its pro-
visions, deeming this the only safe course. Nevertheless, after 
almost two years, the whole Act was declared unconstitutional 
by the Supreme Court of the United States.2 This kind of 
situation shows the practical need for having questions about 
the validity and interpretation of acts decided in advance 
of their operation and enforcement. The protagonists of the 
advisory opinion claim that it meets just this need, that it 
avoids waste in doing invalid acts and delay in passing upon 
acts of doubtful validity or doubtful meaning. 
Queries: (I) There is a serious question whether the 
advisory opinion meets the need last suggested. On the basis 
of what is herein stated, what do you think about this point? 
( 2) In what respect is the general purpose of the advisory 
opinion like the purpose of the declaratory judgment? 
(3) Why is it easier to bring the declaratory judgment 
within traditional notions of judicial power than to bring the 
advisory opinion within such notions? 
2 See note in 33 MICH. L. REV. u54 ( 1935). 
STANDARDS FOR OFFICIAL ACTS 187 
Sec. 3-20. Acts of administrative agencies.* The consti-
tutional separation of powers among three branches of 
government could have been taken to mean that govern-
mental power was divided exhaustively among the three 
branches, so that no governmental power could be exercised 
and no governmental act done, except by the legislative, 
executive and judicial agencies provided for by the Consti-
tution. But this has not been the construction adopted by 
those charged with the interpretation of the Constitution. 
The practical exigencies of government have required the 
creation of a fourth kind of agency, not strictly identifiable 
with any of the three traditional branches. These agencies 
are often called administrative. They are typified by the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and 
various independent boards and offices, in the federal system; 
and are exemplified by workmen's compensation commissions, 
public utility commissions, and a great variety of boards and 
supervisory agents, such as insurance commissioners, banking 
commissioners, and others, in the state systems. 
It cannot be said that these administrative agencies are all 
of one type, or that the powers they exercise, or the acts 
. they do, are all alike. For this reason, I can give only a rough 
picture of the administrative agencies which function in our 
federal and state legal systems. These agencies are all created 
by or pursuant to statutes; in this respect they are like the 
subordinate executive agencies created by Congress and the 
similar executive agencies created by state legislatures.1 And 
usually, they are invested with certain duties and powers 
which might fairly be called executive in character, such as 
*(I.R.) For bibliography on this subject, see STONE, PROVINCE AND FUNC-
TION OF LAW 593 notes (1946) and POUND, OUTLINES OF LECTURES ON 
JURISPRUDENCE 92 (sth ed., 1943); and note also the lectures by Stason, cited 
in this section, note 2. 
1 Regarding the rule-making, or legislative powers, which most of these 
administrative agencies have, see sees. 4-15 to 4-17, inclusive. 
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are involved in the supervision and enforcement of the laws 
with reference to banking, or the laws with reference to 
railroads, or utilities, or the laws relating to employer-
employee relations. As regards functions, powers and duties, 
they are to be differentiated from the executive merely by 
the fact that they enjoy a more or less complete autonomy; 
in particular they are independent of the supervisory author-
ity of the chief executive. They are given a special field of 
operation, such as one of the fields just mentioned, and 
enforce and effectuate the laws in that field. If they did not 
enjoy this independence and control of a special field, they 
would remain mere arms of the general executive branch, 
and we would not need to distinguish them from executive 
agencies which definitely fall within the executive branch. 
Many of these administrative agencies are empowered to 
handle certain types of controversies between parties, con-
tt oversies which are, in essentials, like private lawsuits. In 
this respect, these agencies serve functions similar to courts. 
They are authorized to decide both questions of law and 
questions of fact. For this reason, they are sometimes referred 
to as quasi-judicial agencies, and their powers are called 
quasi-j Jdicial powers. But inasmuch as these bodies are 
authorized to follow simpler procedures than courts use, 
and inasmuch as they determine fact questions without jury, 
they cannot be regarded as ordinary courts. For example, 
a workmen's compensation commission is given authority to 
pass on the claim of an employee against his employer for 
injuries arising in the course of employment. The employee 
must proceed before the workmen's compensation commis-
sion. The commission decides how and when he was injured; 
and decides, according to a fixed schedule, what his compen-
sation shall be. Formerly, this type of case would have been 
handled in a court proceeding by the employee against the 
employer. It would have been a matter for a court and jury 
to determine. This modern proceeding before an admin-
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istrative body has superseded the old legal action. This 
substitution of another trial agency in place of a court would 
not have been possible if grants of judicial power had been 
interpreted to mean that all controversies between parties 
must be heard and determined by the judicial agencies and 
methods provided for in the constitutions. On the contrary, 
administrative bodies are commonly allowed, in fields where 
public welfare so demands, to perform functions like those 
of courts, though these agencies are not regarded as judicial 
bodies in the full constitutional sense. 
Not only could the constitutional separation of powers 
have been taken to mean that all the legislative, executive 
and judicial powers of government must always be invested 
in the three respective branches mentioned in the consti-
tutions, but it might also have been held that the three kinds 
of power must always be kept separate from one another. 
It might have been held that the three kinds of power 
cannot be combined in a single hand. This view has often 
been urged; but again the interpreters of our constitutions 
have had to yield to the practical exigencies of government 
and to recognize the possibility of combining, in a single 
administrative agency, power to make regulations, power to 
enforce them, and power to adjudicate controversies regard-
ing their meaning. In fact, this combination of powers is one 
of the outstanding features of the modern administrative 
agency.2 Instead of separating the regulative powers of gov-
ernment into three hands, the tendency in recent decades has 
been to separate powers of control in regard to different fields 
and subjects of human action. Thus, in the federal system, 
control over railroads is assigned to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, control over radio transmission to the Federal 
Communications Commission, and control of certain em-
ployer-employee relations to the National Labor Relations 
2 As well as one of the chief grounds of objection to the typical administra-
tive agency. See items cited in next footnote. 
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Board; and in the state systems, control of the insurance 
business is invested in an insurance commissioner, control of 
public utilities in public service commissions, etc. Control of 
such a field is invested in a single body or official, and this 
body or official is given authority to legislate, enforce, and 
adjudicate within this field of special competence. In other 
words, within this field, the separation of powers as a scheme 
of checks and balances is not followed out; powers of control 
are not separated, but are combined in one hand. The admin-
istrative body or official is at once lawmaker, executive and 
judge. Its special field of operation is marked out and sepa-
rated from others on a principle which is essentially the 
economic theory of specialization or division of labor. The 
idea is that a body which specializes in the control of rail-
roads or public utilities, can do a better job of creating rules 
for their control, and a better job of supervising their activi-
ties and enforcing the applicable rules, and a better job of 
deciding controversies in regard to their activities and rules, 
than can an agency which has to make all kinds of rules, or 
to enforce all kinds of rules, or to settle all types of con-
troversies. The job of control will be better done not only 
because of the knowledge and experience which comes with 
specialization, but also because the combination of powers of 
·control avoids the delays and possible conflicts of views which 
may result where the job of control is divided three ways. 
Our courts had no little difficulty about recognizing the 
constitutional validity of these hybrid agencies, exercising 
powers part legislative, part executive, and part judicial. 
They helped themselves over the difficulty at first by calling 
the powers of these agencies quasi-legislative, quasi-executive 
and quasi-judicial, as if the addition of the "quasi" conferred 
a different odor on the roses in question. As a matter of 
fact, the real basis for the creation and recognition of these 
agencies with mixed powers was the need for specialization 
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in governmental functions. And nowadays this basis is frankly 
acknowledged. Congress and the legislatures still have to 
decide when the public welfare demands that a governmental 
function be invested in an administrative body rather than 
in an executive officer or court. Indeed, Congress and the state 
legislatures are showing a definite inclination to put specific 
checks on the administrative agencies which they create in 
order to prevent abuses that can result from the combination 
in one agency of the functions of rule maker, rule enforcer, 
and judge. 3 However, such checks are matters for legislative 
determination. There is no longer any doubt about the consti-
tutional status of administrative agencies. Congress and the 
legislatures can invest their creatures, established to control 
special subjects, with almost any powers or combination of 
powers that they deem necessary in the public interest. 
Sec. 3-2 I. Nonregulative acts of governmental agencies. 
It is sometimes tacitly assumed that government does just 
one thing: it performs a regulative function. In fact, this 
assumption is made in the conventional statement of the 
separation of powers doctrine. In classifying governmental 
powers into legislative, executive, and judicial, that doctrine 
subdivides only the regulative powers of government. Cer-
tainly the primary function of the state, as I have already 
pointed out/ is to regulate the behavior of individuals; and 
certainly this regulative function of the state is that in which 
we, as lawyers, are most interested. Even the regulation of 
the behavior of officials must be regarded as secondary to the 
primary function of regulating the behavior of the individual. 
But state agencies perform many acts which are non-
regulative in character, and which fall quite outside the 
S See STASON, ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND ITS CONTROL (Cooley 
Lectures delivered in 1950); Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 
5 U. S. C., sees. 1001-1o11; and the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act 
(an equivalent state act), Wisconsin Laws, 1943, chapter 375· 
1 Sec. 3-01. 
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threefold classification of governmental powers into legis-
lative, executive, and judicial. Besides its regulative function, 
the state performs fiscal functions; it raises and spends 
money. It performs many public services, such as the mainte-
nance of schools and highways and the keeping of records 
of various sorts. And it administers its own affairs as any 
private business concern would do. One sees the operation of 
these nonregulative activities of government most plainly in 
connection with the legislative branch. While the legislature 
takes its name from the fact that it enacts laws, legislative 
bodies in our American legal systems are not confined to 
lawmaking. The Congress of the United States, for example, 
is vested with sweeping powers of taxation. It authorizes 
contracts on behalf of the government; it procures and con-
trols government property; it expends funds for the general 
welfare; it controls and issues money; it supervises and 
investigates the conduct of officials; it declares war and peace. 
Similar acts of nonlegislative character are done by the 
legislatures of the states. These acts, of course, are confined 
to the fiscal and business affairs of the respective states. The 
executive agencies of the federal and state governments are, 
in their turn, required to carry out the legislative mandates 
affecting these fiscal and administrative activities of govern-
ment, so that their activities also fall beyond the field in 
which conduct of individuals is regulated. And the judicial 
agencies of these governments are, in an analogous way, often 
concerned with controversies between agencies of government 
and other disputes which do not immediately relate to indi-
viduals. In short, we need to remember that its regulative 
activity is not the only function government performs. The 
conventional classification of governmental powers in regula-
tive terms is, therefore, one-sided and not exhaustive. It 
suits our present purpose well enough, but sometimes we find 
it necessary to look at all the functions of government in 
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order to understand the operation of regulative and effectua-
tive measures.2 
EFFECTUATION OF STANDARDS FOR OFFICIALS 1 
Sec. 3-2 2. Need for effectuation-control devices. In the 
last subtopic, I have mentioned the kinds of acts which 
officials do--chiefly acts which they do by way of effec-
tuating standards applicable to the individual-and have 
called attention to the standards which are applicable to 
these official acts. I shall now pass on to the ways in which 
these standards for official acts are in their turn effectuated. 
Officials themselves are human beings and, like those whom 
they control, need not only standards to guide their actions 
but proper motives and habits to make them perform accord-
ing to standards. 
The problem of making effective the standards applicable 
to official acts is essentially like the problem of effectuating 
standards for the individual's behavior; it is a problem of 
insuring proper motivation and habits. However, it is not 
quite as easy to devise methods to control officials, and 
especially top officials, as it is to devise methods to control 
the individual. This is the point of a celebrated question 
asked by Juvenal regarding Plato's proposal of a state in 
which the "guardians" would exercise all governmental 
authority: "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" (Who shall keep 
guard over the guardians themselves?) 2 In general terms, 
the answer to this question of control is easy. Officials will 
be controlled by the acts of their superiors, by their education 
2 After all, the activities of government of every kind and character are 
woven together in an inextricable manner so that no part can be properly 
evaluated apart from the whole. This is a point which has already been 
stressed. See sees. 2-36 and 2-39. It is a point which I shall have occasion 
to dwell on again later. See sees. 7-17 to 7-27, inclusive. 
1 The discussion in the present subtopic parallels the discussion of methods 
of effectuating standards for the individual, sees. 2-29 to 2-42, inclusive. 
2 SATIRES, VI, 347• 
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and training, by promise of reward for good behavior, by 
threat of penalty for bad, and so on, just as any actor is 
controlled. But when we undertake to work out specific pro-
grams for the control of particular types of officials, acting 
in the varied situations where they must act, the problems 
of devising sanctions to control officials become most difficult 
and complex. 
The methods devised and used in the American legal 
system can be reduced to four: 
r. The use of independent officials as checks upon one 
another. 
2. The selection of officials on the basis of proper habits 
and training. 
3. The assurance of sound conditions of tenure. 
4· The supervision and disciplinary control of officials by 
superwrs. 
In the next section, the first of these methods will be 
considered; in the sections immediately following, the other 
methods will be treated as they apply specifically to control 
of inferior executives, the chief executive, the trial jury, the 
trial judge, and the appellate judge. 
Sec. 3-23. Checks and balances-separation and integra-
tion of powers. As I have already mentioned, a prominent 
feature of all the American constitutions, beginning with the 
federal, is the separation of governmental powers and acts 
into three kinds: legislative, executive, and judiciaJ.l This 
separation was not made by the framers of the Federal 
1 Although the doctrine of separation of powers is embodied in all the 
state constitutions, I shall spea,k. here only of the Federal Constitution because 
it was the original instrument in which the separation was definitely adopted, 
and because it will serve as an adequate illustration of the nature and effects 
of the doctrine. It should be noted, however, that the Federal Constitution does 
not mention the separation doctrine explicitly, as some of the state constitutions 
do. It simply makes a separation of powers in distinct and express terms; in 
Article I it provides for legislative power; in Article II, it allocates executive 
power and defines its scope; and in Article III, it defines the scope of judicial 
power. 
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Constitution merely as a matter of convenient classification; 
it was made as a matter of policy. The founding fathers were 
deeply impressed by the argument of Montesquieu in his 
Spirit of the Laws that such a separation is essential to the 
~ecurity and protection of the individual.* Behind the separa-
tion of powers of government in this manner was a policy 
of checks and balances. The notion was that by creating three 
separate branches of government, each would serve as a check 
upon the acts and activities of the others. No one branch 
would be able to exceed or misuse its powers, inasmuch as 
it would be restrained by the powers and acts of the other 
two. In other words, the founders of our government ex-
pressed in the doctrine of separation of powers their intention 
to make the three branches of government independent for 
a special purpose-the purpose of using each branch as a 
means of insuring proper behavior, i.e., behavior according 
to standard, by the others.2 
The function of Congress as a check on the executive is 
seen in the fact that the great bulk of legal standards which 
the President is to enforce and effectuate are created by 
Congress. Most of his powers depend upon statute.3 More-
over, the President cannot act without the aid of subordinate 
officials, and these officials occupy offices created by Congress 
* (I.R.) The theory of checks and balances did not originate with Mon-
tesquieu; Locke expressed the theory in somewhat different form. And the 
notion of using one organ of government as a check upon another was 
advanced by Polybius, a Greek writer, before the Christian era. Also, the 
colonial governments were already organized on lines which resembled the 
division of powers made by the Federal Constitution. 
2 It must also be remembered that the separation of powers among three 
branches of government is not the only instance in which the principle of 
checks and balances appears in the framework of American government. 
The division of legislative power between a House and a Senate is a separation 
derived from the British Parliament. The division of powers between the 
federal and the state governments makes the general government and the state 
governments checks upon one another. Similar observations apply to consti-
tutional divisions between state and local government, such as the Home 
Rule Amendments, which have been adopted in many of our states. 
SA few important powers are conferred on the President by the Constitution; 
but most of his powers depend on statutes. 
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and supported by Congressional appropriations. And, while 
the appointment of higher officials is normally made by the 
President, any such appointment must be approved by the 
Senate. In all these respects we see, then, that Congress has a 
very real restraining authority over what the executive branch 
does. On the judicial branch, similar legislative checks obtain. 
All the federal courts except the Supreme Court depend on 
acts of Congress for their existence. All the powers of the 
courts in the federal system, except a few constitutionally 
defined powers of the Supreme Court, are fixed and defined 
by the Congressional will.4 Judicial appointments can be 
made only with the approval of the Senate, or in such manner 
as Congress shall determine. Finally, Congress checks both 
executive and judicial behavior through its power to remove 
federal officials from office by impeachment. The House of 
Representatives is empowered to start removal proceedings 
by filing charges of misbehavior, and the Senate is invested 
with power to hear and determine such charges and enter 
judgment of removal. 
The President's power to veto legislation, his discretion 
in initiating action of various sorts, and his control over 
officials who enforce law, serve to make him a check on the 
behavior of the legislative branch, especially as he owes his 
election to the people and not to Congress. The President 
has some checking power as regards the judiciary in his power 
of appointing judges.5 More important perhaps is the fact 
that the President is the ultimate agency to enforce decrees of 
the courts, and in this sense serves as a check on their action. 
For ordinary purposes, the court's own marshal can accom-
plish whatever is required, but if military assistance becomes 
4 See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U. S. 182 ( 1943); Yakus v. United States, 
321 U. S. 414 (1944). Congress also appropriates money to pay federal 
judicial salaries, though it cannot reduce a judge's salary during his term 
in office. Const. Art. III, Sec. I. 
5 Also his power to pardon serves as a check on judicial action in the 
criminal field. 
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necessary, the courts must call upon the Chief Executive who 
has control of the military forces.6 
The judicial branch serves as a check on Congress chiefly 
through what has come to be known as the power of judicial 
review. This is the power to pass on the constitutionality of 
legislation. This power stands in the way of efforts by Con-
gress to exceed its legislative powers.7 And the judiciary 
exercises an analogous check on the executive branch. The 
courts pass on the question whether executive action exceeds 
constitutional authority; or, where executive action purports 
to be taken under authority of statute, they decide whether 
such action is in harmony with the statutory authority con-
ferred by Congress. 
There can be no doubt about the importance or soundness 
of this system of checks in the American governmental 
scheme. But there has been a tendency at times to exaggerate 
the extent of the cleavage between the branches of our gov-
ernment and to forget the reason for their separation. The 
branches of government were intended to co-operate with, as 
well as to check, one another. The three branches of govern-
ment are partners in the processes of regulation. The one 
branch is to establish regulative provisions, the second branch 
to see that they are enforced, and the third branch to settle 
controversies regarding the meaning and application of regu-
6 This is the point of the remark, attributed to President Jackson, "Well, 
John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it." The decision 
referred to was that of Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, 
6 Pet. 5 I 5 (I 8 32). The State of Georgia was ready to defy the authority of 
the Supreme Court in this case. It seems probable that President Jackson never 
made the remark quoted. WARREN, SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES 
HISTORY, II, 2 I9 ( I922). Nevertheless, the effectuation of the Supreme Court's 
decrees against states or large groups does depend on executive action. 
Also, the judges of the federal courts may depend on the executive for 
protection against personal attack. See In re Neagle, I 35 U. S. I (I 890), 
a dramatic case in which a disgruntled litigant assaulted Justice Field of the 
Supreme Court while the latter was acting as circuit judge in California. 
The attacker was killed by Neagle, a United States marshal, who had been 
assigned by the Attorney General to protect Justice Field. 
7 As to judicial review of the validity of legislation and the effects of such 
review, see also sees. 4-o8 to 4-13, inclusive, and 7-36 to 7-38. 
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lations. The three branches are partially separated, but also 
interdependent.8 The separation has to be interpreted in the 
light of its purpose-to prevent the abuse of power by any 
of the three branches of government involved in the proc-
esses of regulation. Each is intended to check, but not para-
lyze the others' action. The activities of all are integrated 
by a common regulative purpose, and the division between 
them is not intended to destroy their unified operation. As 
Woodrow Wilson once said, "Government . . . is a body 
of men, with highly differentiated functions, no doubt, in 
our modern day of specialization, but with a common task 
and purpose. Their cooperation is indispensable, their war-
fare, fatal." 9 
Sec. 3-2 4· Control of inferior executives. We have now 
considered the checking influences which distinct and separate 
branches of government may exert upon one another's be-
havior. We move on to other processes of control, and con-
8 The system of checks demands that two branches join in governmental 
acts. If the action of each were quite independent of the other, there would 
be no checking. Thus, two houses of Congress check one another and at 
the same time cooperate in legislation, taxation, impeachments, etc. The 
President and Senate participate in appointments and in treaty making. See 
LucE, LEGISLATIVE PROBLEMS 104-139 (1935). The Congress is checked 
by the courts because legislative acts have to be applied by them in litigated 
cases. Indeed, all the instances of checking mentioned in the text are at the 
same time instances of co-operative action. 
9 CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1908). The 
most important instances of checks, extending to the point of paralyzing 
effective governmental action, have been the cases of judicial assertion of 
power of review of any and all kinds of executive and administrative action 
of the federal and state governments. This meant, for example, that every 
hearing on utility rates had to be retried in a federal court, and the processes 
of rate making were slowed to a point where they were almost completely 
stalled. This was the practical situation as regards many forms of governmental 
activity in the 192o's. Since that time the Congress has limited the powers of 
judicial review in various ways, and since about 1938 the federal courts have 
adopted a strong presumption in favor of the correctness of executive and 
administrative action. This combination of statutory limitations and a hands-off 
policy of the courts has completely altered the picture in this important area. 
See for example Railroad Commission v. Rowan and Nichols Oil Co., 310 
U. S. 573 (1940); Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 
po U.S. 591 (1944); and Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
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sider the efficacy of methods of selection, of conditions of 
tenure, and of supervision and disciplinary measures as 
applied to various types of officials. I shall begin with inferior 
executive officials. 
First, the behavior of inferior executive officials is deter-
mined by the way in which they are selected. Undoubtedly, 
the best way to insure proper official behavior is to pick 
persons with sound qualifications. Three methods of selection 
are commonly used. All are theoretically intended to secure 
men who by habit and training are most likely to perform 
the acts which their respective jobs call for. One method of 
selection is appointment. The power to appoint is usually 
vested in a single person, such as the President, or the gov-
ernor of a state, or the head of a department or bureau. The 
appointing official, if competent and honest, can satisfy very 
well the need for a choice based on an estimation of qualifi-
cations and training. This method emphasizes the personal 
judgment of the appointing official regarding the personal 
qualities of candidates; it is especially suited for use in choos-
ing higher officials who will be called upon to determine 
policy questions to some extent, and whose qualifications for 
this purpose can hardly be measured by any fixed standard. 
Another method, and one which has quite wide vogue in 
this country, is popular election. This method of choosing 
fit candidates for such offices as sheriff, prosecutor, etc., goes 
back to the full flush of Jacksonian democracy. As a method 
of choosing officials to enforce the law, it has little to recom-
mend it. Popular election has its place in government; we 
should by all means elect those who make our laws; we 
should all have a voice in shaping the policies of government. 
But, when it comes to the application and enforcement of 
those policies, when it comes to the administration of law, 
we need impartiality, not popular impulse; we need the man 
who knows his business and who applies the law as it is, 
honestly and fearlessly. Popular election does not get such 
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men; in fact, it works the other way. The major fault of 
popular choice is that you and I and other citizens cannot 
obtain the information necessary to pass on a candidate's 
fitness for sheriff, register of deeds, or prosecutor. We have 
no way of getting the facts regarding his ability, his training, 
his habits, his disposition or his fairness. And probably one 
is too optimistic in supposing that the mass of voters attempt 
to choose the best man. Many voters forget the question of 
merit entirely. They vote for a candidate because of friend-
ship, or they cast a straight party ballot, or they vote against 
an incumbent official because he has done an act adverse to 
them or their friends, regardless of whether the act was 
right and proper or not. In short, election of officials is an 
indiscriminate affair. It has little to do with fitness for office. 
It reflects chiefly the ability of the particular candidate to 
make a direct personal appeal to voters, or his readiness to 
make promises to particular persons, or to political or eco-
nomic groups, in exchange for their support.1 
A third method has come to be used more and more in 
recent decades. It gives promise of supplanting the other 
methods wherever this is constitutionally possible. This 
method we may call the civil service method. It relies pri-
marily on the written examination to test the qualifications 
of candidates. The examination is generally open to all who 
fulfill certain formal conditions of training and experience. 
The examination is usually given by a board or by officials 
acting under the supervision of a board. In addition to the 
examination, there is usually a certain amount of weight 
attached to personal experience and to a face-to-face inter-
view in which the personal qualities of each candidate are 
rated. Furthermore, the board does not actually choose a 
1 The faults of popular election, here mentioned, are most noticeable in 
choosing officials for large urban communities. In rural communities and 
small towns, where electors usually know the candidates and their backgrounds, 
popular election can work with a reasonable degree of satisfaction. 
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particular man for the job in question, but sends the names 
of the highest qualifiers, e. g., three persons, to the head of 
the agency for which a person is to be chosen. The head 
of the agency is left free to appoint from the candidates 
so suggested. 
The conditions of official tenure are no less important 
than the methods of selection. In order to secure the most 
efficient and impartial service from officials, it is essential to 
guarantee to them indefinite tenure of office, or, as it is more 
commonly called, tenure during good behavior. At this point, 
government is confronted by an apparent dilemma: either 
to give all officials security and independence, which may 
involve a continuation of weak and incompetent persons in 
office for life; or to reserve a power to terminate official 
tenure at any time, which, of course, enables government to 
get rid of its unfit officials. If the first course is chosen, unfit 
men may be kept long in office. If the second course is chosen, 
all officials are deprived of that feeling of security and inde-
pendence which is the very foundation of unselfish devotion 
to duty. On the whole, the balance of arguments is in favor 
of secure tenure, especially if this tenure is coupled with 
sound methods of selection and removal. If officials are 
chosen on the basis of merit, not too much unfit timber 
should find its way into the official structure. At least, the 
number of unfit persons should, on the average, be lower 
than the number who will fill offices when all candidates 
are chosen on a partisan and temporary basis; and even civil 
service need not stand in the way of removal from office for 
such causes as fraud, disobedience, or neglect of duty. 
Compensation also needs to be reasonable in amount. 
Inadeq1 Late compensation has three harmful tendencies. It 
introdw.:es a temptation to dishonesty and corruption; it 
results over the years in the resignation of the more energetic 
officials; and it diminishes the enthusiasm for service of those 
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who remain in office. Compensation should also include a 
provision for that deferred type of payment which we com-
monly call a pension; such pension is essential to give security 
and thus independence to the officeholder. The combination 
of secure tenure, reasonable pay, and adequate pension, is 
calculated to secure for government services and abilities 
which would command substantially higher returns if de-
voted to private business. 
Behavior according to approved standards can also be 
insured by supervision and threat of disciplinary measures 
by executive superiors. Most officials are subject to super-
vision by superiors who can issue direct orders for action, 
require reports on action taken, and scrutinize or criticize 
the work of their inferiors. Usually, this kind of supervision 
is coupled with authority to remove for misconduct or neglect 
of duty. Where civil service is in force, removal from office 
can be accomplished only after a hearing by an impartial 
agency and only for stated causes. These restraints on re-
moval are essential to guarantee the secure tenure and 
independence at which the civil service system is aimed. 
Besides the disciplinary measures just mentioned, the 
public prosecutor can, in many instances, proceed criminally 
against inferior executive officials for abuse or misuse of 
powers, or for neglect of duty. He can also employ "extra-
ordinary legal remedies," such as quo warranto to question 
the exercise of official power, prohibition to prevent the 
exercise of power not possessed, and mandamus to compel 
the exercise of official power; and he can often use equitable 
remedies by way of injunction for purposes not unlike the 
functions of these extraordinary legal remedies. 
The individual also enjoys adequate civil remedies against 
inferior executives whose misbehavior causes, or threatens, 
injury to him. From the public viewpoint, these remedies 
serve as sanctions to enforce behavior according to approved 
STANDARDS FOR OFFICIAL ACTS 203 
standards. For example, if a sheriff makes an unjustified 
arrest, he is liable for false imprisonment; if he makes an 
unauthorized seizure of an individual's property, he may be 
required to pay the full value of the property by way of 
compensation. If an official fails to do an act which he is com-
manded to do for the benefit of an individual, the latter may 
ordinarily hold him liable for damages, e. g., where an official 
negligently fails to serve process in an action by A against B 
and damage results to A. And official duties may also, in 
some instances, be enforced by equitable or extraordinary 
legal remedies at the individual's behest. 
Examples need not be multiplied. You will realize by this 
time that the obligatory and prohibitive standards directed 
to minor executives, their duties to act or not to act, are 
backed up by formidable sanctions and control devices. 
Nevertheless, you will find only too often a considerable 
difference between the standard for official behavior as it 
appears in the books and the behavior of officials as it works 
out in actual practice.2 Just as there are private persons who 
ignore applicable standards or consciously violate them, so 
there are public officials who fail to act in cases where they 
should act, or who do not carry out duties in the manner 
prescribed by standards. There is a great difference between 
an alert policeman and an indifferent one. This kind of 
difference counts heavily all the way up the scale to the 
chief executive. 
Finally, there is a large and important part of official 
behavior which is not covered by obligatory or prohibitive 
standards. The official is given discretion or power to act or 
both. In these cases, action is left to the official actor's judg-
ment. His acts are intended to be free and uncontrolled. 
Beyond furnishing him with patterns for effective action, to 
2 On this point, compare what is said in sec. 2.-2.9 et seq., regarding the 
discrepancy between standards for the individual's act and their effectuation. 
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use if he chooses to act, the lawmaker does not concern him-
self greatly about effectuation or enforcement. Even the 
traffic officer has some discretion in the performance of his 
duties. The element of discretion increases as one proceeds 
upward in the hierarchy, as I have already said.3 Standards 
of behavior become more general; they do not prescribe 
behavior so definitely and so specifically. Sanctions for depar-
ture from standards are less immediate and direct. Thus, 
the public prosecutor as compared with the ordinary police-
man has a very wide discretion. He has a great deal of 
leeway in deciding what cases to prosecute and what cases 
to disregard. He may take into consideration the strength 
of the evidence, the character of the person accused, and 
the hope for his reform if he be given another chance. This 
kind of discretion is a very good thing in the hands of a 
sound official, but it is hard to draw the line between proper 
use of discretion and the neglect of duty. An incompetent 
or dishonest prosecutor can go pretty far before the sanctions 
of the law will strike him.4 
Sec. 3-25. Control of the chief executive. The chief 
executive is always chosen by popular election. While no 
one can deny that some very weak and some dishonest men 
have been elected to the highest executive offices in this 
country, I doubt if any serious student of our democratic 
3 Sec. 3-o6. 
4 For example, in the days of prohibition the breakdown of enforcement was 
in large part due to the refusal of prosecutors to institute prosecutions for viola-
tions of the liquor laws. One could not blame the prosecutor in an urban 
community too severely for this neglect of duty. Quite apart from possible 
corrupt motives for his neglect, the prosecutor knew that it was most difficult 
to secure convictions by juries drawn from a population which was largely 
opposed to prohibition and that his ardor in favor of enforcement would 
not be appreciated by the wet voters whom he would have to face in a cam-
paign for re-election. Hence, the prosecutor was naturally inclined to make 
a big show of prosecuting violators, but actually to do no more than was 
necessary to keep the drys from becoming aroused and organizing a campaign 
for his defeat. 
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institutions would substitute any other method of choosing 
our chief executives for choice by popular election. Some 
changes in the methods of nominating candidates and in the 
machinery of election might be suggested, but on the whole 
I believe that popular election of the President and governors 
meets with approvaP Popular election works reasonably well 
in regard to chief executives because of the prominence of 
the officers involved. The successful candidate must almost 
always be a man who is well known and who has maintained 
himself in the public eye for a substantial period of time. He 
usually runs on a more or less definite platform. The average 
voter realizes that the chief executive has a hand in deter-
mining important public policies. For these reasons the voter 
is apt to scrutinize the chief executive's qualifications more 
carefully than he does the qualifications of candidates for 
inferior offices, especially in states where the number of 
elective offices is very large and the voter must indicate 
choices for every office from lieutenant governor and secre-
tary of state to dogcatcher. 
The tenure of office of the chief executive is ordinarily 
fixed at a relatively short period of years-four years in the 
case of President of the United States and of most state 
governors, though in a few states the governor holds office 
for only two years. In a number of the states the governor 
is explicitly made ineligible for re-election. Short terms and 
denial of re-election were both dictated by the purpose to 
prevent the perpetuation of men in office-a reaction against 
the former British practice of hereditary succession to, and 
life tenure of, many executive offices. It was intended to 
make the control of policy by the electors direct and imme-
1 I have not made mention here of any of the details of nomination or 
election, such as party conventions, nominating primaries, or the federal elec-
toral college. These subjects are very important, to be sure, but I regard them 
as more properly topics for courses in government, which I assume that most 
of you have had, than as topics for discussion in the present course. 
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diate. However, the short tenure of governors has its draw-
backs, too. In Michigan, for example, where the governor 
holds office for two years, the chief executive has an insuffi-
cient time in which to formulate and push through a pro-
gram. He is hardly settled in office before he must again 
run the gauntlet of popular approval or disapproval. 
The President of the United States needs and receives 
a substantial compensation, $Ioo,ooo, plus large allowances 
for expenses. The pay of governors is also ample in some 
of our states. In other states, an unwise financial policy has 
been pursued by the legislature of keeping the governor's 
salary at an insufficient level, or else the salary is fixed by 
the constitution so that changes cannot be made to meet 
rising costs. The result of this kind of false economy is that 
the man who is elected governor must either be a rich man 
and spend freely of his own funds, or he must make political 
commitments to persons who furnish the funds to finance his 
election campaigns. Either result is contrary to the public 
interest. 
However, the length and security of tenure and the 
adequacy of pay, count for less in relation to the office of 
chief executive than in relation to most other offices. The 
candidate for chief executive is largely· actuated by the 
desire for honors and influence. And, in the case of the 
candidate for governor, the job is often looked upon as a 
stepping-stone to such offices as United States senator, am-
bassador, cabinet member, etc. So that in general, the quality 
of our chief executives has been relatively high, despite some 
of the disadvantageous tendencies mentioned in the fore-
going paragraphs. 
There are no very effective ways of enforcing the standards 
of behavior applicable to the official, who is himself the 
highest law-enforcer. To start with, his range of discretion 
is very wide, and the standards which apply to his activities 
are usually broad and ill-defined. Then there are no ways of 
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compelling the chief executive to perform his positive duties, 
such as his duty to employ the military forces to suppress 
disorder, his duty to set in motion machinery to enforce laws, 
or his duty to appoint officials to fill vacancies. His prohibited 
acts, which violate the rights of others, may be challenged 
before the courts in litigated cases; improper acts may be 
held to be forbidden or ineffective. And the chief executive's 
underlings may be prevented from carrying out his orders 
by threat of suit on behalf of persons injured, e. g., if a 
sheriff undertakes to carry out an unlawful order of the 
governor. Yet there are no judicial remedies of any conse-
quence which are operative against the chief executive 
directly. He may, of course, be impeached and removed 
from office if his conduct be flagrant enough. But impeach-
ment is remote and cumbersome; it is rarely attempted and 
not often successful. Also, the chief executive may be defeated 
for re-election, if the voters disapprove of his behavior. But 
this, too, often fails as a method for visiting on an incumbent 
the proper consequences of misbehavior. It is only too easy 
for the demagogue to explain away the bad features of his 
deeds to an electorate which cannot be too well informed 
on the facts. In short, the obligations of the chief executive 
are without effective legal sanctions. The proper behavior 
of the chief executive is guaranteed principally by the quality 
of the man himself and by the impact upon him of the opinion 
of his leading associates and of the general public. 
Sec. 3-26. Control of the trial judge.* The chief actor 
in the adjudicative process is the trial judge. He controls 
the jury; he has wide discretion in many matters; he often 
* (I.R.) In regard to the subject matter of this section, see generally 
HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES (National Conference of Judicial 
Councils) (I 944), and the following articles by the present author: "Pensions 
for Judges," 2.7 MICH. L. REV. 134 (192.8); "Federal Judges-Appointment, 
Supervision and Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution," 28 
MICH. L. REV. 485, 723, 870 (1930); and "Retirement and Removal of 
Judges," 20 JouR. AM. Jun. Soc. 133 (1936). 
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has to pass on matters of vital importance to individuals. For 
all these reasons we hope for, and expect from him, the 
utmost degree of fairness and objectivity in making his 
determinations. The control of his behavior, like the control 
of inferior executives, takes us back to fundamental questions 
of selection, tenure, compensation, supervision and discipline. 
In order to get and keep good judges, men who will perform 
their functions according to prescribed standards, important 
problems of training, habits and motivation need to be solved. 
In the federal system, judges are appointed by the Presi-
dent with the approval of the Senate. On the face of it, 
this method of selection might seem to promise satisfaction. 
But, unfortunately, the appointment of inferior federal 
judges has come to be heavily involved in local partisan 
politics. The President has, to a large extent, abdicated his 
power of selection, and leaves the real choice to members of 
the Senate or to the politicians who stand behind them.1 
In most of our states, trial judges are chosen by popular 
election.2 This method of choosing judges is open to all the 
1 
"This has come about because political interest in district and circuit j udg-
ships is local rather than national, because the President does not have time 
to investigate the reputation and standing of candidates and is forced to seek 
information and advice from local leaders, because senators and other influ-
ential persons of the state in which a vacancy occurs will naturally be consulted 
by the Senate when it passes upon an appointment, and finally because the 
President himself is in the midst of politics, and is forced to cede local 
patronage for political support. But whatever the causes, there is no doubt 
of the facts. Appointments of inferior judges and promotions to the circuit 
courts of appeal are dictated today by the senators from states where the 
vacancies exist, at least if they are influential and of the President's own 
party; if the senators are members of the opposition party, then naturally the 
President turns for 'suggestions' to the local chiefs of his own party. Every 
vacancy results in a wild scramble and pulling of political wires which 
is only less hurtful to judicial independence and disinterestedness than is 
a popular primary or election. I ask the reader candidly whether we dare view 
this situation with indifference, whether we dare look on without concern 
while this last citadel of justice according to law is engulfed by the rising tide 
of politics." Shartel, "Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision and Removal 
-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution," z8 MICH. L. REv. 485 at 488 
(1930). 
2 According to Haynes, judges are popularly elected in all but thirteen of 
the states. In Connecticut, "Most judges are appointed by the Governor with 
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objections that can be made to its use in the choice of inferior 
executives.3 In addition to the fact that the average voter is 
quite unable to pass upon qualifications for judicial office, 
the popular election and the mudslinging which goes with 
it scare away many of our best potential judges. A campaign 
for popular favor disgusts men of fair and independent type, 
the very men who would make good judges. Such men do 
not need to curry favor with anyone in private law practice. 
They refuse to subject themselves to the political obligations 
which popular elections involve. The consequence is that the 
choice of judges is limited, generally speaking, to the lesser 
lights of the bar. In saying this I do not mean to say that 
we do not obtain some good judges by popular election. We 
all know elected judges who have served ably and well. But 
I do mean to say that the tendency of the system is wrong, 
and that we have probably obtained more good men than 
we were entitled to expect. 
In recent decades there has been a strong and persistent 
movement among civic leaders and members of the bar in 
the several states to introduce methods of selecting judges 
on a merit basis.4 There seems to be fairly complete agree-
ment that judges should be appointed, and that their appoint-
the consent of the General Assembly, i.e., both houses of the legislature. In 
Delaware and New Jersey, nearly all are appointed by the Governor with the 
consent of the Senate. In Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire, most of 
them are appointed by the Governor with the consent of the Governor's Coun-
cil. In four states (Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont and Virginia), 
virtually all are elected by the two houses of the legislature in a joint meeting." 
HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES (National Conference of Judicial 
Councils) 9 (1944). Since this book was published, the State of New Jersey 
has adopted a constitutional amendment under which all judges are appointed 
by the governor with the approval of the state senate. 
3 Sec. 3-24. 
4 This movement is one phase of general efforts to promote improvements 
in our court organization. Various bar groups, national, state and local, are 
active in fostering such improvements. Especially active in this respect has 
been a voluntary association of lawyers known as the American Judicature 
Society, which was founded in 1 9 1 3 "To promote the efficient administration 
of justice" and which publishes a useful journal dealing with problems of 
court and bar organization. 
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ment should be hedged about by safeguards against the 
making of political appointments.5 The methods proposed 
usually combine appointment with checks to insure a scrutiny 
of qualifications and to eliminate political wirepulling. Most 
of the proposals have taken one of three forms. One proposal 
would vest the power of appointment in the chief justice of 
the particular judicial system, a proposal which has, so far, 
not been adopted anywhere in this country.6 Another pro-
posal would vest power to nominate in a nonpartisan com-
mission, which is obliged to investigate the qualifications of 
candidates and suggest a list of names to the governor for 
appointment; the governor's choice would be limited to the 
persons whose names are thus submitted to him. This method 
of selection has been adopted in Missouri as a mode of 
choosing trial judges in the St. Louis and Kansas City areas, 
as well as all judges of the supreme and intermediate appel-
late courts.7 A third proposal of this sort would provide for 
appointment by the governor with the approval of a non-
partisan commission; it would place the initial selection in 
the governor, and give a sort of veto to the nonpartisan 
body. This method has been adopted in California as a mode 
of choosing appellate, but not trial, judges.8 Obviously, the 
make-up of the commission which proposes or approves 
judges under these various schemes is most important. It is 
5 In the states, gubernatorial appointment with the approval of the state 
senate (or equivalent body) seems not to have worked badly; and in the 
recent New Jersey constitution, this is the method of judicial selection which 
was adopted. Const. 1947 Art. VI, Sec. 6. 
6 Judicial selection of judges has been proposed by a number of writers. 
Appointment of inferior federal judges by the Chief Justice with the approval 
of the Supreme Court, is the method which I have urged in an article, 
"Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision and Removal-Some Possibilities 
Under the Constitution." 28 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1930). 
In England, judicial appointments are made by the Lord Chancellor, who 
is the highest judicial officer of the realm and who might, therefore, be com-
pared to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. However, 
The Lord Chancellor does not hold his office as such permanently, but only 
so long as the ministry of which he is a member holds office. 
7 Const. Amend. 1940 Art. VI, Sec. I. 
8 Const. Art. VI, Sec. 4a. 
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desirable to give various interests representation on the 
commission; it is desirable to have on the commission some 
men who have had,judicial experience, some who are prac-
ticing lawyers, and some who are representative of the lay 
public. 9 If the members of the commission be chosen to 
represent various informed interests, and if they be given 
fairly long and staggered terms, I believe that politics in 
judicial appointments can be reduced to a minimum, and 
that the chances of getting a uniformly high-grade judiciary 
would be much improved. 
Tenure during good behavior is guaranteed to judges of 
the federal courts by the Constitution; and judges of the 
superior courts of Massachusetts, New Hampshire and 
Rhode Island enjoy the like tenure.10 Under the new consti-
tution of New Jersey, the judge holds office on first appoint-
ment for a term of seven years, and on reappointment 
remains in office during good behavior. Trial judges in the 
other states hold office for limited terms of years. In most 
of these states, the term is relatively short-four to six 
years; but in a few of them, the trial judge's term of office 
is relatively long, e. g., in New York fourteen, and in 
Pennsylvania, ten years. Any limitation of tenure to a period 
of years, especially to a short period, is inimical to judicial 
independence. But actually, the harmful effects of repeated 
9 Such a nonpartisan commission was represented by a constitutional 
amendment proposed a few years ago by the State Bar of Michigan. It would 
have provided for appointment of supreme court judges by the governor on 
nomination of a judiciary commission of nine persons, to he chosen as follows: 
"The judiciary commission shall consist of a justice of the supreme court 
elected by the justices of that court, a circuit judge elected by the judges 
of the ci.t:cuit courts, a probate judge elected by the judges of the probate 
courts, three electors of this state not licensed to practice law therein appointed 
by the governor, and three members of the bar of this state appointed by the 
commissioners of the state bar of Michigan." 
lO See HAYNES, SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES (National Conference 
of Judicial Councils) 10, 30-50 ( 1944). The superior quality of justice, which 
is usually dispensed in our federal courts, must be ascribed to the secure tenure 
and adequate pay of the judges and to the prestige which their office involves. 
Certainly one cannot attribute it to sound methods of selection (see above, this 
section) nor to effective methods of discipline (see below, this section). 
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exposure to popular caprice have been considerably reduced 
in many places by the activities of bar associations in support-
ing incumbents for re-election, and by tpe gradual develop-
ment in many localities of a tradition of re-electing the sitting 
judge. If the end of each term always meant for the judicial 
mcumbent a real battle for re-election, I believe that we 
would have a much less competent judiciary than we have 
in most of our state courts. Only by making popular elections 
more or less a form has this mode of choice been able to 
produce passable results. 
The pay of trial judges varies greatly.11 The United States 
district judge has a salary of $I 5 ,ooo. In I 948, the salaries 
of some trial judges of general jurisdiction in the states of 
Kansas, Oklahoma and Utah were as low as $4,000. In New 
York, judges in the more populous departments now receive 
$28,ooo; in the less populous, $I 8,ooo. In Pennsylvania, the 
judges of superior courts receive $2 I ,ooo. In Michigan, the 
salaries vary between $7,000 and $I6,soo in different coun-
ties. In the great majority of cases, trial judges are paid 
salaries of $6,ooo to $7,000. In these days when the most 
ordinary labor is paid one dollar and fifty cents or more per 
hour and skilled workmen receive two to three dollars per 
hour, there can hardly be a doubt in anyone's mind that 
$6,ooo is inadequate as pay for the kind of work which the 
judge does and the kind of responsibility which rests on his 
shoulders. When inadequacy of pay is added to the drawback 
of short terms and the possibility of defeat for re-election, it 
is hardly to be supposed that the best lawyer will choose to 
remain long in judicial office. If such a man does seek a judge-
ship, he does so for the sake of the experience and the profes-
11 If the reader wishes to see complete and specific figures regarding the 
salaries of state judges, I refer him to 31 JouR. AM. Jun. Soc. 150 (1948). 
Adequate pensions are hardly less important than adequate pay. See discussion 
of this point in sec. 3-24 above; and on the subject of judicial pensions, see 
generally my article "Pensions for Judges," 27 MicH. L. REV. 134 (1928); 
for recent figures on pensions, see 31 JouR. AM. Jun. Soc. 147 (1948). 
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sional prestige which he will enjoy after he has held such 
an office. 
So far, I have spoken of problems of selection, tenure and 
compensation of trial judges. I cannot say that we have been 
quite successful, on the whole, in dealing with these problems. 
Nor can I give a more favorable report about our handling 
of problems of discipline and supervision. 
The first and most important of existing checks on the 
behavior of the trial judge is threat of reversal for error. The 
Supreme Court will upset his judgment in a civil case, or 
his sentence in a criminal case, if the trial judge commits 
a substantial error of law or fails to comply with the standards 
which control him in any essential respect. The threat of 
reversal is effective as far as it goes; no judge wants to have 
his acts publicly exposed as erroneous.12 The difficulty is that 
this remedy does not cover enough. It does not cover personal 
misconduct, unless it is obvious enough to get into the record 
and unless it is clearly prejudicial to a complaining party. 
Misconduct, such as drunkenness in or out of court, inatten-
tion on the bench or arbitrary refusal to listen to argument, 
manifestation of bias in front of the jury, and abuse of 
lawyers, cannot ordinarily be reached through threat of 
reversal. 
A second possible check on the trial judge is threat of 
criminal liability for his acts. This threat applies to judges 
as well as to other persons; but it is not practically very 
important, since judicial misconduct, if it occurs, is not likely 
to be criminal in character. And civil liability of the judge 
as such, to individual parties is not recognized at all. 
"Judges have always been accorded complete immunity 
for their judicial acts, even when their conduct is dictated 
by 'malicious' or improper motives. The reason is not a desire 
12 Furthermore, orders of the Supreme Court are enforcible against the 
trial judge by threat of personal punishment for contempt; so that we can say 
that they are backed by effective sanctions. 
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to protect the misbehaving official, but rather the necessity 
of preserving an independent judiciary, free from the undue 
influence of the threat, or even the possibility, of subsequent 
damage suits." 13 
The third check on the trial judge, operative where judges 
are elective, is the threat of defeat for re-election. The fear 
of such defeat may indeed check some kinds of misbehavior. 
The judge who has to be elected from time to time is inclined 
to be more polite than he might otherwise be to influential 
parties and attorneys. Only, defeat for re-election is indis-
criminate; it cuts down the courageous and honest judge who 
has to make an unpopular decision as often as the judge who 
misbehaves in a way to displease the public. It is like a 
drastic medicine which kills disease but kills the patient, too. 
Its net effect is to destroy independent judicial behavior of 
all sorts. 
Finally, there is the threat of removal from office by 
impeachment.14 While the judge is legally subject to removal 
for personal misbehavior, this remedy is hardly ever used. 
The houses of the legislature are too busy with other things 
to deal with impeachments. Especially in states where judges 
are popularly elected, the disposition of the legislature is 
always to "pass the buck" to the electors. Impeachment 
proceedings are not even attempted, as a rule, except in the 
most flagrant cases of misconduct. Fortunately, judicial mis-
behavior is relatively rare, but I feel that it is nonetheless 
essential to have effective methods of removing judges when 
cases calling for removal do occur. In recent years in Detroit, 
for example, two judges have been repeatedly charged in 
the newspapers with drunkenness and other scandalous mis-
13 PRossER, ToRTs I07 5 (I 94 I). 
14 In many states, judges are also removable by joint resolution of the houses 
of the legislature, called "address." If the reader is interested in a detailed 
discussion of methods of removal, I refer him to my article, "Removal and 
Retirement of Judges," zo JouR. AM. Juo. Soc. I33 (I936). This method is 
patterned after the British practice. It is applicable, either expressly or accord-
ing to general understanding, to such cases as disability and incompetence, and 
not to cases of misconduct. It is even less frequently used than impeachment. 
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behavior. If these men are innocent it is not fair that such 
accusations go unheard; if they are guilty, it is not right that 
they remain in office. Yet nothing has been done about the 
charges against them; and there is no way now existing to 
eliminate an offending judge other than impeachment. 
What is needed is a judicial method of removing judges 
for misconduct. The supreme court, or an administrative 
council composed of judgei, should be vested with power to 
remove any misbehaving trial judge or judge of an inferior 
appellate court, after notice and hearing. This method of 
removal is used in other countries, and is provided for in a 
few states in this country.15 Jurisdiction to remove judges 
for cause is not unlike jurisdiction to disbar attorneys. It 
should be exercised in a manner similar to disbarment pro-
ceedings. 
Just as much needed as effective methods of removal is 
provision for judicial supervision of the personal conduct 
of the trial judge. One of the most common objections to 
judicial tenure during good behavior is that the judge who 
enjoys this tenure tends to become arbitrary and high-
handed. Certain federal judges are pointed to as examples. 
As I have said in another place: 
"Perhaps this objection is sometimes made by attorneys 
who are only aggrieved by the fact that they are not allowed 
to run wild in the federal courts as they are too often allowed 
to do in state courts where judges are afraid of political 
consequences. But one would not be warranted in assuming 
that this particular criticism is quite without basis in fact. 
The trial judge acts alone. He has a very wide discretion 
in many matters. He sits in hotly contested cases where essen-
111 Alabama, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon and 
Texas, provide for judicial removal of some or all judges for misbehavior. 
Provisions for such removal were introduced in New Jersey by the Constitution 
of 1947; they apply to judges of superior and county courts. Const. Art. VI, 
Sec. 6 (4). In 1947, New York, which had long provided for removal of 
justices of the peace and other petty judges, after trial by an appellate division 
· of the . supreme court ( Const. Art. VI, Sec. 17), also made provision for 
removing judges of superior courts by judicial proceedings. Art. VI, See. 9-A. 
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tial facts are disputed and feeling runs high. He is on the 
firing line, so to speak, and subject to the greatest stress and 
strain. And in this connection it is worthy of note that the 
trial judge is the one most often charged with arbitrariness, 
high-handed conduct, and abuse of discretion. An occasional 
reversal of a case does not have that immediate and essential 
effect to restrain him in his everyday conduct. Even though 
his lapses may not be frequent, they should not go unchecked. 
The high-handed conduct of a single judge not only works 
serious injustice to individuals but through his conduct the 
entire bench suffers a serious impairment of its reputation 
and of public trust. It seems, therefore, desirable that there 
should be devised some supervision over the daily conduct 
and discretionary acts of the trial judge." 16 
In an earlier article, proposing a method of supervision 
for the federal bench, I discussed the form which such 
supervision should take: 
"The officials best suited to exercise this supervision are 
the Chief Justice and the presiding circuit judges. The Chief 
Justice should give attention to the conduct of all federal 
judges; the presiding circuit judges should oversee the 
conduct of district judges. These supervisory authorities 
should undertake to restrain arbitrary and high-handed de-
meanor, abuses of discretion, and other minor judicial impro-
prieties. They should suggest, criticize and admonish. Most of 
the common causes of complaint against federal judges should 
soon vanish if the Chief Justice and the presiding circuit 
judges were to act in the manner suggested, and especially 
if the power to supervise were reinforced by effective methods 
of removal in case of persistent misconduct. Each judge 
would have the feeling on all occasions that his conduct might 
cume under the eye of the Chief Justice or the presiding 
circuit judge. He would constantly feel the need, as we 
ordinarily express it, 'to watch his step.'" 17 
16 
"Retirement and Removal of Judges," 20 JouR. AM. Jun. Soc. 133 
at 134 (1936). 
17 
"Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision and Removal-Some Pos-
sibilities Under the Constitution," 28 MICH. L. REv. 485, 723, 87o, at 727 
( 1930). For an elaboration of this plan for supervision, see continuation of 
passage quoted. 
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If, as is certainly true, most of our trial judges do behave 
themselves as they should, this is because they have sound 
personal habits and the training of lawyers, and are controlled 
by social and extralegal sanctions, such as the opinion of 
fellow members of the bar and of other persons with whom 
they come in contact. It is not because of well-worked-out 
methods of disciplinary control. In fact, existing disciplinary 
methods of checking what I have called personal misconduct, 
are almost completely lacking or ineffective. 
Sec. 3-27. Control of trial jury.* The jury is part and 
parcel of our adjudicative machinery.1 Although its members 
are laymen and private citizens, the jury constitutes collec-
tively an official agency. The function of the jury, as it is 
ordinarily stated, is to find the facts. There are various stand-
ards which govern the jury's activities and procedures, such 
as the rule which forbids the jury to talk about the case to 
outside persons during the course of the trial, rules regarding 
burden of proof, etc. In the aggregate, the rules are all 
intended to insure a fair consideration and determination of 
the facts by the jury on the basis of the proofs which are 
presented to it. The effectuation of these standards for jury 
behavior presents many distinctive problems, which I believe 
it is desirable to discuss separately from problems regarding 
control of other official agencies involved in the adjudicative 
processes. 
* (I.R.) See generally regarding the trial jury, WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES 
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 482-512 (1929). 
On the subject of jury selection, see Blume, "Jury Selection Analyzed; 
Proposed Revision of Federal System," 42 MICH. L. REv. 831 (1944), and 
Knox, "Jury Selection," 22 NEW YoRK UNIV. L. Q. R. 433 (1947). See also 
the new federal statute relating to jury selection, 2 8 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1 8 61 
et seq.; Report to the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges of the 
United States of the Committee on Selection of Jurors (1942); Thiel v. 
Southern Pacific Company, 3 2 8 U. S. 217 ( 1946) ; and Fay v. New York, 
.1U U. S. 261 (1947). 
1 See sec. 3-11 above regarding the constitutional requirement of jury 
trial in criminal cases; and sec. 3-14 regarding the requirement of juries in 
civil cases. 
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Methods of selection are basic in the control of the jury 
as in the control of other official actors. Many methods have 
been employed since the early days of the English common 
law jury. Today, jury selection is governed by statutes in • 
all jurisdictions, and these statutes vary greatly in substance 
and detail. It would only be confusing to try to describe all 
the methods of selection which have been, or which are now, 
in use. I shall give you only a description of common methods 
used, and of the usual agencies involved in the processes of 
jury selection. 
In the older practice, a jury was often drawn by the 
sheriff pursuant to a specific order of the judge, to serve 
in the trial of a specific case. Today it is still possible in 
some instances to draw juries for the trial of specific cases; 
but usually the statutes provide for the preparation of a 
comprehensive list of eligible jurors in advance of need, and 
require that juries for most cases be drawn from this list. 
In our larger cities, this eligible list may embrace several 
thousand names, and in smaller localities, the number of 
names usually runs into the hundreds. The list is prepared 
in some jurisdictions by the sheriff, in some by a jury com-
missioner, and in many places today by a jury commission, 
consisting of two or more persons. From this eligible list, 
the clerk of the court, or some other specified official, draws 
by lot a smaller list, or panel, to serve on juries during a 
particular term of court. The reason for the large list, as 
well as the choice by lot, is to avoid the possibility of packing 
juries with persons of known views. The list and the juries 
to be drawn from it are supposed to represent a "cross section" 
of the community. 
Persons drawn for jury service must meet certain statutory 
qualifications. They are usually required to possess: I. phys-
ical capacity (e.g., be able to hear); 2. mental capacity (e.g., 
be of "sound mind and discretion"); 3· of good moral char-
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acter; 4· a definite political status (e.g., citizenship or right 
to vote); 5. residence in the district of jury service; 6. a 
definite economic status (e.g., be a property owner or tax-
payer), though this qualification is by no means universal. 
Persons who do not have these qualifications are normally 
to be excluded from the jury list by the sheriff or other 
official agency which makes up the list of persons eligible 
for jury service; though, of course, the judge will eliminate 
disqualified persons himself if any such get by the initial 
sifting procedures. 
The make-up of jury lists and panels is further reduced 
by various statutory exemptions. For example, public officers 
and employees and persons engaged in certain professions, 
such as doctors, lawyers and teachers, are commonly exempt 
from jury service. An exempt person may serve or not at 
his election; the exemption belongs to him personally, and 
must be claimed by him; in this respect it differs from a 
disqualification. 
Persons may also be excused from jury service if they 
satisfy the court in which they are called to serve that they 
have a valid reason for not serving at the particular time, 
such as an illness in the family which requires their presence 
at home. 
Finally, constitutional provisions and statutes uniformly 
contain provisions intended to insure that the jury which is 
to try the particular case will be made up of persons who 
are able to hear and determine that case without bias. The 
application of these provisions involves selective activities 
of the judge and the parties concerned in the case to be tried. 
Accordingly, when a group of veniremen (persons called 
for jury service) is drawn for the trial of a case, the judge 
and counsel for the parties examine the proposed jurors to 
determine whether each one is impartial and able to perform 
his duties as juror properly. Each is asked whether he is 
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opposed to the law applicable to the particular case, e.g., 
in a case in which the capital penalty may be involved, 
whether he is opposed to capital punishment. He is asked 
whether he has already formed and expressed an opinion 
concerning the facts of the case. He is asked whether he is 
biased for or against any of the parties in the case. He is 
asked whether he is interested (financially) in the outcome 
of the case. If it appears from the examination that the 
prospective juror is not impartial, he is challenged by inter-
ested counsel "for cause," or may be excused by the court 
on its own motion. In addition to the dismissal of persons 
for cause, statutes very commonly provide that parties are 
entitled to a certain number of peremptory challenges. Such 
challenges are to be used to get rid of persons whom the 
party in question (or his counsel) regards as likely to be 
hostile or unfavorable to his side. The general aim is the 
same as the aim of challenges for "cause." The difference 
is that no actual showing of bias must be made to appear; 
the peremptory challenge can be exercised without any ex-
planation or statement of a reason for challenging the juror. 
Theoretically, this combination of selective devices, start-
ing with the preparation of a comprehensive jury list by 
an official agency, and followed by the drawing of a panel 
by lot, by exempting and excusing persons, and by striking 
off other persons for reasons of bias in the particular case, 
and finally by peremptory challenges, is supposed to result 
in a jury which is at one and the same time a cross section 
of the community, unbiased in its views, and satisfactory to 
all persons who are involved in the case to be tried. Actually, 
however, the average jury can hardly be said to represent 
a fair cross section of the community. Most of the ablest 
and busiest persons are able to avoid jury service by claiming 
exemptions or making excuses, and usually it is definitely 
to the interest of one party or the other to challenge the 
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more intelligent jurors. The consequence is that only too 
often juries, especially in cities, are constituted of persons 
whose experience and capacity are below the average of the 
community. But I doubt if the remedy for rhis situation is 
to be found in the abandonment of jury trial-though as I 
have already pointed out, trial without jury is growing in 
popularity in some fields 2-rather the practical remedy for 
inferior juries is to be sought in better and more discrim-
inating methods of selection, in reducing the number of 
exemptions and excuses, and in improving the pay and other 
conditions of jury service.3 
Inasmuch as the jury is made up of laymen, it cannot be 
expected to know the rules which are applicable to its official 
activities, the rules which apply to its weighing of evidence 
and its determination of facts. The judge always instructs 
the jury on request and, in fact, is required to instruct the 
jury as to its duties and procedures in determining the facts. 
But there are two kinds of verdicts which the jury may be 
required to give: a special verdict and a general verdict. A 
special verdict is a simple determination of facts which are 
disputed between the parties. Usually it takes the form of 
specific answers to specific questions of fact, e.g., "Did the 
defendant make such and such a promise?" and "Did the 
defendant perform this promise?" ~ch a verdict decides 
2 At its best, jury trial is not a very satisfactory device for settling civil 
litigation; it is cumbersome, costly in time and money, and unpredictable as 
regards results (see sec. 3-14). Waiver of jury trial, with consequent trial 
by the judge, is occurring with ever-growing frequency. In criminal cases 
I doubt if anyone, familiar with the jury's historic role in the development 
and protection of our liberties, would want to do away with the jury. Anyhow, 
abolition of jury trial would require constitutional amendment, and this could 
not be easily accomplished (see section 3-ll). 
3 It is a common opinion today that the service of women as jurors has 
raised the quality of juries, since many well-qualified women have the time 
to serve. If this opinion be accepted as correct, it is unfortunate that the 
statutes in some states allow women to claim, as such, an exemption from jury 
service. 
Regarding possibilities of improving methods of selecting juries, see the 
items cited in note * above. 
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only fact questions and leaves to the judge the task of apply-
ing the law to the facts found. The functions of finding facts 
and of applying law are, in effect, completely separated. The 
general verdict is of quite a different sort; it represents the 
more common practice in this country. It is applicable to all 
criminal cases and is employed in most civil cases. In render-
ing a general verdict, the jury performs two functions; it 
determines the disputed facts and applies the law to them. 
For instance, in a case where D is charged with the theft 
of X's goods, and defends on the grounds that he took the 
goods believing they were his own, and that he was insane 
at the time of the act, the jury does not specifically report 
in its verdict whether D took the goods of X, and if so, 
whether he thought they were his own, or if he was insane 
at the time he took them; instead the jury declares simply 
that D was guilty or not guilty of the crime charged. Such 
a verdict obviously requires that the jury not only decide 
what happened, i. e., the facts, but also that it employ the 
rules of law applicable to what happened. This in turn makes 
it necessary that the jury be instructed about the rules of 
law applicable to the facts in issue. The court must tell the 
jury what the law requires it to do in connection with all 
the possible fact conclusions which it may justifiably reach 
on the evidence presented to it. This often calls for very 
elaborate instructions; and the jury is left with the task of 
applying them to the actual facts. 
From what has already been said you will realize that 
the judge exercises a substantial control over the jury. In-
deed, he controls the jury's performance of its functions in 
several important ways. First, he determines what evidence 
is to be admitted for the jury's consideration. He passes on 
the admissibility of this evidence, bit by bit, as it is presented. 
Second, he instructs the jury regarding its own functions and 
procedures, and regarding the law of the case where a general 
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verdict is to be found. Third, the trial judge in the common 
law practice was accustomed to comment on the weight of 
the evidence; he gave the jury the benefit of his opinion 
and advice in relation to the facts of the case. This practice 
is still followed in the federal courts, and in a substantial 
number of state courts.4 However, in the majority of states 
this practice is no longer permitted; the judge is prohibited 
from indicating his opinion on the evidence in any way. 
Fourth, he is empowered to scrutinize the evidence which 
has been presented, and if he finds that the evidence on one 
side is altogether insufficient to support a verdict, he must 
direct the jury to find a verdict for the other side. As a recent 
writer says: 
"In present-day practice a directed verdict is a device for 
taking a case from the jury when there is no issue of fact 
for the jury to decide. The jury brings in a verdict, but it 
is clearly recognized that the act of the jury is merely a 
matter of form. This practice must be carefully distinguished 
from ( 1) instruction on the law and ( 2) advice on the 
facts." 6 
Fifth, the judge may set aside the jury's verdict if he con-
cludes that it is contrary to the great weight of evidence, 
or is supported by insufficient evidence. Thus, if a jury has 
found D guilty of a crime, the judge may set this verdict 
aside if he finds that the verdict is based on insufficient 
evidence to justify a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.6 
4 See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, I74 U.S. I (I899) in regard to the 
judicial role in jury trial in the federal courts. 
5 Blume, "Origin and Development of the Directed Verdict," 48 MICH. L. 
REV. 55 5 (I 9 5o) . It is almost impossible to give an accurate characterization 
of the directed verdict in a sentence or two. And this observation holds in some-
what less degree of the other devices herein mentioned. My purpose here is to 
point out methods of controlling jury action, not to furnish complete summa-
tions of the law. If the reader wishes further information regarding the directed 
verdict, he can profitably consult the article above cited. 
6 The double jeopardy clauses of our constitutions (which forbid an accused 
to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense) are ordinarily construed to 
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In short, the judge supervises and checks the jury's fact-
finding process in various ways just mentioned. The stand-
ards which require the jury to perform its functions in a 
certain manner are effectuated in a very real sense by this 
judicial control. However, it must not be supposed that the 
control of the judge over the jury's verdict is complete. The 
jury can ignore the judge's instructions with impunity. There 
was a time when juries in criminal cases were punishable 
for contempt in ignoring the court's instructions, and when 
juries in civil cases were liable to injured parties for return-
ing improper verdicts.7 But for almost three centuries now 
it has been established in all Anglo-American jurisdictions 
that a jury cannot be penalized, criminally or civilly, for 
rendering a wrong or perverse verdict. And inasmuch as the 
jury has a wide range of discretion anyway, in drawing its 
conclusions of fact from the evidence, it must be apparent 
that the jury has considerable freedom of action. The stand-
ards which control the jury, like all other standards which 
we have discussed, are only partial in their coverage and 
are by no means completely enforcible. The judge's control 
merely represents elements of guidance and enforcement of 
standards within the limited range where enforcement is 
feasible. 
Sec. 3-28. Control of appellate judge.* The appellate 
judge, like all other persons involved in the adjudicative 
forbid all attacks on a jury's verdict of acquittal. Such a verdict cannot be 
overturned by appeal or otherwise; it matters not if the most obvious errors 
have been committed, or if conclusive proof of guilt be later found; the jury's 
verdict of acquittal is final as to the prosecution of the defendant on the 
particular charge. However, a state can construe its double jeopardy clause 
differently and can accordingly provide for appeal by the prosecution without 
violating the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and two states 
have so provided. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); and see 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE CoDE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, sec. 428 and 
annotations at 12.03 et seq. 
7 I HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 337-347 ( 1924). 
* (I.R.) On the subject matter of this section, see generally the items cited 
in sec. 3-2 6, note *. In addition the reader should consult a study which has 
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process, is governed by standards. And the effectuation of 
standards in his case raises many of the same problems as 
the effectuation of the standards applicable to the trial judge; 
methods of selection are usually the same and methods of 
removal are also the same.1 
But there are two important differences between the work 
of the appellate, and the work of the trial, judge. The trial 
judge normally sits alone. Every appellate court is made 
up of several men; often as many as nine sit and work 
together. The conduct and determinations of each appellate 
judge are, to a considerable extent, restrained and supervised 
by his fellow members on the court. Furthermore, the appel-
late judge works in a more quiet atmosphere than the trial 
judge; he works chiefly on legal problems far removed from 
the emotional strains of battle over facts. Both these differ-
ences mean that there is less need for checks on personal 
misbehavior of the appellate judge, such as outbursts of 
temper, etc. 
And the control of the supreme court judge differs from 
the control of the trial judge and the intermediate appellate 
judge in another way. As in the case of the chief executive, 
the supreme court is not controlled or affected by any very 
direct or immediate legal sanctions.2 The court has no supe-
rior. The proper behavior of supreme court justices is guar-
anteed chiefly by the quality of the persons who man the 
court. These men are almost invariably lawyers of long 
been prepared for the Council of State Governments by Spector and which 
has just appeared in preliminary draft. The study is entitled The Courts of 
Last Resort of the Forty-Eight States ( 1950). It covers selection, compensa-
tion, removal and retirement of state supreme court justices as well as other 
important features of supreme court organization. 
1 See sec. 3-26. 
2 Only the threat of impeachment and defeat for re-election are worth men-
tioning. Both are remote, and the latter is indiscriminate. Nevertheless there 
does not appear to exist any pressing need for additional ways of checking 
or removing supreme court judges. Thoroughly bad individuals are not apt 
to reach the supreme court; and, if a judge in that high office misbehaves, his 
conduct is likely to evoke action where the misdeeds of an inferior judge 
might not. 
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training and experience; their ideals and purposes are derived 
from this legal background. If such men are swayed at all 
by outside influences, they are moved chiefly by a regard 
for public opinion and especially for the opinion of their 
brethren at the bar. As a matter of fact, both appointment 
and popular election work better in relation to supreme court 
judges than they do in relation to judges of inferior courts. 
Thus, I think it is clear throughout the years that most 
appointees to the Supreme Court of the United States have 
been outstanding men; 8 and even the elective process which 
is employed in most of our states has worked reasonably well 
in the selection of supreme court judges. The prestige of 
such judgeships means that many good lawyers are ready 
to accept appointment or election; political bosses who use 
their power over the choice of other officials almost openly 
to serve their own ends, do hesitate to install venal men or 
men of questionable reputation on the supreme bench. Fur-
thermore, judges of our supreme courts are chosen, if they 
are elected, for terms which are usually longer than the terms 
of trial justices; 4 their pay is also better, and the tradition 
of re-electing them is more common; so that these judges 
enjoy a greater degree of independence than trial judges 
do. I do not think that our methods of choosing and con-
trolling the judges of our supreme courts are by any means 
ideal; and yet it is only fair to say that the average of men 
3 Some persons may be inclined to challenge this statement. They will point 
to the appointment of many New Dealers to the Supreme Court by President 
Roosevelt. I shall have to answer that whether one likes the social philosophy 
of these appointees or not, practically all of them were men of outstanding 
ability. So long as the President has the power to appoint, and so long 
as the Supreme Court makes the important policy determinations that it does, 
we shall have to expect that the President will choose appointees whose social 
views are in general accord with his own. 
4 For example, in Pennsylvania, justices of the supreme court are chosen 
for twenty-one years: judges of the principal trial courts, for ten years; and 
in Michigan, supreme court justices are chosen for eight years, judges of the 
circuit courts for six. 
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on our supreme courts is far above the average of government 
personnel, in regard to both ability and integrity. 
Sec. 3-29. Problems. r. Tumey v. Ohio.1 Chief Justice 
Taft delivered the opinion of the court: 
"The question in this case is whether certain statutes of 
Ohio, in providing for the trial by the mayor of a village 
of one accused of violating the Prohibition Act of the State, 
deprive the accused of due process of law and violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, because 
of the pecuniary and other interest which those statutes give 
a mayor in the result of the trial. . . . 
"All questions of judicial qualification may not involve 
constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal 
bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem gen-
erally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. Wheel-
ing v. Black, 25 W. Va. 266, 270. But it certainly violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and deprives a defendant in 
a criminal case of due process of law, to subject his liberty 
or property to the judgment of a court the judge of which 
has a direct personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in reach-
ing a conclusion against him in his case. 
"The Mayor of the Village of North College Hill, Ohio, 
had a direct, personal, pecuniary interest in convicting the 
defendant who came before him for trial, in the twelve 
dollars of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not 
have received if the defendant had been acquitted. . . . But 
the pecuniary interest of the Mayor in the result of his 
judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process 
of law is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were 
drawn to stimulate small municipalities in the country part 
of counties in which there are large cities, to organize and 
maintain courts to try persons accused of violations of the 
Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement 
is offered by dividing between the State and the village the 
large fines provided by the law for its violations. The trial 
is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without oppor-
1 273 U. S. 510 at 514'-15, 523, 53Z, 533 (1927). 
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tunity for retrial and with a review confined to questions of 
law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity 
by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment on the 
weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so mani-
festly against the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias or 
willful disregard of duty by the trial court. The statute 
specifically authorizes the village to employ detectives, dep-
uty marshals and other assistants to detect crime of this kind 
all over the county, and to bring offenders before the Mayor's 
court, and it offers to the village council and its officers a 
means of substantially adding to the income of the village 
to relieve it from further taxation. The Mayor is the chief 
executive of the village. . . . He is charged with the busi-
ness of looking after the finances of the village. It appears 
from the evidence in this case, and would be plain if the 
evidence did not show it, that the law is calculated to awaken 
the interest of all those in the village charged with the 
responsibility of raising the public money and expending it, 
in the pecuniarily successful conduct of such a court." 
Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant, tried for 
offenses against the Ohio prohibition law in the circumstances 
above indicated, had been denied due process of law; and 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio, upholding his 
conviction, was reversed. 
The decision of this case is expressed in terms of the lack 
of due process. How would you restate the court's conclusions 
in terms of motivation of judicial behavior and of the effec-
tuation of standards applicable to such behavior? 
2. Consider the following discussion of methods of retir-
ing disabled and superannuated judges: 2 
"Another device for eliminating disabled or superannuated 
judges is compulsory retirement at a fixed age. This partic-
ular device is chosen in order to escape the difficulty of passing 
on individual cases and of making invidious distinctions be-
tween individuals affected. Often the individual who ought 
2 Shartel, "Retirement and Removal of Judges," zo JouR. AM. Juo. Soc. 
133 at 137, 138 (1936). 
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to be retired does not realize that he has ceased to be able 
to perform his functions. It is not easy for others to tell 
him that he has lost his fitness for his job. A compulsory 
retirement makes the process of elimination easy and quite 
impersonal. But while the administrative difficulty is thus 
avoided, the legislative problem is not. Is it feasible to fix 
a uniform age for compulsory retirement? If so, what shall 
be the age thus fixed by constitution or statute? The fact is 
that not all men become incapacitated at the same age. Some 
men are old at so, while occasionally a man retains his facul-
ties and full vigor until 90 or over. Whatever age of retire-
ment is set, some waste of competent man power will result; 
the judicial system will lose the experience and ability of 
some men who still have all their faculties though they have 
passed the fixed age. Against this waste must be balanced 
the advantage of eliminating dead timber. That it is not 
easy to fix a uniform age for retirement is attested by the 
not uncommon opinion of competent persons that such an 
age is not possible to fix and by the marked diversity of 
opinion among other persons as to what the proper age should 
be. But admitting the difficulties it does not seem to the writer 
that fixing an age for judicial retirement is different in kind 
from fixing an age for any other significant act or event. The 
age for majority is typical; not all persons arrive at the age 
of discretion at the same time. Nevertheless we must and 
do fix such an age on the basis of a general estimate. And 
no one has ever felt that the fact that some good professors 
or army officers or business executives will be put on the shelf 
by an automatic superannuation provision constituted a con-
clusive reason against such a requirement. If provision is 
made for part-time service by retired judges, the waste of 
man power need not be great; almost all states have over-
crowded dockets. The retired judge can always sit if he is 
willing, and be assigned to the types of matters for which 
he is best fitted." 
Can one regard methods of retirement as devices for con-
trolling judicial behavior? Compare methods of retirement 
with methods of selection, in this respect. 
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3· Hancock v. Elam.8 Nicholson, C. J., delivered the 
opinion of the Court: 
"This suit was brought by Hancock to recover of Mary 
L. Elam $228 for work and labor, in repairing a mill. The 
jury found a verdict for defendant, and plaintiff has ap-
pealed .... 
"In this case, after the jury had been out from eleven 
o'clock until dinner time, which we suppose was about one 
o'clock, upon returning into Court and announcing that they 
could not agree, and that they did not disagree as to the 
evidence, or the charge of the Court, the Sheriff was per-
emptorily ordered 'to lock them up until they should agree,' 
and that, without allowing them to have their dinners before 
being locked up. The jurors might very well understand 
from this order, that they were required either to agree or 
to submit to indefinite confinement and starvation. They were 
ordered to be locked up until they should agree. They did 
agree in the course of several hours, but whether their dis-
agreement was harmonized, under free, patient investigation 
and deliberation, or under the apprehension of prolonged 
confinement and starvation, we have no means of determin-
ing. We can see, however, that under the influence of such 
an arbitrary order, jurors may have yielded their convictions, 
in order to avoid the threatened consequence of continued 
disagreement .... 
"The verdict is, therefore, set aside, and the judgment 
reversed." 
How would you state the prohibitive standard applicable 
to the judge's act in this case? How is this standard enforced? 
4· Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.4 
Plaintiff brought action in a California court against the 
defendant railroad for injuries caused by the latter's neg-
ligence. The case was removed to a federal court on the 
ground of diversity of citizenship. At the start of the trial, 
plaintiff moved to strike the jury panel because the jury 
3 6~ Tenn. 33 (1874). 
4 J28 u.s. ~17 (1946). 
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commissioner and clerk of the court had excluded all daily 
wage earners from the jury. These officials testified that the 
exclusion of wage earners was motivated by knowledge that 
the federal district judges had consistently excused such 
persons from jury service because of pecuniary hardship 
(i.e., the pay for jury service was only $4.00 per day). The 
district court denied plaintiff's motion. The jury found a 
verdict for defendant, and on appeal the circuit court of 
appeals affirmed a judgment for defendant. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari. Held-the exclusion of daily wage 
earners in drawing the jury panel was improper, and the 
judgment was reversed. 
Murphy, J., speaking for the Supreme Court said in part: 
"The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in 
connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, neces-
sarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross 
section of the community. Smith v. Texas, 3 I I U. S. 128, 
I30; Glasser v. United States, 3I5 U.S. 6o, 85. This does 
not mean, of course, that every jury must contain representa-
tives of all the economic, social, religious, racial, political 
and geographical groups of the community; frequently such 
complete representation would be impossible. But it does 
mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court offi-
cials without systematic and intentional exclusion of these 
groups. Recognition must be given to the fact that those 
eligible for jury service are to be found in every stratum 
of society. Jury competence is an individual rather than a 
group or class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the 
jury system. To disregard it is to open the door to class 
distinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the 
democratic ideals of trial by jury .... 
"The undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates a 
failure to abide by the proper rules and principles of jury 
selection. Both the clerk of the court and the jury commis-
sioner testified that they deliberately and intentionally ex-
cluded from the jury lists all persons who work for a daily 
wage. They generally used the city directory as the source 
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of names of prospective jurors. In the words of the clerk, 
'If I see in the directory the name of John Jones and it says 
he is a longshoreman, I do not put his name in, because I 
have found by experience that that man will not serve as 
::t juror, and I will not get people who will qualify. The 
minute that a juror is called into court on a venire and says 
he is working for $I o a day and cannot afford to work for 
$4, the Judge has never made one of those men serve, and 
so in order to avoid putting names of people in who I know 
won't become jurors in the court, won't qualify as jurors in 
this court, I do leave them out. . . . Where I thought the 
designation indicated that they were day laborers, I mean 
they were people who were compensated solely when they 
were working by the day, I leave them out.' The jury com-
missioner corroborated this testimony, adding that he pur-
posely excluded 'all the iron craft, bricklayers, carpenters and 
machinists' because in the past 'those men came into court and 
offered that (financial hardship) as an excuse, and the judge 
usually let them go.' The evidence indicated, however, that 
laborers who were paid weekly or monthly wages were placed 
on the jury lists, as well as the wives of daily wage earners. 
"It was further admitted that business men and their wives 
constituted at least so% of the jury lists, although both the 
clerk and the commissioner denied that they consciously chose 
according to wealth or occupation. Thus the admitted dis-
crimination was limited to those who worked for a daily 
wage, many of whom might suffer financial loss by serving 
on juries at the rate of $4 a day and would be excused for 
that reason. 
"This exclusion of all those who earn a daily wage cannot 
be justified by federal or state law. Certainly nothing in the 
federal statutes warrants such an exclusion. And the Cali-
fornia statutes are equally devoid of justification for the 
practice .... 
"It is clear that a federal judge would be justified in excus-
ing a daily wage earner for whom jury service would entail 
an undue financial hardship. But that fact cannot support the 
complete exclusion of all daily wage earners regardless of 
whether there is actual hardship involved. Here there was no 
effort, no intention, to determine in advance which individual 
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members of the daily wage-earning class would suffer an 
undue hardship by serving on a jury at the rate of $4 a day.l1 
All were systematically and automatically excluded." 
Frankfurter, J., and Reed, J., dissented. Jackson, J., took 
no part in the decision of the case. 
How is this decision related to the methods of controlling 
a trial jury above discussed? Does the decision really meet 
the problem presented by the $4.00 per diem allowance for 
jury service? 6 
UsE OF STANDARDS FOR OFFICIALS 
Sec. 3-30. Use by executive officials. We have now men-
tioned the standards applicable to various official acts, and 
have examined the ways in which these standards are effec-
tuated. It is necessary to consider also the intentional uses 
of these standards, the ways in which they are used to guide 
action. How are these official standards used, and by whom? 
How does 0, the official actor, use them? What use do courts 
make of them? How are they used by the individual and 
his legal counselor? And in what ways are they used by the 
student of the law? 1 
The standards with which we are now concerned are ad-
dressed primarily to the official actor, 0. He is in the position 
5 The compensation of jurors is now fixed at $7.00 per day in the federal 
courts, "except that any juror required to attend more than thirty days in 
hearing one case may be paid in the discretion and upon the certification of the 
trial judge a per diem fee not exceeding $10 for each day in excess of thirty 
days he is required to hear such case." U. S. C. A. tit. 2 8, § 18 71. 
6 Regarding the decision in this case, see note in 59 HARV. L. REV. n67 
( 1946), and article by Fraenkel, "The Supreme Court and Civil Rights: 
1946 Term," 47 CoL. L. REV. 953 at 959 (1947). 
It is interesting to compare the effects of systematic racial discrimination in 
the drawing of juries. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) and Akins v. 
Texas, 325 U. S. 398 (1945); and the effects of the selection of so-called 
special or "blue ribbon" juries for criminal trials in state courts. Fay v. New 
York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), noted in 46 MICH. L. REv. 262 (1947) and 
discussed in the article by Fraenkel above cited. 
1 The discussion in the present subtopic parallels the discussion of ways of 
using standards for the individual, sees. 2-43 to :z.-48, inclusive. 
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of hearer, and is intended to shape his acts by reference to 
the standards. In this sense they are standards for O's use; 
they cover, in more or less detail, important acts which he 
may do or think of doing. But these standards are not quite 
independent; in very large part they connect O's act with 
A's. Very frequently, the official begins by using a standard 
applicable to the individual's act in the manner described 
in the last chapter.2 Thus 0, a policeman who is patrolling 
the street, applies such a standard for individual action when 
he notes that A, the driver of a car, is speeding. On the 
basis of this observation regarding A's conduct, 0 will employ 
a standard applicable to his own official act, a standard which 
tells him what to do on such an occasion.3 As you see, 0 is 
called upon to apply two sets of standards, those applicable 
to A and those applicable to himself; he considers whether 
A is subject to arrest, and, if so, how he shall make the 
arrest. In both respects 0 makes use of legally prescribed 
standards; he checks the elements of an act (A's or his own) 
against the specifications of a standard. O's method of apply-
ing standards is not essentially different from the method 
employed by A when A uses standards in planning his acts 
or in sizing up their effects.4 
The chief executive or any superior official may make 
similar uses of standards applicable to individual and official 
acts. A police chief, for example, may have to test a series 
of acts, including his own, by the applicable standards. Thus, 
he may first have to decide whether there is sufficient evidence 
to indicate that A was speeding or that he was driving while 
drunk; then, whether 0 who arrested A behaved according 
to the standards applicable to an arrest; and finally the chief 
may have to decide what the presented facts require him to 
2 Sec. ~-45. 
3 Here, O's use of a standard to guide his own action parallels the indi-
vidual's use of a standard to guide his acts. Sec. 2-44. 
4 Sec. 2-44. 
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do and the manner in which he is to do it. If he believes 
that A cannot be shown to have violated any standard or 
that 0 acted improperly in arresting A, the chief may be 
bound to order A's discharge. If he thinks that A is probably 
guilty and that his subordinate has acted properly, the stand-
ard applicable to his own act requires that he have A detained 
and produced before a magistrate on the morrow. The per-
formance of his proper functions may require such a superior 
executive to use not only the standards applicable to A's 
acts, but also the standards governing the acts of his inferiors 
and those which govern his own. 
Sec. 3-3r. Use by the courts. The trial judge is often 
called upon to apply the proper standards to the acts of indi-
viduals. The method which he uses in applying such stand-
ards has already been described.1 He applies standards to 
the acts of officials and official agencies in essentially the same 
manner. And his own acts are also governed by standards. 
These he must look to and use in laying out his own courses 
of action.2 They determine his powers and functions; they 
define the acts which he must do in supervising and conduct-
ing a trial. They specify methods he must use in bringing 
the case to issue, and in admitting evidence to the jury; they 
determine the manner in which he is to instruct the jury, 
and enter judgment or sentence; they determine when he 
is to direct a verdict, set a verdict aside, and so on. 
The supreme court, in its turn, may be called upon to 
use standards applicable to the acts of A, to the acts of 0, 
to the acts of the jury, and to the acts of the trial judge; 
the court may have to decide whether any or all these acts 
have been performed according to applicable standards. In 
examining these prior acts of individuals and official agencies, 
and in taking action based thereon, the supreme court is also 
1 See sec. 2-4-5. 
2 Here the judge's use of a standard, i.e., to guide his own action, parallels 
the individual's use of a standard to guide his acts (sec. 2-4-4-). 
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guided by standards; it applies them in its own acts. So that 
the supreme court's use of standards may represent a sequence 
of applications comparable to the series of acts described in 
"The House That Jack Built." 
Sec. 3-32. Use by A and his counselor-reliance on O's 
habits. All standards are addressed primarily to a limited 
group of persons, but all standards are important also, in a 
secondary sense, to other persons than the addressees, because 
these others are affected one way or another by what the 
addressees do. In this sense, A may be concerned with the 
standards applicable to acts which 0 has done.1 His rights 
may depend on O's acts, and he may have to know whether 
0 has acted effectively. He may be injured by an act that 
0 has done, and need to decide whether 0 has behaved in 
a manner which will warrant his recourse to the courts for 
an injunction, or other remedy. These secondary uses of 
standards addressed to 0 hardly require further elaboration, 
in view of what has already been said about multiple uses 
of standards, and inasmuch as the methods of applying such 
standards toO's acts are essentially the same as various other 
applications of standards already discussed. 
But A's concern with acts of O, like his concern with acts 
of B, is not limited to past acts of O, to acts that 0 has 
already done. On the contrary, A often needs to predict the 
future behavior of 0.2 He has to rely on what 0 is going 
to do. For the purpose of prediction, A rests his calculations 
on observations of the past behavior of 0. Sometimes A may 
use the prescribed standards for official behavior as a basis 
for predicting what 0 will do; A expects 0 to perform his 
duties and exercise his powers as prescribed by legal stand-
1 Compare the discussion of A's application of standards to acts which 
B has done (sec. 2-46). 
2 The discussion in this section of the bases for predicting O's behavior 
parallels the discussion in sec. 2-46 of the bases for predicting B's behavior. 
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ards; A predicates this expectation on the general law-abiding 
habits of officials. But the standard itself merely tells A 
what 0 is supposed to do; it does not form a basis for pre-
dicting whether he will act according to its terms. O's known 
habits are the basis for that kind of calculation. 
If legal standards covered every act which 0 might do, 
and if these standards were completely effectuated, A might 
in all cases rely on legal standards as a basis for prediction. 
But much of official conduct falls beyond coercive legal 
standards. A large part of O's conduct is privileged, or dis-
cretionary.3 What will 0 do in areas where he is free to act 
or not to act? So far as A's planning depends on what he 
can expect 0 to do, A has just two things to rely on-O's 
habits and his declared intentions. For example, if A is a 
busy doctor and is called as a witness in a suit between X 
and Y, he hopes to be put on the stand at once and without 
delay. Can he count on this courtesy? Or must he expect to 
cool his heels for a half day while he waits for his turn to 
be called to the stand? The answer lies in the discretion of 
Judge Jones, presiding at the trial. A may rely on the known 
practice of Judge Jones to interrupt the course of a trial 
and put the b~sy witness on the stand out of turn. Or he 
may rely on the personal assurance of Judge Jones that this 
will be done. Moreover, officials do not always act according 
to standards. And what is just as important, their activities 
do not always eventuate as they are supposed to do. On the 
one side, there is the discrepancy between prescribed stand-
ards and the forms which behavior actually takes. On the 
other, there are various practical factors which may defeat 
the operation of legal remedies.* Thus, in the case of a 
3 See sec. 3-04 regarding the unregulated areas of official action; and com-
pare sees. 2-os, 2-07, 2-11 and 2-46 regarding the unregulated areas of 
individual action. 
* (I.R.) These two propositions constitute for me the gist of the "realist" 
position. The relevant items regarding the realist point of view are very 
numerous; I shall suggest only a few, in order of date of publication. These 
238 OUR LEGAL SYSTEM AND HOW IT OPERATES 
banker who is about to loan money to B, the capacity of B 
to repay it may loom larger than B's legal obligation. The 
banker may be more interested in the fact that the legal 
means of collection may fail for various reasons, that official 
aid may be very costly, or may be futile in the sense that 
a judgment may be uncollectible. Or again, A, whose car 
has been damaged in a collision through the fault of B, must 
consider not only whether a jury ought to give him a full 
recovery for his loss, but also the question whether there is 
some chance that the legal processes through which he will 
obtain compensation may go awry at some point. B may have 
ways to evade or defeat A's claim. B's witnesses may con-
tradict A's, and the jury may believe B's witnesses. Or the 
jury may be prejudiced against A, and may reject his claim 
in spite of all the evidence in his favor. And finally, if A 
is one of the "bad men" about whom Holmes speaks,4 he 
counts upon the discrepancies between legal standards and 
official acts for his own advantage. Let us say he contemplates 
opening a gambling establishment. He knows well enough 
that he will be acting contrary to legal standards. He bases 
his calculations of profit on his ability to evade official sanc-
tions and to corrupt certain officials and to make gains large 
enough to offset the costs of fines and losses. In all the 
cases I have mentioned, A has to look first of all to actual 
patterns of official behavior. He uses them as bases for calcu-
represent different attitudes toward the realist viewpoint. A full citation of 
articles maintaining the realist point of view is appended to Llewellyn's second 
article cited below (at pages 1257-IZ59). 
Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (1912), a trans-
lation from the German in Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence, 1936. 
Frank, Law and Modern Mind (1930), reprinted in 1950. 
Fuller, "American Legal Realism," 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 429 (1934). 
Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897). 
Llewellyn, "A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step," 30 Col. L. Rev. 
431 (1930). 
Vewellyn, "Some Realism about Realism," 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). 
Pound, "The Call for a Realistic Jurisprudence," 44 Harv. L. Rev. 697 
(1931). 
4 See sec. 2-p, problem 3· 
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lating possible acts of 0. He is justified in resting his cal-
culations on legal standards only so far as these can be 
identified with the lines that official behavior will probably 
take. 
A's legal counselor has a large part in A's forecasts of 
official action, and in planning the practical results of A's 
own action. Both the counselor's knowledge of law and his 
experience with legal affairs are brought to bear in these 
respects. The successful counselor learns early in his practice 
to weigh his chances of achieving actual results. He learns 
how important it is to think out and provide for the various 
contingencies which may arise under a contract, deed, mort-
gage or will that he is drafting. He learns that promises 
are not always kept; that doubtful promises are usually 
construed by each party according to his self-interest; that 
vague or inadequately drafted instruments may entail the 
necessity for court action to determine meaning. He learns 
to appreciate the difference between the standards in the 
books and the results which can be achieved through official 
aid.5 He learns-and advises A accordingly-that there is 
a vast difference between having a lawsuit and having the 
means of proving it; that even when evidence is available, 
the processes of proof are uncertain and fraught with hazards, 
such as the disappearance or impeachment of a key witness; 
that it is usually better to settle a lawsuit at a substantial 
discount than to incur the cost, suffer the delays, and run 
the risks of litigation; that there is no point in pursuing an 
expensive lawsuit to a conclusion against a defendant who is 
uncollectible; that the bias of juries counts heavily in certain 
cases. In short, he has to learn how to plan his client's lawsuit 
G The importance of this aspect of the lawyer's role was first clearly stated 
by Justice Holmes. He said that the real meaning of legal rules inheres in their 
probable application by judges and other agents of the state, that the lawyer 
must be able to foretell what these officials are going to do, that the lawyer's 
primary function is that of prophecy. See "The Path of the Law," 10 HARV. 
L. REV. 457 (1897). 
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and draft his client's documents, and guide his client's acts 
in the light not only of knowledge of legal standards but 
also of experience with human contact, especially official 
conduct. 
Sec. 3-33· Use by student of official standards and habit 
patterns-academic and practical training. In the foregoing 
section and others/ I have tried to give you a picture of 
various kinds of work which the legal counselor is called 
upon to do. These materials suggest at the same time impor-
tant lines of preparation and training which the legal coun-
selor needs to have. They suggest uses of official standards 
which the student of the law must learn to make, and uses 
of official habit patterns which he must become familiar with. 
In the present section, I want to deal with these necessary 
skills and the times and methods of acquiring them, in other 
words with the what, when, and how of these parts of S's 
legal education. 
S, the student of the law, must first of all learn to use 
legal standards, to analyze fact situations, and to fit them to 
legal standards. The importance of this side of his training 
has been stressed in our discussion of uses which he makes 
of standards applicable to the individual.2 We saw how S 
follows and criticizes the applications of standards which 
others have made in actual cases, and how he makes manifold 
hypothetical applications of standards, and thus acquires ex-
perience in their use. Standards applicable to officials are used 
by S in the same ways. He can make similar examinations 
of others' applications of standards to official acts, and make 
similar hypothetical applications of official standards.3 In 
1 See sees. z-44, z-46, z-47. 
2 See sec. z-47. 
3 And if we are thinking of S's experience in applying standards to official 
acts we must also count here the numerous standards and methods to be 
mentioned in subsequent chapters: in Chapter 4, standards and methods which 
govern the legislator's act; in Chapter s, those which control the inter-
STANDARDS FOR OFFICIAL ACTS 241 
fact, there are no marked differences between the uses he 
makes of the two kinds of standards. Everything I have 
said about uses of standards for the individual is relevant 
here; and everything I shall say here about uses of official 
standards applies equally to the use of both kinds of stand-
ards. I aim chiefly to expand and drive home some of the 
points already suggested regarding the place in legal educa-
tion of exercise in the use of standards. 
As our law schools are set up and operate, the law student's 
work is preponderantly theoretical. This is another way of 
saying that he is a nonparticipant in the legal scene. He 
studies the operation of the legal system from the outside. 
His detachment from the legal scene carries certain advan-
tages and also involves certain limitations. Both advantages 
and limitations are reflected in the uses which he makes of 
legal standards. 
One advantage of S's detached position is that it allows 
him to wrestle with a very wide variety of problems of apply-
ing standards. The variety far exceeds the bounds of the 
direct experiences which S might have with actual cases. The 
law reports make available a large supply of materials for 
re-examination. And these materials are found in a form 
to show how a court has worked out a problem of application. 
They are well adapted for study and the development of 
the capacity to think in legal terms. In these respects, 
the reported cases constitute a fund for instruction hardly 
equalled in any other art or science. When we add to S's 
opportunity to work with reported cases, his chance for dis-
cussing, analyzing, and dealing with hypothetical situations, 
preter's act of construing legislation; in Chapter 6, those which guide the 
judicial lawmaker's acts of finding, making, and unmaking law; and finally 
in Chapter 7, those which determine or shape the acts of various policymakers. 
All these important official acts and the standards applicable to them can be, in 
fact must be, studied by S in the same manner as the official standards mentioned 
in the present chapter. 
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we find that S has an almost unlimited scope for exercise 
in the use of standards. 
Another advantage of S's detached treatment of cases 
is the fact that it makes possible an objective attitude towards 
the standards themselves and their applications. S can view 
a legal problem impartially from every side. He does not 
have to apply standards in cases which affect his interests or 
sympathies in any way. For this reason, he can be free of the 
natural bias of those who are touched by the actual operation 
of the legal system. A, who drives a car and collides with 
another car, cannot be expected to view the event with the 
same detachment asS; A is naturally swayed by the impulse 
to justify what he has done or failed to do. Even his coun-
selor's thinking tends to take on the color of A's interest. 
Nor is S required to apply individual or official standards 
to a concrete occurrence, which may affect the lives of real 
human beings-as judge and jury must do. To be sure, judge 
and jury are normally more objective than the parties them-
selves, or their witnesses, because judge and jury have no 
personal stake in the decision of the controversy before them, 
and because they are chosen by methods which are designed 
to eliminate the element of bias as far as possible. Neverthe-
less, judge and jury see the parties and hear their "real life" 
stories; judge and jury cannot be entirely unaffected by 
factors of human sympathy or prejudice. S is one step fur-
ther removed from the actual facts. He does not have to 
make a decision which will have practical effects. He can, 
if he will, view each case from all angles. He can, if he tries, 
acquire habits of objective judgment. Such habits will serve 
him well even when, later on, he assumes the position of 
counselor and representative of a particular point of view. 
He will need to anticipate the points which his opponents 
can make as well as those which he ought to make himself. 
But the law student is getting ready for the time when 
he will make actual uses of legal standards in the practice 
STANDARDS FOR OFFICIAL ACTS 243 
of the law. His exercise in analyzing cases and applying 
standards is only preparatory for his functions as counselor 
and advocate; it has to be supplemented by exercise in doing 
the practical work of a lawyer. Ultimately he has to acquire 
experience as adviser, as draftsman of instruments, as pleader, 
and perhaps as judge and as draftsman of legislation. The 
student needs to learn how to use the law library, i. e., how 
to find the standards which he is to apply. He needs to learn 
how to prepare briefs, i. e., how to use previous applications 
of standards in decided cases in order to support his own 
lines of argument. He needs to learn to draft important in-
struments, and to try cases. 
The whole approach to these practical jobs is different 
from the approach which one takes to the study of decided 
or hypothetical cases. In the study of cases, one tries to mul-
tiply all the legal possibilities and to resolve them as far as 
one can. One tries to develop a grasp of legal standards by 
making all possible applications of them, normal and abnor-
mal. One tries to develop a sense for distinctions by working 
them out into the greatest refinements. By contrast, in doing 
a practical job the actor aims primarily to insure desired 
results. He wants to accomplish something constructive, not 
merely analyze situations in legal terms. Above all he is 
minded to do a safe job. He does not see how close he can 
come to legal shoals, but adopts a safe course. He draws a 
pleading, so far as he can, which does not raise legal ques-
tions. He draws an instrument, such as a long-term lease or 
a contract, in which all probable points of dispute between 
his client and the other party are covered and provided for. 
He is not interested in peculiar situations and difficulties as 
such. Rather, he aims to avoid difficult legal problems if he 
can. He uses his experience with legal standards and legal 
methods as means of avoiding legal problems. 
There is no question in anyone's mind about S's need for 
practical training for law practice. The only questions are 
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when and how this kind of training is to be given. Some older 
practitioners think extensive practical training should be 
given in the law schools; and are inclined to criticize the 
schools for sending their graduates out incompletely pre-
pared for practice. On the other hand the law schools ac-
knowledge only a minimum obligation to give the student 
practical training. They recognize an obligation to give him 
some experience in the use of the law library, some experience 
in the drawing of pleadings and argument of disputed points 
of law, and some experience in the drafting of important 
instruments. But almost all law teachers are convinced-and 
their views determine the policies of the schools-that the 
place to learn to practice law is in actual law practice, that 
the law school cannot go far in training the student to practice 
law, that the law school has neither the time nor the facilities 
for giving such training efficiently. Three years is felt to be 
little enough time in which to introduce the law student to 
the various fields in which he has to make use of legal 
standards and legal methods. If there were any slack time, 
over and above what is needed for a sound academic training 
(plus a minimum initiation in practical methods), I believe, 
and I think most experienced law teachers believe, that the 
law student should be detached from the law school by just 
that much sooner, and sent out into practice where he can 
learn most speedily and efficiently how to write briefs, to 
advise clients, to draft instruments, and to try cases. 
Legal education is sometimes compared unfavorably with 
medical, in regard to this matter of practical training. It is 
pointed out that the medical student is given not only 
academic training in medical science but a substantial amount 
of practical training in medical work-contact with patients 
and experience in use of medical and surgical procedures. 
Even the general practitioner of medicine has to have at 
least one year of interneship beyond the normal period of 
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four years in medical school, in which he learns to use the 
medical science with which he has become familiar. And the 
specialist has to put in several additional years beyond that. 
The suggestion is then made or implied that the processes 
of legal education have nothing to correspond to the practical 
training of the physician. But the difference in this regard 
between legal and medical education is merely apparent. 
Probably the actual academic part of the training for the two 
professions does not differ greatly in quantity. Most of law 
school training is of the academic type for a period of three 
years, and I think it is safe to estimate that no less than three 
years of the five or more which the young physician must 
spend in school and in the hospital are really academic in 
character. Probably the young lawyer needs as long a subse-
quent period of practical work as the young physician in 
order to get a grasp of his professional tasks. This is recog-
nized in a few jurisdictions by specific provision for an 
apprenticeship in law practice before the young lawyer is 
admitted to the bar.4 Likewise, in most European countries 
service of an extended apprenticeship is a prerequisite to 
admission to the profession. This kind of service corresponds 
in all essentials to a medical interneship. But in most states 
in this country no such requirement of practical preparation 
exists; this does not signify any essential difference, however, 
between the two professions in regard to academic and prac-
tical training. It only means that the young lawyer gets his 
license to practice before he is fully prepared; he has to 
obtain the bulk of his practical training after he is admitted 
to the bar. 
4 Until almost the end of the 19th century the predominant form of legal 
training in the U. S. was of the apprentice type. Relatively few of the men 
who went to the bar were trained in school. The law student prepared himself 
in a law office under the supervision of a practitioner. This form of training 
resulted in an undue emphasis of the practical, and a serious neglect of 
theoretical and systematic preparation. Blackstone and a few other texts were 
read by the student, but the bulk of the training of the young lawyer was 
derived from observing and aiding the work of his practitioner-teacher. 
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In recent years the law student's preoccupation with legal 
standards and their application has been vigorously criticized 
from another angle, by a group of so-called "realists." * 
These writers say that legal standards are abstract and give 
S a totally misleading impression of the activities, and the 
relations, of individuals and officials. They say the traditional 
approach involves a neglect of realities, that descriptions of 
behavior are more significant than standards of behavior, that 
what is needed by S is an appreciation of the way individuals 
and officials behave in actual life.5 They stress the habit 
factors which were mentioned in the last and other sections. 
As regards the law student, they declare that he needs to 
be taught to perform the prophetic functions which Holmes 
ascribes to the lawyer. He needs to be made to realize that 
legal standards are not descriptions of reality, but merely 
ideal pictures. Lawyers and judges come to the realization 
of this fact through their experience with the actual operation 
of the law. And the law student should have the difference 
between the ideal and the actual hammered into him so that 
later on he will properly evaluate his own observations along 
this line, and so that he will be spared the disillusionment 
entailed by having impossible ideals destroyed by his future 
experiences in practice. 
* (I.R.) See bibliography on the realists in sec. 3-32-, note *· 
5 Toward the end of the last, and the beginning of the present, century 
our American legal scholarship and teaching were justifiably criticized, too, 
for dealing with their subject matter in a social vacuum. Writers and teachers 
took law as it was and hardly asked about its social functions. Lawyers, 
writers, and students (and I was a student myself when this was the case) 
concentrated on the technical niceties of existing law. That was the day of what 
Pound has called "mechanical jurisprudence." Lawyers lived in a "heaven 
of juristic conceptions." The social background of the law and its relations 
to real people were hardly mentioned in those days. Holmes, Pound, and 
Wigmore were the spearheads of a general attack on this traditional approach 
which neglected social functions and the ends of law. Most of what these 
pioneers stood for and taught, has now become well accepted; it constitutes 
the most important part of our present-day notions regarding legal policies. 
I mention this change in approach in passing only because it also affected the 
direction of legal education. I shall leave consideration of policies to our last 
chapter: Legal Policies and Policy Making. 
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No doubt these writers have helped to correct a one-sided 
stress on legal standards and their manipulation. No doubt 
the lawyer does need to know business practices, the ways 
of life, and the habits of all kinds of people. When I was 
a law student this sort of thing was hardly mentioned. The 
modern law teacher tries to complete his classroom presen-
tation with all the material he can muster, regarding the 
actual operation of the legal system and regarding the habits 
of individuals and officials so far as they are relevant to the 
operation of the legal system. He points out the discrepancies 
which do often exist between legal standards and their effec-
tuation. He tries to fill out his classroom discussion with 
necessary references to the practices of business and actual 
modes of living. You will note, indeed, that I have given 
you a great deal of material of this realistic type in this and 
the next preceding chapter; and you will find that the same 
approach and presentation of material is adopted in most of 
your regular law courses. 
However, I have two reservations to offer regarding the 
theme of the "realists." Without these reservations, I think 
some of their expressions of opinion might leave you with 
misleading impressions. In the first place, I think some of 
the more ardent "realists" are guilty of overstressing the 
need to study actual behavior of officials and individuals. 
Their emphasis on the prophetic function of the lawyer is 
just as one-sided as the abstract viewpoint which it was aimed 
to correct. There is no call here to fly from one extreme to 
the other; no call to exchange one one-sided viewpoint for 
another. There is no occasion to conclude that legal standards 
are of secondary importance, as some of the extreme "real-
ists" seem to do, simply because the operation of standards 
is not one hundred per cent perfect.** Certainly, we as 
** (I.R.) Among items in which such a one-sided emphasis is laid on habit 
patterns and attitudes and on the lawyer's function of prediction, see items 
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lawyers need to understand the role of standards. We need 
to know how they are made, how they are applied, how 
they are interpreted, how far they are realized in practice. 
Even when we describe human behavior or prophesy what 
the behavior of individuals or officials is going to be, we 
cannot afford to ignore the patterns set up to guide behavior. 
The primary purpose of our legal system is to furnish 
guidance for behavior. And guidance for behavior involves 
the use of standards, models of action established before-
hand, or, if you will, prescribed plans of action. We see 
their character most plainly in connection with effective acts. 
It is absurd to suppose that plans or patterns are unimportant 
because they are not always perfectly carried out. Important 
as it is to call attention to deficiencies in execution and effec-
tuation, the core of legal training will always be the legal 
standards and their application. 
In the second place, I have some question about the extent 
to which a knowledge of people and their ways can be taught 
in law school. In prelegal courses, such as psychology, social 
psychology, sociology, economics, and political science, and 
in law courses, such as jurisprudence and sociology of law, 
most of what is scientific in the field of human behavior 
can be given to the student. These sciences represent the sum 
total of what our thinkers and writers have been able to 
achieve by way of systematic descriptions and observations 
of human attitudes, habits, and practices. But these sciences 
from Frank, Arnold, and Radin, cited in sec. 1-01 note *, and Rodell's 
Woe Unto You, Lawyers! (1940). 
Among items in which a balanced stress on standards and habit factors is 
adopted, see items by Holmes, Pound, Dickinson, and Fuller, cited in sec. 
3-32, note * and Llewellyn, "The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs: 
The Problem of Juristic Method," 49 YALE L. J. 1355 (1940). Ten years 
earlier I think Llewellyn would have had to be counted among the writers 
who overstressed the realist viewpoint; at that time he referred to legal 
rules as mere "paper rules"; the "real rules" were for him the official patterns 
of behavior, "A Realistic Jurisprudence-The' Next Step," 30 CoL. L. REV. 
431 (1930). 
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of behavior hardly touch the practieal bases for predicting 
official and individual behavior. That is a type of knowledge 
which is not easily described, set down in books, or taught. 
It is the kind of knowledge which comes through personal 
experience, experience which each lawyer must have for 
himself. How can a school, for example, develop in its 
students a sense for detecting a lying witness, or a capacity 
for negotiating the settlement of a damage case, or an ability 
to figure out when the court will put a defendant on proba-
tion? There is no reason why the teacher should not con-
tribute anything he can along these lines, but I do not think 
it can be very much. Most of the kind of information, which 
the practitioner needs and gets, regarding individuals, wit-
nesses, and judges, is not generally available; it can only 
be acquired by S after he is a practitioner, not while he is 
in law school. The most that the law teacher can do about 
such information is to call S's attention to the importance 
of it, when, as, and if he can come by it. Accordingly, I have 
a feeling that most of the talk about the deficiencies of law 
schools in failing. to teach practical material of this kind is 
far removed from pedagogical realities, quite as far removed 
from realities as was the old-fashioned doctrine which some 
extreme protagonists of realism so vociferously talk about 
and criticize. 
Sec. 3-34. Problems. I. Ex parte Hardcastle.1 Morrow, 
J ., delivered the opinion of the court: 
"This is a habeas corpus proceeding in which the relator is 
held under an order of the city health officer of San Antonio, 
by virtue of quarantine regulations established in accord with 
chapter 85 of the Acts of the Fourth Called Session of the 
Thirty-fifth Legislature, under a statement of the order of 
arrest that, according to the information of the health officer, 
relator is affected with gonorrhea .... 
1 84 Tex. App. 463, 208 S. W. 531 (1919). 
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"The Legislature, under the police power, has authority 
to authorize the establishment of quarantine regulations for 
the protection of the public against contagion from those 
persons whose condition is such as to spread disease, and, 
incident thereto, to authorize the arrest and detention of such 
persons: and such, we understand, is the purpose of the 
statute in question. Under its terms, the proper health officer 
may issue a warrant by virtue of which a lawful arrest may 
be made without preliminary thereto affording the person 
affected a hearing; but if, after arrest, such person challenges 
the right of the authorities to continue the detention, the 
fundamental law accords him the right to have the legality 
of his detention inquired into by a proper court in a habeas 
corpus proceeding. . . . The health authorities causing the 
arrest of relator derive their power to do so from the alleged 
existence of the fact that the relator is affected with the 
disease mentioned, and that her detention is required in the 
public interest to prevent contagion. If those facts do not 
exist, the officer has no jurisdiction to continue the restraint 
and the court in the habeas corpus proceeding has authority 
to inquire whether the facts essential to jurisdiction exist. 
Ex parte Degener, JO Tex. App. s66, I 7 s. w. I II I. ... 
"We conclude that, under the act of the Legislature in 
question, the relator had the right to a hearing on writ of 
habeas corpus, and therein to prove the nonexistence of the 
facts necessary to authorize her continued detention and 
thereby obtain release. Facts essential to determine whether 
she should or should not be held not being available in this 
court, it is ordered that the writ of habeas corpus prayed for 
be granted, and that it be referred for hearing to Hon. R. 
B. Minor, Judge of the Fifty-Seventh Judicial District of 
Texas." 
What important standards for official acts are here 
involved? Who is called on to apply them? 
2. Judge Jerome Frank says in a recent article: 
"Litigation is the ultimate reference for the lawyer. By 
and large, in the last analysis, legal rights and duties, so-
called, are nothing more or less than actual or potential 
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successes or failures in lawsuits. A lawyer who has inadequate 
acquaintance with litigious processes is, relatively, an impotent 
lawyer. Indeed, the lawyer is differentiated from other men 
by the sole fact that he, more expertly than others, is sup-
posed to know the way of courts. (When I speak of courts, 
I include administrative agencies, which constitute a special 
sort of court.) 
"When you come to practice and, acting for your client, 
Mr. Shadrach, draw his will, or pass on a bond issue, or 
organize a corporation, or negotiate the settlement of a con-
troversy, or draft a legislative bill, you will--or you should 
be--concerned with how the courts will act. If you are com-
petent, you will, as best you can, try to answer this question: 
'What will happen if those specific documents or transactions 
hereafter become a part of the drama of a trial?' For the 
legal rights and duties of your client, Mr. Shadrach, under 
any given document, or in connection with any given trans-
action, may mean simply what some court, somewhere, some 
day in the future, will decide at the end of a trial in a future 
concrete lawsuit relating to Shadrach's specific rights under 
that specific document or in connection with that specific 
transaction. In the last push, when your client gets into 
litigation, he has a legal right if he wins the lawsuit, a legal 
duty if he loses it. 
"You will note that I have emphasized trials and trial 
courts. In that respect, I differ from most law teachers. With 
a very few notable exceptions, the kind of so-called 'law' 
taught by most professors in schools consists of deductions 
from upper-court opinions. The schools, generally speaking, 
are upper-court law schools. But upper courts, courts of the 
sort in which I sit, are relatively unimportant for most clients. 
Why? Because the overwhelming majority of lawsuits are 
never appealed, and, in most of the small minority which are 
appealed, the appellate courts accept the facts as 'found' by 
the trial court. 
"This brings me to the transcendent importance of the 
facts of cases. A legal rule, principle or standard, says merely 
this: 'If the facts are thus and so, these are the legal con-
sequences.' In a lawsuit, any particular rule, then, should be 
applied only if the facts invoking that rule's application are 
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found to exist. If you, as a lawyer, assert that a given rule 
should govern your client's case, you will therefore fail, you 
will lose your suit, unless either the opposing lawyer concedes 
that those are the facts (which he seldom does), or you 
persuade the trial court (a jury or a trial judge sitting with-
out a jury) that those are the facts. 
"Now the actual facts in a suit do not walk into the 
courtroom. For they are past events, events which occurred 
before the suit began. The trial judge or jury, in most cases 
(i.e., those in which the facts are disputed) can usually learn 
about those past facts in but one way-through the court-
room narratives of witnesses. The witnesses, being human, 
may make mistakes in their original observation of the facts, 
in their memories of what they thus observed, or at the trial 
in their reports of their memories. Some witnesses deliber-
ately lie. Many others are biased, and, because of bias, un-
consciously distort their stories. The trial judge or juries, 
who are themselves merely fallible human witnesses of the 
witnesses, must guess which, if any, of the witnesses accur-
ately testify about the actual past facts. 
"A guess it must be, since there exist no mechanical instru-
ments for weighing evidence or for determining the honesty 
and accuracy of the respective witnesses. We have not yet 
perfected a foolproof lie detector; we certainly now have no 
detector of the unconscious distortions of prejudiced but 
honest witnesses; and almost surely, we will never have a 
contrivance for correcting a witness' original mistaken obser-
vation of the facts. 
"The facts, then, for decisional purposes are no more than 
what trial judges or juries guess-what they think the facts 
are (or, more accurately, what they publicly say or imply 
they think the facts are). The 'facts' consist, therefore, of 
the fallible subjective reactions of the trial judge or jury to 
the fallible reactions of the witness. Consequently, subjec-
tivity, in two ways, inheres in trial-court fact finding-in the 
subjective reactions of the witnesses, and in the subjective 
reactions to the witnesses of the jury or trial judge'. Specific 
decisions frequently turn on such subjective reactions, cul-
minating in such fallible findings of the facts. In court-houses, 
the legal rules are never self-operative, are always at the 
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mercy of those findings and often of that subjectivity. I can 
perhaps most easily indicate the practical significance of that 
subjectivity by quoting what I have said elsewhere with 
respect to the trial judge: 'What we call the "facts" of a case 
constitute, often, the most important ingredient of the trial 
judge's decision. But when the testimony is in conflict,-as 
it is in thousands of cases-the "facts" of a lawsuit consist 
of the judge's belief as to what those facts are. That belief 
results from the impact on the judge of the words, gestures, 
postures and grimaces of the witnesses. His reaction-inher-
ently and inescapably subjective-is a composite of the way 
in which his personal predilections and prejudices are stimu-
lated by the sights and sounds emanating from the witnesses. 
Now these personal attitudes of the judge reflect the subtlest 
influences of his experience and of the manner in which he 
has moulded them into what we describe, loosely, as his 
"personality." Where he was born and educated, his parents, 
the persons he has met, his teachers and companions, the 
woman he married, the books and articles he has read-these 
and multitudinous other factors, undiscoverable for the most 
part by any outsider, affect his notion of the "facts." All kinds 
of obscure, unarticulated community moral attitudes thus 
play their part in his fact determination.' As I recently said, 
on behalf of our court: 'Democracy must, indeed, fail unless 
our courts try cases fairly, and there can be no fair trial 
before a judge lacking in impartiality and disinterestedness. 
If, however, "bias" and "partiality" be defined to mean 
the total absence of preconceptions in the mind of the judge, 
then no one has ever had a fair trial and no one ever will. 
The human mind, even at infancy, is no blank piece of paper. 
We are born with predispositions; and the process of educa-
tion, formal and informal, creates attitudes in all men which 
affect them in judging situations, attitudes which precede 
reasoning in particular instances and which, therefore, by 
definition, are prejudices. Without acquired "slants," pre-
conceptions, life could not go on. Every habit constitutes a 
pre-judgment; were those pre-judgments which we call 
habits absent in any person, were he obliged to treat every 
event as an unprecedented crisis presenting a wholly new 
problem, he would go mad. Interests, points of view, pref-
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erences, are the essence of living. Only death yields dispas-
sionateness, for such dispassionateness signifies utter indiffer-
ence. "To live ... is to have an ethics or scheme of values, 
and to have a scheme of values is to have a point of view, and 
to have a point of view is to have a prejudice or bias ... " 
An "open mind," in the sense of a mind containing no pre-
conceptions whatever, would be a mind incapable of learning 
anything, would be that of an utterly emotionless human 
being, corresponding roughly to the psychiatrist's descriptions 
of the feeble-minded. More directly to the point, every 
human society has a multitude of established attitudes, un-
questioned postulates .... Much harm is done by the myth 
that, merely by putting on a black robe and taking the oath 
of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and strips 
himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking 
machine.' For obvious reasons, the point becomes markedly 
sharper when cases are tried by juries. 
"Never forget that courts do business at retail, not whole-
sale. All decisions are specific decisions in specific suits. In 
advising a client of his rights and duties, a lawyer is attempt-
ing to predict, to guess, what decision will be rendered in 
a specific bit of litigation. Often that requires him, before any 
suit is begun or even threatened, to guess whether, should 
litigation arise, there will be a dispute about the facts, and, 
if so, whether conflicting testimony will be introduced at the 
trial, and what trial judge or jury will try the case, and what 
will be the reaction of that as yet unknown trial judge or 
jury to that as yet unknown testimony. 
"Prediction of specific decisions is hazardous, then, not 
primarily because of uncertainty about the legal rules but 
usually because of the obstacles to guessing what the trial 
courts will guess to be the facts. Due presumably to the 
difficulty of such guessing, Learned Hand, our greatest 
American judge, declared, after a long period on the trial 
bench, 'I must say that as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit 
beyond almost anything else short of sickness and death.' 
Sir William Eggleston, the present Australian Ambassador, 
an experienced trial lawyer, wrote this year, 'With regard to 
the trial of pure questions of fact, I am of opinion that the 
results are ... much a matter of chance.' 
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"Because, fixing their attention on upper courts, they 
neglect that crucial aspect of court-house government, many 
leading law teachers do their maximum worst in gravely 
miseducating their students. Repeatedly they assert that clear 
and precise legal rules usually prevent litigation, and imply 
that the difficulty of predicting decisions stems largely from 
uncertainty in or about the rules. That amounts to saying 
that if all the legal rules were settled and precise, or if 
parties to controversies always could agree on the pertinent 
rules, there would be little or no litigation. That is pure, 
unadulterated tosh. In most suits, no disagreement arises 
about the rules, and the disputes relate solely to the facts. 
Decisions in such suits, says many a professor, quoting 
Cardozo, leave 'jurisprudence ... untouched.' That is 
true, provided you so conceive of 'jurisprudence' that it stays 
aloof from the affairs of ordinary men. But such a decision 
often means death or imprisonment or poverty or a ruined 
life to some mere mortal who, in his benighted ignorance, 
has more regard for his own welfare than for the aesthetic 
delights of pure 'jurisprudence.' 
"Uncertainty about some of the legal rules exists; one 
comes upon it in the 'marginal' (or 'unprovided' or 'new' 
cases). Cardozo correctly said that such uncertainty ought 
not to be exaggerated. However, the point he missed, because 
he was an upper-court lawyer or an upper-court judge during 
most of his career, is this: The major cause of legal uncer-
tainty, which is vast in extent, inheres in the unknowability 
of the 'facts' of cases. For I repeat that few cases are appealed 
and that, even when a case is appealed, the upper court 
usually accepts the facts as found by the trial court. Appellate 
courts deal principally with the legal rules. For that reason, 
upper courts are relatively unimportant. Trial courts-trial 
judges and juries-are the pivotal factor in the judicial 
))2 process .... 
What difficulty about the application of standards does 
Judge Frank stress? Is this point brought out in your law 
studies? , 
2 
"A Plea for Lawyer-Schools," 56 YALE L. J. 1303 at I305-I3II ( 1947). 
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What proportion of contracts made between citizens A 
and B give rise to litigation, i.e., disputes in court regarding 
law or facts? What does this suggest? 
Sec. 3-35· Summary and concluding observations. The 
main theme of this chapter has been the control of official 
acts by legal standards. We have been concerned with 
methods of controlling official acts which are, in turn, mainly 
significant as means or methods of controlling individuals. 
First, we dealt with the standards which are established 
to control officials, and the ways in which official acts are 
significant. The discussion here included an analysis of 
executive acts, a discussion of the functions of courts and 
court procedures, and a brief description of the activities of 
administrative agencies and certain nonregulative acts of 
governmental agencies. 
Second, we discussed the ways of effectuating standards 
for officials. Here, methods of motivating official behavior 
along desirable lines, methods of selecting officials, and 
methods of checking official acts were treated. 
Finally, we considered the important uses which are made 
by various persons of the standards prescribed for official 
acts: how these standards are used by executive officials, by 
the courts, by the individual and his counselor, and by the 
student of law. 
The stress throughout both this chapter and the preceding, 
has been on legal methods-methods of controlling people 
and methods of using and applying standards. This stress is 
justified by the fact that the principal thing which one gets 
in law school is a knowledge of legal methods-methods of 
analyzing fact situations and methods of applying legal stand-
ards to a case. No one can acquire a knowledge of all the 
law; no one can remember for long even a major part of 
the law which one covers in law school. Every practitioner 
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and every teacher has learned, analyzed and digested-and 
then forgotten-a great quantity of law. One often hears 
the practitioner say that he could not take a bar examination, 
or that he never knew so much law as when he graduated 
from law school. What he has carried away and kept are 
methods of analyzing fact situations, methods of applying 
legal standards to a case, and a feeling for the ways in which 
legal principles can be and will be developed and applied. 
Just as one who has learned to swim never loses his sense 
for the way to keep himself afloat and propel himself through 
the water, a legal trainee never loses his sense for, and ability 
to use, the legal methods into which he has been initiated. 
CHAPTER 4 
Legislation * 
Sec. 4-or. Lawmakers and legislation. Several kinds of 
governmental agencies create standards for the guidance of 
individuals and officials. These agencies include the conven-
tion or assembly, which establishes the basic instrument of 
government called the constitution; the legislature (or in the 
case of the federal government, the Congress) whose func-
tion is to enact statutes, sometimes called acts, public acts, 
or laws; cities, towns and villages, which enact ordinances; 
various executive and administrative officers and boards 
which exercise rule-making authority; and the courts, which 
lay down rules, principles and doctrines in the decision of 
cases. 
To the extent that these various agencies produce standards 
of behavior, I shall speak of them henceforth as lawmakers, 
speak of their grist as law, and call their activity lawmaking. 
The word legislation, however, I shall reserve for enacted 
law and distinguish between legislation on the one hand and 
judicial lawmaking on the other. Accordingly, legislation will 
* (I.R.) Suggestions for further reading: 
Field, David Dudley, Centenary Essays (New York University, 1949), 
a group of papers dealing with codification and law reform. 
Pound, Outlines of Lectures ,on Jurisprudence (sth ed., 1943) 124-139, 
furnishes a comprehensive bibliography on legislation and codification. 
Pound, "Sources and Forms of Law," z 1 Notre Dame Lawyer z46-3 14 
and 22 ibid. I-8o ( 1946), discusses sources of law, the traditional 
elements in law, and the imperative element; the last title covering 
legislation and codification. 
Read and MacDonald, Cases and Materials on Legislation (1948), a very 
useful collection of material. 
Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction (3rd ed. by Horack, 1943), 
a large treatise recently revised; contains material on the legislative 
process as well as the interpretive process. 
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include three types of law: ( 1) constitutional provisions ( 2) 
statutes (3) executive or administrative rules.1 
Sec. 4-02. Scope of chapter-statutes as chief subject. 
The present chapter will be devoted to legislation as above 
defined. The process of judicial lawmaking will be considered 
fully in a later chapter. However, it does not seem to me 
necessary to consider all three types of legislation in equal 
detail. Statutes constitute the most prominent type of enacted 
law. The legislature is a body established for the very pur-
pose of enacting statutes; it acts frequently and prolifically; 
it creates the lion's share of standards applicable to individ-
uals and to officials. I believe therefore that the character and 
significance of legislative activity will be amply developed 
by a discussion of the making and the effects of statutes. And, 
apart from occasional remarks about the effects of consti-
tutional provisions and three sections in which subsidiary 
lawmaking is briefly considered, all the following discussion 
of legislation will center on the acts of the legislature.1 
The material of this chapter will be taken up under the 
following heads: 
The legislative process. 
Standards for the lawmaker. 
Subsidiary lawmaking. 
Lawmaker's statement of standards. 
Significance of legislation. 
1 Patterson uses "legislation" in essentially this manner. He includes in 
the term all forms of law which are characterized by "textual rigidity." He 
mentions as specific examples the Constitution of the United States, treaties, 
federal statutes, federal executive orders and administrative regulations, state 
constitutions, state statutes, administrative regulations, municipal ordinances, 
and rules of court. DOWLING, PATTERSON, AND POWELL, MATERIALS FOR 
LEGAL METHOD 2.1-2.9 ( 1946). 
1 Except where I specifically refer to the Congress or to a state legislature, 
I shall use the word legislature henceforth in the generic sense to refer to 
the Congress, to a state legislature or to either without distinction. This usage 
will avoid a cumbersome reference to the Congress each time I wish to refer 
to the act of statute making. 
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THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 
Sec. 4-03. Enactment of statute-a series of steps. 
A statute does not spring full-blown from the legislative 
brow as Minerva did from the brow of Jove. The process 
of getting a law on the books usually extends over a con-
siderable period of time. It involves many distinguishable 
acts of different persons.1 A law is suggested, formulated, 
debated, revised, amended, and adopted. Its completion 
involves such separate steps or acts as the preparation of 
a bill, the introduction of the bill in one house of the 
legislature,2 the reference of the bill to a committee, the 
consideration, revision, and redrafting of the bill by this com-
mittee, the return to the house of the bill with the commit-
tee's report, the debate on the bill in the house, its adoption 
by the house, the signature and certification of adoption by 
the presiding officer and clerk, the repetition of all these steps 
in the second house of the legislature, the signature or veto 
by the chief executive of the state, the repassage of the bill 
by the necessary majorities in case of veto, and finally the 
publication of the enacted law in some official form. In other 
words the legislative process is not a solid indivisible unit but 
a series of interconnected steps; it is not a simple instan-
taneous occurrence but a sequence of acts. 
Sec. 4-04. Occasion and purpose of legislation. The legis-
lative act, like all forms of human action, originates in a felt 
need to change the environment.1 In the legislative situation 
1 The adoption of a constitution or a specific constitutional provision is 
also a series of acts in which various agencies participate. There are not only 
distinguishable acts in the constitutional convention itself, but the work of the 
convention is ordinarily submitted to the voters to be accepted or rejected. 
2 Before the process of enactment is complete the proposed law is commonly 
called a bill or draft. When the process of enactment is complete the bill 
or draft becomes an act, statute or law. 
1 By "change the environment" we can mean either an alteration of the 
environment itself, or a change of the environment in the sense that the actor 
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the actor recognizes a need to change the patterns of action 
which govern the behavior of his fellows. He becomes aware 
of the fact that these patterns of action, or standards, are not 
the best available or that they are not as effective as they 
should be under prevailing conditions. He recognizes the 
need to change standards or to set up new ones. Often the 
perception of the need for change originates outside the legis-
lature; the legislature's attention is directed to the need by 
some individual or group of persons. But in any event the 
legislature itself must recognize this need. The need is the 
occasion for legislation; it is, to paraphrase a statement of 
Lord Coke, the mischief and defect for which the existing 
law does not provide.2 
Closely related to the occasion for legislation is the purpose 
of legislation. In fact this purpose is nothing more than what 
the legislature aims to do about the need which it recognizes. 
The purpose of action and the occasion for action cannot 
really be severed from one another; the purpose of action 
springs from an existing occasion. The lawmaker acts to meet 
a need, as I have just said. His action is remedial; his 
purpose is to change existing standards. First of all he has 
to decide upon a general purpose-what he wants to accom-
plish by amending or creating standards. What behavior of 
A or 0 does he wish to foster or bring about? What ends 
or objectives does he wish to achieve by amending or creating 
legal standards? It is not too important how we characterize 
such questions: whether we call them questions of objectives 
or ends, or whether we call them questions of purpose or of 
policy. All of these characterizations-and they are all 
used--come to about the same thing. All mean that the 
moves from one environment to another. The legislative change in the environ-
ment is, needless to say, of the former type. It involves a change of surround-
ing social conditions by altering prevailing legal standards. 
2 Heydon's Case, 3 Co. 7a ( 15 84). Coke is speaking of the factors which 
have to be considered in interpreting a statute. Among them he counts "what 
was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide." 
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lawmaker has to face the problem of deciding what is socially 
desirable; he has to decide what results he wants to bring 
about by amending or creating legal standards. This is the 
basic legislative problem. 
Suppose, for example, it is suggested to the lawmaker that 
there is a liquor problem, a need to eliminate the use of 
intoxicants by establishing and enforcing prohibitory stand-
ards. He must decide whether it is a real need and, if so, 
what to do about it. He has to make a choice among such 
alternatives as these: (I) to undertake to prevent the harm, 
individual and social, that flows from overindulgence in 
intoxicants, perhaps by outright prohibition of the traffic in 
intoxicants; ( 2) to check the misuse of intoxicants, by for-
bidding their sale at certain times, e.g., after midnight, or 
by preventing their use by certain persons, e.g., minors; 
(3) to induce the individual to be temperate in the use of 
intoxicants, by employing the educational machinery of the 
state; ( 4) to adopt a hands-off policy and so allow each 
individual to decide for himself how far he will indulge 
in the use of intoxicants, or at least allow him to decide for 
himself except as he is checked by the standards of other 
social institutions, such as the family or the church; ( 5) to 
pursue a policy quite the opposite of that which is suggested 
and encourage each individual, by education or otherwise, 
to make the most of his opportunities for alcoholic indul-
gence, on the theory of the saying "eat, drink, and be merry 
for tomorrow you may die." All these are possible alterna-
tives for the lawmaker. Which of these alternatives is to be 
chosen? Which is to be the objective of the state as expressed 
in its legal standards? 
Ordinarily, the occasion for enactment is not mentioned 
in the legislation itself, nor is the purpose for which it is 
intended announced. The lawmaker takes need and purpose 
for granted and simply issues directives for the guidance of 
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individuals and officials. This, I mean to say, is the common 
type of legislative act; it sets forth standards of behavior 
without indicating the reasons of need and purpose which lie 
behind them. But only recently the Congress and the legis-
latures of some of our states have revived the practice, not 
unusual several centuries ago,3 of declaring in their important 
legislative acts the needs on which they are based and the 
purposes to be promoted by their enactment. The following 
section from the federal Fair Labor Standards Act is typical 
of this modern practice: 
"Congressional finding and declaration of policy. (a) The 
Congress finds that the existence, in industries engaged in 
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, of 
labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the min-
imum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and 
general well-being of workers (I) causes commerce and the 
channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be used to 
spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the work-
ers of the several States; ( 2) burdens commerce and the free 
flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method 
of competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes 
burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of 
goods in commerce; and (5) interferes with the orderly and 
fair marketing of goods in commerce. 
"(b) It is declared to be the policy of sections 20 I -21 9 
of this title, through the exercise by Congress of its power 
to regulate commerce among the several States, to correct 
and as rapidly as practicable to eliminate the conditions above 
referred to in such industries without substantially curtailing 
employment or earning power." 4 
The importance and helpfulness to the interpreter of a 
declaration like this, can hardly be overestimated. The point 
s Good examples of the former practice are two famous statutes which you 
will encounter in your first-year property course: the Statute De Donis Con-
ditionalibus, 13 Edw. I, Westm. II, c. 1 (1285) and the Statute of Uses, 
1.7 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1536). Both statutes contain elaborate statements about 
the need for legislation and the purposes intended. 
4 
.f:l Stat. 1o6o, sec. z, 2.9 U. S. C., sec. 1.01. (b), June :&5, 1938. 
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is one which you will see better when we consider, in the 
next chapter, the roles played by legislative need and legis-
lative purpose in the processes of interpretation.* 
Sec. ros. Legislative provisions as means. The first 
major problem of the lawmaker, as I have just said, is to 
determine what he wants to accomplish. His next problem 
is to decide how he will accomplish the purpose or purposes 
which he has set for himself. This is the problem of choosing 
means. What are the appropriate standards to establish for 
individuals and officials in order to accomplish his general 
objective? What are the best devices to use to effectuate the 
standards he sets up, and thus carry out his general plan? 1 
Various phases of the problem of means have already been 
discussed. In section 2-01 it was pointed out that the law-
maker uses legislation as a means to ends; it was said "The 
lawmaker, L, issues general directives to the community as 
the owner of a factory might issue instructions, blueprints 
and models to guide the work of the men in his factory." 
In section 2-43 it was said that the lawmaker "uses standards 
instrumentally, to control the behavior of others. He creates 
them as one might devise tools for particular purposes. He 
sets them up in order to achieve results which he wishes to 
bring about. These observations hold equally of all stand-
ards; whether for obligatory, prohibited, effective, permitted, 
*(I.R.) Discussion of the occasion for legislation and of legislative purpose, 
arises most often in connection with interpretation. Until a doubt about the 
meaning of legislation arises these factors are taken for granted; and, as I have 
said in the text, they are not usually mentioned in the legislative enactment. 
However, the importance of these factors in interpretation derives from the 
fact that need and purpose represent important aspects of the legislative act. 
And I believe that the student obtains a better conception of the legislative 
act and of the relation of legislation to interpretation, if he is introduced to 
legislative need and legislative purpose as factors in the legislative process. 
1 From this viewpoint, both the standards which his statute establishes and 
the e:ffectuative devices which he provides for (e.g., penalties, etc.) are means 
used by L to accomplish his legislative purpose, 
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discretionary or ineffective acts. All standards alike are 
related to a maker as his handiwork; all are employed to 
guide the activity of others, by furnishing them with verbal 
patterns to follow." And in sections 2-29 to 2-42 we dealt 
in some detail with problems of effectuating standards. Here 
the problems were all essentially problems of choosing appro-
priate means; in particular the need to consider the attitudes 
of persons to be controlled by standards was emphasized, and 
available methods and devices for motivating their behavior 
were discussed. In chapter 3 similar problems relating to 
methods of controlling officials were analyzed. All these 
materials have illustrated the approach to legislative pro-
visions which we are talking about. The materials do not 
need to be discussed again. I have only referred to them here 
because they represent an important approach to the legis-
lative process and one that is essential to a well-rounded view 
of the lawmaker's job. 
However, legislative ends and means cannot be weighed 
quite independently of one another. Means signify nothing 
apart from an end or purpose which they serve, and an end 
is only realized through the use of appropriate means. Like 
legislative occasion and legislative purpose, legislative pur-
pose and the means of execution are inseparable in practice. 
Try, for example, to distinguish between purpose and means 
in the legislative problem mentioned in the following news 
item in the Detroit Free Press, April 23, I949= 
"SENATEDELAYSLIQUORBILL. The [Michigan] 
Senate almost stopped grocery clerks under 2 I years from 
carrying a customer's case of beer. 
"In a drive to prevent all persons under 2 I years of age 
from handling liquor, the Senate passed the bill. 
"Then Senator Henry R. Kozak, Detroit Democrat, in-
duced the Senate to reconsider the bill so he could offer an 
amendment. 
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"But the amendment was so broad it was considered as 
bad one way as the bill was the other way and the whole 
question was put over till Monday." 
Obviously, the Michigan Senate could not completely divorce 
the purpose to keep intoxicants out of the reach of minors 
from the problem of devising ways to carry out this purpose. 
The distinction between the lawmaker's purpose and the 
means of accomplishing it is not a final physical division of 
matter, like sawing an object in two; it is just a useful 
differentiation of two approaches to the legislative problem. 
Both approaches are possible and both are fruitful, but often 
the two approaches show us pretty much the same matters. 
Sec. 4-o6. Sources of legislative provisions-social con-
text. What are the sources of statutory enactments? Where 
does the lawmaker find the standards and legal ideas which 
he declares in statutory form? He must find them somewhere 
in his own social heritage. His ideas do not spring from 
nowhere; he is limited by the knowledge of his time; he 
acts within a social context or background.* Genuine legis-
lative inventions are rare; ordinarily the legislator does not 
show marked originality. Types of legislative provisions grow 
and change with the centuries, but they change very slowly. 
The great mass of legislation repeats, imitates, and adapts 
oft-used models. 
* (I.R.) The social background of the lawmaker's act-what we here call 
the social context---t~erves four important functions: ( 1) It furnishes materials 
on which the lawmaker may draw in composing an enactment; it is a source 
of legislation in this sense. ( z) The social context provides standards for the 
lawmaker's own act; thus provisions of the constitution govern L's act and 
the standards of moral, natural or divine law may set limits to L's activity; all 
these are background of L's act and in this sense are part of its social context. 
( 3) The social context provides material for the process of interpretation; the 
interpreter performs a supplementary legislative function and draws on source 
materials just as the lawmaker himself does. (4) The context also provides 
standards to guide the interpreter. The first of these functions is developed in 
section 4-06 of the text; the second in sees. 4-08 to 4-II and 4-3q the 
third and fourth functions of social context, in chapter 5. 
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Sometimes the lawmaker borrows statutory prov1s10ns 
verbatim from the statutes of another state, as where he 
copies the Workmen's Compensation Law already in force 
in the other state. Often he finds the essential pattern for 
a statutory provision in the decisions of his own or another 
state. Or he finds the suggestion of the need for legislation 
in the decisions of his own state and works out the details 
of an enactment by following the lines of analogous legis-
lation of his own or another state. Or he derives the sug-
gestion for an enactment from the standards of Holy Writ, 
or the moral ideas of the community/ or the writings of some 
author who discourses on legal or social subjects. Or he finds 
and adopts a standard already formulated, more or less defi-
nitely as the norm of some social institution, such as a church, 
a professional association, or a labor union. Or he finds a 
standard already implicit in the habits and practices of the 
majority of the community, as where he finds that most 
persons are accustomed to drive in a certain manner and, 
framing a traffic code, adopts the common practice as the 
legal rule for driving. 
Sec. 4-07. Problems. Analyze the two following items 
in terms of occasion, purpose, means, and sources: of legis-
lation: 
I. Enactment of the Mann Act (White Slave Act).1 
Before considering specifically the enactment of the Mann 
Act in 1904, it will be worthwhile to set forth some of the 
legislative and social background within which the enactment 
falls. As early as I 8 7 5, Congress had taken steps to prohibit 
((the importation into the United States of women for the 
1 In sec. 7-45 we shall discuss the "higher law" theory according to which 
human law is ultimately derived from natural law or Divine Law. 
1 36 Stat. 8z5, sec. z, 18 U. S. C., sec. 398, May 18, 1904. Both this 
statement regarding the enactment of the White Slave Act and the statement 
about the enactment of the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation Law were 
prepared for me by Mr. Charles Hanson of the law class of 1950. 
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purposes of prostitution." 2 That this prohibition apparently 
proceeded through both houses of Congress without the 
slightest degree of opposition is evidence of the fact that in 
so acting, the Congress was merely giving voice to a com-
munity standard of conduct definitely opposed to such prac-
tices.3 This and succeeding acts, however, left much to be 
desired with respect to the solution of the problem of the 
white slave traffic, a trade which by the early part of the 
2oth Century had reached considerable proportions.4 
The reasons for the inadequacy of the then existent legis-
lation were several. First, although in 1904 the United States 
had entered into a multi-nation treaty for the purpose of 
stamping out the traffic, this agreement proved to be of little 
practical worth.5 Without considerable aid at foreign points 
of debarkation, enforcement of the immigration laws as a 
sole means for eliminating the trade were almost bound to 
prove insufficient. In addition, even completely effective 
operation of such laws could not strike strongly at the large 
number of persons already engaged in the traffic within the 
borders of this country.6 Further, the participants were not 
easily amenable to state regulation since it was discovered 
that they moved frequently from place to place.7 In addition, 
because of the absence of federal legislation, the interstate 
2 Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477, sec. 5· 
3 Further confirmation of this view may be had by examining statements 
made in the course of Congressional debates and others appearing in Congres-
sional reports with respect to later, but closely allied measures. See 45 CoNG. 
REc. 1037, 1039, 61st Cong., zd Sess., "Importing Women for Immoral 
Purposes"; SENATE DocUMENT, No. 196 (Jan. z6, 1910) 32, 6ut Cong., 
zd Sess. (Dec. 10, 1909). 
4 SENATE DocuMENT, No. 2.14. Report of the Commissioner General of 
Immigration, part z, 5, 61st Cong., zd Sess. (Dec. 7, 1909); 45 CoNG. REc. 
821, 61st Cong., zd Sess. (Jan. 19, 1910). 
5 SENATE DocuMENT, No. 196, "Importing Women for Immoral Purposes," 
33 (Dec. 10, 1909). 
6 SENATE DocuMENT, No. z 14, Report of the Commissioner General of 
Immigration, part z, 14, 61st Cong., zd Sess. (Dec. 7, 1909). 
7 SENATE DocuMENT, No. 196, "Importing Women for Immoral Purposes," 
z8 (Dec. 10, 1909). 
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traffic was looked upon as being safer than that carried on 
intrastate.8 This was the situation facing the draftsmen of 
the Mann Act, section 2 of which will be considered here. 
The objects of this legislation, although not fully spelled 
out in the enactment itself, are indicated to some degree in 
the title: "An Act to Further Regulate Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce by Prohibiting the Transportation Therein for 
Immoral Purposes of Women and Girls, and for Other 
Purposes." Further elucidation of the societal changes sought 
to be accomplished, can be gotten from an examination of 
several previously noted references. First, the measure appar-
ently was designed to supplement the immigration laws in 
solving the problem of excluding new additions to the trade 
by providing for further penalties as to interstate activity. 
These additional sanctions were perhaps considered valuable 
as providing a degree of deterrence which would serve to 
limit the number of persons who might attempt to run the 
immigration gauntlet where the penalties imposed by the 
immigration laws taken alone would not so operate.9 Sec-
ondly, because of the prevalence of interstate activity in the 
trade, it was felt that a step toward preventing its existence 
could be taken by preventing such movement.10 
To achieve these objects, penalties were imposed upon 
those who violated the provisions of section 2 of the Act 
through use of the instrumentalities of interstate or foreign 
commerce for the transportation of females for immoral ends. 
These penalties consisted of a fine of not more than $5000 
and of imprisonment of not more than five years. It should 
be mentioned in passing that since, as previously noted, the 
white slave traffic existed in opposition to the established 
8 HousE REPORT, No. 47, 6xst Cong., ~d Sess. (Dec. u, 1909). 
9 SENATE DocUMENT, No. 124, Report of the Commissioner General of 
Immigration, 14, 6xst Cong., ~d Sess. (Dec. 7, 1909). 
lO HousE REPORT, No. 47, 6xst Cong., ~d Sess. (Dec. ~~, 1909), sub-
mitted by Rep. Mann from the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 
270 OUR LEGAL SYSTEM AND HOW IT OPERATES 
social standards of the country, no broad problem of effecting 
social change was involved, and utilization of federal officers 
to apprehend the relatively few engaged in the trade would 
seem to have been appropriate.11 
2. Enactment of the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation 
Law.12 "It is a matter of common knowledge that this law 
forms the legislative response to an emphatic if not a per-
emptory, public demand. It was admitted by lawyers as well 
as laymen that the personal injury action brought by the 
employee against his employer to recover damages for inju-
ries sustained by reason of the negligence of the employer 
had wholly failed to meet or remedy a great economic and 
social problem which modern industrialism has forced upon 
us, namely, the problem of who shall make pecuniary recom-
pense for the toll of suffering and death which that industrial-
ism levies and must continue to levy upon the civilized world. 
This problem is distinctly a modern problem. In the days of 
manual labor, the small shop with few employees, and the 
stagecoach, there was no such problem, or if there was, it was 
almost negligible. Accidents there were in those days and 
distressing ones, but they were relatively few, and the em-
ployee who exercised any reasonable degree of care was 
comparatively secure from injury. There was no army of 
injured and dying with constantly swelling ranks marching 
with halting step and dimming eyes to the great hereafter. 
This is what we have with us now thanks to the wonderful 
material progress of our age, and this is what we shall have 
with us for many a day to come. Legislate as we may in the 
11 At the time immediately preceding the passage of the act there was con-
siderable doubt as to whether Congress had the means at its disposal under 
the commerce power for preventing the use of interstate and foreign commerce 
for the transportation of women for immoral purposes (45 CoNG. REC. 8o9, 
61st CONG., 2d Sess., Jan. 19, 1910). However, fortified by the "Lottery 
Cases," 188 U.S. 321 (1902), the sponsors of the bill succeeded in meeting this 
objection. 
12 Ch. so, Laws of 1911, Stats., Sees. 102.01 to 102.65. 
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line of stringent requirements for safety devices or the aboli-
tion of the employer's common-law defenses, the army of 
the injured will still increase, the price of our manufacturing 
greatness will still have to be paid in human blood and tears. 
To speak of the common-law personal injury action as a 
remedy for this problem is to jest with serious subjects, to 
give a stone to those who ask for bread. The terrible economic 
waste, the overwhelming temptation to the commission of 
perjury, and the relatively small proportion of the sums 
recovered which comes to the injured parties in such actions, 
condemn them as wholly inadequate to meet the difficulty.13 
To remedy this situation it was recognized at the outset 
that the legal relationship between the employer and the 
employee would require a basic reconsideration. As one writer 
stated the matter, "Many suggestions have been made as to 
a remedy, but commissions on Employer's Liability are 
strongly of the opinion that the industry itself should bear 
the burden and not the employee. The industry now bears 
the burden of the wearing out and destruction of machinery 
necessarily resulting from its use, and civilization now de-
mands that the industry bear also the burden of the wearing 
out and destruction of the efficiency of the human machines 
without which the industry could not survive. . . . When a 
man's life is lost, or his efficiency decreased through injury 
in his employment, humanity demands that his dependents 
in case of his death, and he himself in case of injury, shall 
be cared for." 14 
13 Borgnis v. Falk, I47 Wis. 327 at 3471 I33 N. W. zz I ( I9I I). For 
a summary of a consideration of the problem by a New York commission, see 
BULLETIN OF THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKMEN'S 
INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION SERIES: No. 51 Whole Number 126, p. 19 
(1913). 
14 I BOYD, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE 10 
( 1 9 I 3) . This view was concurred in by the Wisconsin Special Committee on 
Industrial Insurance. BULLETIN OF THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, WORKMEN'S INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION SERIES: No. 5> Whole 
Number u6, p. 26 (1913). 
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To achieve this end, the Wisconsin legislature drafted a 
law making several changes in the employer-employee rela-
tionship. First, the defenses of negligence of a coworker and 
of assumption of risk were eliminated; and secondly, a com-
prehensive scheme was provided whereby any substantial 
injury received by the employee, in the course of or incidental 
to his employment would be compensated for according to 
certain definite rules laid down by a simultaneously created 
administrative agency.15 A further avenue for effectuating the 
desired social change lay in making application of the law 
compulsory.16 However, because there was considerable 
authoritative opinion to the effect that such a law would be 
later declared unconstitutional/7 the bill as passed required 
an affirmative election on the part of both employer and 
employee before the provisions of the act were applicable. 
Thus, on September I, I9I I when the Act became effec-
tive, Wisconsin was added to the growing list of jurisdictions 
which, led by Germany in I 883/8 had recognized the impact 
of the Industrial Revolution on the employer-employee 
relationship, and had softened that impact by bringing about 
conformation of this relation to the altered social need. 
STANDARDS FOR THE LAWMAKER 
Sec. 4-o8. Standards-where found. The acts of all our 
lawmakers are themselves guided and controlled by stand-
ards. To be sure, the framers of the original constitution 
begin with a slate which is clean and perform their funda-
15 Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327 at 346, 133 N. W. 221 (19u). 
16 It should be noted that some legislative bodies felt that this was the only 
practical way of enforcing such a law. BULLETIN OF THE UNITED STATES 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKMEN'S INSURANCE AND COMPENSATION 
SERIES: No. s, Whole Number 126, p. 27 (1913). 
17 BULLETIN OF THE UNITED STATES BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION AND INSURANCE SERIES: No. 5, Whole Number 126, 
p. 26 (1913); Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327 at 350, 133 N. W. 221 (1911). 
18 For a historical review and analysis of the German scheme, see I BOYD, 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE 25-52 (1913). 
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mental legislative acts with no other guidance than the 
traditional legal ideas of the community.1 After a constitution 
is once established, however, the amendment of it (and even 
the adoption of a new constitution) usually has to be carried 
out according to the tenor of an amendment clause of the 
existing instrument.2 The acts of the legislature in enacting 
statutes are covered by a variety of constitutional provisions. 
The legislature itself also establishes statutory standards to 
govern the processes of lawmaking; and each house of the 
legislature creates rules of procedure for the governance of 
its legislative and other business. The legislative acts of 
subordinate lawmaking bodies, such as cities and administra-
tive agencies, are governed by constitutional provisions to 
some extent, but in the main by statutes. And finally, in the 
course of the centuries, the courts have developed many 
common-law standards which regulate their own lawmaking 
activities as well as the lawmaking activities of other organs 
of government, insofar as the latter are not controlled either 
by provisions of the constitution or by statutory enactments. 
The standards controlling the enactment of statutes will 
be considered in the following sections; they fall into three 
types: 
r. Constitutional provisions which confer general and 
specific power to legislate 
1 This of course was true only of the original thirteen colonies, which 
adopted their own constitutions, and also of the Republic of Texas. Other states 
which have been formed were controlled by the provisions of the Federal Con· 
stitution and to some extent by acts of Congress. 
2 Certainly this is the normal conception of the manner in which change is 
to be effected; but change can be brought about by revolution, and in our own 
constitutional history there are a few instances in which changes have been 
wrought without obeying the mandates of the earlier instrument. The adoption 
of the Federal Constitution itself is an outstanding example. The Articles of 
Confederation of 1777 required that amendments be adopted by unanimous con· 
sent of the states. These Articles were superseded by our Federal Constitution 
by a method which did not conform to the Articles, i.e., when nine of the 
thirteen states approved. As we all know, all of the states did ultimately 
approve but ratification did not depend on unanimous consent. 
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2. Provisions of constitution, statute, or rules of order, 
which prescribe the form and manner in which legislative 
power is to be exercised 
3· Constitutional provisions which prohibit certain kinds 
of legislation. 
Sec. 4-09. Grants of power to legislate. The first type of 
standard applicable to statute making, and obviously the most 
basic and important type, is the constitutional grant of power 
to legislate.1 Such a grant confers authority on the legislature 
to do effective acts. The constitution maker announces to the 
world that L can establish standards for the guidance of 
others; he determines the purpose for which, and the field 
in which, L's acts shall be effective. For example when the 
Federal Constitution provides that the Congress shall have 
"power to regulate commerce . . . among the several 
States," it authorizes Congress to create effective standards 
for the regulation of. conduct in a particular area. The 
analogy is close between such a grant of legislative power 
and the grant to A of power to do an effective act such as 
the making of a will; both grants provide for acts which 
will have effects within the legal system and both provide 
for acts which are to be done with foresight of these effects. 
The analogy is even closer between the grant of power to 
legislate and the statutory grant of authority to executive 
officials; the lawmaker and the policeman alike are author-
ized to do effective acts, the one to create legal standards, the 
other to enforce them.2 So that I think I am warranted in 
1 The reader must not forget that I am speaking here of the typical Ameri-
can legal system, in which statute making always stands on a constitutional 
foundation. 
2 There are differences in the bases of different effective acts. The effects of 
L's acts are determined primarily by constitutional clauses; usually the effects 
of O's acts depend on either constitution or statute or both. But these differ-
ences of foundation are not important in the present connections; the acts of 
L, A, and 0 alike produce intended legal effects, i.e., they have purposive 
significance within our legal system. 
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saying one prime characteristic of the statute maker's act is 
that it is an effective act, an act depending for its operation 
on a constitutional grant of power. 
The constitutional grant of legislative power may be gen-
eral or specific. The general grant of legislative power is 
characteristic of our state constitutions. These instruments 
ordinarily confer legislative power in broad terms which 
authorize the legislature to enact standards of behavior in 
any field whatever. But there are also constitutional clauses 
which make specific grants of power-power to legislate in 
specific fields or in regard to specific subjects. This type 
of provision, while not uncommon in the state constitutions, 
is predominant in the Federal Constitution. In terms of 
traditional doctrine, the Federal Constitution establishes a 
government of limited powers; this means simply that the 
legislative branch of the federal government (and other 
branches too) can do effective acts only in specified areas. 
Thus Congress is not given a general power to enact stand-
ards on any subject; instead, the Federal Constitution con-
tains provisions that Congress shall have power "to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, 
and with the Indian tribes"; "to define and punish piracies 
and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against 
the law of nations"; and power "to promote the progress 
of science and useful arts by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective 
writings and discoveries." 3 Of course the distinction between 
general and specific grants of power is one of degree; even 
the specific grants of power to the Congress are very wide 
and comprehensive in practical application as I have previ-
ously pointed out.4 
3 All of the grants herein quoted are found in Art. I, Sec. 8. 
4 See sec. 3-03, note z. And the grant of power to lay and collect taxes to 
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States, 
would have to be regarded as a general grant of power, by any criterion 
of generality. See Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 1. 
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One might even maintain that provisions granting legis-
lative power are not only enabling but obligatory in effect. 
They can be said to be obligatory in the sense that they 
implicitly impose a duty to exercise the power granted. They 
tell the legislature what it is expected to do, i.e., make 
standards for the community to live by. However, while such 
an implication of duty can perhaps properly be spel~ed out 
of any investiture with power, the fact remains that the 
constitutional provisions in question are actually expressed as 
grants of power, not as impositions of duty. Furthermore, a 
duty to legislate for the welfare of the community has little 
meaning except so far as the legislature itself recognizes an 
obligation. The exercise of its lawmaking power lies almost 
wholly within the legislature's discretion. If it fails or refuses 
to act when it should, there is no real remedy except to 
choose a new legislative body that will act, or, more spe-
cifically, to replace its inactive or obstructive members by 
others who will do what needs to be done. The duty, if any, 
of the legislature to act for the general good is vague and 
tenuous; the dominant element in these constitutional clauses 
is power, not obligation.* 
Sec. 4-zo. Formal requirements. The second type of stand-
ard applicable to L's act is that which prescribes the form 
and manner in which his authority to legislate is to be exer-
* (I.R.) As regards legislative acts lawyers and judges are almost exclu-
sively preoccupied with the questions whether the act is effective and if so, 
what its effects are. This fact will explain why I find it desirable to look 
at the legislative act chiefly as an effective act and why I do not try to work 
out a sixfold classification of legislative acts such as I used in discussing acts 
of individuals. Most of the categories of acts in our sixfold classification would 
be empty, or almost empty, if we were applying them to acts of the legis-
lature. The legislature is not expected to commit crimes or torts in the 
performance of its lawmaking functions. The standards which one finds in 
constitutions or elsewhere do not mention any such injurious acts. Nor does 
one find among these standards any reference to the legislature's privilege of 
enacting law. The great bulk of standards applicable to acts of the legislature 
are cast in terms of what the legislature can do, and cannot do, effectively. 
This means, to refer again to the sixfold classification, that almost everything 
falls under the head of standards for effective acts. 
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cised. Some standards of this type-the most fundamental 
-are found in constitutional provisions. Thus, common 
constitutional provisions require that statutes be entitled in 
specified ways; that they be enacted a certain period of time 
before they take effect; that they be published in a certain 
manner; 1 that they be adopted by both legislative houses; 
that adoption by the respective houses be certified by the 
signatures of the presiding officer and clerk thereof; that 
statutes be signed by the governor, except when they are 
passed over his veto; and that the houses of the legislature 
keep certain records or journals of their proceedings. Other 
standards to control the legislature's act are found in statutes 
or resolutions adopted by the two houses and in the rules 
of order of the separate houses of the legislature. Ordinarily 
these statutes, resolutions, and rules deal with less important 
matters than the constitutional provisions and go into more 
detail; they are analogous to the rules of form and procedure 
which one finds in the bylaws of a society or corporation. 
Sec. 4-r r. Prohibitions. The third type of standard appli-
cable to L's acts is that which expressly or impliedly prohibits 
lawmaking of certain types or on certain subjects. Examples 
of express specific prohibition are the Contracts Clause of the 
Federal Constitution which declares that "No State shall 
. . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Con-
tracts . . . "; and the clauses of most, if not all, of the 
constitutions which forbid enactment of ex post facto laws: 
i.e., legislation which would operate to make an act criminal 
which was not so when done. Wider and more general pro-
hibitions are represented by the Due Process clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Consti-
tution, which forbid the federal and state governments 
respectively to deprive persons of "life, liberty or property, 
1 As regards the requirement of publication, see also what is said in sec. 
4--1 8 below. 
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without due process of law." These clauses do not, in terms, 
apply to legislative acts, but their terms are general and 
embrace any and all acts of government, including legislative 
acts; and, according to the settled interpretation, this is their 
effect. 
Implied prohibitions are exemplified by the negative side 
of the "separation of powers" doctrine. According to this 
doctrine, prohibitory implications are to be drawn from the 
fact that the constitutions invest the legislature with the 
power of making laws, the executive branch with the power 
of administering the business of government and enforcing 
laws, and the judiciary branch with the power of adjudicating 
controversies. The fact that the constitutions invest the legis-
lature with the lawmaking power is treated. as an implied 
prohibition against its exercising other kinds of power, i.e., 
executive or judicial. Parallel results can be implied from 
the fact that executive and judicial powers are invested 
explicitly in those respective branches. 
These prohibitory provisions and implications applicable 
to L's acts bear an obvious resemblance to the prohibitory 
standards applicable to A's acts; in this respect they appear 
to impose negative duties upon L. However, L cannot be 
sued or punished if he violates a prohibition, as A might be. 
The only important effect of a prohibition, such as that 
barring ex post facto legislation, is that it renders L's counter-
vailing act ineffective. The courts do not approach the con-
sideration of the question whether an act of the legislature 
is violative of a constitutional provision as if they were 
concerned with a duty problem. They talk and think in terms 
of legislative power or the lack of it; and so do all the rest 
of us.* 
* (I.R.) The situation is similar to that in which we consider whether a 
particular contract is violative of law. It is true that one can commit crimes 
and other wrongs by making contracts, e.g., by contracts in restraint of trade. 
Yet contracts are acts which raise chiefly questions of legal effects; thev are 
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Sec. 4-r2. Problems. Consider the following items in 
relation to the matters presented in sections 4-08 to 4-1 I 
above: 
I. The Michigan Constitution, like many other state con-
stitutions, provides that "No law shall embrace more than 
one object which shall be expressed in its title." 1 
Which of the three types of standards applicable to legis-
lative acts is represented by this clause? 
Suppose you were called upon by an interested group to 
draft a bill to be submitted to the legislature. You were 
expected to prepare provisions to achieve the following ob-
jectives: ( 1) to provide for the sterilization of mental defec-
tives, ( 2) to authorize sterilization of such defectives on court 
order and also to authorize voluntary sterilization of such 
persons, (3) to prohibit the advertisement and sale of contra-
ceptive devices, (4) to make punishable the acts of any doctor 
who performs a sterilization operation on a patient for purely 
contraceptive purposes. What would you do in view of the 
provisions in the foregoing constitutional clause? 
2.. "No law shall be revised, altered or amended by refer-
ence to its title only; but the act revised and the section or 
sections of the act altered or amended shall be reenacted and 
published at length." 2 
To which of the three types of standards does this clause 
belong? Just what does this clause require be done? 
3· "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press. . . ." 3 
Which type of standard is here employed? 
4· "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations and among the several 
acts done with the purpose of producing legal effects. And so of statute-
making. The power to legislate can be misused but this does not alter the 
fact that legislation is essentially an effective act. 
1 Mich. Const. I 9 o 8 Art. V, Sec. 2 I. 
2 Ibid. 
3 U. S. Const., Ist Amendment. 
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States, and with the Indian tribes. . . ." 4 This is a specific 
grant, as is stated in section 4-09. This clause allocates control 
of interstate commerce to Congress. Other clauses of the 
Constitution recognize that the power to regulate intrastate 
commerce is preserved to the states. What prohibitive stand-
ards might be implied from these allocations of power? 
Sec. 4-I3. Effectuation of standards-discretion. As stated 
above, the positive obligation of the legislature to create 
enactments for the general welfare, has little meaning beyond 
the needs which the legislature itself recognizes. There are 
practically no sanctions within the legal system to induce 
the legislature to exercise its functions. The exercise of law-
making power lies almost wholly within the legislature's 
discretion. 
But the standards which limit legislative powers to certain 
fields or subjects are capable of effective enforcement under 
our American constitutional system. The courts can, and do, 
refuse to give effect to laws which transcend constitutional 
grants of power, or which offend against prohibitions in the 
constitutions. This method of refusing judicial recognition 
to a legislative act, i.e., holding it ineffective, would for 
example strike down a statute which violated the prohibition 
of ex post facto legislation. The method is equally efficacious 
in regard to constitutional standards which prescribe formal-
ities or methods for the enactment of laws; the courts con-
sistently refuse to give effect to laws which do not comply 
with these requirements.1 
4 U. S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 3· 
1 However, according to the usual view, the deficiency must be evident on 
the face of the statute; e.g., the defects involved in problems 1 and z, sec. 4-u. 
The court does not go behind the certificate of proper officials that standards 
governing methods of enactment have been complied with: e.g., it will not 
permit a showing that a quorum was not present when an act was passed, 
or that an act was passed by less than a majority of votes. See generally Field 
v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
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Sec. 4-z 4· Legislative inertia-law revision commissions. 
The lawmaking process, especially as carried on by the legis-
lature, is strongly affected by inertia. Laws are not made and 
changes are not brought about when they should be. Laws 
often remain on the books long after they have ceased to 
serve any useful end. Sometimes they remain after they 
become positive detriments to the community. More often 
they simply lose their practical importance by reason of 
change of circumstances. They are in a class with a regulation, 
which I understand still stands among the house rules of 
one of the Harvard dormitories, penalizing any resident 
student the sum of one dollar for rolling a cannonball down 
the hall. This may have been an appropriate prohibition right 
after the Civil War, when men were returning to school 
with souvenirs of this type in their possession, but the rule 
has ceased to serve any real function. And so of some of our 
laws; regulations of hitching posts, of fords over streams and 
of other subjects once important have become practically 
inoperative. 
The reason for legislative inertia in the matter of revision 
and change is not hard to discover. The legislative process, 
like other legal processes, is motivated chiefly by immediate 
interests of individuals. The members of the legislature are 
busy. They have many pressing matters to attend to, matters 
in which their constituents are vitally interested, especially 
matters of taxation and of local expenditure. The legislator 
who has a pet project for the expenditure of money in his 
own district will be very active in promoting it, and he will 
also press for a particular measure which many of his con-
stituents want. But he has little incentive to push through 
a measure which neither he nor a substantial body of his 
constituents finds immediately urgent. When, for example, 
a revision of some detail in the law of property is needed, 
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the necessary pressure for change is apt to be lacking; prob-
ably only a limited group of persons is aware of the need 
for change, and this group is too little interested, or too small 
in number to set the legislative mill grinding. The conse-
quence is that legislative needs of real, but less immediate, 
interest are often crowded out and are completely neglected 
for years. 
The need for methods of activating the processes of legis-
lative revision is recognized by all persons familiar with the 
subject. A meritorious experiment to this end has recently 
been tried in a few of our states, notably in New York. The 
method is to create a permanent agency responsible for sug-
gesting revisions to the legislature. In New York two bodies 
are established by law and charged with the functions of 
examining the existing law of the state, searching out needed 
changes in it, and drafting and proposing to the legislature, 
bills through which the changes can be made. One of these 
bodies is the Law Revision Commission, which studies and 
proposes changes in the body of the substantive law, i.e., the 
ordinary rules of law governing the rights and relations of 
individual to individual, and of individuals to the public. 
The other body is the Judicial Council, which performs 
similar functions as regards the law of procedure and the 
law governing the administration of justice. The work of 
such agencies results in calling the legislature's attention to 
needed changes and saves the effort and delay which is in-
volved in preparing legislation for passage. Several other 
states have developed similar devices, and I believe that other 
states will eventually follow suit. While too much must not 
be expected from any single improvement in legislative pro-
cedures, devices are badly needed to keep the law up to date 
and eliminate outmoded legal standards from the statutes 
and the common law of the state. 
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SuBSIDIARY LAWMAKING 
Sec. 4-rs. Subsidiary agencies-delegation of legislative 
authority. The constitution and statutes of all our states 
contain provisions investing local agencies such as cities, 
villages, townships, and counties with legislative authority 
in reference to matters of local concern. The subjects of 
legislation include local highways and traffic, the use of land 
and methods of building thereon, and similar subjects. Fur-
thermore, legislatures invest a great deal of rule-making 
authority in boards and administrative agencies. Thus the 
state bank examiner is authorized to make regulations for 
the business of banking, the state insurance commissioner for 
insurance companies and agencies, the public service commis-
sion for public utilities and transportation companies. In the 
federal field, rule-making authority of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and 
the Federal Trade Commission, exemplifies a similar dele-
gation by Congress of regulatory power to subsidiary law-
making agencies. In short, we must count legislation by local 
and administrative agencies, agencies with limited and special-
ized functions, as an important type of legislation to be put 
alongside statutory enactments. 
You will encounter in your reading of cases the frequent 
assertion that legislative power cannot be delegated, or the 
somewhat broader statement that delegated authority cannot 
be delegated ( delegata potestas non potest delegari). Such 
statements cannot be accepted without substantial qualifica-
tion. Of course, the legislature cannot turn over the whole 
of its legislative authority to some other agency to exercise. 
But the legislature can, and does, empower various subsidiary 
agencies to make standards. Until relatively recent times 
courts were reluctant to admit the existence of this type of 
delegation of authority; instead of doing so, they often made 
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a distinction between delegation of legislative authority, 
which was said not to be possible, and delegation of quasi-
legislative authority, which was said to be permissible. The 
resort to such a distinction was, of course, simply a method 
of saving the face of the nondelegation doctrine which was 
cast in absolute and unqualified terms, at the same time 
allowing actual delegations by calling them by another name. 
Today courts no longer resort to this device. They acknowl-
edge that legislative authority can be delegated as such. 
Sec. 4-z6. Problems: reasons and conditions of delegation. 
The only serious questions which remain are questions regard-
ing the extent of authority which can be delegated and the 
conditions which must be attached. 
Consider these two excerpts in the light of the foregoing 
observations: 
I. Taft, C. J.: 
"The Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized to 
exercise powers the conferring of which by Congress would 
have been, perhaps, thought in the earlier years of the 
Republic to violate the rule that no legislative power can 
be delegated. But the inevitable progress and exigencies of 
government and the utter inability of Congress to give the 
time and attention indispensable to the exercise of these 
powers in detail, forced the modification of the rule." 1 
According to this statement by Chief Justice Taft, what 
is the reason or basis for the delegation of rule-making 
authority? 
2. Lamar, J.: 
"It must be admitted that it is difficult to define the line 
which separates legislative power to make laws, from admin-
istrative authority to make regulations. This difficulty has 
often been recognized, and was referred to by Chief Justice 
Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. I, 42, where 
1 257 U.S. xxv-xxvi (1921). 
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he was considering the authority of courts to make rules. 
He there said: 'It will not be contended that Congress can 
delegate to the courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which 
are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may 
certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature 
may rightfully exercise itself.' What were these non-legis-
lative powers which Congress could exercise but which might 
also be delegated to others was not determined, for he said: 
'The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those 
important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the 
legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a 
general provision may be made, and power given to those 
who are to act under such provisions to fill up the details.' 
"From the beginning of the Government various acts have 
been passed conferring upon executive officers power to make 
rules and regulations-not for the government of their 
departments, but for administering the laws which did gov-
ern. None of these statutes could confer legislative power. 
But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it 
could give to those who were to act under such general 
provisions 'power to fill up the details' by the establishment 
of administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which 
could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, 
or by penalties fixed by Congress or measured by the injury 
done." 2 
What are the limitations suggested by Justice Lamar as 
regards the delegation of rule-making authority? Note that 
this Justice, speaking in I 9 I I, was not quite willing to recog-
nize that the authority which was delegated by Congress is 
"legislative." 
Congress has delegated a large degree of power to the 
Supreme Court to make rules of procedure for actions at 
law, suits in equity, criminal prosecutions, etc. Similar dele-
gations of rule-making authority have also been made in 
many of the states. What is the advantage of this type of 
delegation of power? 
2 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. so6, at 517 (1911). 
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Sec. 4-r7. Standards for the subsidiary lawmaker. The 
rule-making activities of subsidiary legislative agencies are 
controlled by a variety of constitutional and statutory stand-
ards. To start with, all the constitutional limitations which 
apply generally to the exercise of legislative power apply to 
them, such as the prohibition of ex post facto legislation and 
legislation which deprives persons of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law. But there are also particular 
limitations which define the legislative competence of these 
subsidiary agencies and regulate the manner in which their 
rule-making authority is to be exercised. The authority of 
the city council to enact ordinances is restricted to certain 
subjects of local concern and the manner of enactment is 
definitely prescribed. The administrative body can establish 
rules and regulations only in a certain narrow field and only 
in the manner authorized by law. 
It is interesting to note how some of these legislative acts 
depend upon others and how some furnish standards for 
others. Take for example the enactment of a city ordinance 
such as we have been discussing. This enactment really in-
volves a series of three legislative acts: ( 1) the act of the 
constitution maker, ( 2) the statute establishing a city govern-
ment and conferring the power to make ordinances, and (3) 
the ordinance in question.1 The ordinance is dependent upon 
the other two acts. It presupposes them, so that when one 
speaks of a city ordinance regulating parking of automobiles, 
one is merely giving attention to the last of a series of law-
making acts which establish standards of behavior for the 
public, and is taking for granted two more fundamental acts 
on which the ordinance is predicated and which furnish 
standards for the ordinance-maker.2 A like analysis may be 
1 This series of three acts represents the typical situation; but in some states 
the constitution confers power directly on cities. In such cases only two acts 
are involved; the constitution and the ordinance. 
2 The same analysis can be applied to the enactment of a statute, except 
that only two distinct and interrelated acts are involved. The :first is the basic 
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made of the rules and regulations of an administrative body. 
These likewise constitute the third in a series of three legis-
lative acts: a constitutional provision, a statute which confers 
and governs rule-making authority, and the exercise of that 
authority by the adoption of rules. To be sure, it is not 
necessary to mention on every occasion the basic and pre-
supposed elements in such a series. One need not speak of 
the constitutional and statutory basis of a city ordinance or 
administrative rule every time one mentions the ordinance 
or rule. But for some purposes it is important to make explicit 
the precedent elements which are presupposed, notably when 
there is reason to doubt whether the dependent act stands 
on a solid foundation of authority, or whether it conforms 
to all the standards which pertain to its enactment. 
LAWMAKER's STATEMENT OF STANDARDS 
Sec. 4-18. Communication of legislative message. In pre-
paring and issuing his message, the lawmaker has three major 
problems to consider: (I) the problem of fixing a purpose 
or policy, i.e., what general results he wishes to bring about 
through his legislative act (section 4-04 above) ; ( 2) the 
problem of means and methods, i.e., what standards and 
what effectuative devices are appropriate to bring about the 
purpose he aims to achieve (section 4-05 above); and (3) 
the problem of communicating his message to those to be 
affected by it. The first two of these problems have already 
been stressed. The third is no less important; the communi-
cation of his message ought to be planned no less carefully 
by the lawmaker than its content. The problem of communi-
cation really falls into two-the problem of stating his 
message so that it will be understood and the problem of 
act by which the constitution is adopted, establishing the framework of govern-
ment and authorizing the legislature to enact statutes. The second is the act 
of the legislature in enacting the statute in question. The constitutional act 
confers legislative power and governs the form and manner in which statutes 
are to be enacted. 
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transmitting it so as to make sure that the message reaches 
the ears of the persons to be guided or controlled. 
The problem of stating the message, which will engage 
our chief attention throughout the rest of this subtopic, is one 
of the most difficult that I know of. A poorly drawn statute 
can cause more confusion and upset more applecarts than 
almost any act under heaven. The slightest looseness or slip 
in phrasing can result in serious problems of interpretation; 
it can cause uncertainty, delay and costly litigation, to indi-
viduals and officials who have to act or refrain from acting 
and who must carry cases to the Supreme Court for the 
clarification of points which affect their actions. Realizing the 
momentous consequences of what he says and does not say, 
the conscientious lawmaker will do all he can to state his 
meaning so clearly and certainly that it will be understood, 
and understood in the same sense, by everybody. Yet the 
lawmaker can never be quite successful in this aim. His 
messages are addressed to a great variety of persons, persons 
of every degree of intelligence, education, and language 
background, from the most intelligent and highly educated, 
to the very dull and illiterate. Drafting a statute which will 
be read in the same way by persons of all kinds and degrees 
is out of the question; the lawmaker simply does the best 
that he can. 
The problem of transmitting the legislative message is 
intensified by two facts earlier mentioned: that the lawmaker 
sends his message over wide reaches of space, and that he 
hands it down through indefinite stretches of time.1 These 
facts require that the lawmaker, above all speakers, transmit 
his message in a form which cannot miscarry or be lost to 
view. Moreover, the problem of transmitting the legislative 
message, like that of stating the message, is enhanced by the 
1 See sec. r-o8. 
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variety of persons addressed. In regard to transmission the 
lawmaker needs to consider not only levels of intelligence 
and education but also the alertness of the persons addressed. 
Are they ready to seek out what he enacts? Or are they 
inclined to wait for casual information about what he has 
declared? If his message is intended primarily for lawyers, 
he can probably depend upon real effort to discover what 
he has laid down. If the message is directed to the common 
man, he will probably have to expect that knowledge of enact-
ments will reach its intended hearers chiefly through the 
newspapers and through neighborhood gossip. 
Under the circumstances mentioned in the last two para-
graphs you will understand why the statement and the trans-
mission of his message are not minor problems for the law-
maker. But our constitutiom. do not provide much guidance 
to the lawmaker in regard to the way he states his mandate 
or the way in which he transmits it to persons affected. These 
problems are left by the constitutions almost wholly to the 
lawmaker's discretion and ingenuity for solution. He can 
state his legal mandate in any manner he chooses, so long 
as he does not violate the requirements of form previously 
mentioned,2 and does not state it so indefinitely that the 
courts will declare it void. Also the constitutions do require, 
expressly or by implication, that laws be put in printed form 
as they are enacted. The Michigan Constitution, for example, 
requires that "All laws enacted in any session of the legis-
lature shall be published in book form within sixty days after 
final adjournment of the session. . . ." 3 But, in almost all 
states, statutes become operative when they are passed by 
both houses of the legislature and signed by the chief execu-
tive. The process of enactment is then complete. Even under 
a provision like that just quoted from the Michigan Consti-
2 See sec. 4-10. 
3 Const. 1908 Art. V, Sec. 39· 
290 OUR LEGAL SYSTEM AND HOW IT OPERATES 
tution, the operation of a statute does not depend upon 
publication. Publication is not a part of the process of enact-
ment in the Anglo-American systems as it is in the systems 
of the states of continental Europe.4 Whatever is done by 
way of advertising the fact that a law has been passed, is done 
by the legislature in its discretion, or is undertaken unofficially 
by newspapers or other news disseminating agencies, or by 
interested groups such as trade and bar associations. 
Sec. 4-I9. Parts of statute. Statutes, for the most part, 
follow traditional lines of form and structure. (I) There 
is usually a title clause describing more or less accurately the 
content of the enactment; this clause is made mandatory by 
constitutional provisions of many of the states. ( 2) Following 
the title clause is often found a preamble in which the occasion 
of the legislation, its purpose, or both, are explained. Some-
times these explanations are found not in a preamble but in 
the first sections of the body of the act. (3) After these 
preliminaries comes the main body of the act. This is usually 
introduced by some such clause as "Be it enacted that." The 
body of the act is divided up into sections, if the statute is 
one of any size and complexity. The sections set forth stand-
ard acts of individuals and officials, which are to be done, 
not done, etc., together with their consequences and legal 
significance. All the sections are interconnected so as to con-
stitute a unified legislative plan. (4) Following the main 
body of the act, one often finds a section which contains 
definitions of important terms used in the act; sometimes, 
however, the section containing definitions is placed ahead 
of the main body of the act. (5) Another section commonly 
found in statutes is one which deals with the possible con-
tingency that part of the act be held unconstitutional. 
4 In a few states publication is made a prerequisite to the effectiveness of 
a statute. For example, the Kansas Constitution provides: "No law of a general 
nature shall be in force until the same be published," Art. II, Sec. 19. See 
also Wisconsin Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. z 1, 
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( 6) Most statutes contain a concluding section repealing or 
amending other acts which are inconsistent in whole or in 
part with the statute in question. Such a provision is not 
absolutely necessary (see section 4-32 below) though it is 
desirable and is almost always included. 
You will appreciate the parts and structure of a statute 
more readily if you see an example. I have chosen for the 
purpose a federal statute, enacted in I 932, to control the 
issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. I quote the first 
three sections in full and also the last two sections of the 
Act; the others I state in summary form: 
"AN ACT 1 
"To amend the Judicial Code and to define and limit the 
jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity, and for other purposes. 
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That 
no court of the United States, as herein defined, shall have 
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or 
permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of 
a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provi-
sions of this Act; nor shall any such restraining order or 
temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to 
the public policy declared in this Act. 
"Sec. 2. In the interpretation of this Act and in deter-
mining the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the 
United States, as such jurisdiction and authority are herein 
defined and limited, the public policy of the United States is 
hereby declared as follows: 
"Whereas under prevailing economic conditions, devel-
oped with the aid of governmental authority for owners of 
property to organize in the corporate and other forms of 
ownership association, the individual unorganized worker 
is commonly helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract 
and to protect his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain 
acceptable terms and conditions of employment, wherefore, 
though he should be free to decline to associate with his 
1 4 7 Stat. 70. 
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fellows, it is necessary that he have full freedom of asso-
ciation, self-organization, and designation of representatives 
of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions 
of his employment, and that he shall be free from the 
interference, restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or 
their agents, in the designation of such representatives or 
in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection; therefore, the following definitions of, and limita-
tions upon, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts of the 
United States are hereby enacted. 
"Sec. 3· Any undertaking or promise, such as is described 
in this section, or any other undertaking or promise in conflict 
with the public policy declared in section 2. of this Act, is 
hereby declared to be contrary to the public policy of the 
United States, shall not be enforceable in any court of the 
United States and shall not afford any basis for the granting 
of legal or equitable relief by any such court, including 
specifically the following: 
"Every undertaking or promise hereafter made, whether 
written or oral, express or implied, constituting or contained 
in any contract or agreement of hiring or employment be-
tween any individual, firm, company, association, or corpora-
tion, and any employee or prospective employee of the same, 
whereby 
" (a) Either party to such contract or agreement undertakes 
or promises not to join, become, or remain a member of any 
labor organization or of any employer organization; or 
"(b) Either party to such contract or agreement under-
takes or promises that he will withdraw from an employment 
relation in the event that he joins, becomes, or remains a 
member of any labor organization or of any employer organ-
ization." 
Sec. 4· Expressly enumerates various acts of participants 
in labor disputes which do not constitute grounds for the 
issuance of an injunction, such as refusal to continue employ-
ment relations, retention of organization affiliations, giving 
publicity to disputed facts, peaceably assembling, etc. 
Sec. 5. Declares that concerted acts of disputants do not 
constitute unlawful combinations. 
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Sec. 6. Declares that organizational officers are not liable 
for acts of individual members unless they participate in those 
acts or ratify the same. 
Sec. 7· Regulates the issuance of injunctions and the pro-
cedure in connection with the hearing thereof. 
Sec. 8. Provides that the complainant shall not be allowed 
an injunction unless he has fully complied with his own 
legal obligations. 
Sec. 9· Defines the findings which must be made by the 
court in order to justify injunctive relief. 
Sec. IO. Deals with procedure for review. 
Sees. I I and I 2. Deal with proceedings for contempt in 
violating injunctions issued. 
Sec. I3. Contains definitions of important terms used in 
this Act, such as labor dispute, association, etc. 
"Sec. I4· If any provision of this Act or the application 
thereof to any person or circumstance is held unconstitutional 
or otherwise invalid, the remaining provisions of the Act and 
the application of such provisions to other persons or circum-
stances shall not be affected thereby. 
"Sec. I 5. All Acts and parts of Acts in conflict with the 
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. 
"Approved, March 23, I932." 
Sec. 4-20. Statement in popular and in technical language. 
The lawmaker may state his directive message in popular 
or in technical language. By popular language I mean that 
which is in common use in the community. By technical 
language I mean the special terminology used by men belong-
ing to a particular craft or profession. The peculiar terms 
of almost any profession may be used in statutes, e.g., a 
building code may use terms ordinarily used only by con-
tractors, plumbers, and carpenters, and a statute regulating 
the sale of drugs may use names known only to pharmacists 
and physicians. But the technical terms in which we are 
primarily interested and which are most commonly found 
in legislation are the peculiar terms of the legal craft. Statutes 
are usually drafted by lawyers. They are chiefly read and 
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used by lawyers. They are applied by judges who are legally 
trained. It is not surprising, therefore, that statutes do contain 
a great deal of lawyers' language. 
The facts just stated may explain the use of legal terms 
in statutes; do they justify this use? Is the introduction of 
these technical terms into legislation desirable? Why should 
not all legislation be cast in popular terms? Popular terms 
have the advantage of being understood by everybody or 
at least by everyone who has had a moderate amount of 
education. Technical terms are understood only by the few 
who have undergone technical training. 
Before we address ourselves to these questions it must be 
noted that the vast majority of the words which even the 
technical man employs are of the popular sort. Legal terms 
do not constitute a complete language. The lawyer cannot 
express himself exclusively in legal terms. Like everyone 
else the lawyer uses such common terms as "and," "the," 
"house," "street," "go," and "kill." He inserts legal terms 
only when he is discussing subject matter and activities which 
are of peculiar interest to lawyers. Accordingly our question 
about the desirability of using technical terms is considerably 
narrower than it might appear to be at first glance. The 
question is why it is desirable or necessary to use some legal 
terms in legislation, since legislation is never cast wholly in 
such terms. 
One reason for using a technical term may be the fact 
that there is no popular term for the subject matter involved. 
"Carburetor" and "penicillin" are examples; such terms are 
unique; there are no equivalents for them in the common 
language. However, if their subject matter is important and 
becomes generally known, these technical terms become pop-
ular by a gradual process of adoption. In this sense one finds 
many legal words for which there can hardly be said to be 
any popular equivalent. And, on the other hand, there are 
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not a few legal words which have in the course of time 
become popular words by adoption, such words as "posses-
sion " "contract " "corporation " "crime " and others There 
' ' ' ' . 
can be no valid basis for objecting to the use either of unique 
legal terms or of legal terms which have become popular, 
in the enactment of statutes; although, if a unique term is 
to be used, it should probably be specifically defined in the 
statute itself. 
Another reason for the use of technical terms is that they 
can be and usually are carefully chosen and defined. This 
means that technical terms can be used more specifically and 
accurately than popular terms. The latter are almost always 
indefinite in meaning and loosely used. The use of technical 
terms is, therefore, justified by the needs for accuracy and 
certainty. These needs are especially felt in relation to the 
execution of effective acts. Where individuals and officials 
act with foresight of results and where specific guidance of 
acts is aimed to be furnished by legal standards, the actor 
must be told specifically and accurately what he is to do and 
what the consequences of his act will be. The needed degree 
of definiteness and certainty can usually be attained only by 
employing technical legal words whose meaning has been 
brought out and fixed by long experience and use. Moreover, 
in regard to effective acts which are normally done or engi-
neered by lawyers, such as the drafting of pleadings, deeds, 
and wills, the organization of corporations and the prepara-
tion of contracts, statutes usually employ many technical 
terms. The ordinary lay client need not understand the 
statute applicable in such situations; he hires a lawyer to do 
a legal job for him and whether the lawyer is guided by a 
statute couched in popular or in technical terms is of no 
consequence to him. It is no more necessary for the client 
himself to understand the technical jargon which the law-
maker introduces into such statutes than it is for the patient 
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to understand the medical jargon in which a medical textbook 
instructs the doctor in the diagnosis and treatment of ailments. 
Sec. 4-2I. Problems. 1. Is the last argument to justify 
the use of technical terms in statutes entirely convincing? 
Here I make the fact that a transaction is one which is usually 
engineered by lawyers, the criterion for the use of technical 
terms in the relevant statute. Is there a possible fallacy in 
making this fact the basis for the use of technical terms in 
legislation? Does one who uses such an argument lift himself 
by his own bootstraps? 
2. Bentham, writing in the early 19th century, compared 
the use of technical terms in jurisprudence and other sciences 
as follows: 
"The case is, that in the language of every branch of art 
and science that can be named, a more or less extensive stock 
of words of a peculiar nature, in addition to all the words in 
familiar use, is an indispensable appendage: applied to these, 
what the appellation technical imports is nothing more than 
peculiar, as above, to some branch of art and science: to wit, 
in contradistinction to those which, being likewise employed 
in discourse relative to that same branch of art and science, 
have nothing to distinguish them from the words in universal 
use belonging to the common stock of the language ;-or the 
import of them, from the import attributed to those same 
ordinary words. But the difference between these jurispru-
dential peculiar words, and the other peculiar words, is this: 
in the case of the other peculiar words, the deviation from 
ordinary words is matter of absolute necessity, and on the 
occasion of framing them the whole attention and skill pos-
sessed by the framers was commonly employed in the ren-
dering them as expressive as possible; whereas in the other 
case, the deviation from ordinary language being as wide 
commonly as can be imagined,-no attention has been paid 
to render it expressive, by rendering it as near akin as 
possible to the words appertaining to that same common 
stock;-to that end no attention whatsoever was employed, 
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the attention, if any, applied to the subject, having the direct 
opposite end, viz., that of rendering them as inexpressive as 
possible, as unlikely as possible to convey correct concep-
tion;-the only purposes to which they are applicable or 
designed to be applied, are either conveying to the persons 
in question no conception at all, or if any, such as shall have 
the effect of leading them into error, either productive of 
burden to the persons thus deceived, or benefit to the 
deceivers. 
"Terms of art, jurisprudence must have as well as every 
other branch of art and science. But in English practice, the 
terms of art are to what they ought to be, what the terms of 
astrology are to the terms of astronomy. . . . 
"In medical art and science, improvement is rapid and 
extensive at all times and in all places; in legislation and 
jurisprudence, everything is either retrograde, or at best 
stationary. 
"The cause is no secret. In medicine it is the interest of 
every practitioner to promote improvement, and to promote 
it to the utmost, to make whatsoever addition to the stock 
his faculties admit of his making:-of no judicial practitioner 
is this the interest-his interest is directly opposite." 1 
Bentham recognizes the need for technical legal terms. 
What is he complaining of? Is he correct in contrasting 
medicine with law? Do you agree that the legal profession 
attempts to render its language "as inexpressive as possible, 
as unlikely as possible to convey correct conceptions"? 
Sec. 4-22. Incomplete statement of legislative message. 
The lawmaker's handiwork is always incomplete. His mes-
sage is never set forth in a manner to fully define a standard 
act or to declare all of its significance. Only a relatively small 
portion of any legal action picture and its meaning are ex-
pressly set out in the enacted provision. However, this is not 
a peculiarity of constitutional or statutory enactments; all 
verba1 acts are incomplete in this sense. Since this incomplete-
1 III WoRKs OF JEREMY BENTHAM 270-~71. 
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ness is characteristic of verbal acts generally, a few observa-
tions regarding the expression of meaning seem appropriate 
and even necessary at this point. 
Incomplete statement is to a considerable extent unavoid-
able. No matter how careful the speaker, his statement will 
always be unfinished, due to the inadequacy of his knowledge 
of existing conditions and his inability to foresee future 
events. The speaker can never make a complete and all-
embracing statement for the simple reason that he cannot 
think out a complete and final plan on which to base pre-
scriptions of this kind. In addition, there is always the 
necessity of cutting his expression short at some point. No 
statement can be complete in an absolute sense. To express 
any meaning in complete detail would carry the speaker to 
the end of time, since each statement would have to be 
explained and each explanatory proposition further explained 
and elaborated, ad infinitum. 
But in both planning and expression the speaker always 
stops far short of practicable limits. He does not even try to 
figure out and state a full meaning. He leaves gaps as a 
matter of economy of effort. He does not state any more 
than he feels is necessary for the purpose in hand. Speakers 
may vary in their feeling of obligation to develop and express 
meaning. One speaker may act with meticulous care to avoid 
misunderstanding and oversight. Another may mention only 
immediately important points, and for the rest, like the 
bridegroom as he says "I do," he may trust in a benevolent 
Providence to shape the consequences of his verbal act in 
a proper way. Every speaker, careful or careless, takes many 
things for granted. He treats many facts as understood and 
known to the hearer, as well as to himself, and therefore as 
unnecessary to be expressed in verbal form. He leaves much 
unsaid which might be said, expecting the hearer to supply 
it. In short, any verbal act embodies only a part of the 
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meaning which the speaker might express. The hearer is 
relied on to fill up the gaps in what is said, from what he 
knows or what he can find out, if and when supplementation 
of meaning becomes relevant or necessary. 
Economy of expression on the speaker's part does not 
imply neglect or fault. Reliance on the activity of the hearer 
to supply implicit elements from context, makes possible an 
enormous saving of time and effort. Only the bore or pedant 
explains the obvious. The ingenious speaker expresses just 
what he needs to express, neither more nor less. And, since 
the hearer and the speaker act in the light of the same context, 
no additional burden is cast upon the hearer in the normal 
case. In fact, the hearer is hardly aware that he derives the 
meaning of the speaker's verbal act quite as much from 
context and circumstances as from the words he hears. But, 
if the speaker misjudges the elements which need to be 
stated, if he takes too much for granted, if he leaves too 
much to Providence, the hearer will have to supply the lack 
by efforts of his own. The speaker's saving of effort is bought 
at the cost of even greater effort on the part of the hearer, 
who has to fill up the blanks in an inadequate declaration. 
The lawmaker's declarations are incomplete as other verbal 
acts are and for the same reasons. There are unavoidable 
gaps due to the fact that the lawmaker cannot know every-
thing about the situation he tries to control and cannot foresee 
future developments, and due to the fact that he cannot 
express his plan and desire in complete detail. There are 
also careless gaps and plain oversights in legislation. 
But of greatest practical significance is the fact that the 
lawmaker, like other speakers, takes many things for granted. 
He economizes his own effort in expressing his legislative 
plan and thus leaves blanks which may, as conditions later 
develop, need to be filled by explicit judicial rulings. Sup-
pose for example that the lawmaker passes a statute creating 
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a new crime. The statute uses common and legal terms with-
out defining them; it refers to ordinary life situations without 
describing them; it implies a knowledge of many facts which 
it does not refer to even indirectly. The lawmaker assumes 
that the interpreter and other persons affected by the statute, 
will know, or can find out, the meanings of terms and other 
matters of common knowledge. The statute provides for a 
specified punishment, but it says nothing about the details 
of procedure in prosecution, nor about the functions of public 
officials in relation thereto. The lawmaker takes for granted 
that prosecution will follow the forms of existing criminal 
procedure except as the statute makes specific provision for 
a different form. He assumes that existing officials will per-
form their typical functions in reference to this crime as in 
reference to others. All these are matters which the law-
maker could have put into the statute but did not deem it 
necessary to mention. His expression of meaning is left in 
truncated form which will require supplementation by indi-
viduals and officials affected by its provisions. 
Sec. 4-23. Statement of message in general terms. The 
lawmaker uses many general or class terms in framing his 
message. He employs such terms as "person," "contract," 
"injury," "prosecute," and the like. In fact the use of general 
terms is unavoidable. But a general term is to some extent, 
indefinite and in this sense incomplete, so that generality of 
expression involves incompleteness of statement. And gener-
ality varies in degree. Some terms and statements are more 
general and therefore less definite than others. Most legis-
lative enactments are couched in terms which fall between 
the extremes of broad generality and minute specification. 
From the lawmaker's viewpoint general terms have the 
advantages of flexibility in application and of applicability 
to unforeseen cases. If his statute specifies details of appli-
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cation with undue particularity, there is always the danger 
that important situations will be omitted, and that the lan-
guage will fail to cover cases which the lawmaker would have 
wanted to cover if he had had sufficient foresight and could 
have stated his meaning perfectly. General provisions are 
adaptable to whatever conditions may arise. 
"Statutes framed in general terms apply to new cases that 
arise, and to new subjects that are created from time to time, 
and which come within their general scope and policy. It is 
a rule of statutory construction that legislative enactments 
in general and comprehensive terms, prospective in operation, 
apply alike to all persons, subjects, and business within their 
general purview and scope coming into existence subsequent 
to their passage." 1 
However, the flexibility and adaptability of general terms 
are bought at the price of indefiniteness and incompleteness 
as I have already pointed out. A general provision is very 
like one in which the lawmaker has failed to set forth his 
meaning fully. There is a formal difference between them; 
incomplete legislative statement leaves a subject quite un-
touched though it be taken for granted (see next preceding 
section); while the general statement covers the subject 
formally but in an undefined way. The coverage of detailed 
situations. by general terms is rather apparent than real. As 
Holmes has said, general propositions do not decide cases. 
A general provision is one which is unfinished; the applier 
has the burden of supplying details of meaning which are 
only implied or suggested by the general terms. 
The lawmaker may also use general language in order 
to conserve his own efforts in thinking out more detailed 
provisions; or he may recognize that he cannot give the close 
attention to rule-making for specific cases which is needed, 
or that he has not the facilities for investigation and for the 
1 25 R. C. L. 778. 
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framing of detailed rules. He therefore delegates the job 
of detailed legislation to others. These are the cases of sub-
sidiary lawmaking we have heretofore discussed. The law-
maker intentionally leaves to an administrative agency the 
task of filling in details of a broad legislative plan which he 
lays out. Theoretically, the lawmaker might make all the 
rules which the administrative agency is to apply, but for 
reasons of convenience, in order to provide rules which are 
flexible and well adapted to specific types of situations, the 
legislature is content to lay out a general design, and to 
authorize another agency to write in specific elements of the 
regulative scheme. Insofar as an administrative agency has 
to fill in these elements, it is clearly functioning as a supple-
mentary lawmaker. The same is true of the processes by 
which ordinances are made by a city council. And one can 
fairly ask (and we shall do so in the next chapter) whether 
the activity of the judicial applier in filling in details of 
general legislation is not essentially the same. To be sure, 
the judge's activity is not usually called legislation; it goes 
by the name of interpretation. Yet it is nonetheless apparent 
that the judge is writing something into a general regulative 
scheme in the same manner as an administrative or other 
subsidiary lawmaker does. 
So far as a standard is general, it fails to furnish assured 
guidance. To the applier it represents the necessity of exer-
cising unguided judgment in the act of filling in details. To 
the person intended to be guided, generality represents un-
certainty; it means reduced guidance value; a general stand-
ard fails to present a fully developed pattern of action. The 
person is told broadly what he is expected to do or not do, 
and that the rest of the pattern will be filled in by a subsidiary 
lawmaker as occasion requires. This spells for him the pos-
sibility of arbitrariness in application by officials who have to 
fill in detailed rules before they can apply them. 
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Sec. 4-2 4· Problems. I. Consider again the case of State 
v. McGowan, set out in section 2-48, problem 2, where a 
statute penalized the act of arson. 
Spell out: (I) Some of the details of the general terms 
of the statute which the court had to supply; ( 2) some of 
the principal elements which were taken for granted by the 
lawmaker and not mentioned at all. 
2. Consider in a similar way the Commerce Clause of the 
Federal Constitution, which reads as follows: "The Congress 
shall have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign 
Nations and among the several States .... " 1 
Note the principal general terms used. Would you know 
from reading this clause whether Congress can control inter-
state transportation of passengers as distinct from commodi-
ties of trade? What about transmission of radio messages? 
Again, what are some of the important elements of the 
control over commerce which are taken for granted and not 
even referred to? 
3. Dickinson: 
"It is therefore clear why the broader and more funda-
mental principles of the law are themselves almost never 
capable of being applied directly as rules of decision for the 
settlement of controversies. On the one hand the principle 
may be so broad-as e.g., that property rights should be 
protected-that it will embrace within its scope both the 
opposing interests in a particular controversy, and therefore 
give no clue as to which should prevail over the other. Thus 
in a nuisance case both parties can appeal to their right to 
have their property protected. On the other hand, if the 
principle is less broad in its scope, it is likely to express the 
interest of only one of the parties to the controversy, and so 
come into square collision with another equally valid prin-
ciple expressing the interest of the opposing party. Take the 
case of a nuisance again. On one side stands the principle that 
1 Art. I, Sec. 8. 
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a man may lawfully do as he wills with his own. On the other 
stands the principle, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." 2 
How are these statements related to our discussion in 
section 4-23 r What does Dickinson add to the statement of 
Holmes that general propositions do not decide cases? 
4· "The Legislature shall pass no local or special act in 
any case where a general act can be made applicable, and 
whether a general act can be made applicable shall be a 
judicial question." 3 Similar prohibitions of local and special 
legislation are to be found in many state constitutions. 
When is legislation general by contrast with special in the 
sense of this prohibition? Suppose a statute enacts a health 
code for all cities of ten thousand. Is this code general 
legislation? Suppose another health code applies to cities of 
one million, and there is only one such city in the state. 
Does the constitutional clause prescribe the form of stat-
utory statement? Suppose, for example, the legislature passed 
a health code applicable to "the City of Detroit." Can you 
state the purport of the constitutional clause in terms of a 
distinction between general and specific directives, i.e., stand-
ards and orders (see section I -o8) r 
Does the constitutional clause fix the number of items to 
which a statute must apply? Is it sat.isfied if the legislature 
makes a bona fide effort to classify cities, etc. according to 
their needs? 
Sec. 4-25. Codification.* Now and again a legislature 
undertakes to adopt a comprehensive and systematic statute, 
called a code, to embrace all the legal provisions applicable 
2 Meaning: so use your own as not to injure another. "The Law Behind 
Law," z9 CoL. L. REv. z85 at z98 (x9z9). 
3 MICH. CONST. 1908 Art. V, Sec. 30. 
* (I.R.) See bibliography on this subject in sec. 4-01 * note. 
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to a general field. The general purposes of codification are 
to render the law clear, certain, systematic, and complete.1 
On the continent of Europe almost all states, building on 
the foundation of the Roman corpus juris, have codified their 
laws quite completely. The same is true of the South Amer-
ican countries.2 In England the process of codification has 
not gone far. In this country the development of codes has 
been rather irregular; most states have only codified part 
of their law but New York, California and a few other states 
have codified the law of most important fields. 
Common types of codes adopted in the last century and 
a half have been a civil code, dealing with matters of prop-
erty, contract, tort, family relationships, etc.; a code of civil 
procedure or a general practice act, dealing with practice and 
procedure in the courts; a commercial code, covering matters 
such as sales, negotiable paper, etc.; a code of criminal law, 
commonly called a penal code; and a code of criminal pro-
cedure. Narrower fields of law may also be covered in a 
systematic form, by what may be called minor codes. Of this 
character are general acts dealing with the subject of corpo-
rations, traffic on the highways, or probate matters, as well 
as the various uniform acts which have been developed by 
the Commissioners on Uniform Laws and adopted in most of 
our states (e.g., the Uniform Negotiable Instruments law, 
the Uniform Sales law, etc.). 
The process of codification does not begin with a blank 
legal sheet. It is always a reworking of existing legislation 
and of law as laid down in judicial decisions. It not only 
revises and amends pre-existing law but builds upon it and 
1 An additional purpose has often been to unify the law of the country 
in which several competing systems exist in different states or provinces. 
Unification was one of the main reasons for codification in both France and 
Germany. 
2 The original modern codes were drafted in France at the time of Napoleon. 
All subsequent codifications in Europe and South America have built on the 
Napoleonic codes. 
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out of its materials. The task of reworking and reforming 
these legal materials to constitute a clear, simple and unified 
code, is no mean undertaking. It is an undertaking which 
requires a considerable period of time. The difficulty of the 
job and the time which it requires, exclude the possibility 
of preparing and enacting a code in any single legislative 
session. Either the legislature borrows a code already enacted 
elsewhere, or it authorizes the preparation of a code which 
its successors will have to accept or reject. Moreover, the 
preparation of a code requires a degree of expertness which 
the ordinary legislature does not find within its own ranks. 
Consequently codes have usually been framed at the instance 
of a legislative body by a group of experts and submitted in 
the form of drafts for adoption by the legislature itself. The 
German Civil Code, for example, was framed by a select 
group of lawyers, judges, and professors of law. It went 
through several drafts and was twenty years in preparation. 
While the Field Codes, which have been the foundation of 
the principal codes in this country, were not drafted with 
quite the meticulous care of the German, Swiss and recent 
Italian codes, t~eir preparation did extend over a considerable 
period of time and involved great effort by David Dudley 
Field and his collaborators.3 
In the early part of the I 9th century it was supposed that 
codification could be carried to the point where every case 
or situation would be provided for in advance. Bentham, the 
great English law reformer of that period, entertained this 
view; he stressed the idea that the law should be made 
"cognoscible," by which he meant that the law should be 
put in such form that everyone could know his legal rights 
without the least uncertainty. Accordingly the aspiration of 
codifiers of that day was to codify law completely and finally. 
3 You would find interesting H. M. FIELD's LIFE OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 
( 1898). Chapters 7 and 8 give a brief account of the battle for codification in 
New York in the x8so's and x86o's, and of the adoption of codes in the 
western and midwestern states. · 
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But time has proved that the hope of making complete 
and final codes is a vain one. We fall far short of this ideal, 
as we do of all other legal objectives. The possibilities of 
human behavior are too varied to be specifically provided for 
in advance. Life conditions change too rapidly to be antici-
pated in a roster of patterns of prescribed behavior. The 
lawmaker has to be satisfied, in the main, with general state-
ments which can be adapted to innumerable and changing 
situations. The ideal of a complete and final codification, good 
for all cases and all times, has had to be abandoned; it has 
been replaced by a practical working notion of a codification 
which is good for a particular place and time, but which will 
require periodic revision to meet changing needs. 
Sec. 4-26. Compilation, consolidation, annotation and 
indexing of statutes. Even where the statutes of a state are 
not integrated in codes, they are usually grouped and organ-
ized according to topics. This work of compilation is some-
times done at the instance of the legislature and at public 
expense. Sometimes it is done unofficially by a publisher as 
a commercial venture. The objective in either case is to make 
the separate enactments of the state more readily available 
for use and reference by lawyers and individuals. This is a 
desirable objective since the person who wishes to find the 
statutes on a particular topic is thus spared most of the effort 
of seeking for them throughout the miscellaneous assortment 
of laws which are passed from year to year in the sessions of 
the legislature. 
Sometimes the process of integration is pushed one step 
further. All the statutes dealing with a particular subject 
matter are consolidated. Such a consolidation does not ordi-
narily attempt to unify the case law with the statute law, nor 
does it aim primarily to improve existing statute law. It 
merely brings together in a unifying statute all existing 
legislation on a particular topic (e.g., a British consolidation 
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of 132. statutes dealing with perjury). The process of con-
solidation necessarily requires the ironing out of inconsist-
encies and the systematization of the existing statutes to some 
degree, but it is not intended to produce a complete statement 
or a systematic expression of the law.1 
The statutes of the United States and of the states have 
also been annotated with reference to decisions construing 
their various paragraphs and provisions. These annotations 
are very useful to the lawyer as they bring together statute 
law and case law. 
Indexing is another method employed to make statutory 
material readily available. A great deal of attention has been 
given to this type of work in recent years. Most if not all 
of the statutes, federal and state, have now been completely 
and minutely indexed. 
Two general criticisms apply to the compilation, consoli-
dation and indexing that has been done. First is the lack of 
uniform plans according to which material is arranged and 
catalogued. The plans vary greatly from state to state so that 
the lawyer has to familiarize himself with new schemes of 
arranging and cataloguing each time he examines the laws 
of a different jurisdiction. The second criticism results from 
the nature of all these devices. None of them integrates the 
statutory provisions with which it deals. All of them represent 
an organization which is extrinsic to the statutes. They consti-
tute an organization of material which is imposed from the 
outside, a mere arrangement of existing material and not a 
reworking of the material handled. In this respect consolida-
tion and indexing are different from the type of organization 
which is injected by the lawmaker when he creates a code 
1 Names are not always safe guides in this respect. For example, the so-
called United States Code is really a consolidation rather than a codification 
of the federal statutes. "No new law is enacted and no law repealed." The code 
is "the official restatement in convenient form of the general and permanent 
laws of the United States" in force on the date when the code is issued. 
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and fits each of its provisions into a pattern with the rest 
so as to establish a unified, complete, and systematic whole. 
Sec. 4-27. Problems. In an article in the AMERICAN LAW 
REviEw/ DAviD DuDLEY FIELD said: 
"I will mention here four reasons for codification, and four 
sophisms against it: 
"First. There are certain propositions which have become 
maxims of government, one of which is that the legislative 
and judicial departments should be kept distinct, or in other 
words, that the same person should not be both law-giver 
and judge. There is no need of arguing about it. The maxim 
is founded on philosophy and experience. It has taken ages 
of struggle to establish it. And here it is. We profess to take 
it for absolute truth; we talk of it as one of the fundamental 
doctrines of modern government; we write it at the head of 
our constitutions; but we violate it every hour that we allow 
the judges to participate in the making of the laws. 
"Second. Another of these maxims is, that they who are 
required to obey the laws should all have the opportunity of 
knowing what they are. These laws are now in sealed books 
and the lawyers object to the opening of these books. They 
can be opened by codification and only by codification. Do 
not say that this is a figurative expression which proves 
nothing. It proves everything. The law with us is a sealed 
book to the masses; it is a sealed book to all but the lawyers; 
and it is but partly opened even as to them. It is an insult 
to our understanding to say that the knowledge of the law 
is open to everybody. 
"It should be open. That none can deny who has common 
understanding and a decent regard for truth. How can it be 
opened? In one way, and one only; writing it in a book of 
such dimensions and in such language that all can read and 
comprehend it. What if lawyers should say unwritten law 
is good enough for them? They are used to delving in it; 
they like it; they live by it. What then? Supposing it to be 
so does not mend the matter, unless it be assumed that the 
law is made for the lawyers and not for the people. 
1 Field, "Codification," zo AM. L. REV. 1 at z (1886). 
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"These two reasons for codification should of themselves 
be decisive. 
"Third. Another and a third reason is the lawyer's own 
experience; the experience, I might say, of every lawyer. 
What does he do when a case is brought to him, for the 
courts or for his private opinion? The first question he asks 
himself is, has the point been decided? He looks for a 
decision. Where does he look? First in the volumes of his 
own State reports. It may be that he finds a case just decided 
in the highest court on all fours with his own, and he fancies 
that he may rely on that. Can he? We lawyers know that 
there is still a chance of mistake. Look at the list of 'cases 
cited, criticised, distinguished, or overruled.' This is the very 
best aspect of the lawyer's position in the case supposed. But 
what if there be no such decision? Then he looks into the 
decisions of inferior courts in his own State. If he finds one 
that he thinks is applicable, he ventures to take it, though 
with less confidence, because he knows that he is to go 
through the ordeal of the higher court, and his chances there 
are uncertain. Should he happen to find no decision at home 
applicable to his purpose, he goes abroad into other States 
or across the sea. Now he has got beyond the hundreds of 
volumes of his own State he resorts to the thousands of 
volumes of other States and countries. What 'a codeless 
myriad of precedents' to look through l What 'a wilderness 
of single instances' to explore! Consider the nature of the 
search and what is found, after all? He peers into volumes 
upon volumes, with no other guide than an index at the 
end of each volume, or a compilation or collection of indexes 
called digests, of many volumes. These are made sometimes 
by men of sense, and sometimes by men of no sense, without 
any agreement upon a plan or classification of subjects. The 
result is, as might have been expected, that the lawyer, with 
an earnest desire to get the 'best opinion' or the 'weight of 
opinion' has, after all, to make a guess. Now, if he had been 
asked at the outset whether he would not prefer to look for 
an authoritative statement of the rule for his case in a statute-
book, IF HE CouLD FIND IT THERE, he would have an-
swered yes. 
"Fourth. The fourth reason that I will mention is that 
no people, which ha~ once exchanged an unwritten for a 
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written law, has ever turned back. One might as well expect 
the sun to return upon the dial. Even where the written law 
has been imposed upon a conquered people, to whom it must 
have been at first distasteful for that reason, it has held its 
place after the foreign domination has departed. The eagles 
of Napoleon were driven back across the Rhine, but the code 
which went forward with the eagles did not return with them. 
These facts are arguments worth all the theories in the world. 
Scholars may write as many treatises as they will; the experi-
ence of mankind is worth all the books that were ever written. 
You cannot explain away this experience; you cannot reason 
it down; it proves the superiority, beyond dispute or cavil, of 
written to unwritten law, of statute law to case law, or, as it 
might be better called, to guess-law. 
"Now for the sophisms against codification: 
"First. It is said that the law will be 'cabined, cribbed, 
confined,' if it be written .... 
"Second. A second sophism is that a perfect code can not 
be made, and therefore, inasmuch as none but an imperfect 
one is possible, there had better be none at all. 
"Third. A third sophism is this one: we have grown 
strong and prosperous without a code, why get one now? 
What need is there of a change? . . . 
"Fourth. A fourth sophism is, that legislatures are always 
at work changing the laws, and therefore if a code is made 
it will be subject to continual change and so it is better to 
have none of it. . . ." 
Do you agree with FIELD's four reasons for codification? 
How would you answer each of the four sophisms? 
SIGNIFICANCE OF LEGISLATION 
Sec. 4-28. Significance in various aspects. In preceding 
chapters we have analyzed the operation of laws in terms of 
effects on persons. We have considered the ways in which 
standards for the individual affect the individual himself and 
the significance which they have for officials and other indi-
viduals. We have discussed standards for officials in similar 
manner. 
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It is also possible and quite common, to relate the operation 
of legislation to place, time, and other legislation. Where 
does the legislation operate? How long does it operate? And 
how does it affect prior existing, or subsequently created, 
laws? The answers to these questions are found in the same 
places as the laws themselves: in constitutional provisions, 
statutes, and decisions. They are to be the subject matter 
of the following sections. 
Sec. 4-29. Territorial operation. Generally speaking, the 
Anglo-American legal systems adhere to a theory of "terri-
torial jurisdiction." 1 Applied to the operation of legislation, 
this theory means that standards which are found in the 
constitution, statutes, and decisions of a state or country, 
operate only within the territorial limits of that state or 
country. An act of the legislature of Michigan regulates only 
things, persons, and acts within the State of Michigan; a 
federal statute only matters which fall within the domain 
of the United States. This theory is implicit in many pro-
visions of the constitutions, especially in those which dis-
tinguish between state and state, county and county, etc. It is 
a fundamental postulate of common-law thinking. There are 
some exceptions to this general theory, some instances in 
which Michigan legislation will affect persons and trans-
actions beyond the borders ,of the state, or in which federal 
legislation affects persons and transactions beyond the terri-
torial boundaries of the United States. But the theory of 
territorial jurisdiction to legislate, holds good on the whole; 
it states a common limit on the operation of legislation in 
the Anglo-American legal systems. 
Sec. 4-30. Time of operation. Acts of Congress take effect 
from the date of passage if no other date is specified therein. 
1 Among jurisdictions where this theory prevails are Great Britain and its 
dominions, and the United States and its states and territories. 
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The same principles apply to the enactments of the various 
states, apart from controlling constitutional clauses. How-
ever, many states do have constitutional provisions which fix 
the ordinary date at which statutes are to become effective 
at sixty or ninety days after enactment or at some specified 
date such as July first following enactment. Even in these 
states, the legislature always has authority to give immediate 
effect to emergency legislation. 
Ordinarily the operation of a statute is of indeterminate 
duration. Once established by the lawmaker, a legal pro-
vision continues in effect indefinitely in time. Or as we would 
more often say, a statute remains in force until changed. Of 
course the legislature can, and not infrequently does, include 
in a statute a specific provision limiting its operation to a 
definite period. 
There are nevertheless important limits on the temporal 
operation of legislation. Most significant is the principle that 
legislation is to have only future operation.1 The federal and 
state constitutions contain a number of provisions which bar 
retroactive changes in existing law. These aim to protect 
vested rights and established expectations. It is not worth 
our while to specify all these provisions in the present place. 
They are exemplified by the Due Process clauses which bar 
changes in the law that destroy the owner's existing property 
rights. They are also illustrated by the prohibitions against 
ex post facto legislation and against laws impairing the obli-
gation of contracts. Our points of interest here are that, so 
far as clauses of this type furnish standards for the legislative 
act, they put existing laws beyond the reach of legislative 
change; and that so far as they declare limits on the operation 
of legislative acts, they mean that the lawmaker can change 
1 Also important is the type of constitutional provision which permits 
a legislative act to operate only after a certain period of time has elapsed 
following the date of its enactment. 
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existing legislation, but only for the future; that new laws 
can be established, but only with a prospective operation. 
Sec. 4-3 I. Constitutional provisions and other legislation. 
Since we have more than one lawmaking agency within the 
state-the framers of the constitution, the legislature, various 
subsidiary agencies, and the courts-we need criteria (stand-
ards) by which to decide whose lawmaking act prevails in 
case of conflict or overlapping. The most basic of these 
criteria, that which governs the case of conflict between a 
statute and a constitutional provision, has already been fre-
quently referred to. Needless to say, a constitutional provision 
prevails over legislation of any other kind; statute, decision, 
or subsidiary rule. The distinction between fundamental 
legislation represented by our constitutions, and ordinary but 
subordinate legislation, represented by statutes, common law, 
etc., is fundamental in the American legal system. It marks 
the most important departure from English models made by 
the founding fathers. 
Sec. 4-3 2. Repeal and amendment of statutes. The opera-
tion of a statute may be terminated by repeal or changed by 
amendment. In the most general sense this involves the 
principle that where two statutes of the same state are in 
conflict with each other, the statute which is later in time 
prevails. The repeal or amendment of a statute is tantamount 
to making a new statute. The legislature's power to repeal 
or change law is as complete as its power to enact law 
originally/ and the standards which govern the processes of 
lawmaking are applicable to the legislative repeal or change 
of existing laws.2 
1 But see final paragraph of sec. 4-30 above. 
2 The relations of statutes and common law will be discussed in chapters 
5 and 6. 
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But the legislature does not always explicitly repeal or 
change an existing statute. Often it merely enacts another 
statute which is inconsistent, wholly or partially, with existing 
legislation.3 Here the later statute also prevails, on the prin-
ciple already mentioned; but we speak of implied, not 
express, repeal or amendment. The principle of implied 
repeal, like that of the prevailing force of the later statute, 
is one common to all the Anglo-American legal systems. 
Sec. 4-33. Federal versus state legislation. In our federal 
system there are not a few possibilities of conflict between 
federal and state action. There are areas in which the Con-
gress and the state legislature exercise concurrent legislative 
power. For example, Congress is authorized to regulate 
interstate commerce, yet the state legislatures have always 
adopted certain types of local regulations which affect inter-
state commerce. Which of these regulations is to prevail in 
case of conflict or inconsistency, the federal or the state? 
A similar question can arise out of a conflict between a treaty 
with a foreign nation, and the statute of a single state. 
Suppose for instance that a statute of the state of Washington 
forbids aliens to engage in certain occupations, but a treaty 
between the United States and a foreign state permits citizens 
of the latter to engage in those occupations anywhere in the 
United States. Which is to control, the United States treaty 
or the state statute? The answer to both these questions is 
furnished by a section of the Federal Constitution which 
provides: 
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
3 It is obviously preferable to repeal explicitly all prior statutes, or parts 
of statutes, which are in conflict with the new enactment; this avoids difficult 
questions whether such prior enactments do conflict and whether they are 
repealed-questions that may only be settled by litigation. 
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United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and 
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything 
in the Constitution or laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding." 1 
The purport of this section is that where there is any 
conflict between federal and state legislative acts the federal 
act prevails. It not only supersedes any pre-existing state 
legislation of contrary tenor, but stands as an insurmountable 
obstacle to any subsequent state statute which runs counter 
to it.2 
Sec. 4-3 4· Problems. I. It is often said that the legislature 
cannot pass an irrepealable law. Which of the foregoing 
general propositions regarding the operation of legislation 
(sections 4-28 to 4-33) declares substantially the same idea? 
2. It is a generally accepted view that a statute cannot be 
repealed by desuetude, i.e., abrogated by disuse.1 Which of 
the above propositions regarding the operation of legislation 
is, in effect, another way of stating this view? Is there a 
difference? 
3. Suppose a city council enacts an ordinance forbidding 
driving within the city limits at any speed exceeding I 5 miles 
per hour; a later general statute of the state is passed 
prohibiting driving in residential districts of cities and towns, 
at any speed in excess of 25 miles per hour. Would the state 
law repeal the ordinance? Would it matter if the statute were 
prior in time? 
What would be the proper conclusion if the ordinance 
provided for a maximum of 25, and the statute for one of 
I 5, miles per hour? 
1 Art. VI, Sec. z. 
2 It need hardly be said that these statements assume that the federal act is 
a valid one. 
1 See generally GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1916), 
sees. 4-01 to 4-19, 7-o6 to 7-19. 
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Sec. 4-35. Summary. In the above chapter I have tried 
to give you a general view of the legislative process. (You 
will get a much more complete view later if you elect the 
course called Legislation.) I have laid emphasis on the 
human factors involved in the making and operation of 
legislation. More specifically, I have indicated when, how 
and why statutes are made; how far their enactment is 
controlled by standards; and the extent to which legislative 
power may be delegated. I have called your attention to 
certain important problems of stating the legislative message 
so that it will be clear and available to the persons who will 
be affected by it. And finally I have tried to furnish you 
with basic notions of the manner in which any piece of 
legislation operates as regards time, place, and other legis-
lation. 
CHAPTER 5 
Interpretation of Legislation * 
Sec. s-oi. When interpretation is needed-scope of 
chapter. In the preceding chapter we viewed the processes 
of legal control primarily from the side of the agency which 
formulates a legislative message; we stressed the problems 
of the lawmaker. At this place we shift our point of view 
and look at the processes of legal control from the side of 
persons to whom the legislative message is addressed; we 
look at the message as it appears to persons who must use 
or apply its directives. However, we shall not undertake to 
discuss all aspects of the application of legislation. We have 
already covered a large. part of this ground; 1 we have 
already discussed cases where the legislative message is clear 
and understandable and where its provisions are applied 
without effort. The only cases that need to be discussed 
further are those where the application of legislation raises 
doubts or difficulties in the mind of the person who must 
apply it. 
If language were a perfect vehicle of communication, and 
if human beings thought out their intentions with complete 
foresight, and if they expressed their aims and desires fully 
and perfectly, one might expect to find legislation which 
* (I.R.) Suggestions for further reading: 
"Symposium on Statutory Construction," 3 VANDERBILT L. REV. 365-596 
( 1950), an excellent series of papers, including a full bibliography 
on this subject, "Legal Writings on Statutory Construction," s69-584. 
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (3rd ed. by Horack, 1943). 
READ AND MACDONALD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1948). 
See also items cited herein in sec. 5-14, note *, and sec. s-17, note *· The 
voluminous material on this topic is found for the most part in the Law 
Reviews. It is not necessary to cite it all here as it is referred to or quoted in 
the works above cited. 
1 Notably those parts of chapters z and 3 where we discussed the use of 
standards for the individual (sees. z-43 to z-48) and the use of standards for 
officials (sees. 3-30 to 3-34). 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION 319 
needed no interpretation. However, there are deficiencies in 
language itself, in human foresight, and in the ability to 
express ideas; all these contribute to the general result that 
verbal acts of all kinds require interpretation. The use of 
language in legislation, like any other use of language, may 
be insufficient or obscure; it may be ambiguous, self-contra-
dictory, vague or incomplete. If legislation is defective in 
any of these respects there is work for the interpreter to do. 
This chapter will be devoted to the work of the interpreter, 
to cases where the meaning of legislation is problematic and 
has to be settled before it can be applied. This subject matter 
will be taken up under the following heads: 
Role of interpreter. 
Sources and standards of interpretation. 
Typical interpretive problems. 
RoLE oF INTERPRETER 
Sec. s-o2. Who interprets-dominance of judiciary. On 
occasion, almost anyone may be confronted by the necessity 
of interpreting a legislative provision, just as he may have 
to apply one. An important new labor law, such as the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, raises at once questions of interpretation 
for every employer of labor: whether this statute applies to 
his contracts with his employees, and if it does, what are the 
effects of its provisions regarding w:J,ges and hours in his 
case. Only after a considerable length of time do such ques-
tions receive authoritative answers, and until and unless they 
do, the individual affected must make his own guesses as to 
how the act will be applied and enforced.1 In like manner, 
1 In a speech last year Justice Jackson said: 
"I read from time to time of laws enacted by Congress of which it is said 
it will require several years to learn how the Courts will apply them and what 
meaning Courts will give to them. • . . This seems to be accepted as 
necessary and usual, but it really indicates that there is something wrong 
in the process by which law is communicated to this country." "The Meaning 
of Statutes," 34 A. B. A. J. 535, 537 (1948). 
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an official who is under obligation to enforce a legislative 
provision may have to figure out the meaning of its terms 
before he embarks on the performance of his duties. Also 
the trial judge frequently must construe a legislative pro-
vision of doubtful meaning before he takes action or decides 
the case before him. And finally, the Supreme Court counts 
among its chief functions the settlement of questions of 
constitutional and statutory interpretation, that is to say 
questions which come up on appeal from the courts below. 
So that we can truly say that the interpretation of legislation 
is a function which may have to be performed on occasion 
by everyone. 
But judicial interpretations of constitutional and statutory 
clauses have a peculiar significance which does not attach to 
the interpretations of other officials or of individuals. And 
from this peculiar significance has developed the common 
notion that the power of interpretation belongs exclusively 
to the judiciary, or more specifically, to the supreme court 
of each jurisdiction. There is no real contradiction here. The 
one proposition is to the effect that anyone may have to 
interpret legislation before he acts; the other to the effect 
that the supreme court gives the final and conclusive inter-
pretation when it does speak. The latter proposition empha-
sizes the predominant role of the supreme court in settling 
the meaning of legislative provisions. 
The predominance of judicial interpretations is best appre-
ciated if we note the status in our American legal systems 
of judicial decisions construing constitutions and statutes. 
Such decisions are recorded and followed. A judicial interpre-
tation of a legislative provision virtually becomes part of that 
provision's meaning; what the court says adheres to the 
legislative text. The interpretation is a judicial precedent; it 
is treated by all concerned as part and parcel of the provision's 
effective meaning, quite as if written into the provision itself. 
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The supreme court which rendered the decision so regards 
its prior interpretation. Courts of other jurisdictions and text 
writers do likewise. And lawyers always deal with a construed 
provision of a constitution or statute as if the construction 
were embodied in the provision; they do not simply cite the 
text of the provision, they also quote what the supreme court 
has said that the text means. 
In view, then, of the dominance of judicial interpretations 
of legislation and of the fact that the judicial process typifies 
the interpretive process generally, I shall from this point on 
discuss judicial acts of interpretation (except where some 
other interpretive act is indicated) and shall use "interpre-
tation" to mean judicial interpretation. 
Sec. s-oJ. Three theories of interpreter's role-"legis-
lative intent" theory. What is the interpreter's role or 
function? Three theories have been propounded in answer 
to this question. I believe it will help us to understand the 
processes of interpretation if we examine each of these 
theories rather closely. These theories, and the conceptions 
of the interpreter's role which they express, are: 
I. "Legislative intent" theory, to discover L's intent. 
2. "Verbal meaning" theory, to arrive at the settled mean-
ing of the words L used. 
3· "Free interpretation" theory, to interpret as the in-
terpreter chooses. 
First, then, of the "legislative intent" theory. This is the 
conventional theory of interpretation. It declares that the 
judicial interpreter is expected to discover the legislator's 
intent. Statements to this effect appear over and over in 
the cases. Sometimes this theory purports to be a description 
of what the interpreter does; sometimes it is essentially a 
rule of method for the interpreter, telling him that the 
discovery of the legislator's intent is controlling or that his 
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proper goal is to find out what the legislator meant. Offhand, 
these statements sound plausible; and probably in cases where 
the meaning of legislation is fairly clear under all the circum-
stances, such modes of stating objectives do no particular 
harm. But in cases where the legislator's meaning is not clear, 
in cases where real problems of interpretation confront the 
person who must apply legislation, these ways of stating the 
interpreter's objective serve to obscure the real nature of 
the interpretive process and the factors which are involved 
in it; they misdescribe the process which occurs and misdirect 
the attention of the interpreter in a manner which may be 
positively harmful. 
Sec. s-o4. Problems. I. Gray says of this theory: 
"A fundamental misconception prevails, and pervades all 
the books as to the dealing of the courts with statutes. 
Interpretation is generally spoken of as if its chief function 
was to discover what the meaning of the Legislature really 
was. But when a Legislature has had a real intention, one 
way or another, on a point, it is not once in a hundred times 
that any doubt arises as to what its intention was. If that were 
all that a judge had to do with a statute, interpretation of 
statutes, instead of being one of the most difficult of a judge's 
duties, would be extremely easy. The fact is that the diffi-
culties of so-called interpretation arise when the Legislature 
has had no meaning at all; when the question which is raised 
on the statute never occurred to it; when what the judges 
have to do is, not to determine what the Legislature did mean 
on a point which was present in its mind, but to guess what it 
would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the 
point had been present. If there are any lawyers among those 
who honor me with their attendance, let them consider any 
dozen cases of the interpretation of statutes, as they have 
occurred consecutively in their reading or practice, and they 
will, I venture to say, find that in almost all of them it is 
probable, and that in most of them it is perfectly evident, 
that the makers of the statutes had no real intention, one way 
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or another, on the point in question; that if they had, they 
would have made their meaning clear; and that when the 
judges are professing to declare what the Legislature meant, 
they are, in truth, themselves legislating to fill up casus 
omissi.)) 1 
How would you state Gray's objection to this theory? Why 
does his view, if correct, make it difficult to accept the ''legis-
lative intent" theory? 
2. Why does the following case make difficulty for the 
"legislative intent" theory? 
State v. Partlow.2 "The defendant is indicted for selling 
one quart of spiritous liquor to one Rutherford within three 
miles of Mount Zion church, in the county of Gaston, in 
violation of the Act of r 8 8 I, ch. 234· 
"It was in evidence that the liquor was sold as alleged; and 
that there were two churches (about fifteen miles apart) each 
called "Mount Zion church," in said county-one for the 
white people and the other for the colored people. And there 
was nothing in the statute indicating to which of these two 
churches the name applied or had reference. 
"With a view to apply the statute, the state introduced a 
witness who was a senator in the general assembly at the time 
the Act in question was passed, and the court allowed him 
to testify, after objection, that it was intended to apply to 
the church mentioned by himself and the other witnesses, 
and this he knew, because the provision of the Act in respect 
to Mount Zion church was inserted upon his motion, made 
in response to petitions praying for the prohibition of the sale 
of spiritous liquor within three miles of Mount Zion colored 
church, signed by colored people whom he knew. The de-
fendant excepted, and further insisted that the statute was 
ambiguous and therefore void. 
"Verdict of guilty; judgment; appeal by the defend-
ant .... " 
Merrimon, J.: "The Act of r88r, ch. 234, prohibits the 
sale of spiritous liquors within designated distances from 
1 THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW, sec. 370 (1916). 
2 91 N.C. 497 (1884). 
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many churches and other places named therein. So much of 
it as is material to this case provides, 'that the sale of spiritous 
liquors shall be prohibited within three miles of . . . Mount 
Zion church in Gaston county.' 
"It appeared on the trial that there were two churches 
bearing the name 'Mt. Zion' in Gaston county, and there is 
nothing in the statute indicating to which of them it applies. 
"It is plainly the duty of the court to so construe a statute, 
ambiguous in its meaning, as to give effect to the legislative 
intent, if this be practicable. . . . But the meaning must be 
ascertained from the statute itself, and the means and signs 
to which, as appears upon its face, it has reference. It cannot 
be proved by a member of the legislature or other person, 
whether interested in its enactment or not. A statute is an act 
of the legislature as an organized body. It expresses the col-
lective will of that body, and no single member of it, or all 
the members as individuals, can be heard to say what the 
meaning of the statute is. It must speak for and be construed 
by itself, by the means and signs indicated above. Otherwise, 
each individual might attribute to it a different meaning, and 
thus the legislative will and meaning be lost sight of. What-
ever may be the views and purposes of those who procure 
the enactment of a statute, the legislature contemplates that 
its intention shall be ascertained from its words as embodied 
in it. And the courts are not at liberty to accept the under-
standing of any individual as to the legislative intent. . . . 
"Now, the clause of the statute before us simply refers to 
'Mount Zion church in Gaston county,' and there are two 
churches of that name in that county. There is nothing in the 
statute that in the remotest degree indicates to which of the 
two it refers. There are no means or signs of any kind appear-
ing in it, in terms, by implication, by reference, or by any 
possible construction, that go to point to one of the two 
churches any more than to the other. It must, therefore, be 
as inoperative as if there was no church, or fifty churches of 
the same name in that county. 
"The testimony of the witness, who was a senator at the 
time the statute was enacted, was wholly incompetent for 
the reasons already stated. 
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"We are constrained to declare that the clause of the 
statute under consideration is, because of its ambiguity, in-
operative and void. 
"Error. Reversed." 
Sec. s-os. The ccverbal meaning" theory. On the basis of 
reasoning like that of the Partlow Case just quoted, a second 
theory of the interpreter's role has been evolved. This theory 
I call the "verbal meaning" theory. It declares that the 
interpreter is concerned strictly with the established meaning 
of the language which the lawmaker has used. In the words 
of another court, "Whether we are considering an agreement 
between parties, a statute or a constitution, ... the thing 
we are to seek is the thought which it expresses . ... That 
which the words declare, is the meaning of the instrument; 
and neither court nor legislatures have a right to add to or 
take away from that meaning." 1 
As a description of the interpretive process this theory 
has the advantage of frankly converting the process of inter-
pretation into an inquiry based on objective materials. The 
job of the interpreter becomes an investigation of the estab-
lished meaning of what the legislator has said. This concep-
tion of the interpreter's task represents an advance in realism 
insofar as it discards any fictitious and irrelevant subjective 
element suggested by the "legislative intent" theory; it 
represents a sound policy inasmuch as it refers the interpreter 
to objective material, the legislative text, which is also avail-
able to persons affected by the legislation. 
Those who announce this "verbal meaning" theory have 
usually assumed that the proper meaning of a legislative 
text is simple and single; they have usually assumed, if not 
stated, that the proper meaning inheres in the words used 
and can be directly read off. Thus Justice Story, who 
emphatically announces the view that the correct meaning of 
1 Johnson, J., in Newell v. The People, 7 N.Y. 9 at 97 (t8sz). 
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the clauses of the Federal Constitution is to be derived from 
the words used, also takes for granted that there can be 
only one proper meaning of those words. As he says: 
"Nothing but the text itself was adopted by the people. 
And it would certainly be a most extravagant doctrine to 
give to any commentary then made, and a fortiori to any 
commentary since made, under a very difficult posture of 
feeling and opinion, an authority which would operate as 
an absolute limit upon the text, or should supersede its 
natural and just interpretation." 2 
Here Story takes for granted that the text has one natural 
and just interpretation. In another part of the same section, 
he says, "The Constitution was adopted by the people of the 
United States, and it was submitted to the whole upon a just 
survey of its provisions as they stood in t:he text itself." This 
learned author takes great pains at the same time to point 
out that the parties who adopted the language of the Consti-
tution may have had different views as to what its language 
meant. 
Sec. s-o6. Problems. I. If the proper interpretation of 
language, or as Story calls it "the natural and just inter-
pretation," is as obvious and uniform as his theory assumes 
it to be, how is it possible for courts to differ as widely as 
they often do, regarding the correct interpretation of a 
statutory or constitutional clause? Story himself was a mem-
ber of the United States Supreme Court when it thus differed 
in opinion with the supreme appellate tribunal of New York 
in the celebrated case of Gibbons v. 0 gden.1 The difference 
concerned the proper interpretation of the simple language 
of the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution. The 
United States Supreme Court gave the clause a wide and 
comprehensive interpretation, to bring all kinds of intercourse 
2 THE CONSTITUTION (5th ed.), sec. 406 (1905). 
1 9 Wheat. 1 (1824). See full discussion of this case in WARREN, THE 
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, I, 797 et seq. (1937). 
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between states within the legislative power of Congress; the 
New York Court would have restricted Congressional con-
trol to commerce in the sense of traffic in goods. Both 
interpretations were possible, both were reasonable from 
any ordinary point of view, and each was adopted by a bench 
of judges whom we number among the leading lights of 
our legal history. 
Why does such a difference of opinion, as was found in 
the Gibbons Case in regard to the meaning of the Commerce 
Clause, make difficulty for the "verbal meaning" theory as 
Story and others have declared it? 
2. Jethro Brown: "As a matter of fact, however, the 
statute does not mean--cannot mean-to one generation just 
what it meant to a preceding generation." 2 Brown here speaks 
of a statute. His remarks would apply with great force to 
such ancient legislation as the Statute de Donis and the Stat-
ute of Uses. What he says would apply equally to legislation 
such as our Federal Constitution and to important constitu-
tional documents, such as Magna Charta. If what he says is 
true, how does it bear on the "verbal meaning" theory? 
Sec. s-o7. The "free interpretation" theory. This brings 
us to the third theory of interpretation: that the interpreter 
can and does make the statute mean whatever he wants it 
to mean. The theory, which has had considerable vogue 
recently, I have called the "free interpretation" theory; it 
stresses the creative role of the interpreter; in fact, it converts 
this role into a complete theory of interpretation. On this 
point Gray quotes a venerable writer as follows: "Nay, who-
ever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or 
spoken laws, it is he who is truly the Law Giver to all intents 
and purposes, and not the Person who first wrote and spoke 
them." 1 In similar vein, Chief Justice Hughes, when he 
2
"Law and Evolution," 29 YALE L. J. 394 at 396 (1920). 
1 THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW, sec. 276 (1916). 
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was Governor of New York, said of the power of the United 
States Supreme Court to interpret the Constitution: "We are 
under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges 
say it is." 2 
Sec. s-o8. Problems. r. Why would you not be ready to 
accept the "free interpretation" theory? What would be its 
necessary effect? 
2. How would you state a theory to combine the virtues 
of all three theories? In other words what do you think 
ought to be the interpreter's role and method of interpreting 
a statute? 
SouRcEs AND STANDARDS OF INTERPRETATION 
Sec. s-o9. The interpreter's act and his sources. The inter-
preter's act starts with the legislative text. This is the primary 
subject matter of interpretation.1 However, interpretation 
always occurs in a problematic situation. If the application 
of the legislative text raised no doubts, there would be 
nothing for the interpreter to do as such; if the text were 
not unclear or incomplete there would be no call for inter-
pretation. In other words, the interpreter's act is partially 
creative, it adds elements not expressed in the legislative 
text itself. At the very least the interpreter is called upon 
to restate or explain what the legislator has said; and he 
may have to go so far as to correct the legislative statement 
or to supply gaps in it. 
While the creative side of the interpreter's act is indis-
putable, the nature and amount of his contribution will vary 
2 Unlike some who have since quoted his words, the learned Chief Justice 
probably did not intend his statement as a complete characterization of the 
process of interpretation. 
1 Unless one accepts the theory of "free interpretation" in an absolute and 
unlimited form (of course, we do not, and I doubt if anyone does), one 
always begins with the legislative text. 
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from case to case. For this reason there does not seem to be 
much point in trying to separate and distinguish neatly 
between elements contributed to the final meaning by legis-
lator and by interpreter respectively. It can never be quite 
clear, either in reference to a specific interpretive act or in 
reference to the process of interpretation generally, how much 
the interpreter derives from what the legislator has said or 
suggested and how much he adds to the legislative text which 
he is interpreting. What the legislator says passes by imper-
ceptible degrees into what he implies or takes for granted. 
What the legislator implies or takes for granted, is not clearly 
distinguishable from what he would have said, if he had 
thought of the problem which is now presented to the inter-
preter. And what the legislator would have wanted and 
would have said, shades into what the interpreter thinks 
ought to be the meaning of the legislative provision, purely 
as a matter of policy. 
A more promising undertaking than to try to measure 
the specific contributions of legislator and interpreter to the 
final product, is to analyze the interpretative process itself 
in order to see what materials the interpreter works with 
and what he does with these materials. These at least are 
the tasks which we shall set ourselves in the remainder of 
this chapter. In the present subtopic we shall examine pri-
marily the materials out of which the interpreter develops 
his interpretation. In the subtopic to follow we shall see how 
he goes about solving typical interpretive problems. 
Turning now to the materials which the interpreter uses 
in his act of interpretation we find that he has two important 
sets of materials to work with: (I) the language which the 
legislator has used; and ( 2) the context in which the lan-
guage is used. The interpreter deduces his interpretation 
from the text of the legislation and the context of its use. 
Both these factors are objective, and open to investigation 
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and determination by the interpreter; both contribute to the 
final interpretation which he adopts. 
The necessity of considering the text of the legislative 
provision is obvious enough. That is what the interpreter is 
construing. But the nature and role of context is not so 
obvious. What is the context which is important? What do 
we mean by the term and what does it include? In a general 
sense context means setting. It embraces all the conditions 
and circumstances which attend the use of language. In the 
case of the interpreter we can regard context as just another 
name for the sources on which he draws in developing his 
interpretation. In context he finds the materials and ideas 
on the basis of which he reworks the legislator's text. So 
that context is to the interpreter what sources are to the 
legislator; and ideally we hope that both legislator and 
interpreter act in the light of the same context or, otherwise 
stated, draw on the same sources for their verbal acts. If not, 
we shall find that when the interpreter says what the legis-
lator meant, the meaning as declared will not correspond 
with the real meaning of the legislator. 
For the purpose of further analysis and discussion, I shall 
differentiate three kinds of context: 
r. The general context, i. e., the general know ledge of 
the time. 
2. The legal context, i. e., other law existing at the time 
of enactment. 
3. The history and circumstances of enactment of the 
particular legislative provision. 
Sec. s-Io. The general context. Any verbal declaration, 
oral or written, must be interpreted against the cultural back-
ground in which it is made. The culture consists of the entire 
fund of knowledge which belongs to the community. This 
background is implied in all uses of language, and in every 
application thereof. In this sense any legislative declaration 
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must be read and interpreted in relation to the general context 
in which it is enacted and applicable. Exactly the same 
statutory provision would, and should, have a different mean-
ing and application in India from what it would have in 
England; in England, from what it would have in the United 
States. Where habits, knowledge, and modes of living are 
different, the interpretations of one and the same legal pro-
vision are bound to be different. 
Prominent in the general context are the facts of common 
experience in the community. Matters of common knowledge, 
such as the facts that cattle eat grass and that milk requires 
special care to prevent contamination and spoiling, are pre-
supposed and taken for granted in the enactment and the 
interpretation of legislative provisions regarding cattle raising 
and milk marketing. The legislator has to assume that he 
is addressing an interpreter, as well as ordinary individuals, 
who know the common patterns according to which people 
in the community live and move about, e.g., what they use 
an automobile for. Of course, a man from Mars would not 
know these facts and could not interpret what the legislator 
has enacted; and even the mundane interpreter may have to 
make facts of common knowledge explicit, whenever they 
become relevant to a problem of interpretation. 
Another important part of the general context consists of 
the various branches of tested knowledge which we know 
by the collective name of science. Here belong the pure 
sciences, e.g., biology, physics, chemistry, and astronomy, as 
well as medicine, engineering and other fields of applied 
science; and we use science in a broad enough sense to include 
all branches of special knowledge such as agriculture, lum-
bering, plumbing, carpentry, etc. We shall see presently that 
one of the recognized rules of interpretation requires the 
interpreter to give technical words their technical significa-
tion. "Technical" is used here as substantially equivalent to 
"scientific" in the broad sense just suggested. If a scientific 
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word or a word peculiar to a special profession or trade is 
employed in a legislative enactment, the interpreter must 
draw upon the proper field of knowledge for its definition.1 
The general history of the community constitutes another 
part of the context which may have to be used or examined 
by the judicial interpreter. Historical conditions of the past 
are often important in determining the meaning of legislation. 
Even today the Supreme Court of the United States fre-
quently refers to general conditions in America at the time 
when the Revolution occurred and when the Constitution was 
framed. 
And finally, though our enumeration is not intended to 
be exhaustive, the general background includes all the estab-
lished usages of language. It includes the standard meanings 
of words, the usages of grammar, rules of punctuation, and 
other related matters. Language symbols by themselves are 
abstract and meaningless.2 Meaning attaches to them through 
repeated and continuous use. The interpreter, like the legis-
lator, must be able to use and apply standard language 
devices; he must know, for example, what the words "auto-
mobile" and "driving" mean. Language devices and all they 
imply are taken for granted in the processes of enacting, 
applying, and interpreting legal provisions. Familiarity with 
language is something distinct from the common knowledge 
and the scientific knowledge mentioned, although both kinds 
1 Compare sec. 4-zo above, where the use of popular and technical terms 
in statutes is discussed. 
2 Accordingly, a particular group of language symbols-a legislative or 
other text-means absolutely nothing except in terms of a particular cultural 
background. And this dependence of the significance of symbols upon estab-
lished cultural background holds true of all symbols whatever. For example, 
the word "gift" in an English setting, means a donation; in a German setting, 
means poison. What this all signifies philosophically is that the distinction 
between text and cultural context is really a distinction between one part of 
the cultural heritage and another part; it is a distinction between the prevail-
ing symbol system and the rest of the culture. Nevertheless, the distinction is 
a practical one which is commonly made; and I have not hesitated to use it 
for the present purpose. 
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of knowledge are definitely hooked up with language devices. 
However, it is quite possible that a Frenchman may be con-
versant with the knowledge of today but unable to interpret 
a statute written in English. The interpreter must not only 
be possessed of knowledge; he must also be familiar with 
the particular language devices which refer to it. 
Sec. s-I I. Problems. I. A Michigan statute provides: 
"Words imputing to any female a want of chastity shall be 
deemed to be actionable in themselves. . . ." Mich. Stats. 
Ann. § 27.1370. Plaintiff, a married woman, brought action 
for slander based on this statute. The defendant admitted 
that, in an argument over some horses, he had called the 
plaintiff "you damned old bitch." The trial court instructed 
the jury that these words "did impute the want of chastity to 
Mrs. Warren" and that she was entitled to recover. The Su-
preme Court reversed the case on account of this instruction. 
It declared "We are of the opinion that the court erred in 
instructing the jury that the language admitted to have been 
used by defendant, under the circumstances alleged by him, 
was slanderous per se." 
This was all that was said on the subject by the court.1 
On what basis would you say that the court reached its 
decision? 
2. McBoyle v. United States.2 Mr. Justice Holmes deliv-
ered the opinion of the Court. 
"The petitioner was convicted of transporting from Ottawa, 
Illinois, to Guymon, Oklahoma, an airplane that he knew 
to have been stolen, and was sentenced to serve three years' 
imprisonment and to pay a fine of $2,000. The judgment 
was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit, 43 F. (2d) 273· A writ of certiorari was granted by 
this Court on the question whether the National Motor 
Vehicle Theft Act applies to aircraft. Act of October 29, 
1 Warren v. Ray, 155 Mich. 91 at 93 (1908). 
2 283 u.s. 25 (1931). 
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1919, c. 89,41 Stat. 324; U.S. Code, Title r8, § 408. That 
Act provides: 'Sec. 2. That when used in this Act: (a) The 
term "motor vehicle" shall include an automobile, automobile 
truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-
propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails; . . . 
Sec. 3· That whoever shall transport or cause to be trans-
ported in interstate or foreign commerce a motor vehicle, 
knowing the same to have been stolen, shall be punished 
by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment of 
not more than five years, or both.' 
"Section 2 defines the motor vehicles of which the trans-
portation in interstate commerce is punished in § 3· The 
question is the meaning of the word 'vehicle' in the phrase 
'any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running 
on rails.' No doubt etymologically it is possible to use the 
word to signify a conveyance working on land, water or air, 
and sometimes legislation extends the use in that direction, 
e.g., land and air, water being separately provided for, in 
the Tariff Act, September 22, 1922, c. 356, § 401 (b), 42 
Stat. 858, 948. But in everyday speech 'vehicle' calls up the 
picture of the thing moving on land. Thus in Rev. Stats. § 4, 
intended, the Government suggests, rather to enlarge than 
to restrict the definition, vehicle includes every contrivance 
capable of being used 'as a means of transportation on land.' 
And this is repeated, expressly excluding aircraft, in the 
Tariff Act, June 17, 1930, c. 997, § 401 (b); 46 Stat. 590, 
708. So here, the phrase under discussion calls up the popular 
picture. For after including automobile truck, automobile 
wagon and motor cycle, the words 'any other self-propelled 
vehicle not designed for running on rails' still indicate that 
a vehicle in the popular sense, that is a vehicle running on 
land, is the theme. It is a vehicle that runs, not something, 
not commonly called a vehicle, that flies. Airplanes were 
well known in 1919, when this statute was passed; but it 
is admitted that they were not mentioned in the reports or 
in the debates in Congress. It is impossible to read words 
that so carefully enumerate the different forms of motor 
vehicles and have no reference of any kind to aircraft, as 
including airplanes under a term that usage more and more 
precisely confines to a different class. The counsel for the 
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petitioner have shown that the phraseology of the statute 
as to motor vehicles follows that of earlier statutes of Con-
necticut, Delaware, Ohio, Michigan and Missouri, not to 
mention the late Regulations of Traffic for the District of 
Columbia, Title 6, c. 9, § 242, none of which can be supposed 
to leave the earth. 
"Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully 
consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it 
is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the 
world in language that the common world will understand, 
of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To 
make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should 
be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that 
evoke in the common mind only the picture of vehicles 
moving on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft 
simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, 
or upon the speculation that, if the legislature had thought 
of it, very likely broader words would have been used. 
United States v. Thind, 26I. U. S. 204, 209. 
''Judgment reversed." 
Where does Holmes get his information about the meaning 
of "vehicle"? How does he happen to know the manner in 
which planes move? How far are these points dealt with 
in the text of the statute? 
Ordinarily the court goes to the dictionary and other stand-
ard books of reference, if it is in doubt about the meaning 
of an expression which it is interpreting. Does this seem 
proper? 
Suppose the expression is defined in the statute itself, e.g., 
"motor vehicle" in the statute involved in the McBoyle Case. 
What difference does this make? 
Sec. s-I2. The legal context.1 Maitland once declared, in 
words often quoted, "The law is a seamless web." His words 
express neatly the idea that the mass of legal rules, principles, 
1 The sociologist regards the law as part of the culture of a community. 
In this sense he would treat the legal background as a mere part of the general 
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and doctrines, constitutes an integrated whole of which any 
particular law is only a part, and at the same time suggest the 
idea that the entire body of law is a general background for 
any individual legal provision. In this latter sense the law-
maker who frames a law really weaves a small strand into 
an already existing legal web; he takes an established legal 
fabric for granted and attaches his legislation to it. And, by 
the same token, the interpreter assumes and relies on the 
existing legal context; he can understand a particular legis-
lative provision only in relation to it. In working out the 
meaning of any provision, he must trace out connections 
between its terms and the existing legal setting. 
The legal context is traditionally divided into common 
law and legislation, and in line with this division we find 
several recognized rules of interpretation which are intended 
to guide the interpreter in developing the relationships of 
new pieces of legislation to established law. One declares 
that every statute is to be interpreted in the light of the 
common law; or, to use a quaint metaphor of Coke, "To 
know what the common law was before the making of the 
statute is the very lock and key to set open the windows of 
the statute." Another rule declares that statutes in derogation 
of the common law are to be strictly construed-a rule of 
somewhat doubtful virtue since its general tendency is to 
perpetuate antiquated common law at the expense of modern 
legislation. 
The integration of new legislation with existing legislation 
is equally important; and there are helpful rules to guide 
the interpreter in this part of his job. One part of the estab-
lished legal background consists of the constitutions. The 
interpreter must, if he can, harmonize a new statute with 
cultural background. But the legal background is so important for our purpose 
that I feel justified in treating it as something separate and distinct. See the 
remarks made in sec. 5-10, note z, regarding a similar distinction between 
language and culture. 
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these. If a statute conflicts with a constitutional provision, 
of course it is void; but this is not the only significance of 
constitutions. The interpreter presumes that the legislator 
did not intend his act to run afoul of constitutional provisions; 
the interpreter is required to adopt a construction which will 
avoid these consequences. Furthermore, the constitutions 
commonly state important policies regarding the public wel-
fare, the liberties of the individual, and other matters. These 
statements of policy have substantial weight in the inter-
pretation of statutes. Where the judicial interpreter has a 
choice between two interpretations he is always ready to 
choose that one which tends to effectuate, or which is in 
harmony with, such a constitutionally declared policy. 
Another part of the established legal background is made 
up of existing statutes. The interpreter draws on this existing 
material for aid in construing a new statutory provision and 
also tries to harmonize the latter with the existing law. Such 
efforts are in line with well-recognized rules of interpreta-
tion. For example, one such rule declares that any piece of 
legislation is to be interpreted in relation to existing legisla-
tion on the same subject. This rule is commonly called the in 
pari materia doctrine. According to this doctrine, if a new stat-
ute be passed dealing with some special feature of the law of 
corporations, this statute is to be interpreted in the light of 
existing legislation governing corporations; a new larceny 
statute is to be fitted into the existing law of larceny; a new 
tax regulation into the body of law and regulations on this 
subject; in short any legislative act is to be read in the light 
of other legislation on the same subject. 
And we cannot say that the legal background is limited 
merely to existing enactments and existing common law. 
Existing law has behind it a long history. The interpreter 
may consider this history to discover instructive trends. Such 
trends may be useful to him in guiding his choice between 
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different possible interpretations. Furthermore, he may travel 
outside the body of existing law to consider doctrines which 
have been developed by writers on legal subjects. Textbooks, 
encyclopedias, and other works on law, may furnish the inter-
preter with instruction or inspiration for his creative role, 
just as they serve the legislator as sources for ideas and 
materials which he embodies in enactments. So that we have 
to recognize that the sources on which the interpreter draws 
and the materials which he considers, include not only com-
mon law and legislation but also these extralegal writings 
about law. 
In connection with what has just been said about the use 
of legal background as a source of ideas, it is worth pausing 
to note more specifically how the interpreter may use legal 
background as a source of materials and what important 
materials he derives from it. In the legal background he 
may find four important kinds of material: (I) general 
notions of the ends of law; ( 2) definitions of legal ideas 
and existing classifications of legal material; (3) existing 
provisions which define the functions of officials and control 
their modes of action; (4) existing law dealing with the acts 
of individuals. Each of these four elements requires a word 
of comment as regards its status as part of the legal back-
ground. 
I. Prevailing notions of legal policy (ends of law) are 
part of the wider background of the legislator's act: preserva-
tion of the general peace, protection of property, freedom of 
contract and trade, safeguarding family relations, and so on. 
The lawmaker may or may not refer to these policies explic-
itly. But even if he says nothing about them, the interpreter 
assumes that the lawmaker had them in view. Recognized 
legal policies are frequently cited by the interpreter as reasons 
for choosing one interpretation rather than another, for cor-
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recting or limiting the operation of the text, or for filling a 
gap in the text. 
2. Definitions of legal ideas and existing classifications of 
legal material constitute an important part of the legal back-
ground. These definitions and classifications are found in 
various parts of the existing common and statutory law and 
in writings about law. The legislator usually expects the 
interpreter to find them for himself; the legislator does not 
feel obliged to state them out every time he enacts a new 
legislative provision, though occasionally a provision will 
contain definitions of important terms which it employs, as 
well as specifications of the way in which they are to be con-
strued in relation to existing law. 
3· Existing rules and principles which define the functions 
of officials and govern their acts also constitute a major 
element of the background of any new legislation. They 
are taken for granted by lawmaker and by interpreter; they 
are assumed to be part of the legislation just as if they were 
explicitly stated in it. The legislator who creates a new 
action for damages does not ordinarily say anything about 
the rules of pleading or procedure which are to govern the 
action. Nor does he undertake to tell the court how to inter-
pret the legislation in question. He expects all these effects 
of the legislation to be handled according to existing prin-
ciples and techniques of the legal system. Only if the law-
maker wants to make some special provision relative to the 
way in which the new legislation is to be applied, enforced, 
or interpreted, does he take the trouble to refer explicitly 
to general functions and techniques of officials. Nevertheless, 
those general functions and techniques constitute part of the 
significance of new legislation in the sense that they must 
be drawn upon as occasion requires and read into its terms 
by the interpreter. 
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4· New legislation affecting the individual is also incom-
plete and takes much for granted. Existing rules and prin-
ciples of law, which relate to acts and activities of the 
individual, supply the material which is to be read into 
the gaps and blanks of this new legislation. They furnish the 
materials for supplementing the express provisions of the 
new law so far as supplementation is later needed. In this 
respect the function of existing materials is analogous to the 
materials mentioned in the last preceding paragraph. 
Sec. s-IJ. Problems. I. In State v. McGowan (sec. 2-48, 
problem 2) a state statute provided simply that "arson" 
should be punished in a certain manner. The court had to 
decide whether setting fire to a new house, not yet occupied 
as a dwelling, constituted the crime of arson. More specifi-
cally the question was whether such a house was a dwelling 
for the purpose of this crime. Where did the court find the 
definition of arson, and the answer to the more specific 
question? 
2. It should be noted that the parts of a statute are to 
be construed in relation to one another. Any part finds an 
immediate verbal setting in the other parts. Each section is 
to be construed in the light of others, any clause in relation 
to other clauses and to the whole. Indeed, any word has to 
be construed in connection with the words which surround 
it. There are many established norms which recognize this 
method of construing parts with reference to one another. 
I shall mention only one, the maxim of ejusdem generis. 
This maxim is to the effect that general words, following 
an enumeration of specific things, are to be interpreted as 
limited to things of the same kind (ejusdem generis) as those 
specifically enumerated. ( Cf. remarks of Holmes, J., about 
the enumerated forms of motor vehicles in sec. 5-11 above.) 
This maxim and its application illustrate very well the 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION 341 
dependence of the meaning of one phrase or clause upon 
the phrases or clauses with which it is associated. 
3· Hoff v. State of New York.1 Appeal from a judgment, 
entered November 26, I937, upon an order of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial depart-
ment which affirmed a judgment in favor of defendant 
entered upon a decision of the Court of Claims dismissing 
on the merits a claim of the appellant. 
Lehman, J.: 
[I ] "The claimant on March 6, I 9 3 6, while confined 
to Tonawanda State Hospital under an order of the court, 
signed and verified a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
and placed it in a stamped envelope addressed to his attorney, 
A. Stanley Copeland. The claimant had been adjudged 
insane. It is the duty of an employee of the hospital, acting 
under the direction of the superintendent, to examine all 
the mail of patients confined in the hospital before the mail 
is sent out. The claimant, believing that he was sane, had 
written to many men in public life asking their assistance. 
The claimant's wife had been annoyed by inquiries from 
persons who have received such letters. She requested that 
all letters written by the claimant should be sent to her. The 
superintendent of the hospital acceded to her request and, 
by his directions, all mail, including the letter addressed to 
the claimant's attorney and containing the petition for the 
writ of habeas corpus, was forwarded to claimant's wife who 
suppressed the letter. On March 25th, Copeland presented 
a new petition verified by himself to the County Judge of 
Erie county. 
[ 2] "The writ was made returnable on March 30th before 
a jury. On April 2, I936, the claimant was discharged from 
custody after the jury had determined that he was sane. 
Our constitutional guarantees of liberty are merely empty 
words unless a person imprisoned or detained against his will 
may challenge the legality of his imprisonment and detention. 
The writ of habeas corpus is the process devised centuries 
1 279 N.Y. 490 (1939). 
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ago for the protection of free men. It has been cherished 
by generations of free men who had learned by experience 
that it furnished the only reliable protection of their freedom. 
The right of persons, deprived of liberty, to challenge in 
the courts the legality of their detention is safeguarded by 
the Constitution of the United States and by the Constitution 
of the State. The Legislature could not deprive any person 
within the State of the privilege of a writ of habeas corpus. 
(N. Y. Const. art. I, Sec. 4.) The superintendent of the 
hospital by diverting to claimant's wife the letter and petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus obstructed the claimant's right 
to test the legality of his imprisonment. Doubtless the super-
intendent acted in the honest belief that the claimant was 
insane. Nevertheless, his act delayed for a time a test of the 
claimant's sanity which, when made, resulted in his dis-
charge .... 
[3] "The right of the superintendent in the exercise of a 
reasonable discretion to censor the ordinary mail written by 
a patient who has been adjudged insane is not challenged. 
The question is whether the superintendent of a State hospital 
for the insane may in the exercise of his discretion obstruct 
or delay a challenge of the legality of detention by a patient 
held under a court order. To that question one answer is 
clearly dictated. The State cannot under the Constitution 
withhold the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It has 
not attempted to do so. On the contrary, the Legislature 
has provided that 'any one in custody as an insane person, 
. . . is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, upon a proper 
application made by him or some relative or friend in his 
behalf.' (Mental Hygiene Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 27), 
§ 204.) An officer of the State . . . may not by indirection 
accomplish what the Constitution forbids to the State. He 
may not lawfully withhold from a person so detained the 
opportunity to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. . . . 
[4] "The Legislature in the Civil Practice Act has made 
clear that under no circumstances may the grant of the writ 
of habeas corpus, or a hearing upon the writ when granted, 
be refused or delayed. A judge authorized to grant the writ 
'must grant it without delay' whenever a petition therefor 
is presented and for violation of that command a judge 
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forfeits to the prisoner $I,ooo. (§ 1235.) It may not be 
disobeyed for any defect of form. It may be served even 
on a Sunday ( § 1242) and 'the court or judge before which 
or whom the prisoner is brought by virtue of a writ of habeas 
corpus . . . must examine, immediately after the return of 
the writ, into the facts alleged in the return and into the 
cause of the imprisonment or restraint of the prisoner.' 
(§ 1251.) 
[ 5] "The act of the superintendent was an act of mis-
feasance, and the State may be held liable for any damages 
caused by that act. (Martindale v. State, 269 N. Y. 554.) 
In this case the damages were probably very small but there 
can be no doubt that the claimant's challenge, ultimately 
successful, was delayed for approximately two weeks. 
"The judgments of the Appellate Division and of the 
Court of Claims should be reversed and a new trial granted, 
with costs to abide the event." 
(This decision by one of our leading courts is interesting 
to us because of the manner in which the court reaches its 
conclusion; it is also interesting because, as a note writer in 
the Michigan Law Review says, "No case has been found 
to parallel this decision.") 2 
In arriving at his decision is Judge Lehman warranted 
in considering the provisions of the Mental Hygiene Law 
(referred to in paragraph [3]) and the provisions of the 
Civil Practice Act (referred to in paragraph [ 4] of this 
opinion)? In what way are these materials relevant to his 
conclusion? 
What is the relevance of the judge's view that "The writ 
of habeas corpus is the process devised centuries ago for the 
protection of free men. It has been cherished by generations 
of free men who had learned by experience that it furnished 
the only reliable protection of their freedom."? 
We have been talking of interpretation here. Have you 
paused to think just what it is we are interpreting? Is it the 
2 38 MICH. L. REV. 103 (1939). 
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clause of the New York Constitution mentioned in paragraph 
[ 2] ? Is it the Mental Hygiene Law mentioned in para-
graph [3]? Is the court merely elaborating the scope of 
the common law action for false imprisonment? Or do you 
have some other suggestion regarding the subject matter 
(text) of interpretation? 
Sec. s-I 4· History and circumstances of enactment: ex-
trinsic aids. We have now discussed the general context of 
enactment and the legal context. It remains to consider a 
third contextual factor, the history and circumstances of the 
specific provision's enactment. This context is often char-
acterized by the plural title "extrinsic aids." It includes the 
occasion for enactment, e.g., the existence of a depression or 
a crime wave; the legislative history of the passage of the 
provision, embracing all changes in its wording from intro-
duction to final approval; the report of the legislative com-
mittee or official agency or outside group, which prepared 
the draft of the provision for submission to the legislative 
body; the report of a committee to which the draft was 
referred for examination and recommendation; and state-
ments of persons charged with steering the provision in 
question through the legislative processes, made during its 
consideration and enactment. 
There is no sharp line to divide the specific history from 
the general background. The latter may be regarded as the 
more remote circumstances of enactment; the "history and 
circumstances," in which we are now interested, as the imme-
diate circumstances. And there is no clear-cut distinction 
between the specific legal conditions (occasion) out of which 
the enactment in question evolved, and the wider legal 
background. But distinctions are not useless because they are 
not clearly or sharply marked. There are practical differ-
ences between the significance of general context and legal 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION 345 
context on the one hand, and specific conditions and origins 
on the other. Courts have recognized and acted on these 
differences in the processes of interpreting statutes; the courts 
have appreciated that general conditions, cultural or legal, 
can be taken to be commonly known, while specific historical 
materials cannot be supposed to be open to everyone who 
must act on the basis of the legislation.1 
For the reason just stated, not all courts have been ready 
to resort to these "extrinsic aids" to interpretation. The 
English courts have, generally speaking, refused to consider 
them at alP The federal courts in this country make full 
use of these extrinsic aids. The state courts do not reject 
them outright, but have made much less use of them than 
the federal courts have done. It is not worth our while to 
go into detail here regarding the actual holdings of the 
cases.* Such a discussion would require more complete infor-
mation than you possess, regarding technical rules of evidence 
and other matters. It will suffice, for our present purpose, 
to state for your consideration (in the next section) a rela-
tively recent case in the United States Supreme Court, which 
1 See Justice Jackson, "The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says 
or What the Court Says," 34 A. B. A. J. 535,537-8 (1948). 
2 See Davies, "The Interpretation of Statutes in the Light of Their Policy 
by the English Courts," 35 CoL. L. REV. 519 (1935). 
* (I.R.) The initiated reader may be interested in a reference to a few 
instructive articles on this difficult subject. See Chamberlain, "The Courts and 
Committee Reports," 1 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 81 (1933); Davies, "The Interpre-
tation of Statutes in the Light of Their Policy by the English Courts," 35 
CoL. L. REV. 519 (1935); tenBroek, "Admissibility and Use by the United 
States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction," 2.6 
CALIF. L. REv. 2.87, 437, and 664 (1938); tenBroek, "Use by the United 
States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction," 2.7 
CALIF. L. REV. 157 (1939); Powell, "Construction of Written Instruments," 
14 IND. L. J. 199, 309, 397 (1939), same article in abbreviated form in 2.5 
A. B. A. J. 185 ( 1939); Jones, "The Plain Meaning Rule and Extrinsic Aids 
in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes," 2.5 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 2. (1939); 
Jones, "Extrinsic Aids in the Federal Courts," 2.5 IOWA L. REV. 737 (1940); 
Nutting, "The Relevance of Legislative Intention Established by Extrinsic 
Evidence," 2.0 BosTON UNIV. L. REv. 601 (1940); De Sloovere, "Extrinsic 
Aids in the Interpretation of Statutes," 8 8 U. OF P A. L. REv. 52.7 (I 940). 
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will show the variety of extrinsic aids which can be resorted 
to for the purpose of interpreting a federal statute. 
Sec. s-Is. Problems. I. Nye v. United States.1 E, as 
administrator of his son's estate, had entered suit against 
B and C for the wrongful death of his son. One hundred 
miles from the courthouse, M and N, by plying E with 
liquor, induced him to terminate the action. E was illiterate 
and "feeble in mind and body." N, through his lawyer, 
prepared and mailed letters to the trial judge asking that 
the case be dismissed, and filed a final administration account, 
for which he paid the fee. E was promised, and received, 
nothing for the dismissal. Upon the motion of E's attorney, 
an order to show cause why M and N should not be attached 
and held for contempt of court was issued. The district judge 
found that the intent and effect of the actions of M and N 
were to prevent a trial on the merits and adjudged them 
guilty of contempt. The judgment was affirmed by the circuit 
court of appeals. On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed 
the judgments below. 
Douglas, J ., speaking for the Court, said in part: 
[I] "The question is whether the conduct of petitioners 
constituted 'misbehavior . . . so near' the presence of the 
court 'as to obstruct the administration of justice' within the 
meaning of § 268 of the Judicial Code. That section derives 
from the Act of March 2, 1831 (4 Stat. 487). The Act of 
1789 (1 Stat. 73, 83) provided that courts of the United 
States 'shall have power . . . to punish by fine or imprison-
ment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of author-
ity in any cause or hearing before the same.' Abuses arose, 
culminating in impeachment proceedings against James H. 
Peck, a federal district judge, who had imprisoned and dis-
barred one Lawless for publishing a criticism of one of his 
opinions in a case which was on appeal. Judge Peck was ac-
1 313 u. s. 33 (1914). 
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quitted. But the history of that episode makes abundantly 
clear that it served as the occasion for a drastic delimitation 
by Congress of the broad undefined power of the inferior 
federal courts under the Act of I 789. 
[2] "The day after Judge Peck's acquittal Congress took 
steps to change the Act of I 789. The House directed its 
Committee on the Judiciary 'to inquire into the expediency 
of defining by statute all offences which may be punished 
as contempts of the courts of the United States, and also 
to limit the punishment for the same.' Nine days later James 
Buchanan brought in a bill which became the Act of March 
2, I 8 3 r. He had charge of the prosecution of Judge Peck 
and during the trial had told the Senate: 'I will venture to 
predict, that whatever may be the decision of the Senate 
upon this impeachment, Judge Peck has been the last man 
in the United States to exercise this power, and Mr. Lawless 
has been its last victim.' The Act of March 2, I 8 3 I, 'declara-
tory of the law concerning contempts of court,' contained two 
sections, the first of which provided: 'That the power of the 
several courts of the United States to issue attachments and 
inflict summary punishments for contempts of court, shall 
not be construed to extend to any cases except the misbe-
haviour of any person or persons in the presence of the said 
courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration 
of justice, the misbehaviour of any of the officers of the said 
courts in their official transactions, and the disobedience or 
resistance by an officer of the said courts, party, juror, witness, 
or any other person or persons, to any lawful writ, process, 
order, rule, decree, or command of the said courts.' 
[3] "Sec. 2 of that Act, from which§ I35 of the Criminal 
Code (35 Stat. I 113, I 8 U. S.C. § 24I) derives, provided: 
'That if any person or persons shall, corruptly, or by threats 
or force, endeavour to influence, intimidate, or impede any 
juror, witness, or officer, in any court of the United States, 
in the discharge of his duty, or shall, corruptly, or by threats 
or force, obstruct, or impede, or endeavour to obstruct or 
impede, the due administration of justice therein, every 
person or persons, so offending, shall be liable to prosecution 
therefor, by indictment, and shall on conviction thereof, be 
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punished, by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by 
imprisonment, not exceeding three months, or both, according 
to the nature and aggravation of the offence.' . . . 
[ 4] "Congress was responding to grievances arising out 
of the exercise of judicial power as dramatized by the Peck 
impeachment proceedings. Congress was intent on curtailing 
that power. The two sections of the Act of March 2, I 8 3 I 
when read together, as they must be, clearly indicate that 
the category of criminal cases which could be tried without 
a jury was narrowly confined .... 
[5] "Mindful of that history, we come to the construction 
of § 268 of the Judicial Code in light of the specific facts 
of this case. The question is whether the words 'so near 
thereto' have a geographical or a causal connotation. Read 
in their context and in the light of their ordinary meaning, 
we conclude that they are to be construed as geographical 
terms .... 
[ 6] "We are dealing here only with a problem of statutory 
construction, not with a question as to the constitutionally 
permissible scope of the contempt power.* ... 
[ 7] "We may concede that there was an obstruction in the 
administration of justice, as evidenced by the long delay and 
large expense which the reprehensible conduct of petitioners 
entailed .... 
"The fact that in purpose and effect there was an obstruc-
tion in the administration of justice did not bring the con-
demned conduct within the vicinity of the court in any normal 
meaning of the term. It was not misbehavior in the vicinity 
of the court disrupting to quiet and order or actually inter-
rupting the court in the conduct of its business. Cf. Savin, 
Petitioner, supra, at p. 278. Hence, it was not embraced 
within § 268 of the Judicial Code. If petitioners can be pun-
ished for their misconduct, it must be under the Criminal 
Code where they will be afforded the normal safeguards 
surrounding criminal prosecutions. Accordingly, the judg-
ment below is Reversed." 2 
* (I.R.) ·The constitutional question here mentioned was considered and 
decided in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. :z.s:z. (1941). 
2 A large part of the majority opinion, in which the Court considered and 
overruled Toledo Newspaper v. United States, 2.47 U. S. 402. (1918), has 
been omitted. 
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Stone, J ., wrote a dissenting opinion in which the Chief 
Justice and Roberts, J ., concurred. 
Note the first four paragraphs of Justice Douglas' opinion. 
What are the principal factors which he invoked as aids in 
construing this act of Congress? How would you distinguish 
the directions of the House to its Committee on the Judiciary 
and the remarks of James Buchanan (in paragraph [ 2] ) , 
from the statement of the sponsor which was denied con-
sideration in the Partlow Case in section 5-04 above? 
2. In the McBoyle Case, section 5-I I, problem 2, 
Holmes, J., said: 
"Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully 
consider the text of a law before he murders or steals, it is 
reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world 
in language that the common world will understand, of what 
the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make 
the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear. 
When a rule of conduct is laid down in words that evoke 
in the common mind only the picture of vehicles moving 
on land, the statute should not be extended to aircraft simply 
because it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or 
upon the speculation that if the legislature had thought of 
it, very likely broader words would have been used." 
At another point in his opinion he said "Airplanes were 
well known in I 9 I 9 when this statute was passed, but it is 
admitted that they were not mentioned in the reports or 
the debates in Congress." Suppose airplanes had been men-
tioned and suppose it had been clear from the reports and 
debates that airplanes were intended to be included in the 
term "vehicle," should the statute have been construed to 
apply to McBoyle's act? 
3. Suppose the occasion and purpose for a statute are set 
forth in a preamble or in a preliminary . section (see for 
example the federal statute regarding issuance of injunctions 
in labor disputes, which is quoted in sec. 4-I 9). What differ-
ence should this explicit statement make? 
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Sec. s-I6. Nature of rules of interpretation. The acts of 
the interpreter are guided by rules just as the acts of the 
legislator are. In fact, the rules which prescribe standards 
for the interpreter are part and parcel of the rules applicable 
to officials. They are rules which apply to a judge when he 
does a particular kind of act, i. e., interprets legislation. The 
existence and operation of these rules furnish added reasons 
for not accepting the "free interpretation" theory without 
reservations. The interpreter's act is not unrestrained; it is 
not freely creative as is the act of the legislator who enacts 
the text to be interpreted. The interpreter's act is not only 
tied to the legislative text, but is controlled also by estab-
lished rules of interpretation/ 
Some of the rules which guide the interpreter have already 
been noted incidentally in the preceding sections; this notice 
could hardly have been avoided in view of the important 
functions of these rules in the interpretive process. But I 
saved the discussion of their nature and operation until this 
point; I felt that it was necessary to dispose first of the inter-
preter's role and of the material with which he works. The 
rules of interpretation are primarily concerned with the 
ways in which the interpreter handles the legislative text 
and its context. Having finished the consideration of the 
text and context as such, we are now ready to examine the 
rules which guide the interpreter in the performance of his 
functions. 
The rules with which we are concerned are rules of 
method; they are techniques. They tell the interpreter how 
he is to handle text, when and how he should refer to context, 
how to resolve ambiguities, how to eliminate inconsistencies, 
and how to restrict, expand, or supplement the language of 
legislation. On the whole, these rules have been judicially 
1 In fact, the obligation of the interpreter to begin with the text, i.e., with 
the language used, can be regarded as itself a rule of interpretation, the most 
fundamental of all such rules. 
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developed, that is to say they are part of the common law. 
They are rules which the courts have worked out over the 
centuries for their own guidance in elaborating, correcting 
and supplementing the legislative product. But some of these 
common law rules have been deemed so important that they 
have been embodied in constitutional provisions. And in 
recent decades some of the states have, by so-called "statutory 
construction acts," wholly or partially codified the judicially 
developed rules and in some particulars modified them.2 
In their character of rules of method, the rules of inter-
pretation have to be differentiated from ordinary rules of 
law. They are rules for interpreting rules. They do not serve 
the same function as rules which govern the activity of Tom, 
Dick and Harry, and fix their relations to one another. They 
do not have the same role in the legal system as the common 
rules which govern the activities of officials. The rules which 
govern individuals and officials constitute the subject matter 
with which the interpreter works, whereas the rules of inter-
pretation tell him how to do his work. Only the greatest 
confusion of thought can result from the failure to keep the 
interpretive rules clearly in view, from the failure to dis-
tinguish them from the rules being interpreted. If we were 
concerned with the repair of a house, we would not need to 
be warned against confusing the house with the methods used 
in repairing it; nor would there be danger of confusing 
methods of repair with the physical materials which go into 
the repair of the house. But when we leave the physical realm 
and deal with processes of correcting and supplementing legal 
rules we find ourselves in serious danger of blending the 
rules we are interpreting, with rules of interpretation, and 
with other existing legal rules which constitute a major part 
of the background for the interpreter's work. To specify 
further there are three kinds of rules to distinguish and to 
2 Typical is the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act, PURDON's PA. 
STAT. ANN, tit. 46, § 501 et seq. 
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keep clearly in view: First, there are the legal rules which 
are the subject matter of interpretation; these are analogous 
to the house which is to be repaired. Second, there are the 
rules of method which govern the interpreter as he corrects 
and supplements the legislation which he is interpreting; 
these are parallel to the methods of repairing the house and 
are the rules of interpretation in which we are presently 
interested. Third, there are the rules, principles, and objec-
tives of the law, already established and existing, which form 
a background for our interpretive problems; these are com-
parable to the material which is used in the repairing of 
the house and like that material they may be built into and 
added to the rule which is being interpreted. Confusion is 
easy here because subject matter, methods, and material are 
all rules or guides for conduct. To overlook the rules of 
interpretation is likewise easy because rules of interpretation 
are more or less taken for granted and do not have the 
prominent place in attention which is occupied by the subject 
matter of interpretation or the existing law to which it is 
being related. The interpretive rules need to be clearly seen 
as rules of a distinct and special kind which tell the inter-
preter how to clarify, correct and supplement the rules set 
forth in legislative texts. 
Sec. s-I7. Problems-types of rules. I. The expression 
"rules of interpretation" is commonly applied to a wide 
variety of guiding standards for the interpreter. These stand-
ards have only the one feature in common, their guidance 
function; all tell the interpreter how he shall carry on some 
phase of the interpretive process. They range all the way 
from specific rules-rules in a strict and accurate sense-
through principles and presumptions, to the most general 
doctrines and prescribed attitudes. For example the term may 
include such varied elements as the following: (I) a specific 
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rule that when a period of time is referred to in any law, such 
period shall be so computed in all cases as to exclude the first 
and include the last day; ( 2) a principle that associated 
words explain and limit each other, or a principle that 
ordinary word~ are to be taken in their plain and ordinary 
sense; (3) a presumption, that the legislature does not intend 
a result which is absurd; and (4) a prescribed attitude, such 
as that which is expressed in the doctrine that penal statutes 
are to be strictly construed. 
It would serve no good purpose to attempt to furnish an 
exhaustive list of rules of interpretation. The rules are listed 
in standard works on interpretation and are the chief subject 
matter of discussion in courses on legislation. It will be 
enough if I introduce you to a few of the common rules and 
give you an opportunity of "spotting" a few of them in a 
decided case. Accordingly, I suggest that you see how many 
such rules you can point out in the opinion of the court and 
in the opinion of the dissenting judges in the following case: 
Caminetti v. United States.1 Mr. Justice Day delivered 
the opinion of the court: 
" ... The petitioner was indicted in the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California, upon 
the sixth day of May 1913, for alleged violations of the act. 
The indictment was in four counts, the first of which charged 
him with transporting and causing to be transported and aid-
ing and assisting in obtaining transportation for a certain 
woman from Sacramento, California to Reno, Nevada, in 
interstate commerce for the purpose of debauchery, and for 
an immoral purpose, to wit, that the aforesaid woman should 
be and become his mistress and concubine. A verdict of not 
guilty was returned as to the other three counts of this indict-
ment. As to the first count defendant was found guilty and 
sentenced to imprisonment for eighteen months and to pay a 
fine of $r,soo.oo. Upon writ of error to the United States 
l Z4Z U.S. 470 (1916). 
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Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that judgment 
was affirmed. 220 Fed. Rep. 545. . . . 
"It is contended that the act of Congress is intended to 
reach only 'commercialized vice,' or the traffic in women for 
gain, and that the conduct for which the several petitioners 
were indicted and convicted, however reprehensible in mor-
als, is not within the purview of the statute when properly 
construed in the light of its history and the purposes intended 
to be accomplished by its enactment. In none of the cases 2 
was it charged or proved that the transportation was for gain 
or for the purpose of furnishing women for prostitution for 
hire, and it is insisted that, such being the case, the acts 
charged and proved, upon which conviction was had, do not 
come within the statute. 
"It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the 
first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is 
framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the 
constitutional authority of the law-making body which passed 
it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according 
to its terms. Lake County v. Rollins, r 30 U. S. 662, 670, 
67r. ... 
"Where the language is plain and admits of no more than 
one meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise and 
the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no dis-
cussion. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 414, 421. There 
is no ambiguity in the terms of this act. It is specifically made 
an offense to knowingly transport or cause to be transported, 
etc., in interstate commerce, any woman or girl for the pur-
pose of prostitution or debauchery, or for 'any other immoral 
purpose,' or with the intent and purpose to induce any such 
woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to 
debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice. 
"Statutory words are uniformly presumed, unless the 
1 contrary appears, to be used in their ordinary and usual sense, 
and with the meaning commonly attributed to them . . . 
while the title of an act cannot overcome the meaning of 
plain and unambiguous words used in its body . . . , the 
title of this act embraces the regulation of interstate commerce 
2 Three cases were heard and decided together by the Supreme Court: 
Caminetti v. United States, Diggs v. United States and Hays v. United States. 
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'by prohibiting the transportation therein for immoral pur-
poses of women and girls and for other purposes.' It is true 
that § 8 of the act provides that it shall be known and 
referred to as the 'White-slave traffic Act,' and the report 
accompanying the introduction of the same into the House of 
Representatives set forth the fact that a material portion of 
the legislation suggested was to meet conditions which had 
arisen in the past few years, and that the legislation was 
needed to put a stop to a villainous interstate and inter-
national traffic in women and girls. Still, the name given to 
an act by way of designation or description, or the report 
which accompanies it, cannot change the plain import of its 
words. If the words are plain, they give meaning to the act, 
and it is neither the duty nor the privilege of the courts to 
enter speculative fields in search of a different meaning. 
'.'Reports to Congress accompanying the introduction of 
proposed laws may aid the courts in reaching the true mean-
ing of the legislature in cases of doubtful interpretation. . . . 
But, as we have already said, and it has been so often affirmed 
as to become a recognized rule, when words are free from 
doubt they must be taken as the final expression of the legis-
lative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from 
by considerations drawn from titles or designating names or 
reports accompanying their introduction, or from any extra-
neous source. In other words, the language being plain, and 
not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, 
it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent. See 
Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 308 .... 
"The judgment . . . is Affirmed. . . . 
"Mr. Justice McKenna, with whom concurred the Chief 
Justice and Mr. Justice Clarke, dissenting. 
"Undoubtedly in the investigation of the meaning of a 
statute we resort first to its words, and when clear they are 
decisive. The principle has attractive and seemingly disposing 
simplicity, but that it is not easy of application or, at least, 
encounters other principles, many cases demonstrate. The 
words of a statute may be uncertain in their signification or 
in their application. If the words be ambiguous, the problem 
they present is to be resolved by their definition; the subject-
matter and the lexicons become our guides. But here, even, 
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we are not exempt from putting ourselves in the place of the 
legislators. If the words be clear in meaning but the objects 
to which they are addressed be uncertain, the problem then 
is to determine the uncertainty. And for this a realization of 
conditions that provoked the statute must inform our judg-
ment. Let us apply these observations to the present case. 
"The transportation which is made unlawful is of a woman 
or girl 'to become a prostitute or to give herself up to de-
bauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice.' Our 
present concern is with the words 'any other immoral prac-
tice,' which, it is asserted, have a special office. The words 
are clear enough as general descriptions; they fail in par-
ticular designation; they are class words, not specifications. 
Are they controlled by those which precede them? If not, 
they are broader in generalization and include those that 
precede them, making them unnecessary and confusing. To 
what conclusion would this lead us? 'Immoral' is a very com-
prehensive word. It means a dereliction of morals. In such 
sense it covers every form of vice, every form of conduct 
that is contrary to good order. It will hardly be contended 
that in this sweeping sense it is used in the statute. But if not 
used in such sense, to what is it limited and by what limited? 
If it be admitted that it is limited at all, that ends the 
imperative effect assigned to it in the opinion of the court. 
But not insisting quite on that, we ask again, By what is it 
limited? By its context, necessarily, and the purpose of the 
statute. 
"For the context I must refer to the statute; of the purpose 
of the statute Congress itself has given us illumination. It 
devotes a section to the declaration that the 'Act shall be 
known and referred to as the "White-slave traffic Act." ' And 
its prominence gives it prevalence in the construction of the 
statute. It cannot be pushed aside or subordinated by indefi-
nite words in other sentences, limited even there by the con-
text. It is a peremptory rule of construction that all parts 
of a statute must be taken into account in ascertaining its 
meaning, and it cannot be said that § 8 has no object. Even 
if it gives only a title to the act it has especial weight. United 
States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 91 U. S. 72, 82. But it 
gives more than a title; it makes distinctive the purpose of 
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the statute. The designation 'White-slave traffic' has the 
sufficiency of an axiom. If apprehended, there is no uncer-
tainty as to the conduct it describes. It is commercialized vice, 
immoralities having a mercenary purpose, and this is con-
firmed by other circumstances. 
" ... Any measure that protects the purity of women 
from assault or enticement to degradation finds an instant 
advocate in our best emotions; but the judicial function 
cannot yield to emotion-it must, with poise of mind, con-
sider and decide. It should not shut its eyes to the facts of 
the world and assume not to know what everybody else 
knows. And everybody knows that there is a difference 
between the occasional immoralities of men and women and 
that systematized and mercenary immorality epitomized in 
the statute's graphic phrase, 'White-slave traffic.' And it was 
such immorality that was in the legislative mind and not 
the other. The other is occasional, not habitual-incon-
spicuous-does not offensively obtrude upon public notice. 
Interstate commerce is not its instrument as it is of the other, 
nor is prostitution its object or its end. It may, indeed, in 
instances, find a convenience in crossing state lines, but this 
is its accident, not its aid. 
"There is danger in extending a statute beyond its purpose, 
even if justified by a strict adherence to its words. The 
purpose is studied, all effects measured, not left at random-
one evil practice presented, opportunity given to another. 
The present case warns against ascribing such improvidence to 
the statute under review. Blackmailers of both sexes have 
arisen, using the terrors of the construction now sanctioned 
by this court as a help-indeed, the means-for their brig-
andage. The result is grave and should give us pause. It 
certainly will not be denied that legal authority justifies the 
rejection of a construction which leads to mischievous conse-
quences, if the statute be susceptible of another construction. 
. . . the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Clarke concur in this 
dissent." 
The rules of interpretation which are applied in this case, 
relate chiefly to the use of contextual factors: when is context 
to be referred to and when not. Why did the majority of 
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the court feel bound to reject references to the history of 
this act? 
2. In reading and interpreting the language of past works, 
historical, scientific, and literary, the reader is usually desir-
ous of putting himself in the writer's position; he wants to 
know what the writer meant when he wrote, not what he 
would mean if he were writing today. And traditionally the 
judicial interpreter adopts the same approach to the legal 
mandates which have come down from the past; he assumes 
that he is expected to find out what the legislative mandate 
meant when it was issued. Indeed, the judicial interpreter 
regards himself as bound by a principle which requires him 
to read the legislator's declaration in the context in which 
it was enacted. 
What would you think of a proposal to have the courts 
continuously reinterpret constitutional provisions in the light 
of present times and needs, i.e., present context?* 
Suppose courts always interpreted statutes as if they were 
written today. Would this be the same method of interpre-
tation as that represented by the "free interpretation" theory? 
TYPICAL INTERPRETIVE PROBLEMS 
Sec. s-IB. Types of problems. So much for the role of 
the interpreter, the sources on which he draws, and the rules 
which control his operations. Now let us turn to some appli-
cations and illustrations of the principles that have been 
developed, to some typical interpretive problems. Suppose 
* (I.R.) On the proposal here made, see the observations of Kohler in 
"Judicial Interpretation of Enacted Law," translated and quoted in Science 
of Legal Method (American Legal Philosophy Series) 187-200 (1917). 
Compare the following decisions of the Supreme Court which indicate a 
readiness to consider present context (needs) as well as context of enactment, 
in construing the Federal Constitution: McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 
407, 415 (1819); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884); Weems 
v. United States, 217 U. S. 349, 373 (1910); Missouri v. Holland, 252. 
U. S. 416, 433-434 (1920); Home Bldg. and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 
U.S. 398,442-443 (1934); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 2.99 (1941); 
and United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters' Ass'n, 322. U.S. 533 (1944). 
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the language of legislation is ambiguous, how is the ambi-
guity to be resolved? Or suppose the language is general, 
how far is the interpreter free to fill in details or to extend 
the language or restrict its meaning? Or suppose the indica-
tions of the words and the indications of context point in 
different directions, is the meaning suggested by the words 
or the meaning suggested by extrinsic aids to be preferred? 
Or finally, suppose the language of legislation is incomplete, 
how far are the various elements of setting to be drawn upon 
to supply what the words do not declare? Such are the basic 
problems which confront the interpreter. 
For the purpose of convenient treatment I shall divide the 
interpreter's problems into five main types: 
Resolving ambiguity. 
Reconciling inconsistency. 
Reading details into general provision. 
Restrictive interpretation of general provision. 
Extensive interpretation of general provision. 
Sec. s-I9. Resolving ambiguity. Here we start with a 
situation where the text itself points to two or more possible 
meanings. A rather trivial example will show what I mean. 
A business man receives a scribbled note reading, "Your suit 
is ready to try tomorrow. Smith." He hands the note to his 
secretary and says, "Look at that. I cannot tell whether it 
comes from my lawyer or my tailor. Both are named Smith." 
In this case, the word "suit" has two distinct meanings; 
likewise the word "try"; and the name Smith may refer to 
either of two persons. The note is ambiguous in the sense 
that I have in mind. Earlier in this chapter I mentioned the 
case of the statute which was similarly ambiguous; the statute 
which forbade the sale of liquor within three miles of Mount 
Zion Church, in Gaston County.1 On its face, such a statute 
would appear to be clear and sufficiently definite, yet in actual 
I Sec. s-o+. 
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application it turned out to be ambiguous, as there were two 
Mount Zion Churches in said county, one for white persons, 
the other for colored persons. Not a few such ambiguities 
develop even in the most carefully drafted statutes. 
How do these ambiguities happen? Basically, the cause 
of ambiguity is to be found in the nature of language itself. 
It would be utterly impossible to have a specific symbol for 
each and every idea which anyone wants to express. The 
burden of creating, learning and retaining so many words 
would be overwhelming. Instead, we make every one of 
our verbal symbols serve in a number of different type 
situations; practically every important word in the dictionary 
has not one but many meanings. On the one side, this multiple 
use of symbols represents an economy of human effort. On 
the other side it entails danger of confusion; it is the basic 
cause of ambiguity. Yet multiple usage is not the only cause 
of ambiguity in actual life situations. The danger of ambi-
guity is a danger which varies with the way in which persons 
use language. A careful and explicit use of terms will elim-
inate much of the danger; carelessness, ignorance, or lack 
of foresight on the part of the one who uses language, 
increases the danger. For example, in the case of the note 
from the tailor or the lawyer, the ambiguity would not have 
existed if the writer had used his business stationery and 
perhaps not if he had signed his full name. The ambiguity 
would not have existed in case of the churches, if the framer 
of the statute had expressed a little more fully what he had 
in mind and had declared that the statute was applicable to 
Mount Zion Church for colored people. In short, while 
ambiguity is a danger which can never be completely avoided, 
it is a danger which can be greatly reduced by a careful and 
explicit use of language. 
Whatever the cause, ambiguity means a problem for the 
interpreter, a problem of choosing between competing mean-
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ings. Of course, the choice is not absolutely compulsory. The 
court which is called upon to apply a statute which is ambig-
uous in its application may treat the ambiguity as fatal; it 
may refuse to apply the statute at alP But as regards most 
ambiguities, this is not the course taken by the interpreter. 
He feels obliged to choose if he can, and to give effect to one 
of the two or more meanings of which the statutory language 
is capable. This method of dealing with problems of ambi-
guity is the method in which we are interested. What does 
the interpreter do when he undertakes to resolve an ambi-
guity? On what basis does he decide in favor of one meaning 
or another? 
In part the interpreter is guided by rules which aid in 
making a choice between possible meanings of language. One 
such rule requires that he adopt the popular meaning of 
words; it declares that the language of a legislative text is 
to be taken in its ordinary or popular sense. You will remem-
ber that Justice Holmes recognized and followed this rule 
in his opinion in McBoyle v. United States.8 He had to 
decide whether an airplane was a vehicle within the meaning 
of a federal statute which penalized the transportation of a 
stolen motor vehicle from one state to another. He said, "No 
doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word to signify 
a conveyance working on land, water or air .... But in 
everyday speech 'vehicle' calls up the picture of a thing 
moving on land." He concluded, therefore, that, as an air-
plane did not fall within the meaning of "vehicle" in the 
popular sense, its transportation from one state to another 
was not punishable under this statute. The rule is one of 
preference, however; it establishes a mere presumption in 
2 In the Partlow (Mount Zion ChurchY Case, the court's language suggests 
that ambiguity is generally fatal; however, it is not quite clear that the court 
would have refused to choose between the two Mount Zion churches if there 
had been competent evidence (such as a record of debates) on which to predi-
cate a choice. 
3 Sec. s-I I. 
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favor of the popular meaning, not an absolute prescription. 
The context or counter-presumptions may nullify its effect 
so that the interpreter derives only a tentative guidance from 
this rule. 
As a general canon of interpretation, this rule appears 
founded on good reasons. In the first place, the legislative 
provision which is being construed is framed by a legislative 
body presumably drawn from all walks of life and composed 
of persons with different verbal backgrounds and different 
kinds of experience. These men have agreed upon a verbal 
text. It is natural to assume that the standard of usage, which 
this heterogeneous group has followed in adopting its text, 
is the common or popular standard. In the second place, 
legislative provisions are normally framed so as to be appli-
cable to persons generally. So far as they do apply to the 
general population, the popular sense of terms offers the 
appropriate and expectable standard of interpretation. 
Another general rule, which serves as a companion to the 
rule just discussed, and which may aid the interpreter in 
making a choice between possible meanings, is the rule that 
technical terms are to be interpreted in a technical sense. 
Different professions and occupations have their peculiar 
terms and these are sometimes used in legislation; where 
this is the case, the interpreter is directed to adopt the 
technical meaning in his interpretation.4 
But it is sometimes hard to decide whether language is 
used in a popular or a technical sense; usages change; they 
are not clearly divided. As I have said earlier, technical terms 
often become popular, by a slow process of adoption. Thus 
the word "legacy" would usually be regarded as a technical 
legal term, a word used by lawyers to refer to a testamentary 
4. In regard to technical legal terms, the rule which requires that technical 
terms be interpreted in a technical sense is identical with the rule that requires 
the interpreter to find his definitions of legal (i.e., technical) terms in the 
common law and other repositories of legal learning. 
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gift of personal property. In popular usage, however, the 
word "legacy" is often employed in a more comprehensive 
sense to include testamentary gifts of personal property, or 
real property, or both. If the legislature uses the term 
"legacy" in a statute, the interpreter may well decide, as the 
Colorado Supreme Court did in a case of this sort, that the 
term bears a popular meaning.5 In so doing the interpreter 
is aided by a rule of preference favoring the popular meaning 
and based on reasons set forth in an earlier paragraph. 
Of material assistance in resolving ambiguities are also 
a variety of rules which instruct the interpreter in the use 
of the verbal context of the ambiguous word or phrase.6 
Typical are the rule of ejusdem generis and the rule that 
words are to be construed in relation to their associates. The 
former declares that general words (the ambiguous element) 
following an enumeration of specific things are to be inter-
preted as limited to things of the same kind (ejusdem 
generis) as those specifically enumerated. The other rule, 
which is more general and which may indeed be said to 
include the former, stresses the dependence of the meaning 
of one word or phrase upon the words or phrases with which 
it is associated in use. For instance the word "home" in one 
connection might refer to a man's dwelling house; in another 
connection it might refer to place of his origin or birth; in 
another connection it might refer to his legal domicile, as 
where I say, "The State of Michigan is my home." So that 
in one statute the word might receive one construction, in 
another a different construction, depending on the text of 
5 Logan v. Logan, II Colo. 44 ( r888). In reaching its conclusion in favor 
of the popular and comprehensive meaning, the court relied chiefly on two 
points: the fact that the legislature had used this term in a popular sense 
in other statutes, and the fact that the broad popular meaning of legacy would 
give a result more nearly in accord with the aim of the particular statute 
and with established policies (equality of shares), than the technical mean-
ing would have produced. 
6 Other typical rules govern the force and effect to be given to preambles, 
provisos, etc. 
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the statute as a whole or the text of the section in which the 
word is used, or even upon the associated words of the phrase 
or clause in which the word is used.7 
Many other rules serve as guides in resolving an ambi-
guity. Some of them have already been mentioned in dis-
cussing the various kinds of context: the rules which require 
the interpreter to look to the general and historical back-
ground for information; the rule which requires him to find 
his definitions of legal terms in the common law; the rule 
that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be 
strictly construed; the rule that statutes are to be interpreted 
in relation to other legislation dealing with the same subject 
matter; the rule that penal legislation is to be strictly con-
strued, etc. These and almost all the other rules of interpre-
tation hereintofore or hereinafter discussed, can be invoked 
in the solution of ambiguity problems. But it would be tedious 
and superfluous to try to illustrate the application of all these 
rules to problems of ambiguity or to each and every other 
kind of interpretive problem. I shall refer, in the next section, 
only to two more types of ambiguity problems and the 
methods of dealing with them. 
Sec. 5-2o. Problems. I. Abrams et al. v. United States.1 
This case involved a choice between different meanings of 
the word intent. The defendants had been indicted and con-
victed of conspiring to violate the Espionage Act of I 9 I 7. 
On appeal the Supreme Court held the evidence sufficient 
to sustain their conviction of violating said act by publishing 
certain circulars intended to provoke and encourage resistance 
7 An important type of situation where this rule applies-though it is not 
commonly so labeled-is the case of the statute which carries its own definitions 
of questionable terms. These definitions are part of the verbal context of the 
terms as used; they fix the meaning thereof, even though each term standing 
alone might have had other meanings. 
1 250 u.s. 616 (1919). 
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to the United States in the war with Germany and by inciting 
and advocating, through such circulars, resort to a general 
strike of workers in ammunition factories for the purpose of 
curtailing production of ordnance and munitions essential 
to the prosecution of the war. The members of the Court 
differed in opinion as to the sense in which the word "intent" 
was used in . the Espionage Act. Three different senses of 
this term are common in legal parlance-as Mr. Justice 
Holmes points out: according to one usage, a person intends 
what he desires and aims to bring about; according to a 
second, he intends what he foresees as a consequence of his 
action, even though he does not desire to bring the conse-
quence about; and according to a third usage, he intends the 
foreseeable consequences of his act, even though he does not 
actually foresee, nor actually desire, those consequences. 
Mr. Justice Clarke, speaking for the majority of the Court, 
adopted the second usage as the proper one; he stressed the 
highly inflammatory and dangerous character of the circulars 
which defendants had published. In part, he said: 
"It will not do to say, as is now argued, that the only 
intent of these defendants was to prevent injury to the 
Russian cause. Men must be held to have intended, and to 
be accountable for, the effects which their acts were likely 
to produce. Even if their primary purpose and intent was 
to aid the cause of the Russian Revolution, the plan of action 
which they adopted necessarily involved, before it could be 
realized, defeat of the war program of the United States .... 
"These excerpts sufficiently show, that while the immediate 
occasion for this particular outbreak of lawlessness, on the 
part of the defendant alien anarchists, may have been resent-
ment caused by our Government sending troops into Russia 
as a strategic operation against the Germans on the eastern 
battle front, yet the plain purpose of their propaganda was 
to excite, at the supreme crisis of the war, disaffection, sedi-
tion, riots, and, as they hoped, revolution, in this country 
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for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible defeating 
the military plans of the Government in Europe .... " 
Mr. Justice Holmes (supported by Mr. Justice Brandeis) 
dissenting, thought "intent" in this statute should be under-
stood in the first sense; he minimized the danger of evil 
which might result from the circulars published by defend-
ants and emphasized the need for safeguarding freedom of 
speech. As regards the meaning, of intent, he said in part: 
"I am aware of course that the word intent as vaguely 
used in ordinary legal discussion means no more than knowl-
edge at the time of the act that the consequences said to be 
intended will ensue. Even less than that will satisfy the 
general principle of civil and criminal liability. A man may 
have to pay damages, may be sent to prison, at common law 
might be hanged, if at the time of his act he knew facts from 
which common experience showed that the consequences 
would follow, whether he individually could foresee them 
or not. But, when words are used exactly, a deed is not done 
with intent to produce a consequence unless that consequence 
is the aim of the deed. It may be obvious, and obvious to the 
actor, that the consequence will follow, and he may be liable 
for it even if he regrets it, but he does not do the act with 
intent to produce it unless the aim to produce it is the prox-
imate motive of the specific act, although there may be some 
deeper motive behind. 
"It seems to me that this statute must be taken to use its 
words in a strict and accurate sense. They would be absurd 
in any other. A patriot might think that we were wasting 
money on aeroplanes, or making more cannon of a certain 
kind than we needed, and might advocate curtailment with 
success, yet even if it turned out that the curtailment hindered 
and was thought by other minds to have been obviously 
likely to hinder the United States in the prosecution of the 
war, no one would hold such conduct a crime .... " 
On the basis of this condensed statement of the Abrams 
case, what would you infer was the basis of choice between 
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meanings of the word intent? Was it a mere matter of follow-
ing the commoner usage? 
2. Suppose a statute is adopted in California which might 
have either of two possible meanings, meaning X and mean-
ing Y; and suppose this statute is later interpreted by the 
Supreme Court of California in an opinion which adopts 
meaning X. Now suppose this same statute is later borrowed 
and adopted by the State of South Dakota. The Supreme 
Court of South Dakota will treat the California decision as 
controlling. In so doing, how does the South Dakota court 
resolve the ambiguity? How would you formulate the rule 
followed? 
Sec. s-2 I. Reconciling inconsistency. Ambiguity and in-
consistency are quite similar in nature and in the problems 
which they pose for the interpreter. Ambiguity characterizes 
a text which points in two directions, which may have either 
of two meanings. Inconsistency involves separate texts or 
different parts of one text, which point in two directions. 
Ambiguity and inconsistency are alike in that the language 
which the legislator has used points in two ways, and in that 
the interpreter must make a choice between them. 
The chief kind of inconsistency which I have in mind is 
conflict between different parts of a single legislative enact-
ment. The possibility of inconsistency inheres in the fact that 
any extended enactment consists of a series of more or less 
independent and more or less overlapping statements; the 
lawmaker may not sufficiently consider each of his statements 
in relation to the others. He states a purpose in the preamble 
of his legislative act and states a specific mandate in the body 
thereof, which suggest conflicting meanings or which coincide 
with one another only in part. Or he states a standard of 
behavior for individuals in one section, and another standard 
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in another section which is not quite consistent with the first. 
Or he states overlapping but different standards of behavior 
for officials in different sections of his act. In all such cases 
the interpreter has the task of reconciling the applications of 
the various parts of the text with one another. 
How does the interpreter deal with these problems? He 
finds a few guides which are peculiarly applicable to incon-
sistency problems. These rules give preference to one part 
of the legislative act over another part, or to one kind of 
statement therein over another kind of statement. Of such 
rules the two following provisions of the Pennsylvania 
Statutory Construction Act/ are typical; the provisions are 
merely declaratory of common-law rules of interpretation: 
Sec. 563. Particular Controls General. "Whenever a gen-
eral provision in a law shall be in conflict with a special 
provision in the same or another law, the two shall be con-
strued if possible, so that effect may be given to both. If the 
conflict between the two provisions be irreconcilable, the 
special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an 
exception to the general provision, unless the general pro-
vision shall be enacted later and it shall be the manifest 
intention of the Legislature that such general provision shall 
prevail." 
Sec. 564. Irreconcilable Clauses in the Same Law. "Except 
as provided in section (five) sixty-three, whenever, in the 
same law, several clauses are irreconcilable, the clause last in 
order or date or position shall prevail." 
However, most of the rules and methods which the inter-
preter uses in reconciling inconsistencies are not peculiar to 
the inconsistency problem. For the most part, he proceeds in 
about the same way and uses the same methods and materials 
as he does in resolving an ambiguity. The same guiding 
principles apply, so that it is not worth our while to list 
again all those rules which aid in choosing between conflicting 
1 Purdon's Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 46. 
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meanings or which guide the interpreter's reference to the 
general, legal, and the historical context, of the legal pro-
visions which he is attempting to reconcile. Nor is it surprising 
that the interpreter sometimes finds, as he does in resolving 
ambiguities, that all other prescriptions fail, and that he has 
to choose between inconsistent textual provisions simply on 
the basis of what is desirable policy. 
In the wide sense one may find inconsistency between a 
statute and the common law, or between a statute and an 
earlier statute, or between a statute and a constitutional 
provision. For such cases our legal system is prepared with 
general solutions of conflict which are relatively easy. The 
statute displaces the common law, the later statute repeals 
the earlier, and the constitution overrides the conflicting 
statute. Established rules regarding the operation of legal 
provisions leave the interpreter without any real problems 
of reconciling conflicts to struggle with. Only if the incon-
sistency in any of these cases be partial, does the interpreter 
have something to do. He must then decide how much of 
the common law, of the earlier statute, or of the conflicting 
statute, is inoperative and how much of it remains in force. 
Typical of this kind of problem and of the way our legal 
system deals with it, is the following provision of the 
Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act, dictating the proper 
solution where a statute conflicts in part with a constitutional 
prov1s10n: 
Sec. 555· Constitutional Construction of Laws. "The pro-
visions of every law shall be severable. If any provision of 
a law is found by a court of record to be unconstitutional 
and void, the remaining provisions of the law shall, never-
theless, remain valid, unless the court finds the valid pro-
visions of the law are so essentially and inseparably connected 
with, and so dependent upon, the void provision, that it can-
not be presumed the Legislature would have enacted the 
remaining valid provisions without the void one; or unless 
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the court finds the remaining valid provisions, standing alone, 
are incomplete, and are incapable of being executed in accord-
ance with the legislative intent." 
This statute is simply declaratory of principles which the 
courts had worked out for themselves independently of 
legislation. 
Sec. s-2 2. Reading details into general provision. In the 
last chapter I pointed out that the legislator always uses 
language which is more or less general; that he uses general 
language in order to conserve his own effort in thinking out 
more detailed provisions and in order to cover unforeseen 
cases which future conditions may present. If his legislation 
specifies details of application with undue particularity, there 
is always the danger that important situations will be omitted 
and that the language of his text will fail to embrace cases 
which he would have wanted to cover if he had had sufficient 
foresight and could have stated his meaning perfectly. 
On the other side of the ledger is the fact that a general 
text is indefinite; that general language fails to furnish 
assured guidance to individuals and officials who need it. 
An extreme example will make my point. Suppose that a 
criminal statute were to provide simply that "any act preju-
dicial to the general welfare is punishable as a misdemeanor." 
Such a statute leaves everything undefined.1 It fails in the 
prime function of a legal provision. It leaves the individual 
who may be punished, without guidance; and it leaves the 
judge who may have to apply the provision, likewise without 
proper direction. 
1 In fact a cooct would probably hold the very statute which we have 
supposed, invalid by reason of its indefiniteness. (See United States v. Cohen 
Grocery Co., 257 U.S. 81 (1921).) But this does not destroy its value as an 
example. Indefiniteness is a matter of degree. A somewhat slighter degree of 
generality and indefiniteness would escape the ban of invalidity. And consti-
tutional provisions themselves escape this reason for judicial disapproval. 
The problem of dealing with indefinite provisions is one which the courts must 
face and which they do dispose of in the ways indicated in the text. 
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What is the judicial interpreter to do, when he is called 
upon to apply such an indefinite provision? Shall he declare 
the provision void for indefiniteness, and therefore refuse 
to apply it? Or shall he apply it in cases as they arise, 
according to his best judgment on the facts of each case, but 
leave the provision in its undefined state and let every indi-
vidual continue to act at his peril?* Or shall he undertake 
to complete the meaning of the indefinite provision as he 
applies it from case to case, by establishing subsidiary rules 
to define what is, and what is not, prejudicial to the general 
welfare? All three of these solutions are possible and are at 
times adopted; we are interested now only in the last solution 
because it alone can be called interpretation, and because it 
is the common solution adopted by American judges. 
This solution requires the interpreter to define or redefine 
the general terms of the provision to make them definite. In 
the words of Chief Justice Hughes in Home Building and 
Loan Association v. Blaisdell, the famous mortgage mora-
torium case: "· .. where Constitutional grants and limita-
tions of power are set forth in general clauses, which afford 
a broad outline, the process of construction is essential to fill 
in details." 2 The Chief Justice means, though he does not 
say just this, that the interpreter must supply details which 
are not found in the constitutional provision he construes. 
When we connect this method of supplying needed details 
with the general doctrine that judicial decisions are con-
* (I.R.) Occasionally courts realize the danger of making their own, or the 
legislative, product too specific in operation (see first paragraph of this 
section) and warn that instances are not to be understood as definitive; they 
try to keep the operation of the provision which they are construing, general 
and undefined; consider, for example, the way equity courts have refused to tie 
themselves by definite notions of fraud and the way our Supreme Court haa 
refused to formulate standards of due process more definite than the standard 
of reasonableness. Nevertheless specific cases are decided and cited as prec-
edents even though the courts profess to keep their own hands free; so that 
the whole tendency is to convert general legislative standards into more 
specific, as is pointed out in the ensuing paragraphs of the text. 
2 ~90 U. S. 398 at 4~6 ( 1934). 
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trolling precedents for future applications of the provision, 
we see that the details become essentially judicial additions 
to the original text. The court's decisions in one case after 
another furnish more specific rules in the general area cov-
ered by the original indefinite provision. A vague general 
provision is converted by interpretation into an aggregate 
of specific rules, all of which together constitute the effective 
meaning of the general provision. 
Original indefiniteness is especially characteristic of consti-
tutional provisions; in fact Chief Justice Hughes used the 
language above quoted in regard to the Contracts Clause of 
the Federal Constitution. The extent to which such a clause 
is rendered more definite by judicial interpretation can be 
illustrated by the development of the meaning of that clause. 
It reads: "No state shall ... pass any Law ... impairing 
the Obligation of Contracts .... " 3 The major terms here 
are all vague and general. What is a "law"? The Supreme 
Court has said that the term "law" includes state statutes, 
city ordinances, and state constitutional provisions, but does 
not include decisions by state courts. What is a "contract" 
which is protected against impairment? The term "contract" 
is held to embrace private and public contracts, executed and 
executory contracts, express and implied contracts; it includes 
franchises, corporate charters and public grants of land. Like 
questions have arisen and have had to be answered regarding 
the application of "obligation" and "impairing." The result 
is that in the century and a half since the clause was adopted 
a great mass of specific judicial propositions have been de-
veloped which are the real, practical meaning of the Contracts 
Clause. The exact wording of the clause itself has ceased to 
be of primary consequence. It is these details of meaning, 
supplied by adjudication, on which the lawyer's chief interest 
centers. 
8 Art. I, Sec. 1 o. 
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Moreover, this process of filling in details is not limited 
to obviously indefinite statutory provisions and sweeping 
clauses of a constitution. The process of filling in needed 
details occurs regularly in the application of any general 
term which may be found in legislation. As regards all enact-
ments, there is a continuing process of reducing general terms 
to more specific. Thus, the judicial interpretations which have 
supplemented the general terms of the Statute of Frauds fill 
many volumes. One obtains no adequate conception of what 
that statute means by a mere scrutiny of its language. It was 
once said about Coke's elaborate commentary on Littleton's 
Tenures, that the book represented a little rivulet of Littleton 
running through a great meadow of Coke. No less can it be 
said that the text of the Statute of Frauds is almost lost to 
sight in the enormous judicial gloss erected about the legis-
lative original. And while the accumulated volume of ju-
dicially supplied details is never quite so large in the case 
of modern statutes, it is nevertheless apparent enough. Phrase 
after phrase of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act has 
had to be construed, and these constructions constitute, in the 
main, detailed applications and refinements of the general 
terms of this legislation. Every term of a simple statute, such 
as a criminal statute prohibiting the carrying of concealed 
weapons, calls for the same kind of judicial exposition. What 
is a "weapon"? When is a weapon "concealed"? And what 
is "carrying" a weapon? Details have to be filled in, specific 
answers have to be furnished. And, in effect, these specific 
answers develop into a cluster of specific rules. 
The process of filling in details is analogous to the process 
of resolving an ambiguity. Both processes are concerned with 
a legislative text not fully expressed. Both processes involve 
for the interpreter a choice between possible meanings. The 
means of solving an ambiguity and the sources of details are 
alike to be found in the context, general, legal, and historical; 
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and the rules of interpretation applicable to both problems 
are essentially the same. The difference between resolving 
an ambiguity and choosing between the various meanings 
which may be read into a general term, lies in the fact that 
the general term ordinarily allows the interpreter a wider 
choice of possibilities. He is not limited to a choice between 
two but may choose among several detailed meanings. In 
furnishing the details for the Contract Clause, for example, 
the Supreme Court was free to choose from a variety of 
senses of the words contract, obligation, impair, etc. It found 
the material of its choices in popular and legal usages of 
terms.4 
Sec. 5-23. Restrictive interpretation of general provision. 
Sometimes a statute or a constitutional provision is couched 
in terms which literally include more ground or more items 
than the interpreter believes the framer would ever have 
wanted to include; and the question confronts the interpreter 
whether he ought to trim down the operation of the statute 
or constitutional provision by interpretation.* 
The overinclusive provision may be due to any of the 
reasons already mentioned, which explain such defects as 
ambiguity, inconsistency and indefiniteness. But the prime 
reason for overinclusiveness is the legislator's effort to offset 
4 The choice was based on considerations of history and policy, consider-
ations derived from context. See for example such cases as Fletcher v. Peck, 
6 Cranch 87 (18 to); Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 
518 (1819); Home Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 
398 (1934); Gelfert v. National City Bank of New York, 313 U. S. ui 
(1941). 
* ( I.R.) In strict logic restrictive interpretation might be regarded as a 
special instance of the process of filling in details (sec. s-u); or, perhaps, 
the latter process as an instance of restrictive interpretation. Both processes 
involve the qualification or limitation of general language by reading limitative 
particulars into it. However, we are accustomed to think and speak of the two 
processes as different. Filling in details is regarded as a form of limitation 
which supplements or completes what is said; restrictive interpretation (includ-
ing the introduction of exceptions) is regarded as a form of limitation which 
cuts across or contradicts what is said. This difference in traditional view and 
mode of speech is practical warrant for treating restrictive interpretation 
under a separate head. 
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his inability to foresee and specify all the situations to which 
he wants his provision to apply. The legislator wishes his 
provision to be inclusive enough, and therefore uses com-
prehensive terms. He wishes the provision to cover not only 
types of cases of which he has had experience, but also 
analogous types and new types which come into existence in 
the future. To this end he uses catchall phrases. Thus a 
statute may be enacted which prohibits individuals to carry 
dangerous weapons. This blanket provision would doubtless 
apply to a new form of atomic weapon even though such a 
weapon had never been dreamed of at the time when the 
statute was passed. By using comprehensive terms the legis-
lator is able to cope with the problems of an expanding and 
indefinite future. However, in his effort to catch all the fish 
he wants to catch by casting a wide net of broad general 
character, the legislator runs the risk of sweeping up some 
fish in his net which he would not have desired to catch if 
he had had the vision of the "compleat angler." 
How does the interpreter arrive at the conclusion that the 
legislator has overreached himself in this way? Actually the 
interpreter does this on the basis of the fact that important 
contextual factors suggest a narrower inclusion than the 
language suggests. Conventionally he talks in terms of a 
distinction between the purpose (or spirit) of the statute on 
the one hand, and its literal terms on the other. But the 
important point is not the matter of names; it is the fact 
that the interpreter recognizes a divergence between lan-
guage and something else. It is not hard to see that the 
purpose (or spirit), which is not consistent with the language, 
is nothing but the purport of known contextual factors; m-
deed, that it is a mere deduction from them.** 
** (I.R.) Sometimes a partial divergence between different parts of the lan-
guage of a statute (inconsistency) is combined with divergence between the 
language and the spirit. In this case solution of an inconsistency is blended 
with restrictive interpretation. 
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What does the interpreter do when he uncovers such a 
conflict between the text and the purpose of legislation? Of 
course he might refuse to amend the legislator's work, apply 
the statute as it stands, and "pass the buck" back to the 
legislature to make any needed changes. But on the whole, 
courts are inclined to make free use of their corrective power; 
they are prepared to do a job of restrictive interpretation 
whenever they feel that contextual factors point with suffi-
cient clearness to this result. The limits and details of this 
method of pruning down, or engrafting exceptions on, the 
language of a statute will be developed in the following 
cases. 
Sec. s-2 4· Problems. I. State v. Gorham/ 
Fullerton, J. "The appellant was convicted of a violation 
of the speed ordinances of the city of Hilliard. The facts 
are stipulated, and are in substance these: ' 
"The city named lies within, and forms a part of, the 
county of Spokane. The appellant is a duly appointed, quali-
fied and acting deputy sheriff of such county. On June 3, 
I 9 I 9, a charge of grand larceny was preferred against one 
William Agnew, and a warrant issued for his arrest. This 
warrant was given to the appellant for execution. The specific 
charge was the larceny of an automobile, and on inquiry the 
appellant was informed by a police officer of the city of 
Spokane that the accused had been seen on that day on the 
down town streets of the city driving an automobile bearing 
the license number of the stolen automobile. Upon further 
inquiry, the officer found a young man who knew the accused, 
and who stated to the· officer that he had seen the accused 
only a few moments before that time driving an automobile 
'at a good rate of speed' toward the city of Hilliard, on the 
main highway leading from the city of Spokane to that city. 
The officer immediately took up the pursuit of the accused 
on a motorcycle, and in passing through the city of Hilliard, 
1 IIO Wash. 330 (1920); WAITE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW (zd ed.) 62 
(1937). 
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rode the motorcycle at a greater rate of speed than its ordi-
nances permitted.-
"In this court, the appellant . . . (contends) . . . that 
a sheriff is exempt from the operation of city ordinances 
regulating the speed at which a motor vehicle may be driven 
when he is in pursuit of a person accused of felony for whose 
arrest he has a warrant. 
"The sheriff is made, by statute, the chief executive officer 
and conservator of the peace of the county. By statute, also, it 
is made his duty to keep the public peace, and to arrest and 
confine all persons who commit violations of the law, and 
especially is it made his duty to execute all process issued to 
him by a court of justice. His duties in these respects are 
public duties necessary to the safety of the state and its people, 
and necessary for the preservation of public and private 
property. In the performance of these duties, the sheriff has 
many privileges not accorded to a private individual, and 
statutes and ordinances directed against the individual do 
not generally apply to him when so performing them, espe-
cially where their enforcement would hamper and hinder 
performance.2 
"That the enforcement against a peace officer of statutory 
or ordinance provisions limiting the speed at which a motor 
propelled vehicle shall be driven over a public highway 
would have a tendency to hamper him in the performance 
of his official duties, can hardly be doubted. The case in hand 
affords an illustration. Here the felon was fleeing with a 
stolen automobile. Naturally he would pay but little regard 
to the minor offense of exceeding the speed limit. And if 
the sheriff must confine himself to that limit, pursuit in the 
manner adopted would have been useless, since the felon 
could not have been overtaken. The rule contended for would 
2 Where a court is considering a choice between two interpretations of 
a legislative provision, it is very common practice to develop the consequences 
which will follow from the one interpretation and the other, and to allow 
the choice to be determined by the consequences which the court regards as 
preferable or as more nearly in accord with a general legislative purpose. 
See for example Hoff v. State of New York quoted in sec. s-13, problem 3· 
The consequences of alternative interpretations are especially stressed by the 
court when it says, "Our constitutional guarantees of liberty are merely empty 
words unless a person imprisoned or detained against his will may challenge 
the legality of his imprisonment and detention." 
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also hinder the public peace officers in enforcing the statutes 
regulating traffic upon the state highways. These statutes 
contain somewhat stringent regulations as to the speed a 
motor propelled vehicle may be driven over them, and 
contain no exception in favor of the peace officers whose duty 
it is made to enforce them. If these officers may not pursue 
and overtake one violating the regulations without them-
selves becoming amenable to the penalties imposed by them, 
the old remedy of hue and cry is not available in such 
instances, and many offenders who are now brought to answer 
will escape. 
"It is not meant to be asserted, of course, that there are 
no restrictions upon the speed a sheriff or a peace officer may 
travel in the pursuit of a fleeing criminal. Such officers may 
abuse their privileges in this respect as well as in others and 
must answer for such abuse. What is meant to be said is that 
the statutory regulations as to speed do not apply to them, 
and that for an abuse of their privileges in this respect they 
must answer in the manner they are required to answer for 
other abuses of privilege. . . . 
"Our conclusion is that the trial court erred in adjudging 
the officer guilty of the offense charged. Its judgment will 
therefore be reversed, and the cause remanded with instruc-
tion to discharge the appellant." 
On what contextual factors, does the court predicate an 
exception to the speed regulation~ here involved? 
2. Queen v. Tolson.3 Indictment and conv:ction for big-
amy. An Act of Parliament provided that "whoever being 
married, shall marry any other person during the life of the 
former husband or wife . . . shall be guilty of felony"; 
the Act also contained a proviso that "nothing in this act 
shall extend to any person marrying a second time whose 
husband or wife shall have been continually absent from such 
person for the space of seven years last past, and shall not 
have been known by such person to be living within that 
time." D married her husband on September II, r88o; he 
3 (r889) 2.3 Q. B. D. 168. 
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deserted her on December I3, I88I. D, believing in good 
faith and on reasonable grounds that her husband was dead, 
married another on January I o, I 8 8 7. In December I 8 8 7 
her husband, who had not died, reappeared. 
On the question whether D was guilty of bigamy nine 
judges of the Court for the Crown Cases Reserved, held 
that she was not and that her conviction must be quashed. 
Several opinions were filed; the major arguments for the 
court's conclusion were that while the words of the Act 
literally applied to a case such as the one presented, the 
Act must be construed in the light of its purpose, of the 
harsh consequences of applying it here, and of the undoubted 
"principle of English criminal law that, ordinarily speaking, 
a crime is not committed if the mind of the person doing 
the act is innocent." On these grounds the court decided in 
effect that the Act did not apply to a person "who married 
believing in good faith and on reasonable grounds that the 
former husband or wife is dead." 
A minority of five judges dissented; they thought D was 
guilty of bigamy on the ground that the language of the Act 
was plain and clear. One judge declared, "It is the impera-
tive duty of the Court to give effect to it, and leave it to 
the legislature to alter the law if it thinks it ought to be 
altered." 
What factors of context does the majority invoke as a. basis 
for restricting the language of this Act? 
What might be said to be the force and effect of the 
proviso? 
A contemporary commentator said of the decision: 
"The judgment of the majority of the Court will no 
doubt commend itself to popular opinion, and we do not 
assert that the judgment is wrong. It suggests however 
observations of some importance. 
"If the judges are to qualify the plain language of a 
statute by the introduction of limitations and provisos as to 
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which not a hint is to be found in the Act, statutory legislation 
must necessarily become hopelessly confused. If the Courts 
hold that Parliament cannot mean what Parliament says, 
then how is anyone to make sure as to what an Act really 
means? If Parliament had meant to make bigamy in all cases 
a crime, Parliament could not have used language more clear 
than the terms of 24 & 25 Viet. chap. roo, sec. 57· 
"The popular idea that a code would remove all possibility 
as to uncertainty about the meaning of a law is shown by 
the Queen v. Tolson, if proof were needed, to be a delusion. 
Ambiguity arises in the main from the difficulty of framing 
rules accurate enough to meet the subtlety of nature. Human 
nature and the facts of life create cases which human sagacity 
fails to anticipate." 4 
Is there force in this commentator's general criticism of 
the decision? 
3· People 'V. Hatinger.5 
"Bird, J. Under an agreed statement of facts in the trial 
court, the respondent was convicted by a jury of a violation 
of the local-option law. He now seeks to have the conviction 
set aside by this court, on the ground that it is at variance 
with the law. 
"It appears from the stipulation of facts that respondent, 
in the months of August and September, 1912, was operating 
a lunch and soft drink counter in the village of Edmore; 
that he had on sale what was known as 'Old Fort Cider,' 
which he purchased under a positive guaranty that it con-
tained no alcohol; that the same was analyzed and found 
to contain 5.6 per cent alcohol; that as soon as the respondent 
learned that it contained alcohol he discontinued the sale. 
It is conceded by the people that respondent bought and 
sold the cider in good faith and with no intent to violate 
the law. 
"It was the claim of respondent that under the case made 
by the stipulation he was entitled to a directed verdict of not 
guilty. This claim is based upon the concession of the people 
4 (1889) 5 L. Q. R. 449-450. 
5 174 Mich. 333 (1913); WAITE, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW {ad ed.) 
57 (1937). 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION 381 
that respondent had no intent to violate the law. The conten-
tion of the prosecuting attorney was that the question of 
intent was immaterial, and was not a prerequisite to a convic-
tion. The trial court agreed with the contention of the 
prosecuting attorney, and instructed the jury that it was their 
duty to return a verdict of guilty. 
"The question raised is one of construction of the statute 
which is charged to have been violated. While most of the 
offenses defined by the criminal laws involve guilty knowl-
edge or intent, it is admittedly competent for the legislature 
to forbid the doing of an act and make its commission criminal 
without regard to the intent of the doer .... If the legis-
lature may create offenses with or without the element of 
intent, it becomes important to inquire what its intention 
was with respect to the passage of Act No. I 83 of the Public 
Acts of I 899. 
"Section I of the act prohibits in positive terms the sale 
of intoxicating liquors, and no language is used which indi-
cates that the element of intent is to be read into it. Had 
the legislature intended to make the intent to violate the 
law an essential element, it would have doubtless used some 
appropriate language indicating its purpose. If it were neces-
sary to prove intent to violate the law before a conviction 
could be had, the act would fall far short of doing what 
the legislature obviously intended it should do; and pre-
sumably in this can be found the chief reason why it did not 
incorporate into the act the element of intent. Laws forbid-
ding the sale of intoxicating liquor and impure foods would 
be of little use if convictions for their violations were to 
depend on showing guilty knowledge. The fact, then, that 
respondent had no knowledge that the cider contained alcohol 
and that he purchased it and sold it in good faith, with no 
intent to violate the law, will not avail him in the face of 
his admission that he sold it and that it contained alcohol. 
" 
Here the court allowed the language to have its full effect 
and refused to exempt the respondent from liability. Why? 
What is the difference between this case and the Tolson 
Case? Is it a difference of the statutory language? 
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Sec. 5-25. Extensive interpretation of general provision. 
The interpreter sometimes concludes that a provision is too 
narrowly stated. It fails to cover certain cases which are 
within its purpose (or spirit). The deficiency, you will notice, 
is just the opposite of the defect last considered. Here, as 
we assume, the provision is too narrow in terms; there the 
provision was too inclusive. The questions here are whether 
the interpreter shall stretch the provision to include cases 
not normally within their meaning, or whether he shall go 
even further and expand the scope of the provision by 
analogy, to include cases not within its terms in any sense.* 
The reasons for this defect, like other defects of statement, 
may be lack of care in drafting and failure to foresee the 
situations to which the enactment should apply. Particularly 
the sponsor of legislation may have a special case in mind 
and frame a specific rule to cover it, and his legislative 
brethren may be indifferent or inattentive to the wording of 
the act as they go through the steps of enacting it. Thus the 
initiating legislator may think simply of the necessity for 
regulating the catching of trout and may introduce a bill 
fixing a limited trout season. He may not realize (or if he 
does, not care) that catching of other fish needs to be likewise 
regulated, or that a limited season should be similarly fixed 
for each kind of fish. Shall the interpreter extend the appli-
cation of an act so framed to cover all the kinds of fish within 
the need for regulation? 
As regards statutes, our judges are not inclined to indulge 
in extensive interpretation of either sort. They are not usually 
ready to stretch the statutory terms; and they refuse to 
extend them to analogous cases. The courts ordinarily declare 
that it is their function to apply a statutory provision as it 
stands, not to amend it; and they argue that legislation will, 
on the whole, be more carefully drafted if courts refuse to 
* (I.R.) Extensive interpretation may also be combined with solution of 
an inconsistency or resolution of an ambiguity. (Cf. sec. s-z3, note** (I.R.).) 
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correct legislative errors by interpretation, and leave to the 
legislature the responsibility for avoiding or rectifying them. 
Queries: Have these lines of argument any more rel-
evance to extensive interpretation than to restrictive inter-
pretation? Is there any logical or practical basis for making 
a distinction between the two types of correction? 1 
However, our courts often interpret constitutional clauses 
extensively, by stretching their terms to the farthest limits. 
On this point the great Chief Justice Marshall declared, in 
words which are frequently quoted: "We must never forget, 
that it is a Constitution we are expounding ... a Consti-
tution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently, 
to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." 2 Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court of the United States, in particular, 
has construed important clauses of the Federal Constitution 
in the most comprehensive sense. The Commerce Clause, for 
example, has been construed to include many things which 
are not "commerce" in the ordinary sense; the Due Process 
Clause has been given the widest possible meaning so as to 
cover many things which were certainly not originally in-
cluded in the concept of "due process of law" in a historical 
sense; and the Contracts Clause has been interpreted to 
1 In this connection it is relevant to note that the courts in civil law countries 
(France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the Latin American countries) do 
interpret a code provision extensively; they apply a code provision to cases 
which are literally not included but which fall within the principle of the 
provision. See Pound, "Theory of Judicial Decision," 36 HARV. L. REv. 641 
at 647 (1923); and compare the following: 
"With the general assumption of complete codification goes a liberal atti-
tude toward legislation. German legislation is readily construed to cover cases 
beyond its letter. Emphasis is put on the spirit or principle embodied in code 
provisions, rather than on the literal meanings of words. The general 
reliance of the German lawyer on legislation and his readiness to construe 
legislation as complete, i.e., liberally, stand in contrast to our own reliance 
on the common law to furnish the solution of doubtful cases and to our narrow 
construction of statutes, which are expressed in the propositions that the 
common law fills all gaps in the law and that statutes in derogation of the 
common law are to be strictly construed." Shartel and Wolff, "German Civil 
Justice," 42 MICH. L. REV. 863 at 866 ( 1944). 
2 McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407, 415 (x819). 
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embrace many types of transaction which have not been 
called "contracts" in any ordinary usages of that term. 
Sec. 5-26. Problems. I. Why should the Supreme Court 
indulge more readily in extensive interpretation of consti-
tutional, than of statutory, provisions? 
2. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 
50 ( 1 926). The plaintiff was a stevedore employed by the 
defendant company. While he was engaged in storing freight 
in the hold of a vessel lying at the dock in Seattle, he was 
injured through the negligence of a fellow employee of 
the defendant company. He brought action in a Washington 
court to recover damages for the injury sustained. The de-
fendant company contended that it was not responsible for 
the injury to the plaintiff on the ground that the fellow-
servant rule was applicable. Under this rule, an employer 
is not liable for an injury to one servant caused by the 
negligence of a fellow servant. The plaintiff contended that 
his action was governed by a federal statute which abrogated 
the fellow-servant rule in actions by "seamen" against the 
vessel on which they are working, and made the vessel liable 
for all injuries occurring in the course of their employment. 
The trial court held the statute to be applicable, and gave 
judgment on a verdict in plaintiff's favor; the Supreme 
Court of Washington affirmed the judgment. A writ of error 
was granted by the United States Supreme Court. The ques-
tion presented to the Supreme Court was whether or not 
the defendant company was liable to the plaintiff stevedore 
under the terms of this federal statute. 
The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, affirmed 
the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court and held 
that the defendant company was liable to the plaintiff. In 
his opinion, the justice referred to the fact that before Con-
gress enacted the statute in question, it had enacted a similar 
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statute abolishing the fellow-servant rule in regard to suits 
against railroads by their employees. Among other things 
he said: 
"It is true that for most purposes, as the word is commonly 
used, stevedores are not 'seamen.' But words are flexible. 
The work upon which the plaintiff was engaged was a mari-
time service formerly rendered by the ship's crew. Atlantic 
Transport Co. v. lmbrovek, 234 U. S. 52, 62. We cannot 
believe that Congress willingly would have allowed the pro-
tection to men engaged upon the same maritime duties to 
vary with the accident of their being employed by a stevedore 
rather than by the ship. The policy of the statute is directed 
to the safety of the men and to treating compensation for 
injuries to them as properly part of the cost of the business. 
If they should be protected in the one case they should be 
in the other. In view of the broad field in which Congress 
has disapproved and changed the rule introduced into the 
common law within less than a century/ we are of opinion 
that a wider scope should be given to the words of the act, 
and that in this statute 'seamen' is to be taken to include 
stevedores employed in maritime work on navigable waters 
as the plaintiff was, whatever it might mean in laws of a 
different kind." 
This was a case in which the Supreme Court gave an 
extensive interpretation to a statute. What was the special 
factor which induced the court to do this? 2 
Would the Supreme Court have held either the statute 
regarding railroad employees or the statute regarding seamen 
to be applicable to employees of an airline or a motor carrier? 
1 
"The rule that the employer was not liable for injuries caused by the 
negligence of a fellow servant first appeared in England in 1837, and almost 
immediately in the United States, where it was stated elaborately in a well-
known opinion of Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts in Farwell v. Boston 
and Worcester Railway." PROSSER, TORTS 514 (1941). 
2 Another instance of extensive interpretation (or perhaps I should say 
interpretation by analogy) is the common extension of statutes of limitation, 
applicable literally only to suits for possession to cases involving prescriptive 
claims to easements. See, for example, Klin v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 
271 N.Y. 376 (1936). 
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Can you say that Holmes' opinion in the above case is 
consistent with his opinion in the McBoyle Case (sec. 5-II)? 
If "seamen" can include stevedores, why cannot "vehicles" 
include airplanes? In the McBoyle Case Holmes said:"· .. 
the statute should not be extended to aircraft simply because 
it may seem to us that a similar policy applies, or upon the 
speculation that if the legislature had thought of it, very 
likely broader words would have been used." 
Sec. s-27. Summary. Interpretation is necessary because 
legislative provisions are obscurely or inadequately expressed. 
As a matter of terminology we do not speak of interpretation 
except in instances where the meaning of legislation is prob-
lematic and has to be settled before it can be applied. The 
principal instances of this sort arise from the legislator's use 
of ambiguous or inconsistent terms, from his use of indefinite 
language, from the fact that he leaves gaps in his legislative 
plan, and from his employment of overcomprehensive or 
unduly narrow expressions. In the face of a deficient legis-
lative provision the person who is called upon to apply it, 
may take one of three courses. Sometimes he may refuse to 
apply the provision at all; at other times he may attempt 
to apply the provision just as it stands even though the 
results be harsh or even absurd; and finally, he may under-
take to correct the deficiencies in the legislative provision 
before he applies it. Ordinarily, and certainly within very 
wide limits, the last course is that which is chosen by our 
American courts. It is the course which has been discussed 
in the present chapter. 
All the processes of interpretation are creative to a certain 
degree; they involve a limited amount of judicial lawmaking. 
The interpreter's act is aimed to restate and explain the 
legislator's verbal act. The interpreter's act revises or com-
pletes a job of legislation which is deficient or incomplete.1 
1 And the interpreter's own act, like any other verbal act, may be deficient 
or incomplete and call for subsequent interpretation. 
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The interpreter starts work with the language which the 
legislator has used. He draws material for correcting defi-
ciencies from the context of the legislator's act. This context 
embraces matters of general knowledge, the existing legal 
background, and the specific history of the enactment to be 
construed. The interpreter derives his information about 
these extrinsic factors partly from his own previous expe-
riences, partly from deliberate inquiry on the particular occa-
sion, and partly from evidence offered by other persons. 
The whole of the interpreter's procedure is controlled by 
rules of method. These purport to tie the interpreter to what 
the legislator has said; they instruct the interpreter's choice 
as between various linguistic meanings; they specify the 
extrinsic sources on which he may draw for aid in carrying 
out the process of interpretation; they establish a variety of 
presumptions in favor of this meaning or that; they define 
the ends and policies of the legal system. To be sure, these 
various rules do not bind the interpreter absolutely; they 
leave a great deal of play for his discretion and judgment. 
But in practical operation the established procedures and 
rules of interpretation do offer real guidance for the inter-
preter's activities; they do guarantee that he will not depart 
too far from the expectable applications of the text of the 
legislation he is interpreting. While we can say that the 
interpreter acts as a supplementary lawmaker, his action is 
markedly different from the original lawmaker's in that he 
is merely completing or amending a structure already built, 
and he is working according to instructions which specify in 
some detail the way in which he is to carry out even this 
limited task. 
CHAPTER 6 
The Common Law * 
Sec. 6-01. Scope of chapter. A large part of what we 
ordinarily call law is found not in the statutes, but in the 
reports of cases decided by our courts. This case law consists 
of rules, principles, ideas and methods which are used in 
the decision of cases. The body of decisions runs backward 
continuously from today through our colonial period and 
into the earliest history of England. Our colonists began as 
subjects of the English King and derived their legal notions 
from English sources. After the Revolution, the American 
courts simply carried on in their decisions, the notions which 
had been worked out by the English courts. From the English 
cases they derived general ideas and legal methods as well 
as rules and principles to apply. The development of case 
law, based on this foundation, has gone on without inter-
ruption to the present day. 
The continuous but rather loosely interrelated mass of case 
law in England, in this country, and,in the British Dominions, 
* (I.R.) Suggestions for further reading: 
I. Regarding the common law 
Future of the Common Law-Harvard Law School Conference (Harvard 
Tercentenary Publications, 1937). Two of the more important itema 
in this collection of papers were published separately as articles: Stone, 
"The Common Law in the United States," so Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1936), 
and Pound, "What is the Common Law?," 4 U. Chi. L. Rev. 176 
(1937). 
1. Regarding the judicial process . 
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale Univ. Press, 19u). 
Dickinson, "The Law Behind Law," 29 Col. L. Rev. 113, 185 (1919). 
Frank, "Are Judges Human?," 8o U. of Pa. L. Rev. 17, 223 (1931). 
Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (Brentano's 1930) (reprinted 1948). 
Fuller, "American Legal Realism," 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 419 (1934). 
Pound, "Theory of Judicial Decision," 36 Harv. L. R~v. 641, 8u, 940 
(1923). 
3· Regarding sources of case law, see sec. 6-04, note •. 
4· Regarding the doctrine of precedent, see sec. 6-u, note *· 
5. Regarding the overruling of precedent, see sec. 6-18, note •. 
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is sometimes called "the common law" or "the Anglo-Amer-
ican common law." Though more often the mass of case law 
as a whole is not mentioned, but only certain methods, 
principles and doctrines common to the systems of law in 
England, the United States, and the Dominions, these com-
mon elements are called the methods, principles and doctrines 
of "the common law." From these usages of the phrase 
"common law" must be distinguished two others: First, the 
case law of England down to about the time of our Revo-
lution, essentially as summarized in Blackstone's Commen-
taries ( r 76 5); this is sometimes referred to as the "English" 
common law or the "old" common law. Second, it is not 
unusual to speak of the case law of a particular state, e.g., 
New York, as the common law of that state. But usages are 
indefinite and not consistent; often a writer slips from one 
use of the phrase, the common law, into another within 
the confines of a single paragraph. Whatever use you may 
choose to make of this phrase, it is most important that you 
keep these various kinds of decision-law distinct from one 
another. The need for clarity of thought and usage in this 
respect will become sufficiently obvious as we proceed with 
our discussion of the problems to follow. 
A century or more ago, most of the standards provided 
by our American legal systems were to be found in case 
reports. The man who wanted to know what the law was 
went to the reports; he had no other place to go. In the 
ensuing years the proportions of case law and statute law 
have changed. Legislation has intruded into more and more 
fields; the legislatures, federal and state, have added enor-
mously to the bulk of the statutes, so that the predominant 
part of legal standards is now cast in statutory form. In a 
few states, such as New York and California, the process of 
codification has been pushed about as far as it can go. In 
most states, however, the statutory coverage is far from 
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complete; statutes cover only certain fields and parts of 
fields; the intervening spaces are covered by case law. For 
example, the "law" regarding contracts, torts, property, 
trusts, etc., remains uncodified in most states. Where codifi-
cation is relatively complete, the courts still look to "the 
common law" for definitions, methods and general principles. 
Indeed, in your work as law students you will find that your 
time and attention are taken up more with a discussion of 
case law than statute law. In any event, we would be leaving 
our picture of the American legal system and its operation 
quite unfinished if we were to stop without considering the 
important body of legal standards, principles and methods 
expounded in the case law. 
The present chapter will be devoted to the common or 
case law. The discussion will fall under two subtopics: 
Creation of law by decisions. 
"Common law" rules for using, finding, interpreting and 
changing standards. 
CREATION OF LAW BY DECISIONS 
Sec. 6-o2. Occasions for creation of law. When a case or 
controversy is properly presented to an Anglo-American 
court, the court recognizes an obligation to decide it. What 
does the court do if it finds no appropriate rule of law to 
apply to the case or controversy? Conceivably the court 
might, in such a situation, refuse to proceed to a decision. 
But this has never been the practice of courts anywhere, so 
far as I know, and certainly not the practice of any English 
or American court. It does not refuse to decide a case simply 
because it cannot find a ready-made rule to apply. It weighs 
the case, works out the rule that ought to apply, and then 
applies it. Nor is the Anglo-American court ever content to 
dispose of a new and precedented case with the simple decla-
ration that the court holds for the plaintiff or for the defend-
ant, without giving reasons. The court always feels obliged 
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to decide the case that is brought before it, and equally 
obliged to give reasons for its decisions.1 These reasons are 
the rules and principles of law which the court fashions for 
the occasion; they are the rules or principles according to 
which the court decides. They are rules or principles which 
apply to the case in essentially the same sense that statutory 
provisions, if there were any, would be held to apply to it. 
Sec. 6-03. Rules and methods of judicial lawmaking. The 
lawmaking activity of a court is markedly different from the 
lawmaking activity of the legislature. Whenever the legis-
lature recognizes the need to regulate the behavior of indi-
viduals or officials, it creates new standards for the purpose. 
Whenever it recognizes that standards need to be changed, 
it repeals or amends them, or substitutes new standards in 
their place. The court does not make case law in this broad 
and unrestricted fashion.1 Judicial lawmaking is controlled 
by several restrictive rules of method: First of all, the court 
must not lay down a new legal rule except in relation to a 
case which it has to decide. Second, the court must not lay 
down a rule broader than is necessary to settle the case. In 
short, the court legislates only incidentally in the decision 
of a case. As Mr. Justice Holmes said, "I recognize without 
hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can 
do so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to 
molecular motions." 2 Third, the judicial lawmaker must 
stick to hallowed principles in choosing a new rule; he must 
1 In some states they are required by constitution or statute to declare their 
reasons fully and in writing. 
1 Judicial lawmaking is also narrow in another respect; it is limited to gap 
filling and does not generally extend to the making of changes in existing law. 
Certainly statutes cannot be amended by judicial decision nor do courts assert 
a general authority to change the case law as you will see in later sections. 
2 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. zos at 221 (1917) (dissenting in 
regard to other matters). One can say that the reception of the Law Merchant 
in England and the reception of the English Common Law in this country are 
two instances in which judicial lawmaking occurred on a wholesale scale. 
But such instances are not typical of the processes of judicial lawmaking 
today. 
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reason by reference to the closest analogies and derive his 
results as far as possible from doctrines or policies which 
have been settled by the cases or declared by statute. The 
judicial lawmaker is not expected to be a daring innovator. 
He is to look first for a specific rule to apply. If he cannot 
find one, and if he is forced to declare a new rule for the 
occasion, he is to set forth a wider principle from which he 
deduces the rule laid down. He is to bring his decision of a 
case under a specific rule which can, in its turn, be regarded 
as a natural deduction from a general principle which is 
well recognized. 
Sec. 6-o4. Sources of case law.* The sources of case law 
are in general the same as the sources of statute law.1 The 
judicial lawmaker like the legislature, derives standards from 
the available knowledge of his time. He discovers standards 
to adopt primarily in the legal background. If he finds none 
there, he looks to the general social background. 
Ordinarily he starts his quest with the scrutiny of the law 
of his own state. Even though there is no case law directly 
covering the case before him, he may be able to make an 
analogical extension of principles previously accepted by the 
decisions of his own state. If such extensions are not possible 
he looks to the case law of other jurisdictions. In fact the 
* (I.R.) Throughout the rest of this chapter, I ask the student repeatedly 
to distinguish between sources of law and law. I also ask him to differentiate 
the various meanings of the term "common law." Of course, none of these 
distinctions is necessary. They are controlled by usage and are fluctuating in 
character. But I find that the effort to make and maintain such distinctions 
is a useful pedagogical device. The student has a clearer notion of our case law 
and its character after he has wrestled with these distinctions. 
On the general subject of sources of law, see Pound, "Sources and Form• 
of Law," ZI NoTRE DAME LAWYER 247 (I946), and 22 wid. I (I946). 
A full bibliography on this subject is contained in POUND, OUTLINE OF 
LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed.) I IS et seq. ( I943), 
1 As to the sources of statute law see sec. 4-06 and note*. The sources of 
case law are also essentially the same as the sources of interpretation which 
we discussed in the last chapter, especially the general and legal contexts of 
interpretation; see sees. s-o9 to s-13· 
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judge who 1s preparing to lay down a new rule often proceeds 
in both of the ways mentioned. If he finds nothing suitable 
in either of these sources he may borrow a standard from 
the legislation of some other state or from a textbook on 
legal subjects. 
Not infrequently the judicial lawmaker has to look beyond 
the legal background for a standard to adopt. He gives legal 
sanction to an existing folkway or custom, or to the standard 
of an extralegal institution, such as a church or trade asso-
ciation. By judicial recognition, the way, custom, or standard 
becomes a legal standard. However, it is worth noticing that 
these prior existing usages are sometimes spoken of by writers 
on law in a manner which is very misleading. They some-
times speak of these usages as if they were already existing 
law, not dependent upon judicial adoption for their legal 
character. By a logical sleight-of-hand, social usages are 
converted by these writers into law, without adoption by any 
agency of the state. Their method of statement has caused 
an enormous amount of confusion regarding the way law 
arises, by blurring or obliterating the distinction between law 
and its sources. 
Sec. 6-os. Statement of law in cases. In an earlier chapter 
we dealt with the form in which the legislator's message 
is stated.1 We discussed the terms in which it is stated, its 
completeness, its generality, its organization, and other 
matters. I believe that a similar examination of the form 
of the case law will be worth making. 
The common law was often called "the unwritten law" 
by writers of a generation or more ago. It was given this 
name because it was identified with the customs of the com-
munity and these customs were not written down as statutes 
are. But "unwritten law" is a misnomer. Case law cannot 
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properly be identified with customs. And while case law is 
not declared in the same clear-cut form that enactments of 
the legislature are, the case law is written. The decisions of 
cases, at least the decisions of appellate courts, are recorded 
in printed form no less solemn and permanent than enact-
ments of the legislature. As regards written character, case 
law stands on essentially the same footing as legislation. 
And, what is most important for our purpose, the application 
of case law may involve all the problems that the application 
of any verbal statement does. Propositions of case law, like 
propositions of statute law, may have to be interpreted. When 
one applies a proposition of case law, one may have to deter-
mine first of all what that proposition means. In fact, I am 
sure that you will find, after perusing the material which 
follows, that these interpretive problems are more critical 
and more difficult to handle in regard to case law than in 
regard to legislation. 
In the first place, such interpretive problems grow out 
of the fact that case law is not fully stated out. Case law, 
like legislation, takes much for granted. It deals with indi-
vidual cases and does not profess to cover fields. An opinion 
may refer to many decisions in prior cases, but these refer-
ences extend only to those rules and principles which are 
relevant to the points to be decided. The result is that anyone 
who reads case law with understanding, has to fill in a· great 
deal from his knowledge of the legal background. 
Most reported decisions employ a great deal of technical 
legal terminology. Even more than statutes, case reports are 
intended for the eyes of courts and lawyers. Only exception-
ally can a case be read with full understanding by a layman. 
Usually the report states rules and principles in technical 
terms; it describes the procedural steps in technical terms; 
and it even sets forth facts and conclusions of fact in legal 
jargon which is quite incomprehensible to the person without 
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legal training. So that it is almost invariably true that "it 
takes a lawyer" to extract the law from cases. As David 
Dudley Field remarks about case law in a passage already 
quoted: 
"The law with us is a sealed book to the masses; it is a 
sealed book to all but the lawyers; and it is but partly open 
even to them. It is an insult to our understanding to say that 
the knowledge of the law is open to everybody." 2 
But the factor which makes case law most difficult of 
application, even for the lawyer, is the form in which case 
law is stated. It is not declared in a clear-cut legal text, as 
statutes and constitutional provisions are.3 Case law is found 
in judicial opinions on particular cases. These opinions take 
the form of a discussion of a legal problem. The discussion 
may include a great variety of materials. Normally, it in-
cludes a statement of the facts in the case before the court; 
a formulation of the legal problem or issue, which the court 
has to decide; an exposition of various rules of law which 
may be relevant to the decision; an analysis of the facts of 
the particular case in relation to these various rules; the 
citation of the holdings in other cases and an analysis of their 
facts (some of which are analogous and some of which are 
different and distinguishable); and finally, a discussion of 
general principles on the basis of which the court chooses 
to adopt one rule rather than another. In other words, the 
proposition of law for which such a case stands seldom comes 
ready-made; it is interlarded with a discussion of the facts 
of the particular case; it is mixed up with a discussion of 
many other cases; it is put first in one shape and then another, 
here as a principle, there a rule. The person who approaches 
such ·a decision may sometimes find a clearly formulated 
proposition of law for which the decision stands. More often, 
2 See the excerpt from his article, quoted at some length in sec. 4-::17 above. 
B Statutes are characterized, as Patterson says, by "textual rigidity." 
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he has to formulate his own proposition. The legal element 
is "interstitial"; and it is not always easy to dig out of the 
interstices, as you have doubtless found in the reading of 
cases that you have done so far. 
The mass of case law from which rules and principles have 
to be extracted would be quite overwhelming for the indi-
vidual lawyer if he had to do all the e:x:tracting himself. He 
simply could not handle the job alone. The job of integrating 
and organizing the case law is done for the lawyer in partial 
fashion. 
I. In digests of the cases, of which the most notable is 
the American Digest, which is part of the National 
Reporter System and covers all American decided cases. 
2. In encyclopaedias, e.g., Corpus Juris Secundum. 
3· In textbooks, e.g., Williston on Contracts, Prosser on 
Torts, Tiffany on Real Property, and Wigmore on 
Evidence. 
4· In case annotations, e.g., American Law Reports Anno-
tated (A.L.R.), which are selections of important cases 
with collections of other decisions relating to the same 
topics. 
The persons who prepare these works attempt to select and 
extract the significant legal material from the cases, and to 
sort and arrange it by reference to subject, principle and rule. 
Their work is most helpful for practitioner, student and 
scholar. But it is unofficial and unauthoritative; selection, 
statement and arrangement are extrinsic to the material 
organized, in the sense that they are imposed from the outside 
by a person or persons who have no authority to make or 
formulate the law. 
In the last two decades an important enterprise, similar 
to the preparation of textbooks on law, has been carried out 
by the American Law Institute. This is an organization of 
judges, practitioners and law teachers, formed "to promote 
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the clarification and simplification of the law and its better 
adaptation to social needs, to secure the better administration 
of justice, and to encourage and carry on scholarly and scien-
tific legal work." It has restated the law in the following 
fields: Agency, Conflict of Laws, Contracts, Judgments, 
Property, Restitution, Security, Torts, and Trusts. The Re-
statement in each of these fields was undertaken by a reporter, 
who was a specialist in that field and who had working with 
him a number of advisers, chiefly law teachers, also interested 
in the field. Frequent conferences were held, and the drafts 
as they progressed were submitted for discussion and criticism 
by the council and the annual meetings of the Institute.* 
Mr. William Draper Lewis, first director, thus describes the 
work which the Institute undertook to do and what it has 
accomplished: 
"We started with the belief that out of the mass of case 
authority and legal literature could be made clear statements 
of the rules of the common law today operative· in the great 
majority of our states, expressed as simply as the character 
of our complex civilization admits. The result shows that this 
belief was justified. The Restatement of each subject ex-
presses as nearly as may be the rules which our courts will 
today apply. These rules cover not merely situations which 
* (I.R.) For recent statements regarding the work of the American Law 
Institute, and the character and value of its work, see Lewis, "The First 
Restatement of the Law, and How We Did It," 25 NEB. L. REV. 206 (I946); 
and Goodrich, "Report to the American Law Institute," (I 948). Both these 
items are set forth in FRYER AND BENSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 1067 et seq. In his article, Lewis cites the following earlier critical 
reviews of the work of the American Law Institute, which should also be of 
interest to the initiated reader: Clark, "The Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts," 42 YALE L. J. 643 ( I933); Pollock, "Book Review," 47 HARV. L. 
REV. 363 (I933); Patterson, "The Restatement of the Law of Contracts," 
33 CoL. L. REv. 397 (1933); Goodrich, "Institute Bards and Yale Reviewers," 
84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 449 ( I936); Arnold, "Institute Priests and Yale 
Observers" id. at 8 I I; Leach, "The Restatements as They Were In the Begin-
ning, Are Now, and Perhaps Henceforth Shall Be," 23 A. B. A. J. 517 
(I 9 3 7) ; McDougal, "Restatement of the Law of Property," 3 2 ILL. L. REv. 
509 (I937); Vance, "The Restatement of the Law of Property," 86 U. OF PA. 
L. REv. I73 (1937); McDougal, "Future Interests Restated; Tradition v. 
Clarification and Reform," 55 HARV. L. REV. 1077 (1942). 
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have already arisen in our courts, but by analogy rules 
applicable to situations likely to arise. The Restatement of 
a subject is thus more than a picture of what has been 
decided; it is a picture of present law expressed by foremost 
members of the profession. As a result of the way in which 
the work has been done and the persons who have labored 
on it, the Restatement has acquired an authority far greater 
than those of us who organized the Institute to do the work 
anticipated. Though the rules are expressed in the form of 
a code, except in sporadic instances, there never has been 
any desire to give them statutory authority. The Restatement 
is an agency tending to promote the clarification and the 
unification of the law in a form similar to a code. But it is 
not a code or statute.4 It is designed to help preserve, not 
to change, the common system of expressing law and adapting 
it to changing conditions in a changing world." 5 
Sec. 6-o6. Problems. Consider the following items in terms 
of judicial lawmaking and the sources therefor: 
I. Judge von Moschzisker: 
"The judge may discover the solution of the point for 
decision in the constitution or statutes of the jurisdiction 
involved, and when either of these sources supplies the guide, 
he is bound to stop there; if they both fail he must turn to 
the body of the law as previously laid down by his own court, 
and be guided by such relevant authorities as he may find 
there. Should his researches in that field prove fruitless, it 
is usual for him to look for decisions in other jurisdictions, 
and if none appears which appeals to him as furnishing the 
proper rule, then he who is fixed with the responsibility of 
deciding the case has 'to draw his inspiration from consecrated 
4 However, the American Law Institute did prepare three model codes for 
submission to the state legislatures: 1. a Model Code of Criminal Procedure, 
which has been adopted, in whole or in part, in about one-half the states; 
z. a Model Code of Evidence, which has not so far been adopted anywhere; 
and 3· a Code of Commercial Law, which has only progressed to the stage of 
a tentative draft. This last-named code is a joint undertaking of the Law 
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
I> "The First Restatement of the Law and How We Did It," zs NEB. L. REV. 
zo6 at z1s-u6 (1946). See also Goodrich, "Restatement and Codification" 
in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD CENTENARY ESSAYS Z41 (1949). 
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principles,-he is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to 
vague and unregulated benevolence (but must) exercise a 
discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, 
disciplined by system, and subordinated to "the primordial 
necessity of order in the social life." ' " 1 
Von Moschzisker gives a hierarchy of sources from which 
the judge derives the rule which he applies. How far are 
the various items which he mentions to be regarded as law 
and how far as sources of law? Suppose for example a judge 
in Michigan decides to follow a New York decision, there 
being no Michigan decision on the point. Is he treating the 
New York decision as law or as a source of law? What do 
you think von Moschzisker means by the suggestion that 
the judge must, if no other resources are available, "draw 
his inspiration from consecrated principles"? 
Where would von Moschzisker place a textbook or a 
Restatement of the law? Is such a work to be regarded as 
law or a source of law? In what essential respect does a 
Restatement differ from a code? 
2. Petit v. Liston.2 
"Plaintiff, a minor, brings this action by his guardian to 
recover $I 2 5, paid by him upon the purchase of a certain 
motorcycle purchased from the defendants. 
"The case involves the question of whether or not a minor, 
who has purchased an article of this kind, and taken and used 
the same, after paying part or all of the purchase price, can 
return the article and recover the money paid without making 
good to the vendors the wear and tear and depreciation of 
the same while in his hands. . . . 
"Bennett, J. The amount involved in this proceeding is 
not large, but the question of law presented is a very impor-
tant one, and one which has been much disputed in the courts, 
and about which there is a great and irreconcilable conflict 
1 
"Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort," 3 7 HARV. L. REV. 409 at 411 
( 1923), quoting CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PR.OCESS 141 
(1921). 
2 97 Ore. 464 (1920). 
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in the authorities, and we have therefore given the matter 
careful attention. 
"The courts, in an attempt to protect the minor upon the 
one hand, and to prevent wrong or injustice to persons who 
have dealt fairly and reasonably with such minor upon the 
other, have indulged in many fine distinctions and recognized . 
various slight shades of difference. · 
"In dealing with the right of the minor to rescind his 
contract and the conditions under which he may do so, the 
decisions of the courts in the different states have not only 
conflicted upon the main questions involved, but many of 
the decisions of the same court, in the same state, seem to 
be inconsistent with each other; and oftentimes one court 
has made its decision turn upon a distinction or difference 
not recognized by the courts of other states as a distinguishing 
feature. 
''The result has been that there are not only two general 
lines of decisions directly upon the question involved, but 
there are many others, which diverge more or less from the 
main line, and make particular cases turn upon real or fancied 
differences and distinctions, depending upon whether the 
contract was executory or partly or wholly executed, whether 
it was for necessaries, whether it was beneficial to the minor, 
whether it was fair and reasonable, whether the minor still 
had the property purchased in his possession, whether he had 
received any beneficial use of the same, etc. 
"Many courts have held broadly that a minor may so 
purchase property and keep it for an indefinite time, if he 
chooses, until it is worn out and destroyed, and then recover 
the payments made on the purchase price, without allowing 
the seller anything whatever for the use and depreciation of 
the property. 
"Many other authorities hold that where the transaction 
is fair and reasonable, and the minor was not overcharged 
or taken advantage of in any way, and he takes and keeps 
the property and uses or destroys it, he cannot recover the 
payments made on the purchase price, without allowing the 
seller for the wear and tear and depreciation of the article 
while in his hands. 
"The plaintiff contends for the former rule, and supports 
his contention with citations from the courts of last resort 
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of Maine, Connecticut, Indiana, Massachusetts, Vermont, 
Nebraska, Virginia, Iowa, Mississippi, and West Virginia, 
most of which (although not all) support his contention. On 
the contrary, the courts of New York, Maryland, Montana, 
Illinois, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Minnesota, with 
some others, support the latter rule, which seems to be also 
the English rule. 
"Some of the cyclopedias and some of the different series 
of selected cases state the rule contended for by plaintiff, 
as supported by the strong weight of authority;. but we find 
the decisions rather equally balanced, both in number and 
respecta hili ty. . . . 
"Our attention has not been called to any Oregon case 
bearing upon the question, and as far as our investigation 
has disclosed, there is none. 
"In this condition of the authorities, we feel that we are 
in a position to pass upon the question as one of first impres-
sion, and announce the rule which seems to us to be the 
better one, upon considerations of principle and public policy. 
"We think, where the minor has not been overreached in 
any way, and there has been no undue influence, and the 
contract is a fair and reasonable one, and the minor has 
actually paid money on the purchase price, and taken and 
used the article, that he ought not to be permitted to recover 
the amount actually paid, without allowing the vendor of 
the goods the reasonable compensation for the use and depre-
ciation of the article, while in his hands. . . . 
"We think this rule will fully and fairly protect the minor 
against injustice or imposition, and at the same time it will 
be fair to the business man who has dealt with such minor 
in good faith. This rule is best adapted to modern conditions, 
and especially to the conditions in our far western states. 
"Here, minors are permitted to and do in fact transact 
a great deal of business for -themselves, long before they 
have reached the age of legal majority. Most young men 
have their own time long before reaching that age. They 
work and earn money and collect it and spend it oftentimes 
without any oversight or restriction. 
"No business man questions their right to buy, if they 
have the money to pay for their purchases. They not only 
buy for themselves, but they often are intrusted with the 
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making of purchases for their parents and guardians. It would 
be intolerably burdensome for everyone concerned if mer-
chants and other business men could not deal with them 
safely, in a fair and reasonable way, in cash transactions of 
this kind. 
"Again, it will not exert any good moral influence upon 
boys and young men, and will not tend to encourage honesty 
and integrity, or lead them to a good and useful business 
future, if they are taught that they can make purchases with 
their own money, for their own benefit, and after paying for 
them in this way, and using them until they are worn out 
and destroyed, go back and compel the business man to return 
to them what they have paid upon the purchase price. Such 
a doctrine as it seems to us, can only lead to the corruption 
of young men's principles and encouraging them in habits of 
trickery and dishonesty. 
"In view of all these considerations, we think that the rule 
we have indicated, and which is substantially the rule adopted 
in New York, is the better rule, and we adopt the same in 
this state." 
How far do you regard this decision as creative of law 
for Oregon? Where did the court find the rules which it 
adopted? 
3· Daily v. Parker.3 Evans, Circuit Judge: 
"The instant appeal raises this question: Have children 
living in Pennsylvania, a cause of action for damages against 
a woman living in Illinois who caused their father to leave 
them, their mother, and their home and go to Chicago and 
live with her and to refuse to further contribute to their main-
tenance and support? The District Court answered the ques-
tion in the negative and dismissed the complaint. . . . 
"Is the family relationship ~nd the rights of the different 
members therein, arising therefrom, sufficient to support a 
cause of action in each, the father, mother, or children, against 
one who breaks it up and destroys rights of the said individual 
members? 
3 rp F.zd 174 (1945). 
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"Appellee concedes that such a cause of action exists in 
favor of the father and within certain limits and certain juris-
dictions, also in favor of the wife. She denies that such a cause 
of action, however, exists in favor of the children. 
"The history of the development of the family and the 
family relations and the duties and obligations of the mem-
bers of the family is a long one, covering centuries. Its 
development was slow, due to society's acceptance of the 
relative positions of the parties in the family and its reluctance 
to change such status. The husband was lord and master, 
and the rights of all of the members of the family were 
merged in him. He ruled. He spoke in the first person 
singular in all matters. He spoke authoritatively for all. 
Through the centuries, however, there came slowly a change. 
The father is still the master, it may be said, but the duties 
of the master have changed. Where it was said to be his 
duty to rule, he now serves. He recognizes rights of the 
others and his obligation to meet them. 
"Perhaps he is still the titular head of the family. If so, 
his position merely carries with it greater duties and obliga-
tions. The duties of each member of the family are measured 
(at least in theory and in legal conception) by the position, 
the role, each takes in the family. Thus we see the wife, the 
breadwinner, and speaking for the family when the husband 
becomes incapacitated through sickness or invalidism. And 
children of tender years take on the family financial burdens 
when father is incapacitated and mother must attend him 
or for other reasons is unable to contribute to the financial 
support of the family. Relativity of rights and duties marks 
the rights and the obligations of the group and relativity is 
determined in each case by the situation of the family. But 
relativity does not eliminate or destroy the rights of any 
member. 
"It is this conception of the family which must constitute 
our approach to the question at hand. . . . 
"Defendant argues that such rights as here asserted have 
never been, and should not now be, recognized by any court 
until and unless legislation has been enacted creating such 
right. She argues that in the past, children's rights:ttave not 
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been judicially recognized, save after legislative enactment 
and she points to various specific acts which the Illinois 
Legislature enacted to give rights which were not previously 
recognized. . . . 
"Plaintiffs, on the other hand, rely upon the maxim, Ubi 
Jus Ibi Remedium. Also they refer to the bill of rights of 
the Illinois Constitution (Sec. 19, Art. 2, Smith-Hurd Stats.) 
where it is provided 'Every person ought to find a certain 
remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he 
may receive in his person, property or reputation.' They 
contend that the absence of precedent affords no justification 
for denial of a common-law remedy where the right of an 
individual has been invaded by the wrongful act of another. 
"Instead of holding that there is no remedy, because there 
is no precedent, they argue for what they assert to be the 
better rule, and what Dean Pound calls judicial empiricism. 
In other words, the common law has been and is sufficiently 
elastic to meet changing conditions. We quote from Dean 
Pound's book, 'The Spirit of the Common Law,' page 183: 
'Anglo-American law is fortunate indeed in entering upon 
a new period of growth with a well-established doctrine of 
lawmaking by judicial decision .... Undoubtedly ... ju-
dicial empiricism was proceeding over-cautiously at the end 
of the last century .... If the last century insisted over-
much upon predetermined premises, and a fixed technique, 
it did not lose to our law the method of applying the judicial 
experience of the past to the judicial questions of the pres-
ent.' ... 
"Our conclusion, without going further into the matter, 
is that a child today has a right enforceable in a court of law, 
against one who has invaded and taken from said child the 
support and maintenance of its father, as well as damages 
for the destruction of other rights which arise out of the 
family relationship and which have been destroyed or de-
feated by a wrongdoing third party. Likewise, we are per-
suaded that because such rights have not heretofore been 
recognized, is not a conclusive reason for denying them ..•. 
"The judgment is reversed with directions to proceed in 
accordance with the views expressed in this opinion." 
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What sources are used by Judge Evans in his decision? 
Does he rely on constitutional sources? On common law 
sources? On general background? 
Does he go beyond the consecrated principles to which 
Judge von Moschzisker refers? 4 
Sec. 6-o7. The "discovered law" doctrine. Down until 
about two generations ago legal writers in this country were 
quite unwilling to admit that the judge actually creates law 
by his decisions. This reluctance was due chiefly to the pre-
vailing "separation of powers" doctrine, according to which 
the legislature is to make laws, the executive to carry them 
out, and the judge to apply them to controversies. To admit 
that the judge makes law was to concede that he disregards 
this fundamental dogma. Adhering to a literal interpretation 
of the separation doctrine, these writers denied that the judge 
legislates, and in order to avoid ascribing a legislative role 
to him, they developed the so-called "discovered law" doc-
trine. Its purport was that the rules and principles that the 
judge announces in his opinions are merely discovered by 
him. They are supposed to have existed since the beginning 
of time, even though neither the judge himself nor anyone 
else was aware of their existence before they were judicially 
announced. 
This "discovered law" doctrine involved an automatic or 
"slot machine" conception of the application of standards 
to cases. It denied entirely the judge's role in creating new 
law. It ignored entirely the judge's function of settling doubts 
and uncertainties regarding the law. By cloaking all these 
matters in a mystery, it prevented a rational explanation of 
the creative side of the judge's role. 
Today practically all theoretical writers and most judges 
are ready to recognize the limited creative role of the judge. 
4 Compare Russell v. Men of Devon, z Term R. 667 (1788) quoted in 
sec. 6-17, problem 3· 
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They are ready to admit that the judge does of necessity 
make law. That he has many legal problems to solve, and 
in solving them contributes new law for the guidance of 
future judges. They regard the so-called discovery of pre-
existent law as merely a pious fiction, invented to save the 
face of a doctrine of "separation of powers" stated in absolute 
form. They realize that interstitial legislation is a necessary 
consequence of the decision of doubtful cases. The recognition 
that lawmaking of this character attends the decision of cases, 
has meant a real advance in realism and in clarity of thinking 
about law and the judicial process. 
One factor which probably contributed to the success and 
former acceptance of the "discovered law" doctrine, was the 
fact that the judge's creative work occurs only in small bits, 
as is pointed out above. His lawmaking is not on a large 
scale. No doubt his prime function in the mine-run of cases, 
is to apply standards to acts of individuals and officials, stand-
ards which can fairly be said to be already existing; judicial 
legislation is secondary and incidental. It is easy to overlook 
the element of judicial lawmaking as it occurs from case to 
case. This oversight is a good deal like the failure to see 
that a glacier moves because it moves so slowly. It is only 
when we look at the imposing structure of the common law 
as it has grown up and developed through the centuries that 
we get a real appreciation of the creative work that judges 
have done and are doing. 
Sec. 6-o8. Problems. 1. At one place in his Nature and 
Sources of Law, Gray asks the question regarding a group of 
common law rules, "What was the law in the time of Richard 
Coeur de Lion on the liability of a telegraph company to 
persons to whom a message was sent?" (Sec. 222.) What is 
Gray's point? 
2. Suppose states X, Y, and Z have respectively three 
different common law rules regarding the same subject 
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matter: e.g., different rules regarding "attractive nuisances," 
or regarding the effects of a mistake in telegraphic trans-
mission of a contractual offer, or regarding the test for 
insanity as a defense to criminal liability. Why does the 
existence of such differences create logical difficulties for the 
"discovered law" doctrine? 
Suppose the differing rules are found not in judicial deci-
sions but in statutes. Does this alter the logical difficulty? 
Why? 
3· Does the fact that the legislature of state X passes 
different statutes at different times make logical difficulties 
for the "discovered law" doctrine? * 
Suppose the Supreme Court of state X changes its view of 
the law in the course of time; first it adopts rule I, later it 
adopts rule 2 on the same subject, still later rule 3, and 
finally it reverts to rule I again. What does this suggest? 
"CoMMON-LAw" RuLES FOR UsiNG, FINDING, 
INTERPRETING AND CHANGING STANDARDS 
Sec. 6-09. Legal standards and rules for their use. The 
acts of the judge like the acts of any other official are con-
trolled by standards. Some of these standards-the rules of 
pleading and procedure-have already been considered in 
the third chapter of these lectures. To be contrasted with 
these are the rules of method which govern his handling of 
* (I.R.) Those who adhere to a "higher law" theory, are prone to accept 
the "discovered law" doctrine. There is, however, no necessary connection here. 
The "discovered law" doctrine is concerned only with judicial lawmaking and 
purports to describe (and prescribe) a relationship between judicial decisions 
and an existing body of law. There is no mention of a parallel relationship 
between legislation and an existing body of law; it is not denied that the 
legislature can and does lay down law which never existed before. But the 
"higher law," according to its protagonists, is a body of pre-existing principles 
which stand apart from human law; these principles serve as sources for 
legislative lawmaking and limitations on such lawmaking. Of course, this 
"higher law" can serve likewise as source and limit of judicial lawmaking. 
My quarrel with the "discovered law" doctrine is that it gives a special, 
different and unrealistic explanation of judicial lawmaking. See section 7-45 
for further discussion of the "higher law" theory. 
408 OUR LEGAL SYSTEM AND HOW IT OPERATES 
legal materials. Some of these latter rules have also been 
given sufficient consideration, such rules as those which tell 
the judge how to deal with conflicts between constitution and 
statute, and between statute and statute; and also the rules 
which govern the processes of interpretation. Besides these 
many rules of method, we have also referred to the rules 
which govern the judge's function as lawmaker. All these 
rules control the judge in handling legal materials. Some of 
them regulate his handling of statutory material, others his 
acts of creating case law. There remain a number of other 
important rules of method which control the judge's choice 
of legal rules, his use of legal rules, and his interpretation 
of the materials which he finds in the case law. These are 
to be the subject of discussion in the remainder of this chapter. 
Sec. 6-IO. Primary rules of use: follow statutes and follow 
decisions. First among the rules of judicial method is one 
which directs the court to apply the mandate of statutes in 
cases which come before it. This rule is taken for granted 
by the legislature whenever it enacts a statute. The legislature 
assumes that the standards which it declares will be used by 
the courts in the decision of cases. The courts themselves 
consistently recognize their obligation to follow statutes; no 
court would ever question that it is bound to carry out the 
mandates of a statute, provided of course, that the courts 
regard the statute as constitutional. 
Occasionally this rule is explicitly stated; 1 more often the 
rule is taken for granted. The fact that the rule is not men-
1 The rule appears explicitly in the clause of the Federal Constitution which 
declares that "the laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme 
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any 
thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstand-
ing." (Art. VI, Cl. z.) But this clause is apparently intended for the immediate 
purpose of declaring the obligatory force of federal statutes, etc., on state 
judges; their obligatory force on federal judges is taken for granted. Again, 
that clause of the Federal Constitution which provides that "judicial Power 
shall extend to all Cases in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the 
Laws of the United States . . ." rather implies than states the binding 
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tioned frequently does not mean that it is any the less impor-
tant. It does mean that its role in the operation of the legal 
system can be overlooked. The fact that the binding force of 
statutes is assumed and not mentioned, has resulted in a fail-
ure to analyze the controlling force of statutes on the court, 
and this in turn has resulted in some very obscure thinking 
about the binding force of standards. What needs to be noted 
is that a simple statute is a mandate to an individual or an 
official, and that this statute is supplemented by a very general 
superstandard which requires the judiciary to effectuate 
statutory provisions. This superstandard is analogous to the 
explicit provision of the Federal Constitution that the Pres-
ident "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." 
For example, a statute which penalizes reckless driving raises 
questions of the binding force of two standards. It is needful 
to inquire whether the statute furnishes a standard for indi-
vidual action and also whether the court is bound to apply 
this standard by virtue of a standard applicable to it. The 
statutory provision does not per se bind the court; the court 
is rather bound by a general standard which directs it to use 
statutes in cases which come before it; in so doing it acts 
pursuant to a standard for applying standards, an established 
rule of judicial method.2 
A second general rule of judicial method, parallel to the 
rule which requires courts to follow statutes, is embodied in 
the doctrine of precedent, or as it is sometimes called, the 
doctrine of stare decisis. This doctrine requires the courts to 
follow previous decisions. It was received by our colonial 
force of federal statutes. Quite apart from provisions of this sort, the binding 
force of statutes upon courts is so ingrained in the thinking of judges and 
lawyers that it can fairly be called a part of their habitual attitudes. (Art. III, 
Sec. 2..) 
2 Even if the statute expressly provides that the court shall take certain 
action, a very common type of statutory provision as applied to trial courts, 
the situation is not changed. There are still two standards-the standard 
applicable to the individual and a second standard requiring the court to 
apply the first. 
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ancestors as part of their English common law heritage. As 
Salmond has said, "The importance of judicial precedents 
has always been a distinguishing characteristic of English 
law .... A judicial precedent speaks in England with 
authority . . . the courts are bound to follow the law that 
is so established." 3 What Salmond says of the English system 
holds equally of the American legal systems today. 
Sec. 6-I I. Problems. I. Von Moschzisker says, in a passage 
quoted above: 1 
"The judge may discover the solution of the point for 
decision in the constitution or statutes of the jurisdiction 
involved, and when either of these sources supplies the guide, 
he is bound to stop there; if they both fail he must turn to 
the body of the law as previously laid down by his own court 
and be guided by such relevant authorities as he may find 
there. Should his researches in that field prove fruitless, it 
is usual for him to look for decisions in other jurisdic-
tions, . . ." 
How are this author's remarks related to the points about 
rules of method which are made in the last preceding section? 
2. Consider the "choice of law" problems which the court 
had to deal with in the following case: 
E. A. Stephens & Co. v. Albers.2 The plaintiff, who 
operated a silver fox farm, paid $7 50 for a fox named, 
"McKenzie Duncan." Soon afterward this fox slipped 
through an inner gate inadvertently left unfastened at feed-
ing time, and escaped. Next evening, the fox was shot by a 
ranchman who lived six miles distant, and who discovered 
the animal prowling near his chicken house. The ranchman 
did not know of the nature, value, or ownership of the 
animal, but removed his pelt and gave it to a trapper to sell 
8 jURISPRUDENCE {6th ed.) sec. 61 (I9ZO), 
1 
"Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort," 3 7 HARV. L. RE.'V. 409 at 41 1 
(19z3). 
2 81 Colo. 488 (z9z7). 
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on commission. The latter sold the pelt to the defendant for 
$7 5. The plaintiff later found out what had happened to the 
fox and located its pelt in the defendant's possession. Plaintiff 
brought suit for the value of the pelt, and recovered $7 5. 
Defendant appealed. 
Burke, J.: 
". . . Defendant says McKenzie Duncan was a wild 
animal whose possession was essential to ownership, and that 
when he escaped and pursuit was abandoned plaintiff lost 
title which the ranchman obtained by slaughter and passed 
to defendant by sale. Plaintiff says the fox was domesticated; 
that his disposition to return to his pen (animum (sic) 
revertendi) must be presumed; that irrespective of such facts 
foxes are taxable in this state, hence the common law rule as 
to domesticated animals applies; and that the common law 
rule as to wild animals is not applicable here. . . . 
"For the common law we go to Blackstone who says: A 
qualified property may subsist in wild animals 'by a man's 
reclaiming and making them tame by art, industry and edu-
cation; or by so confining them within his own immediate 
power, that they cannot escape and use their natural lib-
erty .... These are no longer the property of a man, than 
while they continue in his keeping or actual possession; but 
if at any time they regain their natural liberty, his property 
instantly ceases; unless they have animum revertendi (the 
intention of returning) which is only to be known by their 
usual custom of returning .... The deer that is chased out 
of my park or forest, and is instantly pursued by the keeper 
or forester: remains still in my possession, and I still preserve 
my qualified property in them. But if they stray without my 
knowledge, and do not return in the usual manner, it is then 
lawful for any stranger to take them.' 3 ••• 
"It should be borne in mind that when this common law 
rule was formulated the great wild animal menageries of the 
present day, with their enormous collections and vast invest-
ment, were in embryo, and the business of raising fur bearing 
animals in captivity was practically unknown in England .... 
3 2 Bl. Comm. *391 et seq. ( 1765). 
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"Counsel for defendant further says this common law rule 
is in force in this jurisdiction by virtue of an act passed by 
our territorial legislature in I 8 6 I. 'The common law of Eng-
land, so far as the same is applicable and of a general 
nature, . . . shall be the rule of decision, and shall be con-
sidered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.' 
Sec. 6516, p. 1698, C. L. 1921. 
"Applicability as to past or to future conditions would 
often be difficult, if not impossible, of ascertainment. That 
it is to be determined when claimed is clearly indicated by 
the language of Mr. Justice Beck, who, speaking for the court 
nineteen years after the passage of the statute, in a case where 
the common law rule as to damage done by trespassing cattle 
was involved, said, 'such a rule of law is wholly unsuited and 
inapplicable to the present condition of the state and its 
citizens.' Morris v. Fraker, 5 Colo. 425, 428. 
"For the reason hereinbefore pointed out we think it 
equally clear that the common law rule now invoked 'is 
wholly unsuited and inapplicable to the present condition of 
the state,' the transaction in question, and the industry out 
of which it grew. 
"Having then neither statute nor applicable common law 
rule governing the case we must so apply general principles 
in the light of custom, existing facts, and common knowledge, 
that justice will be done. So the courts of England and the 
United States have acted from time immemorial and so the 
common law itself came into existence. 
"Counsel for defendant concedes he would have no title 
had the fox been released by a stranger or killed by one 
informed of its ownership. The thread is too frail to support 
its burden. McKenzie Duncan was held in captivity, semi-
domesticated, escaped by accident, fled against the will of his 
owner, and pursuit was abandoned by compulsion. This de-
fendant in fact had, or is charged with, knowledge that the 
pelt purchased was the product of a vast, legitimate, and 
generally known industry; that it had a considerable and 
easily ascertainable value; that it bore the indicia of owner-
ship; that it has been taken in an unusual way; that the seller 
was not the owner; that no right of innocent purchasers had 
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intervened; and that it was from an animal taken in a locality 
where its kind ferae naturae was unknown and in a state 
where large numbers were kept in captivity. 
"We are loath to believe that a man may capture a grizzly 
bear in the environs of New York or Chicago, or a seal in 
a mill pond in Massachusetts, or an elephant in a corn field 
in Iowa, or a silver fox on a ranch in Morgan County, 
Colorado, and snap his fingers in the face of its former owner 
whose title had been acquired by a considerable expenditure 
of time, labor, and money; or that the rule which requires 
that where one or two persons must suffer the loss falls upon 
him whose carelessness caused it, has any application here. 
If the owner was negligent in permitting the escape the dealer 
was even more reckless in making the purchase. 
"Under all the circumstances of this case we feel obliged 
to hold that the defendant obtained no title which it can 
maintain against the plaintiff. 
"The judgment is accordingly affirmed." 
vVhat rule did the defendant contend was applicable here? 
Why did the court reject it? 
How did the court dispose of the statute which adopted 
the English common law as "the rule of decision" in 
Colorado? Did this statute make the English law a source 
of law, or make it law for Colorado? 
How do you interpret the paragraph beginning, "Having 
then neither statute nor applicable common law ... "? 
3· An important field of the law bears the name "conflict 
of laws." The bulk of the problems which are considered 
in this field are problems of the "choice of law." Suppose 
as an example that 0, who lives in Michigan, is the owner 
of land in Ohio which he wishes to convey. What law con-
trols such a transfer, the law of Michigan or the law of 
Ohio? Story states the answer thus: "All the authorities in 
England and America . . . recognize the principle in its 
fullest import, that real estate, or immovable property, is 
exclusively subject to the laws of the government within 
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whose territory it is situate." 4 Accordingly, the formal suffi-
ciency of a conveyance is governed by the law of the place 
where the land lies; that law also determines what constitutes 
the delivery of a deed, who is a competent grantor, etc. 
However, statutes in some states have modified the require-
ment regarding formalities by providing that the conveyance 
of local land is valid, as regards form, if it complies with 
the law of the place where the conveyance is executed. 
What rules regarding "choice of law" appear in the fore-
going statement? 
4· In r789 the first Congress of the United States enacted 
the Federal Judiciary Act. Section 34 of this act provided: 
"The laws of the several States, except where the Consti-
tution, treaties, or statutes of the United States otherwise 
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in 
trials at common law, in the courts of the United States, in 
cases where they apply." 
This section was intended primarily to specify the law which 
was to be applied in the federal courts in lawsuits between 
citizens of different states ("diversity of citizenship" cases). 
Justice Story, speaking for the Supreme Court in the famous 
case of Swift v. Tyson 5 held that "laws of the several states" 
referred only to statute law and that on matters of common 
law the federal courts were at liberty to follow their own 
ideas of the general common law. This interpretation was 
repeatedly criticized, but was adhered to by the Supreme 
Court until I937· Thus Black and White Taxicab, etc., Co. 
v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab, etc., Co.6 involved a contract 
between A, a citizen of Tennessee, and B, a citizen of Ken-
tucky, made in Kentucky and to be performed there. There 
was no question but that the operation of the contract was 
to be governed by Kentucky law, nor that the contract was 
4CoNFLICT OF LAWS (8th ed.) sec. 428 (1883). 
lix6Pet. (U.S.) I (1842). 
6 176 u. s. SI8 (1928). 
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of a type which was invalid under the Kentucky decisions. 
However, in a suit to enforce this contract the Supreme Court 
held the contract valid and binding between the parties. The 
majority opinion declared: 
"The cases cited show that the decisions of the Kentucky 
Court of Appeals, holding such arrangements invalid, are 
contrary to the common law as generally understood and 
applied. And we are of opinion that petitioner here has 
failed to show any valid ground for disregarding this con-
t t " 7 rae, ... 
According to this decision of the Supreme Court, what is 
the common law of Kentucky applicable to this contract? 
What determines the content of the common law of Ken-
tucky? 
In this last case Holmes, J. (with Brandeis and Stone, J J.) 
dissented. He said in part: 
"Books written about any branch of the common law treat 
it as a unit, cite cases from this Court, from the Circuit Courts 
of Appeals, from the State Courts, from England and the 
Colonies of England indiscriminately, and criticise them as 
right or wrong according to the writer's notions of a single 
theory. It is very hard to resist the impression that there is 
one august corpus, to understand which clearly is the only 
task of any Court concerned. If there were such a transcen-
dental body of law outside of any particular State but obliga-
tory within it unless and until changed by statute, the Courts 
of the United States might be right in using their independent 
judgment as to what it was. But there is no such body of law. 
The fallacy and illusion that I think exist consist in supposing 
that there is this outside thing to be found. Law is a word 
used with different meanings, but law in the sense in which 
courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite 
authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced 
in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the 
common law generally but the law of that State existing by 
the authority of that State without regard to what it may 
7 Ibid. 52.8. 
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have been in England or anywhere else. . . . Whether and 
how far and in what sense a rule shall be adopted whether 
called common law or Kentucky law is for the State alone 
to decide. . . . The Supreme Court of a State does some-
thing more than make a scientific inquiry into a fact outside 
of and independent of it. It says, with an authority that no 
one denies, . . . that thus the law is and shall be. Whether 
it be said to make or to declare the law, it deals with the 
law of the State with equal authority however its function 
may be described." 8 
Under Holmes' view, how is the common law of Ken-
tucky determined? What rule for choosing applicable law 
is to be recognized by the federal courts? 
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,9 the Supreme Court 
speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis overruled Swift v. 
Tyson and the whole series of cases following it. I need not 
go into the reasons for the conclusion in the Erie Railroad 
Case, as we are interested only in the views above expressed 
regarding the determination of common law. It is only 
important for our purpose that the Erie Railroad Case in 
effect adopted the views propounded by Justice Holmes 
above.* 
Sec. 6-r2. Judicial lawmaking and the following of 
precedent. Judicial lawmaking and the following of prece-
dent are correlative acts. They are like proposal and accept-
ance of marriage. The judges who lay down a precedent 
offer it as a guide for subsequent decision; the judges who 
8 Ibid. 532-536. 
9 304 u.s. 64 (1937). 
* (I.R.) The distinction is now definitely made between state created rights 
and federally created rights, or, as I would prefer to say, between state created 
law (statute or common law) and federally created law. Regarding develop-
ments since Erie Railroad v. Tompkins was decided, see Guaranty Trust Co. 
v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); and Clark, "State Law in the Federal Courts: 
The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins," 55 YALE L. J. 267 
( 1946); Gavit, "State Rights and Federal Procedure," 25 IND. L. J. I ( 1949); 
Keeffe et al., "Weary Erie," 34 CORN. L. Q. 494 ( 1949); and Blume and 
George, "Limitations and the Federal Courts," an article to appear in the 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW in 1951• 
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follow the precedent accept it as a guide. The aims and 
intentions of these groups of judges are parallel respectively 
to the intentions of the legislature which enacts a statute and 
the court which applies it. Just as the legislature passes a 
statute with implicit confidence that its provisions will be 
applied by the courts in future cases, the supreme court as 
it lays down an original decision expects its opinion to serve 
as a guide for future decisions, and tries to make it a satisfac-
tory and safe guide. On the other hand, judges in subsequent 
cases uniformly recognize the obligation to follow the prece-
dent already established. This is one of the basic tenets of 
Anglo-American judicial method, as I have already pointed 
out. And the following of precedents is reinforced by the 
conscious judicial recognition that precedents ought to be 
followed as a matter of policy, and by judicial habits of mind 
which have become established through long training in our 
common law modes of thinking. 
Acts of legislation and the following of precedents affect 
others than the judicial participants. Individuals, officials, and 
judges of lower courts rely upon the decision which has been 
made and upon its obligatory force on judges in subsequent 
cases. They rely upon the habits and practices of judges of 
following cases. They rely upon the authority of precedent. 
And further than this, they regard the judicial decision which 
establishes a precedent as an implied promise, and a solemn 
one, to adhere to the rules laid down therein. From the 
court's point of view the promise can be likened to a promise 
made to oneself-a resolution; but from the point of view 
of the outsider, the supreme court's declaration stands as a 
public confession of faith. The court says in effect: "This is 
what we hold now; it is what we are going to hold in like 
cases in the future." The court does sometimes go back on 
its resolution; it overrules a precedent. But no one likes to 
go back on a pious resolution openly announced, least of all 
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judges who are trained to announce their intentions and to 
stick to them. The supreme court's assurance of continuity 
of decision is therefore a considerable bond on which to rely.* 
Sec. 6-Ij. Varying force of precedents. Precedents are 
not self-effectuating. They do not control later decisions 
automatically. Precedents only control to the extent that they 
are accepted as binding by judges in later cases. Varying force 
is attached by judges to different kinds of prior decisions. The 
variation in weight or operation of precedents is apparent in 
several respects: 
I. As regards the place and court in which the precedent 
is cited. A decision of the supreme court of state X has a 
different weight when cited in an inferior court than when 
it is cited in the supreme court itself. It also has another 
weight when it is cited in state Y; in the latter state it is 
usually regarded merely as persuasive authority, and courts 
there will follow it only to the extent that its reason com-
mends itself to their judgment. 
2. As regards the character of the judicial statement which 
is relied on. If the opinion is unanimous, it will have one 
force; if the court is divided in opinion, the weight of its 
decision is somewhat weakened. 
3. As regards the scope of acceptance of the view expressed 
by the precedent. If, for example, a precedent is supported 
by an overwhelming weight of general authority, it is entitled 
to more weight than if it diverges from general views. 
4· As regards age and confirmation in later cases. A new 
precedent, it is often suggested, may be overruled more 
readily than one which has been long and continuously 
followed. 
* (I.R.) Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent-Conference at Cincin-
nati Law School, 14 U. CrNN. L. REv. 203-323 (1940); (Justice) Jackson, 
"Decisional Law and Stare Decisis," 30 A. B. A. }OUR. 334 (1944); (Justice) 
Douglas, "Stare Decisis," 49 CoL. L. REV. 735 (1949). See also sec. 6-18, 
note *· 
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5. As regards the subject matter involved in the previous 
decision. Courts have less hesitation about overruling cases 
in some fields than in others, e.g., decisions on points of 
evidence and procedure than decisions on points of property 
law. Compare von Moschzisker, "Stare Decisis in Courts of 
Last Resort," 37 HARV. LAw REv., 409 ( 1924). 
Sec. 6-I 4· Problem. 
Salmond: 
"Decisions are further divisible into two classes, which may 
be distinguished as authoritative and persuasive. These two 
differ in respect of the kind of influence which they exercise 
upon the future course of the administration of justice. An 
authoritative precedent is one which judges must follow 
whether they approve of it or not. It is binding upon them 
and excludes•their judicial discretion for the future. A per-
suasive precedent is one which the judges are under no obli-
gation to follow, but which they will take into consideration, 
and to which they will attach such weight as it seems to them 
to deserve. It depends for its influence upon its own merits, 
not upon any legal claim which it has to recognition. . . . 
"The authoritative precedents recognized by English law 
are the decisions of the superior courts of justice in England. 
The chief classes of persuasive precedents are the following: 
"( r) Foreign judgments, and more especially those of 
American courts. 
"Cz) The decisions of superior courts in other portions of 
the British Empire, for example, Irish courts. 
"(3) The judgments of the Privy Council when sitting 
as the final court of appeal from the Colonies. 
"(4) Judicial dicta, that is to say, statements of law which 
go beyond the occasion, and lay down a rule that is irrelevant 
or unnecessary for the purpose in hand. We shall see later 
that the authoritative influence of precedents does not extend 
to such obiter dicta, but they are not equally destitute of 
persuasive efficacy." 1 
1 JURISPRUDENCE (6th ed.) sec. 63 (192.0). 
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Does Salmond make a valid distinction here? In what way 
shall we describe the difference in the binding force of 
authoritative and persuasive precedents? Do courts ever over-
rule the former? 
Do you accept his distinction between the force of a 
decision and a dictum? Would it be correct to say that a 
dictum of a court in state X is persuasive there, in the same 
way as a decision made in state Y? 
Sec. 6-rs. Dictum and decision.* Not all statements 
which one finds in a judicial opinion are regarded as having 
binding authority. Only those declarations of law which are 
made by the court upon questions which are necessary to 
the decision of the case before it, are binding in later cases. 
An opinion expressed by the court upon some question of 
law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before 
it, is dictum and not binding. Dictum may be persuasive, but 
it has not the force of decision. This all means that one must 
make the distinction between decision and dictum-a distinc-
tion which is not easy to make and which will cause you 
plenty of trouble as you proceed with your study of cases. 
Under the caption, "What Does a Case Decide?" Oliphant 
points out three types of dictum and suggests the difficulty 
of distinguishing dictum from decision. He says in part: 
"In the first place, a court, in deciding a case, may throw 
out a statement as to how it would decide some other case. 
Now if that statement is a statement of another case which 
is as narrow and specific as the actual case before the court, 
it is easily recognized as dictum and given its proper weight 
as such. In the second place, the court may throw out a 
broader statement, covering a whole group of cases. But, so 
long as that statement does not cover the case before the 
* (I.R.) In addition to the item by Oliphant; cited in the next footnote, 
see Goodhart, "Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case," 40 YALE L. J. 
161 (1930). 
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court, it is readily recognized as being not a decision, much 
less the decision of the case. It is dictum, so labeled and 
appraised. But, in the third place, a court may make a 
statement broad enough to dispose of the case in hand as 
well as to cover also a few or many other states of fact. 
Statements of this third sort may cover a number of fact 
situations ranging from one other to legion." 1 
Simply put, dictum is any statement of law by the court 
which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it. 
The third of the types of dictum mentioned by Oliphant is 
the one which makes most difficulty. It is the type in which 
the court has laid down a proposition in its decision which is 
more general than it needs to be in order to decide the case. 
It raises the question, when is a proposition broader than it 
needs to be? When is it too general? Oliphant supposes a 
case in which A's father induces her not to marry B as she 
has promised to do. If the court holds that A's father is not 
liable to B for inducing A to break her contract, what proposi-
tion should it base its conclusion on? Oliphant suggests the 
following possibilities among others: 
"I. Fathers are privileged to induce daughters to break 
promises to marry. 
"2. Parents are so privileged. 
"3· Parents are so privileged as to both daughters and 
sons. 
"4· All persons are so privileged as to promises to marry. 
"5. Parents are so privileged as to all promises made by 
their children. 
"6. All persons are so privileged as to all promises made 
by anyone." 
And this author then asks: 
"Where, on that graduation of propositions, are we to take 
our stand and say, 'This proposition is the decision of this 
case .•. '? Can a proposition of law of this third type ever 
1 
"A Return to Stare Decisis," 6 AM. L. S. REV. 215 at 21 7 et seq. ( 1 928) . 
"'22 OUR LEGAL SYSTEM AND HOW IT OPERATES 
become so broad that, as to any of the cases it would cover, 
it is mere dictum?" 
Sec. 6-I6. Problems regarding dictum. I. Now to pursue 
to the end the line of suppositions which Oliphant makes let 
us assume that the court which decides the case rested its 
decision on the sixth of the above possibilities: All persons 
are so privileged as to all promises made by anyone. Might 
not the court in a later case, involving a breach of promise 
of marriage induced by a neighborhood busybody, quite prop-
erly say that the previous decision only supported the second 
possibility, i.e., that parents are privileged to induce the 
breach of such promises? If the court in this later case deter-
mined to hold the busybody liable, it would call the proposi-
tion of law laid down in the first case dictum insofar as it 
went beyond what was necessary to decide the first case. 
2. Suppose another later case arises in which Z has induced 
X to breach his contract to sell and deliver lumber to Y; on 
what basis might the court distinguish the original case 
involving A's father, and justify a conclusion that Z is liable 
for damages to Y? 
3· The process by which the judge limits the application 
of a prior judicial declaration, which he calls dictum, closely 
resembles the process by which the judge restrictively inter-
prets a legislative declaration in statutory form (sees. 5-23 
and 5-24). Elaborate and explain the analogy. 
4· What is the relation of dictum to the rules of method 
which limit judicial lawmaking (see sec. 6-o3 above)? 
Sec. 6-I7. Analogical and extensive interpretation of 
precedents. Problems. When a novel case arises, one which 
is not clearly covered by a statute or by a prior decision, the 
court to which it is presented will develop a principle from 
its former holdings, and decide the case according to this 
principle. This method of decision obviously extends the 
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holdings of the previous cases, although the court usually 
talks as if it were applying law which it found in them. 
I. Let us return for a moment to the breach of promise 
cases discussed above. Suppose D, a father, induces his 
daughter to breach her promise to marry P, and P sues D 
for damages. Suppose, further, that the court which decides 
the action in D's favor, rests its conclusion on the proposition 
that a father is justified in inducing his daughter to breach 
a promise of this kind. Now, if a later case comes before this 
court in which a son has been induced by his mother to breach 
a promise of marriage, what would this court probably hold? 
How would it state the proposition of law of the second 
case? How would it state what was decided in the first case? 
Can the method of extending the principle of a decision 
to a new case be reconciled with the traditional doctrine which 
limits the controlling force of a decision to what is actually 
decided? 
2. Commonwealth v. Hoxey.1 The indictment set forth 
that the inhabitants of Williamstown, on the I sth of March, 
I 8 I9, were duly assembled in town meeting, for the choice 
of town officers for the political year then next ensuing; that 
a moderator was duly chosen, who called on the electors 
present to give in their votes for a selectman for the year 
ensuing; that the defendant, while the moderator was presid-
ing in the meeting, and was receiving the votes for a select-
man, with force and arms, intending as much as in him lay 
to prevent the choice of said selectman according to the will 
of the electors, and to int~rrupt the freedom of election, 
unlawfully and disorderly did openly declare that the old 
selectmen should not be chosen, and attempted repeatedly 
to take from the box, which contained the ballots of the 
electors, the votes of the electors; and so the jurors say, 
"'that the said T. F. Hoxey, on &c., at &c., in the public 
1 16 Mass. 385 (182o). 
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town meeting aforesaid, in manner and form aforesaid, did 
behave himself disorderly and indecently, to the disturbance 
of the peaceable and quiet citizens then and there assembled 
for the purpose aforesaid, in violation of the rights of private 
suffrage, against the peace of the commonwealth aforesaid, 
and contrary to the form of the statute in such case made 
and provided.' 
"The defendant pleaded guilty to the indictment, and 
moved in arrest of judgment, 'because the said indictment 
purports to be founded upon a statute of law of the common-
wealth; whereas there is no such statute in the state, making 
the facts set forth in the indictment an offence against the 
commonwealth; and because the facts set forth in the indict-
ment do not amount to an offence at common law.' . . . 
ccBy the Court. The indictment charges the offence to have 
been committed contra formam statuti; but no statute is found 
to describe the offence as alleged. The statute of 17 8 5, c. 7 5, 
§ 6, imposes a penalty of twenty shillings for disorderly 
conduct in town meetings, if the offender shall, after notice 
from the moderator, persist in his disorderly behavior, and 
shall refuse or neglect to withdraw from the meeting, after 
being directed to do so by the moderator. The offence laid 
in the indictment is not within this provision. . . . 
"The remaining question is, Do the facts charged amount 
to an offence at the common law? On this question we enter-
tain no doubts. Here was a violent and rude disturbance of 
the citizens, lawfully assembled in town meeting, and in the 
actual exercise of their municipal rights and duties. The 
tendency of the defendant's conduct was to a breach of the 
peace, and to the prevention of elections, necessary to the 
orderly government of the town, and due management of its 
concerns for the year. It is true that the common law knows 
nothing perfectly agreeing with our municipal assemblies. 
But other meetings are well known and often held in Eng-
land, the disturbance of which is punishable at common law, 
as a misdemeanor. In this commonwealth, town meetings 
are recognized in our constitution and laws; and the elections 
made and the business transacted by the citizens, at those 
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meetings, lie at the foundation of our whole civil polity. If 
then there were no statute, prohibiting disorderly conduct at 
such meetings, an indictment for such conduct might be sup-
ported. 
((Motion overruled." 
Would you regard such a decision as a creative decision? 
Why? 
Is the court ready to extend the existing statutes to cover 
this new case? Do not the same objections apply to the 
extension of the principle of prior decisions to cover the 
new case? 2 
3· Russell v. Men of Devon.8 
"This was an action upon the case against the men dwelling 
in the county of Devon, to recover satisfaction for an injury 
done to the waggon of the plaintiff's in consequence of a 
bridge being out of repair, which ought to have been repaired 
by the county; to which two of the inhabitants, for themselves 
and the rest of the men dwelling in that county, appeared, 
and demurred generally .... 
"LoRD KENYoN, Ch. J. If this experiment had succeeded, 
it would have been productive of an infinity of actions. And 
though the fear of introducing so much litigation ought not 
to prevent the plaintiff's recovering, if by law he is entitled, 
yet it ought to have considerable weight in a case where it 
is admitted that there is no precedent of such an action having 
been before attempted. Many of the principles laid down by 
the plaintiff's counsel cannot be controverted; as that an 
action would lie by an individual for an injury which he has 
sustained against any other individual who is bound to repair. 
But the question here is, Whether this body of men, who are 
sued in the present action, are a corporation, or qua a corpora-
tion, against whom such an action can be maintained. If it 
be reasonable that they should be by law liable to such an 
action, recourse must be had to the Legislature for that 
purpose. But it has been said that this action ought to be 
2 See Hall, "Nulla Poena Sine Lege," 47 YALE L. J. 165, 17~-180 (1937) 
and compare sec. s-zs above. 
3 (1788) 2 Term R. 667. 
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maintained by borrowing the rules of analogy from the 
statutes of hue and cry: but I think that those statutes prove 
the very reverse. The reason of the statute of Winton was 
this; as the hundred were bound to keep watch and ward, 
it was supposed that those irregularities which led to robbery 
must have happened by their neglect. But it was never im-
agined that the hundred could have been compelled to make 
satisfaction, till the statute gave that remedy; and most un-
doubtedly no such action could have been maintained against 
them before that time. Therefore, when the case called for 
a remedy, the Legislature interposed; but they only gave 
the remedy in that particular case, and did not give it in any 
other case in which the neglect of the hundred had produced 
any injury to individuals. And when they gave the action, 
they virtually gave the means of maintaining that action; 
they converted the hundred into a corporation for that pur-
pose: but it does not follow that, in this case where the Legis-
lature has not given the remedy, this action can be main-
tained .... 
"AsHHURsT, J. It is a strong presumption that that which 
never has been done cannot by law be done at all. And it is 
admitted that no such action as the present has ever been 
brought, though the occasion must have frequently happened. 
But it has been said that there is a principle of law on which 
this action may be maintained, namely, that where an indi-
vidual sustains an injury by the neglect or default of another, 
the law gives him a remedy. But there is another general 
principle of law which is more applicable to this case, that 
it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than 
that the public should suffer an inconvenience. Now if this 
action could be sustained, the public would suffer a great 
inconvenience; for if damages are recoverable against the 
county, at all events they must be levied on one or two 
individuals, who have no means whatever of reimbursing 
themselves; .... 
"BuLLER, J. and GRosE, J. assented. 
"Judgment for the defendants." 
Here the court refused to make an analogical extension of 
prior decisions and established principles. Why? 
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What do you think of the "strong presumption" which 
Justice Ashhurst mentions? If applied, what is its effect? 4 
Sec. 6-I8. Overruling precedents. Problems. Courts do 
overrule their prior decisions. Even the clearest precedents 
are not absolutely binding. Three theories are expressed in 
the following excerpts as to whether courts should overrule 
previous decisions and if they are to overrule them, when 
they should do so. 
I. In People v. Tompkins 1 the court said in part: 
"The learned district attorney is clearly right in his asser-
tion that the law of this state, as enunciated in the cases of 
Clough, Stetson and McCord, is at variance with the rule 
adopted by many other states in the Union. We are also 
impressed with the weight of the argument that in view of 
the constantly expanding ingenuity of intelligent criminals, 
which serves to render the administration of criminal justice 
more and more difficult, the law must be progressively prac-
tical in order to keep pace with the development of new 
forms of crime. But these arguments, impressive as they are, 
simply serve to suggest that it is the province of courts to 
give effect to existing rules of law and not to legislate. The 
law of this state, as set forth in the McCord Case, has been 
in existence since I 8 3 7. It has become a rule of personal 
liberty quite as firmly established in this state as the rule of 
property recently re-affirmed in the case of Peck v. Schenec-
tady Ry. Co., 170 N. Y. 298, 63 N. E. 357. Although it 
may be admitted that this rule, which exists only in New 
York and Wisconsin, is at variance with what now appears 
to be the more reasonable view adopted in at least twelve 
of our sister states, and although it may be conceded to be 
too narrow for the practical administration of criminal justice 
as applied to modern conditions, we are admonished that the 
remedy is not with the courts, but in the legislature. We 
4 Compare Daily v. Parker, quoted in section 6-o6, problem 3; Pyle v. 
Waechter, 202 Iowa 695 (r926); and dissenting opinion of Grose, J., in 
Pasley v. Freeman, (r789) 3 Term R. 51. 
1 186 N.Y. 413 (1906). 
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cannot change the existing rule without enacting, in effect, an 
ex post facto law. This cannot be done without ignoring the 
constitutional rights of many who may legally claim the 
protection of the rule. Neither can it be done without judicial 
usurpation of legislative power." 
How would you state the theory here announced? Is there 
a real point in the statement that the court "cannot change 
the existing rule without enacting, in effect, an ex post facto 
law"? 
2. In Bricker v. Green/ Bushnell, J., speaking for the 
court, said in part: 
"We come, then, to the question of imputed negligence. 
In this case, a wife who, while riding with her husband as 
a passenger, was killed by a combination of his negligence 
with that of a third party. Under the authorities as they now 
stand in this State, she could not have recovered had she 
survived nor can her administrator now recover. This rule, 
which exists only in Michigan, has been consistently applied 
in this State since the decision in Lake Shore & Michigan 
Southern R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 274, 277, decided in 
1872, and it has been just as consistently criticized both within 
and without this jurisdiction. . . . 
"The amicus curiae brief of the State Bar of Michigan 
closes with this statement: 
" 'In the typical case, there is presented, on the one hand, 
the plaintiff-passenger, wholly free of any negligence or 
wrongdoing. On the other hand, there is the tortfeasor whose 
negligence has brought harm to such passenger or contributed 
to such harm. The injured party brings suit. The court must 
choose between them, the one innocent, the other guilty. 
Which is to be preferred? Must we continue for all time to 
drag in this exploded and obsolete legal monstrosity with the 
sole result of throwing the loss on the innocent party? The 
"imputed negligence" doctrine prefers the wrongdoer. He is 
the favored one and he is allowed to go free of responsibility 
for his wrongdoing. The loss is thrown upon the innocent 
passenger. As has been pointed out, abolition of the pernicious 
2 313 Mich. 218 (1946). 
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doctrine would affect only the wrongdoer and that only to 
the extent of preventing his escape from liability for his own 
negligence to one free from fault. At rock-bottom, the im-
puted-negligence doctrine is a denial of justice as between 
parties litigant. Hence, the rule of stare decisis should not 
be invoked in its behalf to perpetuate it through the many 
years to come. . . .' 
"Ever since I 872 we have adhered to the imputed-
negligence rule. We have recognized from time to time the 
changes brought about by the innovations of science and 
engineering, and we have carefully considered at much 
length the implications of the rule, its application, and the 
effect of its abandonment. As a result of our study and 
observation we are convinced that in the long run the appli-
cation of the rule is more harmful than helpful and results 
in more injustice than it prevents; and that we should not 
continue the invariable application of the so-called imputed-
negligence rule merely and solely on the ground that the 
injured person was a voluntary, gratuitous passenger in an 
automobile, the driver of which was guilty of negligence 
which was a contributing proximate cause of an accident and 
injury to such passenger .... 
"The rule of imputed negligence as announced and applied 
in Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railroad Co. v. Miller, 
25 Mich. 274, and in subsequent cases of like character, is 
overruled, so far as pending and future cases are concerned. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the trial judge applied the 
law as laid down in our opinions, we must, in view of our 
present holding, set aside the judgment of no cause of action 
and order a new trial. ... " 
How would you formulate the theory here announced? 
What are its effects as regards the instant case? As regards 
the decision of future cases? 
3· Payne v. City of Covington.3 Opinion of the court by 
Creal, Commissioner: 
"The framers of our Constitution who gave multiplied 
months to preparation of the instrument which was later 
3 276 Ky. J80 (I9J8). 
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ratified and adopted by the people, knowing the general 
tendency of governments and especially subordinate taxing 
divisions thereof and their officials to run into debt and incur 
liabilities that would affect their faith and credit and impose 
onerous burdens upon the tax paying public placed these 
positive and wise limitations upon the powers of the counties, 
towns, etc., to incur debts or impose liabilities upon them-
selves beyond the limitations prescribed in the quoted pro-
visions without referring the proposition to the voters for 
approval (section I 57). Knowing also that the electorate 
through zeal or improvidence is often inclined to assume 
excessive and burdensome indebtedness, they inserted sec-
tion I 58 of the Constitution as a further safeguard limiting 
the total amount of indebtedness that might be incurred by 
a political subdivision in any manner whatsoever, even by a 
vote of the people. . . ." 
The opinion then reviewed several of the court's prior 
decisions construing the provisions in question, and the de-
cisions of other courts construing similar provisions; and the 
opinion continued: 
"The rule announced in the domestic cases referred to lets 
down the barriers to the mischief obviously intended by the 
framers of the Constitution to be prohibited, and invited an 
orgy of maladministration waste of public funds and accumu-
lation of indebtedness in counties and municipalities of 
alarming and in many instances ruinous proportions, which 
inevitably follow in the wake of judicial pronouncement 
removing restraint and limitations upon public expenditures 
and the creation of public indebtedness. The court can only 
view with regret the mischief already wrought under sanc-
tion of its decisions in giving a clearly strained and erroneous 
interpretation to the involved sections of the Constitution, 
however, and as will later be pointed out, the court is not 
by any rule of stare decisis or long continued erroneous con-
struction rendered powerless to remedy the ills arising from 
its erroneous prior interpretations but may with propriety and 
so far as is consistent with vested rights acquired or acts done 
on faith of its decisions subordinate that rule when justice 
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and public welfare make such a course preferable to perpet-
uation of error. . . . 
"But it is said that the doctrine of stare decisis prevents 
us from overruling our former opinions and compels us to 
continue to follow them, howsoever erroneous they may 
be .... 
"Of course; all of the authorities say that more hesitation 
will be indulged against overruling prior opinions establish-
ing property rights than in cases where such rights are not 
established. But no case that we have been able to find attrib-
utes such binding force to the rule as compels courts to 
continue to follow prior erroneous opinions to the detriment 
of the public interest, and when prior erroneous opinions are 
not only without reason to support them, but are in direct 
conflict with what was intended by a statute, a Constitution, 
or by the parties to a contract .... We, therefore, conclude 
that if there ever was a case where the doctrine of stare 
decisis should not prevent us at this time from correcting the 
glaringly erroneous opinions heretofore prevailing on the 
question in hand, it is this one, and we unhesitatingly disallow 
its urged effect in this case. 
"But it might be said that property rights have been 
created in following our prior interpretations of the sections 
of the Constitution referred to, and which is true. We con-
ceive, however, it to be competent for a court, in overruling 
a prior adopted principle, to preserve in the overruling 
opinion all rights accrued under the prior declaration, the 
same as if they had been created or arose out of a former 
existing statute which was later repealed by the Legis-
lature .... 
"Therefore, in overruling our prior opinions and in declar-
ing our disapproval of such erroneous interpretations herein 
dealt with, we do so with the express reservation that all 
rights heretofore created and accrued in favor of all persons 
interested, in any manner whatsoever, shall be preserved 
and the principles of this opinion will not apply to any 
transaction begun or in the course of completion, or finished 
before this opinion becomes final. But the various taxing units 
of the commonwealth embraced by the two sections of the 
Constitution, supra (I 57 and I 58) shall, after this opinion 
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becomes final, observe and be governed by the interpretation 
herein made, and shall contract no debts beyond the amount 
of revenue which they themselves provide under authority 
given to them by the Constitution or Statutes legally enacted 
thereunder. Therefore, if they wish to incur debts in any 
fiscal year they must not exceed in the aggregate what they 
themselves produce under the authority so given to them, 
and that any indebtedness in excess of what they do so pro-
duce, shall be void. As a consequence of the conclusions we 
have reached the opinions in the cases of City of Providence 
v. Providence Electric Light Co., supra; Overall v. City of 
Madisonville, 125 Ky. 684, 102 S. W. 278, 31 Ky. Law 
Rep. 278, 12 L. R. A., N. S., 433; Carter v. Krueger & Son, 
175 Ky. 399, 194 S. W. 553, and all others following the 
interpretations therein made, are hereby expressly overruled; 
but with the reservation, supra, whereby the rights of all 
parties are preserved, and this opinion shall have a prospec-
tive effect only. 
"However, the withholding of any retroactive effect of 
this opinion requires an affirmance of the judgment, since 
compliance is shown with the erroneous interpretations here-
tofore made. Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court 
is affirmed. 
"The whole court sitting." 
How would you formulate the theory here announced? 
What are its effects as regards the instant case? As regards 
the decision of future cases?* 
Sec. 6-I9. Summary. In this chapter the chief topics for 
consideration have been the ways in which case law is made, 
* (I.R.) "But an overruling decision may be limited to prospective effect 
only, and thereby have the same general, future operation as a legislative 
enactment. In the overruling case, the court may apply the overruled decision 
to the case before it and announce a new rule which it will apply to jural 
relations that arise thereafter." Kocourek and Koven, "Renovation of the Com-
mon Law Through Stare Decisis," 29 ILL. LAW REV. 971 at 97'- (1935). 
Two jurisdictions, Montana and Kentucky, have adopted this theory and 
method of overruling precedents. See editorial "Sensible View of Stare Decisis 
Gains Ground," '-3 AM. }uD. Soc. JouR. 3'- (1939); Kocourek, "Retrospective 
Decisions and Stare Decisis and a Proposal," 17 A. B. A. J. 180 (1931); and 
Green, "Freedom of Litigation," 38 ILL. L. REv. II7, 248, 355 (1943-1944). 
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followed, and changed by our judges. We have analyzed 
the massive body of precedents, built up bit by bit by judicial 
decisions and known collectively as "the common law"; and 
have noted the ambiguity of the latter term. We have exam-
ined the more important rules that our judges have worked 
out to guide each judge in the handling of legal materials. 
These rules are superstandards of judicial method. They 
tell the judge where to find rules of law to apply, how to 
choose among possible rules, how and when to lay down 
a new rule or precedent, how far to follow precedents already 
established, and when to depart from or overrule such prec-
edents. And the lawyer needs to understand the role of these 
rules of method no less than the judge. Without this under-
standing a lawyer cannot read a case intelligently, or write 
a law brief, or present a legal argument in court. 
CHAPTER 7 
Legal Policies and Policy Making * 
Sec. 7-oi. Scope of chapter: policies and how made. In 
the foregoing discussion, standards have been viewed pri-
marily as means of achieving ends, as instruments through 
which the lawgiver tries to effectuate policies which he 
envisages.1 We have not yet come to grips with the question 
of what the ends of law are. We have assumed in our discus-
sion that legal standards are created to serve human ends. 
But what are those ends? What are the purposes which find 
expression in legal standards? Why does the legal system 
furnish guidance of various sorts? Why prohibit behavior 
of some kinds? Why command other kinds of behavior? Why 
permit certain activities? And, why does the law undertake 
to make many predefined acts effective? Until now, we have 
given only passing notice to such questions.2 Thus far, we 
* (I.R.) Suggestions for further reading: Pound, "A Survey of Social In-
terests," 57 HARV. L. REv. I (1943) (a rewriting of a paper originally pub-
lished in 1921); POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
(I9I3), chapter on Ends; PoUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 63 et seq. 
(I942); STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW (I946), Chapters 
XV, XX, XXI, XXII; M. Cohen, "On Absolutisms in Legal Thought," 84 
U. of PA. L. REV. 681 (I936); F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL 
IDEALS (I933); Dickinson, "The Law Behind Law," 29 CoL. L. REV. II3, 
285, especially at 296-307 (I929); Pekelis, "The Case for a Jurisprudence of 
Welfare," I I SOCIAL RESEARCH 3 I2 ( 1944); MACIVER, THE MODERN 
STATE, chapter 5 (I926). 
1 In thus treating law and its standards as instrumentalities devised to serve 
human ends, I have merely followed the modern trend of thinking here and 
elsewhere. Ever since the epoch-making work of Von Ihering, Law As a 
Means to an End, legal writers have been stressing the instrumental character 
of law. In this country, the great protagonist and popularizer of this viewpoint 
has been Roscoe Pound. As he says, "Making or finding law, call it what you 
will, presupposes a mental picture of what one is doing and why he is doing 
it." AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 59 (I9IJ). 
In the present work, the instrumental approach to law is represented espe-
cially by the discussion in sees. I-07 et seq., z-oi, z-I I, z-Is, 2-29, 4-04, 
4-os, 6-02 and 6-I7. 
2 More or less definite references to legal policies will be found in the 
following places: sees. 2-I I, 2-29, 4-04, 4-os, 4-07, s-u, s-IJ (problem 3), 
5-20 (problem r), 5-23, 5-27, 6-o6, 6-II (problem 2), 6-18 and 6-19. 
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have only carried the discussion of legal problems up to the 
point where we have found that questions involving legal 
policies were involved, and have stopped there. In the present 
chapter, I propose to take up these questions as such; I want 
to consider what our principal legal policies are, and show 
how these policies are fixed and formulated. 
Sec. 7-02. Legal policies and policy makers. The creation 
of a legal standard is an intentional, a planned, act. The 
lawmaker who does his job properly works out a full plan; 
he works out the provisions of his standard with a clear 
appreciation of the ends he wants to accomplish by it. His 
planning encompasses both the provisions of the standard 
itself and the ends for which the standard is framed/ These 
ends serve as self-imposed guides for the framing of the 
standard.* 
By a legal policy, I mean an end or objective of such a 
legislative plan. In framing a constitutional provision, the 
draftsman has certain ends in view; these are legal policies. 
In enacting a statute, the legislature likewise entertains pur-
poses which are to be attained through the creation of a 
standard or standards; these are also legal policies. And the 
judicial lawmaker who establishes a standard by his decision 
visualizes certain objectives behind it; these objectives are 
legal policies, too. A legal policy, then, as I am using the 
term, is essentially a legislative policy; it is the objective 
1 For examples of statutes in which the legislative ends are definitely 
stressed, see sees. 4-07 and 4-19; and compare the general discussion in 
sec. 4-04 of the point here made. 
*(I.R.) It is worth noting that the means-ends analysis can be developed 
in more detail; it can be applied in the following series: Legal remedy as 
means of securing legal right (end); legal right as means of recognizing 
legal interest (end) ; and remedy, right, and interest as means through which 
a legal policy is recognized. In the present chapter, I have chosen to use the 
means-ends analysis in the last sense. This is the sense which is useful in the 
present chapter. The choice of a terminology or a mode of analysis is largely 
dictated by the purpose in hand, though convenience dictates that one not 
depart too far from common usage. 
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of a lawmaker. So that when I speak of legal policies in the 
rest of this chapter, I shall be taking the legislative point 
of view and focusing attention on the purposes for which 
the lawmakers of our American legal system create standards. 
The creation of a policy is a verbal act. It is a declaration 
of intention. Often it is a part of the same verbal act as the 
standard to which it relates. The framer of a legislative pro-
vision establishes standards and tells what he wants to accom-
plish by them, all in one breath. And the judicial lawmaker 
lays down a rule of law and in the same opinion declares what 
the purpose of the rule is. This method of coupling standards 
and policies has become the common practice with Congress, 
as I have already pointed out; it enacts various provisions 
regulating individual and official conduct, and joins with them 
an expressed declaration of policy.2 Only too often, however, 
the policy maker's purpose is stated on a separate occasion, 
or is perhaps not thought out at all, or is merely assumed 
and taken for granted.3 In all these cases, the interpreter of 
law has to discover the lawmaker's policy. In some cases, this 
means that he must conjure up something which, like the 
"little man," was "not there." The interpreter becomes, in 
effect, the policy maker of the legislation he is interpreting. 
So policies and their declarations are always connected with 
human actors. Individual human beings may act on behalf 
of organized groups, as the lawmaker and other officials do 
when they entertain and express policies on behalf of the 
state.4 But only individuals do acts and lay out plans. I stress 
2 See examples in sees. 4-04 and 4-19. 
3 See further regarding the incompleteness of legislative declarations, sec. 
4-22. 
4 It is common usage to speak of the ends of law, the policies of government, 
and the interests of society as if law, government and society were persons 
who entertained ends, pursued policies, and asserted interests. This mode of 
speaking does no harm if one appreciates that it is metaphorical and elliptical. 
In fact, I shall not hesitate to follow this common usage myself throughout 
the rest of this chapter. But it must always be remembered that these modes of 
speech refer in the last analysis to ends, policies and interests recognized and 
adopted by officials. Cf. sec. 3-o 3. 
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this personal role of policy makers and other officials in order 
to forestall the type of thinking which loses sight of human 
acts in the midst of dry abstractions. Of course, I do not 
mean to limit our discussion to particular policies of particular 
lawmakers on particular occasions.** I do not mean that you 
and I can get along without generalized types of policies, 
or general ends of law as expressed in official actions on many 
occasions. We must make use of these general ideas; in fact, 
most of the policies with which we shall have to deal in the 
remainder of this chapter are general in the sense just men-
tioned. But the fact that they are general and commonly 
accepted, does not deprive them of their character as ends 
recognized by actual officials. 
Sec. 7-03. Policies as guides for other officials. One of the 
lawmaker's primary aims is to give guidance to other officials. 
Correlatively, these officials look to him for guidance. The 
lawmaker ordinarily makes his instructions as detailed as 
possible. He tells other officials, in the form of specific stand-
** (I.R.) More specifically, my reason for recognizing the role of the 
policy maker in formulating and recognizing legal policies lies in the fact 
that it is so common to speak of legal policies, ends of law, legal interests, 
social interests, etc., in the elliptical manner mentioned in the preceding foot-
note. This usage neglects the personal side of legal policies and policy making. 
It leaves policies hanging in the air, and can, on this account, be seriously mis-
leading. To speak of the ends of law is quite as if one spoke of the aims of 
poetry, or the purposes of philosophy. Poetry and philosophy do not, as such, 
recognize ends. In this connection, ends must mean, respectively, the general 
aims which are cherished by poets and the general purposes which are professed 
by philosophers. By the same token, what we mean when we speak of the ends 
of law are the purposes which are entertained by persons who create law, or 
who interpret and apply it. If this is not clearly realized, it is easy to fall into 
the fallacy of personifying the law itself. Much of the difficulty which I have 
found over the years in trying to explain the ends of law to law students 
seems to me to stem from the fact that law is regarded as if it were somehow 
endowed with a phantom personality which can pursue objectives of its own, 
and as if it had an independent existence apart from the acts of lawmakers, 
judges, and other officials. But if we look upon law merely as a set of standards 
established by human acts, and if we see the ends of law as objectives enter-
tained by human lawmakers and intended to guide the acts of human officials, 
we shall not have too much difficulty in grasping the meaning of the ends 
of law or the policies of the legal system. 
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ards, what they must do and not do, what they may do, and 
what they can do effectively. But he may employ very broad 
and indefinite standards, including the type of broad state-
ment in which we are at present interested, to wit, the declara-
tion of policy. In other words, the lawmaker's explanation 
of his aims has guidance value, too, though this guidance 
may be rather remote and vague. If the lawmaker's plan of 
guidance by specific directions is adequate, and normally it 
is, then his vague and general declarations of policy play 
very little part. But sometimes specific directions turn out 
to be ambiguous or conflicting, or are found to be altogether 
lacking. In that case, the official who is looking for guidance 
must seek for directions outside the specific standards pro-
vided; he may find it in an explicit declaration of legislative 
policy, or a general policy of the common law, such as the 
policy of preserving the public peace, or a general policy of 
our constitutions, such as the policy of allowing the individual 
the maximum of freedom in deciding what contracts he will 
make. When other guides fail, legally recognized policies 
serve as secondary standards and furnish at least a minimum 
of guidance for official action. 
Similar resort to general policies for guidance may be 
had by officials when the lawmaker intentionally fails to 
provide specific standards to go by. Of this type, as you will 
recall, are the instances where the legislature delegates sub-
sidiary lawmaking authority to administrative agencies.1 This 
kind of delegation does not leave the agency with an unlim-
ited lawmaking discretion. Usually the agency is tied down 
by an explicit declaration of policy in the act which invests 
it with governmental authority; and besides this, the agency 
is to be guided by policies such as public convenience, the 
protection of life, protection of property, etc., which find 
general recognition in constitutional clauses, statutory provi-
1 See sees. 4-15 to 4-17; and compare sec. 4-2.3. 
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sions, and judicial decisions. Of this same general type and 
purport are the cases of acts which are left to the free discre-
tion of judges. For example, if a judge must pass on the 
question whether a particular type of contract operates as an 
unreasonable restraint of trade-a vague enough standard-
he looks for and obtains some guidance in common declara-
tions of policy, legislative and judicial. He finds some support 
in policies regarding free contract, freedom of business, pro-
tection of the public against monopoly, etc. Such policies serve 
as a secondary, but nonetheless helpful, guidepost to direct his 
conclusions. Again, if a judge has to decide whether a partic-
ular offender is to be put on probation or sent to prison, he 
does not find himself entirely without leads as to the proper 
choice to make. He is aided by declared policies of statute 
and decision, regarding reformation of offenders, the protec-
tion of the public against injury, etc. Alike in all these cases 
where specific standards are intentionally not provided, policy 
declarations of various sorts serve the official actor as general 
guides. 
Sec. 7-04. Legal policies-classification-subtopics. Pol-
icies, like the private objectives of the individual, might be 
listed almost without number. They vary widely from one 
legal system to another. For classification and further dis-
cussion, I have selected the principal policies recognized by 
the American legal systems.* 
* (I.R.) Also like motives (e.g., hunger and sex, self-regarding and other-
regarding motives, self-preservation and socially directed motives), policies 
can be classified in a variety of ways. For example, policies can be related 
to the persons who announce them (officials and theorists) 1 they may be 
policies which are adopted in fact and those which ought to be adopted; they 
may be related to things, tangible and intangible, to physical environment and 
to culture; they may be related to various kinds of personal subject matter, 
as individuals, groups and communities. 
It is obviously not feasible to consider and mention all the policies that 
have ever been adopted. A selection must be made. It is also not feasible 
to analyze and classify the selected material except in limited ways. In fact, 
the selection of items for analysis and the classification of material selected, 
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All these policies have an actual and an ideal side. They 
are actual in the sense that they are, in fact, adopted by some 
or all the American legal systems. They are ideal in the 
sense that they are goals which may or may not be achieved; 
and ideal in the further sense that they are viewed as desirable 
or proper goals by those who adopt them. 
Along with each policy presented, I shall refer to standards 
in which it is recognized, and to various governmental meas-
ures through which it is effectuated.1 
The policies will be subdivided and described under three 
heads, to each of which a subtopic will be devoted: 
Policies regarding the individual. 
Policies regarding the community. 
Policies regarding organized groups. 
These three subtopics will be followed by a fourth and con-
cluding head, entitled Determinants of Policies, in which 
you will see how policies are formulated and what shapes 
their development. 
PoLICIES REGARDING THE INDIVIDUAL 
Sec. 7-os. Stress on the individual claim. The United 
States was born in the heyday of individualist thinking. The 
emphasis of political and economic writers of the time was 
on the claim of the individual, on his demand for liberty, 
equality and security. These writers were much impressed 
by the drawbacks of governmental interference with indi-
vidual initiative, and by the dangers of governmental abuses 
of power. They regarded the individual as the best judge 
of his own interests, and felt that governmental restraints 
always go back to what the classifier thinks is important. In this regard, the 
following treatment expresses my personal views of what is significant in this 
field. 
1 Consult section 3-o1, note I, regarding the senses in which the terms 
"government" and "state" are used in these lectures. 
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on his acts and choices should be held to a minimum. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the practical policy makers of 
that day embodied these general views in the federal and 
state constitutions which they framed. It is not surprising 
that they gave emphatic recognition to the individual will, 
and adopted a hands-off policy for government which would 
allow the individual to work out his own salvation. 
But this original concern with the individual's claims is 
more than a matter of historical interest; it continued without 
break or challenge almost until the end of the nineteenth 
century. It found expression in innumerable subsequent dec-
larations of constitutions, statutes, and decisions. Even today 
the vast bulk of our private law is focused on the claims of 
the individual; we talk of his acts, his rights, his powers, his 
privileges, and his remedies, almost without end. So that the 
legal policies in which individual claims are recognized are 
still matters of prime, practical import to us as law students. 
They constitute a natural and convenient starting point for 
our discussion of legal policies. 
The claims made by individuals and recognized by law 
I shall call "individual interests," following the terminology 
which is now commonly accepted. These are claims asserted 
by individual men, and also recognized as the subject matter 
of protection by the policy makers of our legal system. They 
may be said to ha~e two aspects: an individual aspect and 
an official aspect. The individual aspect is found in the making 
of a claim for protection on the individual's part. The official 
aspect is found in the grant of that protection by policy 
makers. These two aspects of the policy of protecting an 
individual claim are linked together when we speak of the 
legal recognition of an individual interest or the legal protec-
tion of the individual.* 
* (I.R.) The treatments of this subject by Pound and Stone seem to me to 
suffer from the fact that they do not develop this official aspect clearly. They 
do indicate that legal interests are claims asserted by people 1 they fail to 
442 OUR LEGAL SYSTEM AND HOW IT OPERATES 
A convenient inventory of these recognized interests of 
the individual has been prepared by Pound. He lists three 
major groups of individual interests: I. interests of person-
ality; 2. interests in domestic relations; 3· interests of sub-
stance. I adopt the essential features of Pound's inventory 
in the three sections which follow/ 
Sec. 7-06. Interests of personality. This group of recog-
nized interests underlies a major segment of the law of torts 
as well as important parts of the criminal law. The group 
embraces such interests as the claims of the individual to live 
without molestation by others, to move about without re-
straint, to act freely, to believe and say what he chooses, and 
so on. These interests find recognition in constitutional pro-
visions, which guarantee the protection of the life, the liberty, 
and the equality of the individual. They also find recognition 
in statutes and decisions, defining standards for individual 
action, and fixing the rights, powers, .privileges and immuni-
ties of individuals in regard to other individuals and to 
officials. 
The policy of protecting the individual's personality is 
subdivided by Pound further into: 
a. Protection of the integrity of his physical person--
against aggression or injury by others, such as assaults, bat-
teries, and negligent harms. 
b. Protection of the freedom of his will-against restraints 
on his freedom of movement and freedom of action; and 
against compulsion and fraud in the like respects. 
indicate with equal clarity that legal interests, legal ends and legal policies are 
interests, ends and policies recognized and adopted by people, i.e., by officials. 
See PouND, OuTLINE oF JURISPRUDENCE (sth ed.) 96-97 ( 1943); PouND, 
SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 68-69 (1942.); STONE, THE PROVINCE AND 
FUNCTION OF LAW 487 et seq, (1946). 
1 OUTLINE oF JuRISPRUDENcE, (sth ed.) 97-102. ( 1943). However, I have 
modified some items and have omitted others in order to simplify the presenta-
tion. See also STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW, chapter 2.1 
(1946). 
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c. Protection of his personal reputation--against defam-
atory acts, i.e., libel and slander.* 
d. Protection of his freedom of belief and opinion--against 
governmental interference and interference by others; the 
protection in this regard extends to religious tenets, political 
beliefs, and economic views; it covers freedom of speech 
and of the press and of assembly, as well as freedom of 
belief. All these freedoms are clearly recognized by provisions 
of the constitutions, by statutes, and especially by the decisions 
of the Supreme Court. 
Sec. 7-07. Interests in domestic relations. The individual's 
interests in domestic relations cover his family relationships. 
They are, in a very real sense, an extension of his personality 
to include claims regarding his relations to others. Many of 
these claims are recognized in legal policies. For example, 
the claims of husband and wife to one another's society; the 
claims of husband and wife that third parties shall not inter-
fere in their relations to one another; the claims of the parent 
to the control of the child, and to its society and services; 1 
the claims of the child to the society and support of the 
parent.2 It is not necessary to elaborate these claims or the 
policies behind their recognition; they are well known and 
find expression and recognition in a variety of familiar rights, 
powers, privileges, and remedies. 
Sec. 7-08. Interests of substance. The individual's inter-
ests in the economic sphere are recognized in many important 
* (I.R.) Pound also lists at this point, as a further head, the protection of 
the individual's privacy and sensibilities. No doubt this head represents a proper 
inclusion for a complete discussion such as Pound's, but as our purpose is 
merely to give a brief account of the recognition of individual interests, and 
as the inclusion of this item would require more explanation and discussion 
than our space allows, I have decided to omit it. 
1 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), discussed in sec. 
7-33, problem 4· 
2 See Daily v. Parker, 152 F. 2d 174 (1945), quoted in sec. 6-o6, prob-
lem 3· 
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legal policies. These interests cover all of the individual's 
claims regarding property, contracts, and related matters. 
They constitute the subject matter of the law of property 
and the law of contracts. These interests are recognized and 
the policies behind them are announced in the provisions of 
the constitutions which guarantee the property and the liberty 
of individuals, as well as in numberless enactments and deci-
sions, which expound the rights, powers, and privileges of 
the individual. 
The recognized interests of the individual in this sphere 
can be subdivided into: 
a. The individual's claim of the opportunity to acquire 
tangible things. This claim is commonly given recognition 
in the form of powers and privileges of acquiring tangible 
things in standard ways, as by occupation, by purchase, by 
gift, by exchange, by will, and by inheritance. 
b. The individual's claim to use and control tangible things 
acquired. This claim finds recognition in various rights, 
powers, privileges, and immunities of ownership and posses-
sion. The policy behind the recognition of this claim to use 
and control tangibles is typical of the policies which lie behind 
the legal recognition of all the claims of the individual. The 
individual must be allowed to control his own destiny.1 The 
individual who has property need not worry about the mor-
row. Hence, the legal policy of protecting his use and control 
of tangibles is a policy of encouraging him to make his own 
future secure. 
c. The individual's claim of the opportunity to choose a 
vocation. Of this claim to free choice of vocation, a recent 
writer says: 
"It is this aspect which a famous judge much later symbol-
ized in 'the natural right to be an iceman.' The Jeffersonian 
1 This aspect of property is sometimes characterized by the phrase, "property 
for security." It includes not only the property-holder's security as regards 
his own future, but also his ability to assure the future living of other persons 
dependent upon him for support. 
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democratic spirit drew from the principle of equality of 
citizens the corollary that all men should have equal access 
to all offices, pursuits and professions. Though carried at times 
to remarkable lengths, it did draw attention to the important 
fact that the claim to free choice of vocation is not merely 
a claim of substance, to earn a salary. It is also an intimate 
claim of personality affecting the activities and environment 
of each man's life. . . ." 2 
The individual was guaranteed by our constitutions against 
certain governmental interferences with his choice of a voca-
tion. But the policy of the law was far from any guarantee 
of a job to the individual. It was essentially a guarantee 
against discrimination. Equality of opportunity to engage in 
any ordinary line of work was guaranteed; in particular, 
limitations and inequalities of opportunity based on race and 
color were outlawed by the Federal Constitution. 
d. The individual's claim of freedom of contract-his 
opportunity to make such contracts as he pleases. This claim 
has been recognized very fully by our law from the founda-
tion of our country down to the present time. In the language 
of Jessel, M. R., a famous English judge, in a decision 
rendered in I 8 7 5, ". . . if there is one thing which more 
than another public policy requires it is that men of full 
age and competent understanding shall have the utmost 
liberty of contracting .... " 3 As we shall see presently, the 
modern social trend in legal policies is resulting more and 
more in limits on this freedom. Yet it is still substantially 
accurate to say with Sutherland, ]., of our Supreme Court, 
that "freedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general rule 
and restraint the exception." 4 
e. The individual's claim to enforce contracts and other 
beneficial arrangements with others. Until A and B, the 
2 STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 534 ( 1946). 
3 Printing and Numerical Registering Company v. Sampson (1875) L. R. 
19 Eq. 462 at 465. 
4 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 at 546 ( 1923). However, 
see the further discussion of this statement in sec. 7-3 6. 
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parties to a contract, have concluded their arrangement, 
both enjoy freedom of contract. This is the individual interest 
last above discussed. But when their agreement has been 
completed, each enjoys a new and different interest, the 
interest in having the contract enforced. This interest also 
has been strongly stressed by our American legal systems, 
and still retains most of its pristine vigor.5 
Often the original policy of our government in the eco-
nomic sphere has been characterized as a policy of free 
enterprise, or as an adoption of the economic doctrine of 
laissez faire. These characterizations are good enough if one 
understands what the doctrines of our government have 
really been; if not, they can lead to misunderstanding. The 
danger lies in the fact that both these characterizations give 
expression to the individual's claims to liberty and omit to 
express his claims to security. "Free enterprise" has always 
involved the individual's economic claims in both respects. 
First, it has involved recognition of the individual's freedom 
of action, and second, it has involved the assurance to him 
of the fruits of his acts. These can be regarded as two distinct 
policies, or lines of policy, regarding his claims. Both are 
represented in the analysis above developed; both are fully 
recognized in our legal systems. The policy of allowing free 
scope for individual action in the economic sphere is clearly 
adopted by the Federal Constitution in clause after clause; 
freedom to create property is recognized; also freedom to 
acquire property and freedom of contract. But no less clearly 
are adopted the policies of protecting established property 
rights and established contract obligations. The liberties and 
expectations of individuals in both these respects have been 
announced with equal force by state constitutions down to 
the present day; likewise in judicial opinions interpreting the 
5 I shall have more to say about the claim to the enforcement of contracts 
when I come to discuss the social interest in the security of transactions; see 
sec. 7-15. 
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constitutional clauses or laying down general principles of 
law. And not infrequently both policies are stated in statutory 
form. Free enterprise meant originally, and still means, both 
freedom of the individual to establish claims and security 
for them when established. 
Sec. 7-09. Alternative classifications and names of policies 
regarding the individual. The individual interests which have 
found recognition in government policies have been given 
a variety of names, such as individual wants, needs, claims, 
and "rights." 1 Each of these names has had in the past, and 
still has, some vogue. Each name has a connotation of its 
own, but all express an approach to legal problems which 
puts the emphasis on the individual's claim. For our present 
purpose, there is no great issue involved in choosing one 
name rather than another, but their substantial identity is 
worth noting so that we shall not become confused when a 
change of terms is encountered. 
It may also have struck you that the individual's welfare 
can be broken down and analyzed in different ways. The 
classifications of individual interests adopted in sections 7-o5 
to 7-o8 is by no means the only one available or in use. In 
fact, the traditional classification of individual interests is 
cast in terms of the liberty, the equality, and the security of 
the individual, rather than in terms of personality, domestic 
relations, and substance. However, liberty, equality and secu-
rity, like the other three terms, are very broad and inclusive. 
They require further subdivision and specification. Liberty 
in what respects? In regard to the movement of one's person, 
the acquisition of property, the use of one's property, or in 
what other regard? And similarly of equality and security. 
When we work out answers to these questions we arrive at 
1 The word "right" is here used in a broad sense, which includes rights, 
powers, and privileges (e.g., A's "right" of ownership); and not in the sense 
of right as we define the term in section 2-19 (i.e., as the correlative of 
a duty). 
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about the same place and achieve a list substantially the same 
as our inventory of individual interests. Nevertheless, as the 
analysis of individual welfare is often made in terms of 
liberty, equality, and security, and is very common in judicial 
opinions, I have included below several problems which are 
cast in these terms or in some combination of them. 
Any selection of material for discussion as well as any 
classification of it, has its virtues and its shortcomings. These 
inhere in the emphasis which the selection or classification 
gives. The analysis of individual welfare in terms of liberty 
has the advantage of stressing the privileges of the indi-
vidual; the analysis in terms of security has the advantage 
of stressing his rights as against others; and the analysis in 
terms of equality has the virtue of stressing comparisons 
between one individual and another, so that unperceived 
discrimination does not enter into the legal treatment of A 
and of B. The analysis in terms of individual interests, that 
which we have presented, has the merit of stressing the 
general importance in legal affairs of the individual's claim; 
it serves to give weight to the point that a prime policy in 
wide areas of our law is to give effect and protection to the 
individual's will. 
But you should note that the stress on the individual's 
claim, as well as the stress on his liberty, equality, and secu-
rity, means a stress on his advantages. Individuals do not lay 
claim to burdens. Burdens do not appear in any of the classi-
fications mentioned, except incidentally and as the obverse 
side of the individual claimant's interests. Of course, a good 
deal of the time, one man's advantage is another man's 
burden, and vice versa, so that indirectly the duties of the 
individual to other individuals are taken account of. But this 
cannot be said of social duties. The exclusive attention to 
the individual's claims led to a neglect of claims which were 
to be made on behalf of society generally. It tended to make 
lawyers and judges overlook the obligations of the individual 
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in society, unless these obligations were very striking and 
clear. The result was that social considerations had a hard 
time achieving recognition with legal, and especially with 
judicial, policy makers; a slow and painful process which 
is to be the main theme of sections 7-12 and following. 
Sec. 7-ro. Conflicting interests--necessity of choice. Every 
individual interest mentioned in the foregoing sections is 
limited in scope. No interest is guaranteed without qualifi-
cation. Even the most extreme individualist thinkers of the 
last century saw that individual interests overlap and cut 
across one another at some point. A's freedom to act becomes 
at some point a violation of B's personal integrity. A's free-
dom of speech is limited by a duty not to defame B. A's 
freedom to acquire property does not include the liberty to 
take property which belongs to another. The simple fact is 
that A and B alike want the whole world to hold and to 
move about in, and both cannot have this unrestricted scope 
for action. The scarcity of space and things imposes necessary 
problems of division which the policy maker must face in 
recognizing individual interests. 
To furnish a method or general standard for resolving 
these conflicts of interest, various criteria have been suggested 
by those thinkers who cast their formulas in terms of indi-
vidual welfare. For Bentham, the criterion is to be the 
solution which will procure the greatest happiness for the 
greatest number; for Spencer, the liberty of each individual 
is to be limited only by the like liberty for all; for Felix 
Cohen, a modern writer, the promotion of the good life for 
all is the criterion to adopt. Obviously such criteria of choice 
do not furnish ready or easy methods of resolving conflicts. 
The policy maker is left with a wide range of discretion, 
both in deciding what interests to recognize and in deciding 
how far to recognize and secure each interest. Such general 
standards do define a general approach to legal problems, 
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a general line of attack on them; and the policy maker's 
approach or line of attack is not without importance, as I 
shall show later. In any event this kind of general standard 
is all that the policy maker has to guide his determinations. 
But conflicts of interests do not stop with the conflict of 
A's interest with B's interest. A's interest frequently conflicts 
directly with a general interest of the community, such as 
the interest in the public peace or the interest in the public 
morals. A's freedom of action does not extend so far as to 
permit him to run naked through the public streets. His 
freedom of speech does not include the liberty to advocate 
the overthrow of the existing government by force and vio-
lence. At some point the line of demarcation must be drawn 
between conduct which is, and conduct which is not, per-
mitted. This line is drawn by the policy makers of the com-
munity, in the light of the various individual and public 
interests which they recognize. Such conflicts and the methods 
of resolving them I shall refer to more in detail presently. 
For the moment it suffices to say that conflicts of this type 
are no easier to deal with than the conflicts already discussed, 
and the methods suggested for resolving them are equally 
indefinite and difficult to apply. 
And finally, even at an early day, practical policy makers 
of the Anglo-American law realized that there were cases 
in which the individual, A, was to be protected against his 
own acts. A's will was not to control, even as to himself. 
A could not agree to the maiming of his person. The King, 
it was said, had an interest in maintaining his fitness as a 
soldier. Also, A could not agree to be killed so as to confer 
a good defense on his killer. And infants were protected 
against the effects of their own acts; they could not contract 
freely. Today we would say that these cases involve counter-
vailing social interests, which the policy maker weighs and 
finds controlling. But formerly these countervailing interests 
were not too clearly perceived or named. Such cases were 
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merely treated as exceptional and not allowed to overturn 
the general principle which made the individual the master 
of his own destiny. 
Sec. 7-II. Problems. I. Suppose that D states to X that 
P is a thief. In fact, D speaks on the basis of misinforma-
tion; P has not committed any theft, and his innocence 
becomes obvious upon investigation. D has violated a pro-
hibitive standard, and P is entitled to recover damages for 
defamation. On what policy is this prohibitive standard 
based? If D acted in perfect good faith, can he not assert 
a countervailing interest? At first blush, it might seem that 
D has a meritorious defense; but we all know that our legal 
system has not recognized any such privilege on D's part. 
What does this mean in terms of conflicting interests, i.e., 
policies? 
In the foregoing case, the interest of D is sacrificed to 
that of P. However, if P had formerly been a servant of 
D, and if D had, in good faith, answered an inquiry as to 
P's character, made by Y, another prospective employer, 
there would again be presented a conflict of interests. But 
the result would be different; D's act would be privileged 
(i.e., permitted). Why? 
2. In Ross v. State, a Texas case decided in r88r/ the 
defendants were convicted of the murder of one Hall, a town 
marshal who had attempted to arrest them. The appellate 
court decided, in view of the testimony, that Hall had no 
legal right to make the arrest. The court stated its conclusion 
as follows: 
"Hall, the deceased, having no right to arrest the defend-
ants or either of them, what were the legal rights of the 
defendants, if, in preventing this illegal arrest, they or either 
of them slew him? ... 
"As the law, divine and human, gives the citizen the right 
to stand upon his individual rights, and to use force against 
1 10 Tex. App. 455 at 463. 
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force to successfully prevent the attempted wrong, the citizen 
whose liberty is thus unlawfully assailed can not only use 
force, but can increase that force and continue to increase it 
even to the death if necessary to prevent the attempted 
wrong, and if he slay his adversary he will be held excused. 
Otherwise the lawless aggressor, the vindictive oppressor 
will be permitted to triumph over the rights and liberties 
of the citizen. Right will be made to do homage to wrong, 
and look to future redress in the courts of the country. This 
is not American law. The citizen has the right to maintain 
his liberty at all hazards, against any and all persons who 
attempt to invade it unlawfully, taking care not rashly to 
use or resort to greater violence than is necessary to its 
protection." 
Do you think the court reached a proper solution of the 
conflicting individual interests here? In holding the defend-
ant's act privileged, the court laid stress on the policy of 
freedom of movement for the individual. What important 
community interests (policies) does this court overlook? 
Compare the following statement in Smith v. Common-
wealth: 2 
"While personal liberty is a very highly esteemed right, 
it is better to undergo the ill convenience of an unlawful 
arrest, from which the law will deliver, than that human life 
should be sacrificed, and a dispute as to whether an arrest 
is unlawful should not be decided with pistols, when it is 
a matter that the magistrate can speedily determine .... " 
3· How can you justify a compulsory education law, i.e., 
a law which requires all children to attend school until they 
reach the age of sixteen? Suppose "little Willie" prefers to 
spend his time fishing rather than in school attendance? 
4· Stephen: 
"The result is that discussions about liberty are either 
misleading or idle, unless we know who wants to do what, 
by what restraint he is prevented from doing it, and for what 
reasons it is proposed to remove that restraint. 
2 Smith v. Commonwealth, 196 Ky. 479 (1922). 
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"Bearing these explanations in mind, I may now observe 
that the democratic motto involves a contradiction. If human 
experience proves anything at all, it proves that, if restraints 
are minimized, if the largest possible measure of liberty is 
accorded to all human beings, the result will not be equality, 
but inequality reproducing itself in a geometrical ratio." 8 
To illustrate the force of what Stephen says, let us 
suppose a case where twenty persons, including A and B, 
B, are competitors in a particular line of business operating 
on a national scale. A buys out two competitors; he is then 
able to obtain supplies at lower prices than B because he buys 
in larger quantities; he is also able to obtain more favorable 
treatment in regard to freight rates (rebates); and he can 
establish advantageous retail outlets for his product. A makes 
large profits and continues to buy out competitors until only 
B is left. A then lowers prices so that B is squeezed out of 
business. ~hat does this story suggest in relation to the 
point last made by Stephen? 
As a matter of fact, some or all of the acts of A above 
mentioned would be forbidden by federal statutes (Sherman 
Act, Interstate Commerce Act, Clayton Act, Robinson-Pat-
man Act, etc.). I need not go into details regarding these 
cross-cutting prohibitions and restraints on A's liberty of 
contract. What is the general policy behind them? 
PoLICIES REGARDING THE CoMMUNITY 
Sec. 7-r2. Present-day stress on general welfare. Since 
the end of the nineteenth century, greater stress has been 
put on the general good as the objective of legal and gov-
ernmental policies. Where formerly legal and political prob-
lems were discussed almost exclusively in terms of individual 
claims, discussion today is carried on more and more in terms 
of the general welfare. By the prevailing doctrine, the indi-
SLIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY 18z (1874). 
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vidual is no longer assumed to have an intrinsic value or to 
enjoy necessary rights.1 He is no longer assumed to have 
essential claims to freedom, equality or security. Instead, 
there has developed a strong tendency to put the securing of 
interests on a social basis; a strong tendency to emphasize 
the good of the community or over-all group. 
However, even the switch of attention to community wel-
fare has not represented a complete change of legal policies. 
It has been, rather, a change of point of view. The policy 
maker pursues largely the same objectives; but he has a 
different slant which introduces the social or community 
welfare factor into his calculations. He recognizes the same 
policies and objectives under different names. The policy 
maker of today recognizes the individual's claims, not as 
such, but for the social good.2 Thus the policy of recognizing 
individual interests of personality is justified by the com-
munity's interests in the individual's life. Sound and capable 
individuals may be regarded as necessary to a soundly func-
tioning community. Hence, individual welfare readily be-
1 No doubt the founders of our republic thought of certain individual rights 
as fundamental and beyond the reach of the policy maker. And in the phi-
losophy of Kant, the individual is assumed to have an intrinsic value. His prac-
tical imperative reads: "Act so as to use humanity, whether in your own person 
or in the person of another, always as an end, never as merely a means." 
Watson, Selections from Kant (Ed., 19z7) z46. Probably it is correct to say 
that the modern exponents of the "higher law" in this country all maintain 
similar views. Compare discussion of "higher law" views in section 7-45. 
These writers hold that there are certain parts of human life which are sacred 
and not to be controlled for the public good. 
2 Individual welfare and social welfare do not, accordingly, represent com-
pletely divergent objectives. In a certain area the two kinds of welfare may 
coincide; the individual may be accorded what he wants because it is good 
social policy to do so; this is the area of legal recognition of his claims in the 
form of rights and legal interests. Beyond this area of positive recognition lies 
another where it may be a matter of indifference, socially speaking, whether 
the individual's wants are satisfied or not, and where the legal system adopts 
a policy of neutrality; this is the area of liberties. And beyond this area of 
indifference and neutrality is one where the individual's claims run counter 
to the general good, or the good of other individuals; this is the area of legal 
prohibition. Compare what is said in sections z-03 to z-1 1, inclusive. See also 
the remarks of Stone regarding the interchangeability of interests seen from 
different viewpoints. THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 490-491 (1946). 
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comes a community objective. In this sense, the state, through 
its legal system, not only undertakes to secure benefits for 
its membership as a whole, it also treats the welfare of each 
individual member as a state objective. 
To some extent, the social viewpoint of policy matters is 
a natural consequence of the fact that policy makers who 
formulate, and other officials who execute, policies, are social 
agents. They act for the community, and in its interests. In 
other words, the machinery of the state is social machinery. 
This fact tends to give all official thinking a social coloring.3 
It tends to make officials look at all objectives of their activity 
in terms of the community's welfare. But, in the American 
legal systems, this tendency to the social or official viewpoint 
will always be kept within bounds, so long as the present 
constitutions stand. These instruments prohibit many possible 
official inroads on the individual's claims. These instruments, 
together with our individualist tradition, make the indi-
vidual and his claims the starting point for official action. 
These instruments take the individual's claims for granted, 
and have the effect of requiring that social interests be newly 
established and positively recognized. Our officials cannot 
forget the individual while they continue to operate under 
our existing frame of government.4 
3 In some parts of the world, this stress on the community interests has been 
almost as one-sided and exaggerated as the stress on individual welfare was 
here in the last century. Thus some governments, notably the recent Fascist 
and Communist regimes, have fallen into ways which sacrifice individual life 
and personality for some mystical racial goal or party advantage. As is indi-
cated in the text, this extreme of emphasis on group interests would hardly be 
possible under our American legal systems without a complete change of our 
constitutions. 
Of course, officials may also be controlled by selfish interests or the interests 
of smaller groups. See next general subtopic, POLICIES REGARDING OTHER 
GROUPs AND CoMMUNITIEs. 
4 In fact, our strong recognition of individual claims was achieved as a part 
of a revolution in which the existing government and its officials were dis-
placed by the efforts of nonofficial individuals. These individuals were able 
to secure the protection of individual claims in setting up a new government. 
If English and American history prove anything, they show that an established 
officialdom does not on its own motion recognize individual interests and confer 
its blessing on individual claims. 
456 OUR LEGAL SYSTEM AND HOW IT OPERATES 
In the following sections, I shall try to present an inven-
tory of legal policies regarding the community. The objec-
tives of these policies I shall call "social interests," following 
a terminology which has become current through the writings 
of Pound and others. I shall begin the inventory of social 
interests with those which are the most ancient and generally 
recognized: 
Social interests in internal peace and order (sec. 7- I 3) 
Social interests in security of acquisitions (sec. 7-I 4) 
Social interests in security of transactions (sec. 7- I 5) 
and then move on to other social interests (sees. 7-I 8 to 
7-24), which have been more recently recognized and 
adopted. 
Sec. 7-r3. Social interests in peace and order. Historically, 
the preservation of peace and order in the community appears 
to be the earliest objective explicitly recognized and avowedly 
pursued by politically organized society. It is also probably 
the most fundamental of all governmental polic1es, inasmuch 
as the achievement of most, if not all, other social interests 
depend upon order. And it is a most comprehensive social 
policy; it covers a large share of the protection given by 
government to individual claims against criminal and tortious 
aggressions by others; and it embraces several social interests 
to be presently discussed, if the phrase, ''peace and order," 
be used in a broad sense. 
Under the existing American legal systems, the chief 
responsibility for maintenance of peace and order rests with 
the states, though the federal government may have to act 
to preserve order in connection with its ordinary operations, 
e.g., the work of its courts, or may have to deal with an 
extraordinary situation, e.g., a general rebellion. The prin-
cipal means employed by the states to preserve· peace and 
order are state and local police forces, consisting of sheriffs, 
LEGAL POLICIES AND POLICY MAKING 457 
constables and other officers, and state military forces, com-
monly called militia.1 The federal government maintains a 
system of United States marshals, a Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and various inspectors and executive officers, 
as well as its military forces. 
On the legal side, the policy of preserving peace and order 
is expressed or implicit in many prohibitive standards appli-
cable to individuals, especially in the standards of the crim-
inal law. This policy is the basis for punishing murder, rape, 
robbery, and other acts of violence. This general objective 
is also evident in many legal limitations on the individual's 
privilege of self-help. Keeping the peace is involved, too, 
in numerous correlative standards, applicable to officials. 
Legal provisions commonly require officials to arrest, sup-
press, and prosecute individuals who disturb the public order; 
and the governors and the President are authorized and 
required by constitutional and statutory provisions to declare 
martial law in case of serious public disorder. 
Sec. 7-I 4· Social interests in security of acquisitions. You 
will see in the policy of protecting acquisitions an old familiar 
face. This policy cannot be regarded as a quite new item in 
our policy inventories. First, the social interests in the security 
of acquisitions are already familiar in the sense that they are 
roughly identical with the individual's interests in holding 
things.1 Recognition of these social interests does not con-
stitute any wide departure from the individualist point of 
view. The social interests merely represent the social bearing 
of the individual interests. Recognition of the social interests 
consists essentially in finding a social justification for the 
protection of individual claims to control things. 
1 The militia is a body of citizens of a state, enrolled in its military force 
on a part-time basis. The militia is not usually called together for actual service 
except in emergencies. In both respects, the militia is to be distinguished from 
a regular army, such as that maintained by the federal government. 
1 Sec. 7-o8, subdivision b. 
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Second, the policy of protecting acquisitions may be said 
to be only a part, or at most, an offshoot, of the policy of 
preserving peace and order, and in either case, not a new 
policy. Obviously, the public peace and the security of acquisi-
tions are closely connected. Many disturbances of the peace 
do relate to the acquisition or control of things; the robber 
disturbs the public peace at the same time that he violates 
the security of acquisitions. But the security of acquisitions 
is such an important phase of public order, and looms so 
large in legal discussions that it well deserves, and is usually 
given, a separate place among social interests.2 
The social interests in protecting individual acquisitions 
lie behind all the various legal forms in which private prop-
erty is recognized. As a recent writer says, ". . . substantially 
the whole law of real and personal property, as well as great 
parts of the law of torts and crimes, are directed to the 
security of acquisitions." 3 And these social interests find 
recognition (along with the individual) in the American con-
stitutions, notably in the provisions forbidding government 
to deprive persons of property without due process of law, 
and in various provisions prohibiting retroactive legislation. 
"Acquisitions" in this connection refers to acquisitions of 
land and tangible goods. "Security" refers to the protection 
given to the individual's claims to such land and goods. So 
that the social interests in security of acquisitions mean the 
legal objective of making secure the claims of those who 
establish control of land or goods in prescribed ways, such 
as by occupation, by transfer or exchange, by inheritance, etc. 
The individual claims thus recognized are commonly desig-
nated "property rights." 4 They are secured, so far as they 
2 After all, the number of policies which we distinguish and the distinctions 
between them that we make, are to be determined mainly by considerations of 
convenience and common usage. 
3 STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 561 (1946). 
4 
"Rights" is here used in a broad sense which includes rights, powers, and 
privileges. 
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are secured, by legal remedies, by private actions of different 
kinds, by limited self-help, and by public prosecution. 
Sec. 7-rs. Social interests in security of transactions.1 The 
policy of recognizing the individual's claims to enforce con-
tracts and other beneficial arrangements with his fellowmen 
has already been counted among policies regarding the indi-
vidual. Now, I want to refer to the social reason given for 
recognizing this claim. All of modern economic life rests 
upon the sanctity of contractual undertakings. Goods are pro-
duced and distributed on the faith of promises by others. 
Services are performed on a like basis. Security in these 
respects is the foundation on which all forms of economic 
activity rest. This security is what Cardozo means when he 
speaks of the ". . . overmastering need of certainty in the 
transactions of commercial life." 2 
It is a basic policy of all modern governments to furnish 
the needed security of transactions. In some measure, this is 
done by providing preordained patterns for contractual trans-
actions and obligations (forms for effective acts) so that all 
parties who enter into contractual undertakings can know 
beforehand what the effects of their acts will be, and thus 
avoid controversy and misunderstandings. But, of course, the 
ultimate basis for security of transactions is found in the avail-
ability of legal remedies to back up promises made. And, so 
that the assurance of governmental backing for contractual 
obligations will be doubly sure, the states are expressly for-
bidden by the Federal Constitution "to pass any . . . Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . ." 3 This means 
1 Transfers of tangible things are also transactions in one sense. However, 
I have included these under the preceding head. I have followed the usual 
practice of distinguishing between contracts and other executory transactions 
on the one hand, and conveyances, sales, and other executed transactions on the 
other. 
2 THE GROWTH OF THE LAW III (I924). 
3 Art. I, Sec. Io. 
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that no state can legislate in a manner to change the obligatory 
force of an existing contract.4 
Sec. 7-I6. Problems. r. The Constitution of the United 
States gives Congress power "to provide for the Punishment 
of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the 
United States." 1 Acting under this authority, Congress has 
provided for the punishment of persons who counterfeit the 
money of the United States or attempt or conspire to do so, 
or who possess tools, plates, or instruments intended to be 
used for such purpose. Which of the policies (social interests) 
above mentioned is primarily involved in this constitutional 
provision and these statutory enactments? 
2. Assume that larceny (theft) is defined by the common 
law as the act of taking and carrying away the goods of 
another with the intent to deprive the owner permanently 
thereof. What policy (social interest) lies behind the judicial 
recognition of this common law offense? 
3· It is a settled doctrine of common law that the possessor 
of a chattel is entitled to legal protection of his control against 
all the world except a prior possessor or a person who has 
the immediate right to possession. Stated the other way 
around, a defendant in a suit for possession of a chattel cannot 
rely upon the title of a third person (jus tertii); he cannot 
assert that someone else has a better claim to the chattel than 
the plaintiff has. These doctrines can result in sustaining 
against aggression even the control of a plaintiff who has 
come into possession of a chattel by wrong, e.g., a thief. 
Obviously, it is not the policy of our legal system to give 
4 Literally, the contracts clause seems to preclude any impairment whatever, 
but the Supreme Court has interpreted it in effect to mean that no state can 
unreasonably impair the obligation of a contract. See further, regarding the 
interpretation of the contracts clause, the discussion in sec. s-:u above. 
In some respects the due process clauses of the Federal Constitution also give 
some protection to the obligation of contracts; and the various clauses which 
preclude retroactive legislation have some protective effect in this regard. 
1 Art. I, Sec. 8. 
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protection to the wrongdoer as such. What is the policy 
behind this broad protection of the possessor's control? 
4· Consider the following rules regarding the legal cap-
ture of a whale: 
"In the Greenland whale-fishery, by the English custom, 
if the first striker lost his hold on the fish, and it was then 
killed by another, the first had no claim; but he had the 
whole if he kept fast to the whale until it was struck by the 
other, although it then broke from the first harpoon. By the 
custom in the Gallipagos, on the other hand, the first striker 
had half the whale, although control of the line was lost. 
Each of these customs has been sustained and acted on by 
the English courts, and Judge Lowell has decided in accord-
ance with still a third, which gives the whale to the vessel 
whose iron first remains in it, provided claim be made before 
cutting in. The ground as put by Lord Mansfield is simply 
that, were it not for such customs, there must be a sort of 
warfare perpetually subsisting between the adventurers." 2 
Why is it necessary to have a standard effective act for 
such cases? What is the prime policy for the court to consider 
in dealing with such competing possessory claims? 
Why do you assume that the English courts adopted a 
different standard for one place from the standard adopted 
for another? 
5. In a case involving the contention that a foreign cor-
poration, by seeking and obtaining consent to do business in 
a state, had impliedly agreed to be sued in any county of 
the consenting state, Holmes, J ., dissenting, said: 
"In order to enter into most of the relations of life people 
have to give up some of their Constitutional rights. If a man 
makes a contract he gives up the Constitutional right that 
previously he had to be free from the hamper that he puts 
on himself." Power Company v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490 
at 497 (1927). 
2 HOLMES, COMMON LAW 2IZ (1881), 
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How would you characterize the "constitutional right" 
which a man gives up when he makes a contract? What does 
Holmes mean by "the hamper that he puts upon himself"? 
Sec. 7-I7. Human control of environment--increased role 
of government-law and other means of control. Man is 
affected by his physical environment in many ways. His activ-
ities are shaped by the nature of the place and conditions in 
which he lives. But the effects of environment on him are 
not the whole story. The rest of the story has to be told in 
terms of his control over the environment, his use of the 
means which it provides, and his production of goods and 
services to meet his own needs. The environment acts upon 
man, but he reacts upon it. He remakes his surroundings. 
He prepares himself against the natural forces which he finds 
about him. He puts cushions between himself and "nature 
in the raw." He makes clothes, builds shelters, and lights 
fires to warm himself,. and thus is able to live in climatic 
conditions for which his natural bare body is not adapted. 
And he makes use of Nature's resources and produces goods 
and services for his own ends. He cultivates the soil to pro-
duce food. He tames and breeds animals to furnish food and 
power. He takes minerals, coal and petroleum from the earth 
in order to create tools and produce energy. He builds roads 
and instruments of transportation. In short, the world in 
which man lives is largely a world of his own creation; the 
natural world puts limits on his activities, but man revamps 
natural conditions, uses natural resources, and creates goods 
and services to satisfy his wants. 
Natural conditions surrounding the community have al-
ways been, and still are, reshaped mainly by individuals 
acting on their own initiative. For example, A ordinarily 
decides whether to build a house for himself and what kind 
to build, and he may build it with his own hands if he chooses. 
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Another individual, B, may specialize in building for others, 
as the carpenter or mason does. Both A and B are individual 
enterprisers, and typical of many individuals in the com-
munity. Collectively such individuals contribute heavily to 
the nature of the surroundings in which they and other mem-
bers of the community live. Similar observations apply to 
the utilization of natural resources and to the creation of 
goods and services for the community. Individual enter-
prisers are the principal users of natural resources, and the 
principal producers of goods and services for the community. 
In fact, as I have already pointed out, our American eco-
nomic system stands on a solid foundation of individual free 
enterprise. 
But individual enterprise is not adequate to meet many 
of the needs of the community, and, as I have already pointed 
out, ours is a day of increasing stress on community interests. 
With this increased stress on community interests has come 
an increased demand for community services, and this de-
mand it has fallen largely to the lot of government agencies 
to satisfy.1 This has meant that government and law have 
assumed an ever-increasing role in modern society. This 
development is well illustrated in the history of our Amer-
ican legal systems.2 Beginning at a period when governmental 
1 Here I have spoken of only two possibilities, individual action and govern-
mental action. There are obviously other possibilities than these two. A man 
may provide shelter for his family as well as himself; an individual may 
furnish facilities for others for hire, and a group may provide for the welfare 
of its own members. But governmental activity is the subject of our story. 
For our purpose it is not essential to consider all the possible alternatives. It 
suffices to treat the individual's provision for himself as the only alternative 
for governmental provision, as this is the simplest and most fundamental 
alternative, and corresponds with our traditional emphasis on individual free 
enterprise. 
2 These systems began in a revolution against established authority. The 
result was an overstress on individual liberty and a belittling of the role of 
government. Liberty meant, to the men of that day, freedom from governmental 
restraint. What our Revolutionary forefathers saw in the large was that the 
liberties of the individual need to be protected and secured against official 
misdeeds. Governmental control of the individual was, in their eyes, an evil; 
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functions were held to a minimum, and legal ends were 
defined in terms of satisfying individual claims, keeping the 
peace, and securing acquisitions and transactions, government 
has gradually developed into an institution to perform a wide 
variety of community services. 
"'Under the compulsion of the changed conditions 
brought about largely by mechanical and technological devel-
opment, the modern state has rapidly ceased to resemble the 
old political organization, whose chief functions were de-
fense, the administration of justice, and the exercise of a 
rather narrow police power.' 3 'Today, the state acts also 
as a doctor, nurse, teacher, insurance organizer, housebuilder, 
sanitary engineer, chemist, railway controller, supplier of 
gas, water and electricity, town planner, pensions distributor, 
provider of transport, hospital organizer, roadmaker, and in 
a large number of other capacities.' . . .4 
"'The supplying of money and credit has become an im-
portant government enterprise. In addition to acting as the 
authority to control the currency, the government has been 
forced to act as a great credit agency, lending money, either 
directly or through subsidies, to banks, railroads, insurance 
companies, private business undertakings, and owners of 
homes and farms. . . ' " 5 
We are, of course, interested primarily in the effects of 
this expansion of government functions upon the policies of 
the legal system. But law is merely one of the means em-
ployed by government to effectuate its ends. When we were 
examining the effectuation of legal standards, we found it 
necessary to look beyond the strictly legal machinery of 
governmental control can always be abused, and is not to be extended beyond 
what is really necessary; the less government the better, one might say. 
Compare sees. 7-os, 7-o8 and 7-ll, problem z. 
3 BLACHLY and OATMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICA-
TION I-S (Brookings Institution, 1934), quoted by FRYER AND BENSON, 
LEGAL SYSTEM 1089 (1948). 
4 Committee on Ministers' Powers, Vol. II, 1932, Minutes of Evidence, 
p. 52 (memorandum of W. A. Robson) ibid. 
5 BLACHLY AND OATMAN, loc. cit. 
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enforcement and to observe the effects of such governmental 
activities as taxation, spending, and education. So here, I 
think it is essential to see legal policies in relation to the 
policies of government as a whole. A legal policy is always a 
policy of government. Both law and legal machinery are 
instruments of government; they are created and maintained 
by government. The policies of government which are ex-
pressed in law are often intertwined with and dependant 
upon other purposes of government. Thus, for example, a 
statute which requires an income tax return from each poten-
tial taxpayer expresses a legal policy which is merely an 
adjunct or incident of a fiscal policy of the state. The legal 
requirement of a return is only intelligible in the light of 
the income tax setup. Likewise, a statute which limits the 
loads which may be carried by trucks on public highways is 
almost meaningless unless one sees that this limit is incident 
to a governmental undertaking to provide and maintain 
highways. In other words, the regulation of behavior by pre-
scribed standards is only a part, and often only an incidental 
part, of government functions. The purposes behind regula-
tions-especially regulations applicable to official acts-can-
not be understood apart from the policies behind other 
functions of government. 
Hence, instead of continuing in the following sections with 
a list of the social interests served by legal regulations, I 
shall try to provide you with a list of the social interests 
served by governmental measures of all kinds. The list will 
include the social interests which are recognized by law, and 
special emphasis will be put on strictly legal policies and 
measures. But, for the reasons just indicated, all the major 
policies and measures of our state and federal governments 
will be included. 
Sec. 7-I8. Social interests in natural resources. Man 
depends upon his natural environment for the basic means 
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of livelihood.1 The land, the air, the rain, the streams, the 
lakes, the sea, the forests, the minerals, the fish and other 
wildlife, are gifts of Nature. So far as these are limited in 
amount, or irreplaceable, the policy maker has to decide how 
such natural assets are to be controlled and utilized. He 
recognizes social interests in their exploitation; or as we 
commonly say today, he adopts a policy of conservation. He 
may assign some of these assets to private or individual 
control; others he may reserve for more or less complete 
public control. Varying dispositions have been made of dif-
ferent natural resources in different times and circumstances. 
Without being too specific as to what we include under the 
term, we can readily agree that land is the most basic of 
natural resources. Land has been quite consistently assigned 
by our American legal systems to individual control and 
ownership. This was the conception of the proper disposal to 
make of land which prevailed at the time our federal gov-
ernment was founded.2 The private ownership of land was 
accordingly recognized from the start, and it remains an 
established tenet of our governmental policy. However, the 
general recognition of private ownership has not stood in 
the way of important legal checks on the owner's control 
over this natural resource. First, there were checks on the 
owner's powers of disposition, intended to keep land free 
from fetters on use and to insure the free alienation of land. 
It was recognized by our courts and legislators, as it had been 
1 Man also prepares himself against the natural forces that he finds about 
him. Partly this preparation is the work of individuals, but to a not incon-
siderable extent, preparatory and preventive measures of this type are under-
taken by government, e.g., flood and fire control; and steps to prevent the 
spread of disease, e.g., quarantine, premarital examination, vaccination. 
2 Though the ownership of land had not been too general or widespread 
in England, from which our ancestors came, private ownership of land was 
the general rule there, and the English settlers all had the ambition, which 
most had not been able to gratify in England, to own land. Here, land was 
relatively plentiful; it could only be effectively utilized by individual farmers 
and settlers. It was natural that private ownership was accepted without 
question. 
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by English courts and lawmakers, that the owner of land 
ought not to be allowed to tie it up perpetually so that it 
could not be freely used and alienated. The social interests 
in the full use and free transfer of land were appreciated, 
and, as a result, the owner's individual interest was limited 
to a complete usufruct for life, coupled with powers to name 
his successors (by deed, will, etc.) and powers to control 
their use and disposition of the land for a moderate addi-
tional period. Furthermore, the general recognition of private 
ownership did not in the beginning, and does not now, ex-
dude a considerable degree of governmental control aimed to 
prevent injury to others by the landowners' activities, e.g., 
the common-law prohibition of the maintenance of nuisances 
and statutory prohibitions of the maintenance of dangerous 
instrumentalities and statutory regulations intended to insure 
the construction and maintenance of safe and sanitary struc-
tures on the land. Nor has the principle of private ownership 
stood in the way of zoning legislation aimed to insure segre-
gation of uses, and comfortable and, to some extent, aesthetic, 
conditions of living.3 And finally, it must be realized that the 
principle of private ownership was not initially extended to 
all land. The federal government assumed control of the 
territories of the West and acted as a governmental proprietor 
thereof. In fact, the federal government still exercises a not 
inconsiderable control over the utilization of land through 
its ownership of vast areas in our western states and in our 
territorial possessions.4 As owner, the federal government has 
3 Zoning legislation divides up areas, urban or rural, into zones, and permits 
only particular uses of land in particular zones, such as residential uses, business 
uses, uses for apartment houses, and factory uses. Usually the statutes which 
establish zoning confer a considerable degree of discretion on administrative 
agencies, to fix and change zones and to determine their application in particu-
lar cases. 
4 "In the western states the Federal Government owns vast tracts of land. 
The extent of this public domain may be realized from the following figures: 
in Arizona, 92 per cent of the lands within that state are owned by the United 
States Government; in California, 52.58 per cent; in Colorado, 56.67 per cent; 
in Idaho, 83.80 per cent; in Montana, 65.80 per cent; in Nevada, 87.8:1. per 
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been in a position to conserve the resources of this land, e.g., 
minerals and timber, and to insure its economical exploita-
tion.5 
Forests and solid minerals, such as coal, have generally 
been treated as part of the land, and subject to the same 
principles and policies as the land itself.6 Oil and gas and 
subsurface water have usually been regarded as unowned 
until they are reduced to possession. The owner of the land 
on which they occur merely has a preferential right to reduce 
them to control. Nevertheless, the landowner's individual 
interest in these resources has been subjected to a great deal 
of legislation of the common regulatory type, intended to 
control the acts of the individual landowner and the acts of 
other individuals so as to prevent waste of these important 
natural resources. Statutes regulating methods of production, 
use, and marketing of oil and gas are of this type, as well 
as statutes regulating the utilization of natural water for sale, 
for power, and for irrigation.7 
Wild animals, i.e., fish and game, have usually been 
treated as vacant property. If on private lands, the land-
owner has an exclusive right to appropriate them to his own 
use. If on public lands, our legal systems originally adopted 
the policy of allowing these resources to be freely appro-
priated by individuals. But in recent years our governments 
cent; in New Mexico, 62.83 per cent; in Oregon, 51 per cent; in Utah, 8o.18 
per cent; in Washington, 40 per cent; in Wyoming, 68 per cent." KERWIN, 
FEDERAL WATER-POWER LEGISLATION 6S (1 926). 
5 Whether the government has actually used its control to the best advantage 
is another question. 
6 You will be interested to know that in many countries of the world, 
notably those which belong to the civil law group, all or some of the minerals 
under land belong to the government and not to the owner of the surface. 
In those countries, such resources are exploited normally by persons or com-
panies to whom the government grants concessions to search for and extract 
them from the land. 
7 See, for example, as regards legislation relating to oil and gas: Ford, 
"Controlling the Production of Oil," 30 MICH. L. REv. 1170 {1932); and as 
regards the use of water, Hathorn v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 194 N. Y. 
p6 (1909). 
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have asserted more and more control over wildlife, no matter 
where it may be, in order to prevent its depletion or com-
plete extinction. This control has been exerted by the states 
and the federal government, either on the basis of a general 
social interest in conservation or in the name of public 
ownership of wildlife.8 
Other natural assets, such as streams and lakes, are, to a 
limited extent, recognized as subjects of private ownership. 
But there is a distinct tendency in the law today to treat 
streams and lakes, along with the air 9 and the sea, as 
common property, strictly owned by no one, yet subject to 
public control of the most sweeping character. Public control 
is predicated on the policy of making these assets as fully 
and generally available for the use and enjoyment of all 
the population as is practicable.10 
In addition to the above cases, in which the social interest 
in natural resources is recognized or asserted, we find numer-
ous other instances within the last generation where our 
governments, especially the federal government, have taken 
extraordinary pains to safeguard these resources against de-
struction or injury by natural causes. Public funds have been 
freely spent to protect forests against destruction by fire, to 
secure property along rivers against erosion, to drain swamp 
lands, to reclaim desert lands, and to encourage farmers to 
use approved methods of land cultivation. 
Sec. 7-I9. Social interests in production of goods and 
services. Man creates goods and services to satisfy his own 
wants. He does not, like wild animals, depend wholly upon 
the table Nature has set. The individual man may provide 
8 See generally BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, sec. 6 (1936). 
9 See Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport quoted in sec. 7-zr, problem 1. 
10 See, for example, Collins v. Gerhardt, 237 Mich. 38 (1926), and a com-
ment entitled "Federal Power Act-Jurisdiction and Functions of the Federal 
Power Commission-Constitutional Limitations," 39 MICH. L. REV. 976 
(1941). 
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for his own needs, or he may, as a business enterprise, under-
take to supply the needs of others. Or, in our politically 
organized society, government may recognize the com-
munity's needs for goods and services, and undertake to 
insure their production for the benefit of the community as 
a whole.1 It is this general interest and the measures taken 
by government to stimulate and control productive processes 
that are to be the subjects of the present section. 
At the end of the eighteenth century when our govern-
ment was founded, free enterprise was an outstanding fact 
in this part of the world. Life was primarily agricultural, 
and each home produced most of its own goods and services. 
It was not unnatural to develop economic theories and policies 
based on this condition of affairs. The policy of free enterprise 
was explicitly formulated and remained the traditional and 
generally accepted policy into the nineteenth century. This 
policy recognized individual initiative as the principal means, 
if not the only means, of inducing the production of goods 
and services for self and for others. It saw production as a 
process depending on self-interest to create for oneself, and 
as a process relying on profits to motivate creation for others. 
While these theories of production prevailed, there was not 
too much scope for the recognition of social interests in the 
productive process, or for governmental interposition in the 
production of goods and services. 2 
Nevertheless, the policy of free enterprise was not absolute 
even in the beginning. It has long been recognized that some 
restraints might be placed on freedom of enterprise, and that 
some economic enterprises might be sponsored or undertaken 
1 Again, as in the last two sections, I limit myself to two alternatives: 
individual action and governmental action. It seems quite unnecessary for my 
present purpose to discuss other possibilities. See sec. 7-r 7, note r. 
2 
"The unfettered right to contract was pressed, as we have seen, during 
these phases as the indispensable means whereby individuals seize such oppor-
tunities, whether of work or profit, as the social and economic environment 
offers." STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 533, 534 (1946). 
LEGAL POLICIES AND POLICY MAKING 471 
by government itself. And the policy of free enterprise has 
suffered further serious inroads as a result of the practical 
needs of our times and their impact on the thinking of legis-
latures and courts. Even the individualist cast of our consti-
tutions has not been able to stop these social trends. The 
scope of individual freedom of enterprise is being perceptibly 
reduced by the two expedients of increasing the number of 
governmental regulations on the one hand, and of increasing 
the number of governmental enterprises on the other. Both 
these expedients involve the recognition of new social inter-
ests, or the expansion of social interests already recognized. 
The shape which these developments have taken is illustrated 
in the following materials. 
First, free enterprise may be directed to the production 
of the wrong kinds of goods. The profit motive is not always 
directed to the creation of useful goods, or the rendition 
of meritorious services. For example, the producer may be 
tempted to prepare unwholesome food or drugs for the 
market. Penalties and inspections may be employed by gov-
ernment in order to insure that his products are of proper 
quality. Or the producer may choose to prepare marijuana 
cigarettes, or quack remedies for the market; or he may elect 
to operate a gambling den, or house of prostitution. The 
community may decide through its policy makers that such 
goods and services are always coupled with injurious conse-
quences; the community interest in preventing their produc-
tion may be recognized and appropriate measures to this end 
adopted. 
Second, the productive processes themselves may be carried 
out in a way, or with means, which are harmful to the com-
munity. Thus, coal needs to be mined, and clothing manu-
factured, but these industries should not be allowed to 
operate in ways which endanger the lives, limbs and health 
of persons who are employed in them. The community is 
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interested in the working conditions in various productive 
enterprises. It requires the installation of safety devices. It 
enacts regulative provisions regarding hours and conditions 
of labor. It prohibits child labor. It charges the persons 
engaged in producing goods and services with the burden 
of compensating their workmen for personal injuries suffered 
in the course of their employment. And, as regards services, 
such as professional or technical services, government adopts 
standards to insure the competence and honesty of the persons 
who render them, e.g., requirements of training for medicine, 
law, and other professions. 
Third, free enterprise may result in monopoly. One large 
fish may swallow all the rest, or one enterpriser may buy 
out all his competitors, or join them in restricting the quantity 
or quality of goods or services rendered to the public. Acts 
of entrepreneurs, e.g., contracts, conspiracies and consolida-
tions, which result in a monopoly, or which tend to have this 
effect, may be forbidden outright by law, and administrative 
agencies may be created to supervise business in order to see 
that monopolistic trends are controlled. But some kinds of 
monopoly seem to be inevitable. Such monopolies call for 
regulation, instead of prohibition, in order to insure the 
production of the proper amount or kind of goods or services. 
Thus, the entrepreneur who establishes a local water works 
usually enjoys a monopoly in fact, as it is not feasible to 
have several concerns competing in furnishing water to one 
community. He is not to be left to decide at his discretion 
on the quantity and quality of service he will give. His 
monopoly gives him an undue power over others. Such power 
calls for public control; it has entailed the enactment of many 
legal regulations, and the creation of a variety of adminis-
trative officials to enforce them. 
Fourth, the needed but unprofitable enterprise must be 
reckoned with by government. Since the turn of the century, 
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it has been appreciated ever more clearly that not all the 
goods and services which the public requires will be produced 
through individual undertakings inspired by the profit 
motive. As these goods and services are definitely needed, 
there is a social interest in their production, and, as indi-
viduals do not have sufficient incentives to act, government 
has no choice but to take a hand in the productive processes. 
Some products and services can be made available if govern-
ment becomes the purchaser thereof at an agreed price, e.g., 
guaranteed prices to farmers. The production of other goods 
and services can be induced by the offer of a subsidy of some 
kind, in order to reduce the producer's costs, e.g., subsidies 
by the federal government to the airlines and the merchant 
marine. Other goods are produced when government affords 
protection to the producer as against threatened competition, 
as in the case of the protective tariff to foster home industry. 
Other products and services will be forthcoming only if 
governmental agencies furnish them. Of this last type are 
public highways and the prosecution of atomic research. 
Governmental productive enterprises have become a type 
so important and so common that they deserve special notice. 
Such governmental enterprises enter fields which cannot be 
developed profitably by the individual, fields which involve 
risks too great for the individual entrepreneur to run, fields 
which demand an amount of capital which the individual 
cannot obtain, and fields where the public is dissatisfied 
(justly or unjustly) with the kind of services rendered by 
private concerns, such as water works or other utilities. For 
any or all of these reasons, we find governmental agencies 
projected into the problems of financing and administering 
enterprises for the public benefit. Among the earliest ventures 
of this sort, embarked upon by American governments at 
public expense, were provisions for streets, highways, and 
bridges. These could hardly be called business enterprises as 
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they were commonly maintained without cost to the user. 
More recent governmental undertakings have included water 
works, sewage disposal facilities, parking lots, transportation 
facilities and hospitals of various kinds.3 In the same class 
fall the provision of parks and playgrounds, the clearance of 
slums, and the public financing of low-cost housing. And 
finally, under this head we can place the pending health 
insurance program of the federal government, which would 
provide medical and hospital insurance for everybody.4 All 
these measures involve chiefly the use of fiscal and admin-
istrative powers; government undertakes to create and man-
age these enterprises to serve the needs of the community. 
Sec. 7-20. Social interests in distribution of goods and 
services. The distribution of goods produced in a community 
also presents problems of planning for the policy maker.1 
His general end, we shall assume, is to achieve a fair dis-
tribution; but great differences of opinion prevail, both as 
to what constitutes a fair distribution and what are the best 
methods of bringing such a distribution about. For some 
collectivists, a fair distribution is an equal distribution of all 
the goods produced in the community; for others, a fair 
distribution is one which is relative to the need of the dis-
tributee, or to the productive effort which he has put forth. 
For individualists, the question of the fairness of the ultimate 
3 Thus, different branches of government establish hospitals and provide 
medical care for the indigent, the insane, the feeble-minded, the crippled, the 
blind and the tuberculous. 
4 Such a program was again urged upon Congress by President Truman 
recently, having been under discussion for several previous years. Whether 
this program in its pending form is desirable or feasible, or whether it is 
likely to be adopted in the near future, need not be debated here. The fact 
that it is seriously proposed, and the further fact that similar health programs 
have already been adopted in England, Sweden, and other countries of Europe, 
do point to a growing sense of responsibility of the modern community for the 
health of all its members, and to the possible assumption by government of 
a policy of health protection of a very broad scope. 
1 I use "distribution" to include both the process of distribution (exchange, 
sale, gift, etc.) and the end result of the process. · 
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distribution is little stressed; it is simply assumed that free-
dom to produce and to exchange goods and services will result 
in. a satisfactory distribution thereo£.2 
Then there are differences of opinion as regards methods 
of insuring a fair distribution. According to the theories of 
various collectivists, the state must intervene to insure a 
division of the product on whatever basis it determines to be 
fair. This intervention may involve the use of its regulatory 
or its fiscal or its administrative powers. The intervention may 
extend as far as the out-and-out appropriation by government 
of both production facilities and products, and the assignment 
of definite shares of the product to individuals by, and in the 
name of, the state. However, according to our traditional 
theory of free enterprise, the best method of dividing the 
product is to allow each producer to obtain whatever share 
he can by his own productive efforts and the processes of 
exchange.3 Under this view, government adopts a hands-off 
policy as regards the distribution of goods within the com-
munity, and permits the economic processes of production 
and exchange to work themselves out in their own way; 
government only enters the picture to protect distributees in 
their holdings and to secure the processes of production and 
exchange against extreme forms of aggression by outsiders. 
2 This is true of the simon-pure advocates of free enterprise; they are not 
much concerned with the problem of fair distribution; they regard the eco-
nomic processes of production and distribution as self-sufficient; they are 
inclined to assume that these processes will work out for the best, if only 
government does not interfere or tinker with them. 
So far as the writers who maintain this view felt that it was necessary to 
justify the appropriation of a share by A, they found the justification in A's 
labor as a producer, or in a social compact of some sort. See LOCKE, Two 
TREATISES ON GovERNMENT (London, 6th Imp.) 2.15 et seq. (1764). The 
justification on the basis of A's labor as producer, is commonly called the 
"labor theory" of property. 
3 The first part of this statement is an expression of the "labor theory" of 
property, referred to in the next preceding note. As regards the functions of 
property, this statement suggests two: "property for use" and "property for 
exchange." Compare what is said regarding "property for security" in 
sec. 7-o8, b, and "property for power," referred to later in this section 
(in the discussion of monopoly). 
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The tendency in the United States has been to make a 
compromise between extreme individualist and collectivist 
policies regarding a fair distribution of the community's 
product (goods and services). In making this compromise, 
government starts with a policy of distribution along tradi-
tional lines of free enterprise, but recognizes a variety of 
limited countervailing policies which cut down its scope. 
These countervailing policies are expressed in various regu-
lative, fiscal and administrative measures intended to temper 
the rigors of free enterprise and protect the community 
against obvious defects of its operation. These countervailing 
policies, and the social interests which they recognize, and 
the governmental measures which they involve, will be the 
subject of discussion in the following paragraphs. 
First, there are regulations intended to make sure that 
goods and services reach the right persons. For example, 
certain drugs and poisons and firearms are intended to reach 
only certain persons in the community. Their general and 
free distribution is found to be harmful. Opiates and bar-
biturates are needed by certain persons and may be obtained 
by them under proper safeguards; but their free use in the 
community is injurious since it leads to an increase in drug 
addiction. Pistols may be properly distributed to reliable 
persons for the purpose of self-defense and the defense of 
property; they should not be allowed to come into the hands 
of unreliable persons. Accordingly, these needs for restraints 
on free distribution are expressed in various restrictive and 
prohibitive legal provisions which are intended to prevent 
these products from reaching the hands of the wrong persons. 
Second, going far back in Anglo-American law, there have 
always been some restraints on the opportunities of the 
"haves" to exact a price from the "have-nots." Some of the 
oldest examples are our usury legislation and analogous rules 
LEGAL POLICIES AND POLICY MAKING 477 
of common law and equity.4 Bentham and other ardent 
individualists fought hard against usury legislation as a con-
tradiction of the principle that each individual should be 
allowed to look after his own interests. But restraints on 
usury, and certain other forms of unfair exaction, persisted 
in spite of individualist attack; they represented an initial 
recognition of inequality of bargaining power among indi-
viduals, a realization of the truth of the New Testament 
statement: "Unto everyone that hath shall be given, and he 
shall have abundance; but from him that hath not shall be 
taken away even that which he hath." 5 These restraints 
express a social interest in protecting the weak and needy 
against the abuse of power by those who already possess a 
large distributive share of the world's goods. And legal 
prohibitions or regulations of monopoly are variations played 
on the same theme. The individual who gets a monopoly in 
the production of goods and services can exact an unreason-
able price for them. This means an undue advantage in the 
distribution of goods. It means that he obtains an excessive 
distributive share in the total product of the community in 
return for what he delivers to others. This kind of monopoly 
power is either prohibited or is closely regulated. Usually 
some type of administrative agency is created to fix the price 
which the monopolist can exact for his product or service. 
Moreover, the monopoly category with its corresponding 
social interests and restrictive governmental measures, is 
assuming an ever-greater place in our legal thinking today. 
Monopoly is largely a function of time and circumstances. 
The very fact that a producer can demand a price of some 
kind for his product or service represents some degree of 
power over buyers. Temporary conditions may result in a 
shortage of almost any commodity or service, so as to give 
4 E.g., legal restrictions on (or invalidity of) transfers of expectancies by 
presumptive heirs, and the equitable doctrine that the mortgage debtor cannot 
waive his equity of redemption. 
5 Matthew XXV: 29. 
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an unfair advantage to the producer. During the recent war 
this happened in regard to a variety of commodities, and 
particularly in regard to rental properties. The situation was 
made the basis for emergency price regulations. Indeed, 
notions of monopolistic enterprises, of "business affected with 
a public interest," and of inequality of bargaining power, have 
now been so broadly defined by our Supreme Court that 
Congress and our legislatures are enabled to classify almost 
any enterprise under these heads, and authorized to regulate 
its charges and activities accordingly, provided the enterprise 
seems to these legal policy makers in their wisdom to be 
making unfair exactions from the public. 
Third, government has sometimes used its various powers 
to guarantee to each individual the enjoyment of a minimum 
distributive share; not the absolutely equal share which is 
the professed aim of communism, but a fixed minimum below 
which the individual's "take" from the community income 
is not to be allowed to fall. Such a guarantee is seen in 
legislation which assures to A a minimum wage, an old age 
pension, employment insurance, workmen's compensation 
insurance, and health insurance. It is seen in the legislation 
which exempts his homestead and the tools of his trade from 
seizure or execution for debt. But on the whole, our legal 
systems have remained committed to the free enterprise 
system. Above a minimum they have not tried to guarantee 
to A an actual distributive share of any kind. Instead, they 
have guaranteed to A an equal opportunity to acquire a share 
by his acts. This opportunity is not a distributive share, 
because when B has acquired something it is no longer open 
to acquisition by A. And this opportunity is not a guarantee 
of a job, because when B takes a job, there may be none left 
for A; B's opportunity to work may exclude A's chance for 
a job. However, today the job holder is asserting, and to 
some extent, successfully, preferential and seniority rights 
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with regard to employment. So far as this is true, the job 
holder has something more than an equal, but empty, oppor-
tunity to seek a job; he has a guaranteed opportunity to work, 
superior to that of others. It is only a few steps further, 
along this route of a legally secure opportunity to work, to 
the recognition of a workman's "right to his job"-a right 
which the protagonists of labor have been vigorously pressing 
for legal recognition ever since the day of the "sit-down" 
strike.6 Whether such recognition will come, and whether it 
is desirable that it should, is not for us to decide; we are 
only interested in noting the trend of the times. 
Fourth, government has used its tax powers to cut down 
the distributive share of A, who has acquired a substantial 
portion of the community's goods or income. If, then, govern-
ment pays over the proceeds of the levies, directly or in-
directly, to B, who has a small share or none at all, this 
obviously ·operates to reduce the difference between A's and 
B's financial positions. For example, our governments in this 
country have imposed income taxes, graduated to rest more 
heavily on large incomes; they have exacted estate and in-
heritance taxes, similarly graduated, from decedent's estates; 
and they have collected special dues from presumably opulent 
employers of labor. When government later pays out old age 
pensions from the proceeds of these impositions, taxes and 
dues, or when it compensates a workman for losses due to 
unemployment or injury, government is, in effect, cutting 
down one set of incomes and enhancing another set. Govern-
ment is, in effect, charging the free enterprise system with 
the burden of collecting and paying a minimum share of the 
community's product to persons who would otherwise receive 
small, or negligible, distributive shares. 
Finally, there are the enterprises undertaken by govern-
ment which were discussed in the next preceding section 
6 See "Legal Status of the Sit-Down Strike-Legal and Equitable Remedies," 
35 MICH. L. REV. IJJO (1937). 
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(sec. 7-19). I refer to roads, highways, parks, playgrounds, 
parking lots, water works, sewer systems, housing, hospitals, 
etc. These enterprises produce services at public expense. 
Sometimes, such enterprises furnish goods or services, i.e., 
distribute them, to all equally, gratis or at a nominal charge. 
Sometimes they furnish goods and services gratis to those 
who cannot pay, e.g., medicines and medical and hospital 
services for the indigent; and furnish the same goods and 
services at a substantial charge to those who can pay. And 
sometimes they furnish their products to the members of 
the public at a charge sufficient to sustain the whole burden 
of financing, as in the case of many modern building projects, 
parking lot projects, etc., commonly referred to as "self-
liquidating." 
Sec. 7-2I. Problems. r. Hinman v. Pacific Air Trans-
port.1 
Haney, Circuit Judge. 
"From decrees sustaining motions to dismiss filed by 
defendants in two suits, appellants appeal and bring for 
review by this court the rights of a landowner in connection 
with the flight of aircraft above his land. . . . 
"Appellants allege, in the bills under consideration, facts 
showing diversity of citizenship and that the amount in con-
troversy exceeds $3,000 exclusive of interest and costs; that 
they are the owners and in possession of 72 0 acres of real 
property in the city of Burbank, Los Angeles county, Cal., 
'together with a stratum of airspace superjacent to and over-
lying said tract ... and extending upwards ... to such 
an altitude as plaintiffs . . . may reasonably expect now or 
hereafter to utilize, use or occupy said airspace. Without 
limiting said altitude or defining the upward extent of said 
stratum of airspace or of plaintiff's ownership, utilization and 
possession thereof, plaintiffs allege that they ... may rea-
sonably expect now and hereafter to utilize, use and occupy 
said airspace and each and every portion thereof to an altitude 
1 (U. s., 9th Cir., I 936) 84 F.zd 7 55 at 7 56 et seq. 
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of not less than I 50 feet above the surface of the land. 
The reasonable value of the property is alleged to be in 
excess of $3oo,ooo. 
"It is then alleged that defendants are engaged in the 
business of operating a commercial air line, and that at all 
times 'after the month of May, 1929, defendants daily, 
repeatedly and upon numerous occasions have disturbed, 
invaded and trespassed upon the ownership and possession 
of plaintiffs' tract'; that at said times defendants have 
operated aircraft in, across, and through said airspace at alti-
tudes less than roo feet above the surface; that plaintiffs 
notified defendants to desist from trespassing on said air-
space; and that defendants have disregarded said notice, 
unlawfully and against the will of plaintiffs, and continue 
and threaten to continue such trespasses. . . . 
"The prayer asks an injunction restraining the operation 
of the aircraft through the airspace over plaintiff's property 
and for $9o,ooo damages in each of the cases. 
"Appellees contend that it is settled law in California that 
the owner of land has no property rights in superjacent 
airspace, either by code enactments or by judicial decrees and 
that the ad coelum doctrine does not apply in California.2 
We have examined the statutes of California, particularly 
California Civil Code, § 659 and § 829, as well as Grandona 
v. Lovdal, 78 Cal. 6II, 21 P. 366, 12 Am. St. Rep. 121; 
Wood v. Moulton, 146 Cal. 317, 80 P. 92; and Kafka v. 
Bozio, 191 Cal. 746, 218 P. 753, 29 A. L. R. 833, but we 
find nothing therein to negative the ad coelum formula. 
Furthermore, if we should adopt this formula as being the 
law, there might be serious doubt as to whether a state statute 
could change it without running counter to the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. If we 
could accept and literally construe the ad coelum doctrine, it 
would simplify the solution of this case; however, we reject 
that doctrine. We think it is not the law, and that it never 
was the law. 
"This formula 'from the center of the earth to the sky' 
was invented at some rerriote time in the past when the use 
2 Editor's note: The court here refers to the old maxim, "Cujus est solum 
ejus est usque ad coelum," which meant literally that the owner of land owned 
the airspace above it to an indefinite height (to the heavens). 
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of space above land actual or conceivable was confined to 
narrow limits, and simply meant that the owner of the land 
could use the overlying space to such an extent as he was 
able, and that no one could ever interfere with that use. 
"This formula was never taken literally, but was a figur-
ative phrase to express the full and complete ownership of 
land and the right to whatever superjacent airspace was nec-
essary or convenient to the enjoyment of the land. 
"In applying a rule of law, or construing a statute or 
constitutional provision, we cannot shut our eyes to common 
knowledge, the progress of civilization, or the experience of 
mankind. A literal construction of this formula will bring 
about an absurdity. The sky has no definite location. It is 
that which presents itself to the eye when looking upward; 
as we approach it, it recedes. There can be no ownership of 
infinity, nor can equity prevent a supposed violation of an 
abstract conception. 
"The appellants' case, then, rests upon the assumption that 
as owners of the soil they have an absolute and present title 
to all the airspace above the earth's surface, owned by them, 
to such a height as is, or may become, useful to the enjoyment 
of their land. This height, the appellants assert in the bill, 
is of indefinite distance, but not less than r 50 feet. . . . 
"We believe, and hold, that appellants' premise is un-
sound. The question presented is applied to a new status and 
little aid can be found in actual precedent. The solution is 
found in the application of elementary legal principles. The 
first and foremost of these principles is that the very essence 
and origin of the legal right of property is dominion over it. 
Property must have been reclaimed from the general mass 
of the earth, and it must be capable by its nature of exclusive 
possession. Without possession, no right in it can be main-
tained. 
"The air, like the sea, is by its nature incapable of private 
ownership, except in so far as one may actually use it. This 
principle was announced long ago by Justinian. It is in fact 
the basis upon which practically all of our so-called water 
codes are based. 
"We own so much of the space above the ground as we can 
occupy or make use of, in connection with the enjoyment of 
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our land. This right is not fixed. It varies with our varying 
needs and is coextensive with them. The owner of land owns 
as much of the space above him as he uses, but only so long 
as he uses it. All that lies beyond belongs to the world. 
"When it is said that man owns, or may own, to the 
heavens, that merely means that no one can acquire a right 
to the space above him that will limit him in whatever use 
he can make of it as part of his enjoyment of the land. To 
this extent his title to the air is paramount. No other person 
can acquire any title or exclusive right to any space above him. 
"Any use of such air or space by others which is injurious 
to his land, or which constitutes an actual interference with 
his possession or his beneficial use thereof, would be a trespass 
for which he would have remedy. But any claim of the land-
owner beyond this cannot find a precedent in law, nor support 
in reason." 
How far does the court recognize the claims of Hinman, 
and another, to the airspace over their land? What social 
interest in this space does the court recognize? 3 
How does the court dispose of the old maxim according to 
which the possessor of land has "possession of the column of 
air situated above the surface to an indefinite height"? 
2. Crane v. Campbell, Sheriff.4 
Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
"The question presented for our determination is whether 
the Idaho statute, in so far as it undertakes to render criminal 
the mere possession of whiskey for personal use, conflicts with 
that portion of the Fourteenth Amendment which declares 
3 The scope of the social interest in the airspace over privately owned land 
has been variously conceived and defined in the case law and statutes. See Ball, 
"The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land," 6 UNIV. OF PA. L. REv. 631 
( 192.8); and RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs, Explanatory Notes, Tentative Draft 
No.7, 1931, p. 51. This matter is a subject for your further consideration in 
your courses in Torts and Rights in Land. For our present purpose, the only im-
portant points are ( 1) that a social interest is recognized where none would 
have even been suggested before 1900, and { 2.) that the individual land-
owner's interest is correspondingly limited. 
4 :145 U.S. 304 at 305 et seq. (1917). 
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'No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law .... ' 
"It must now be regarded as settled that, on account of 
their well-known noxious qualities and the extraordinary evils 
shown by experience commonly to be consequent to their use, 
a State has power absolutely to prohibit manufacture, gift, 
purchase, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within 
its borders without violating the guara,ntees of the Four-
teenth Amendment. . . . 
"As the State has the power above indicated to prohibit, 
it may adopt such measures as are reasonably appropriate or 
needful to render exercise of that power effective .... And, 
considering the notorious difficulties always attendant upon 
efforts to suppress traffic in liquors, we are unable to say that 
the challenged inhibition of their possession was arbitrary 
and unreasonable or without proper relation to the legitimate 
legislative purpose. 
"We further think it clearly follows from our numerous 
decisions upholding prohibition legislation that the right to 
hold intoxicating liquors for personal use is not one of those 
fundamental privileges of a citizen of the United States which 
no State may abridge. A contrary view would be incompatible 
with the undoubted power to prevent manufacture, gift, sale, 
purchase or transportation of such articles-the only feasible 
ways of getting them. An assured right of possession would 
necessarily imply some adequate method to obtain not subject 
to destruction at the will of the State. 
"The judgment of the court below must be 
u Affirmed." 
What individual interest did Crane assert here? 
What social interests lay behind this Idaho statute, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court? 
How did the Court square the recognition of these statu-
tory aims with the policies of the Fourteenth Amendment? 
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How did the Court connect the mere possession of liquor 
(like Crane's) with the production and distribution of this 
prohibited article? 
3· Adkins v. Children's H ospital.5 
Mr. Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court. 
"The question presented for determination by these 
appeals is the constitutionality of the Act of September I 9, 
I 9 I 8, providing for the fixing of minimum wages for women 
and children in the District of Columbia, 40 Stat. 960, 
c. I74· ... 
"The statute now under consideration is attacked upon the 
ground that it authorizes an unconstitutional interference 
with the freedom of contract included within the guaranties 
of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. That the 
right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty 
of the individual protected by this clause, is settled by the 
decisions of this Court and is no longer open to question. . . . 
(Citations including Adair v. United States, zoS U. S. 
I 6 I). . . . Within this liberty are contracts of employment 
of labor. In making such contracts, generally speaking, the 
parties have an equal right to obtain from each other the best 
terms they can as the result of private bargaining. 
"In Adair v. United States, supra, Mr. Justice Harlan 
(pp. 174, 175), speaking for the Court, said: 
"'The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms 
as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right 
of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon 
which he will accept such labor from the person offering to 
sell. . . . In all such particulars, the employer and em-
ployed have equality of right, and any legislation that dis-
turbs that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty 
of contract which no government can legally justify in a free 
land .... ' 
"There is, of course, no such thing as absolute freedom 
of contract. It is subject to a great variety of restraints. But 
freedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general rule and 
restraint the exception; and the exercise of legislative author-
11 261 U.S. 525 at 539 et seq. (1923). 
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ity to abridge it can be justified only by the existence of 
exceptional circumstances. Whether these circumstances exist 
in the present case constitutes the question to be answered. 
" 
The Court (three justices dissenting and one justice not 
sitting) decided this question in the negative and held the 
statute unconstitutional. 
What is the policy ascribed by the Court to the framers 
of the Fifth Amendment? What becomes of the social interest 
which the Congress of the United States recognized and 
attempted to protect? 
However, in West Coast H a tel Co. v. Parrish/ the Adkins 
Case was overruled and minimum wage legislation was held 
to be valid (four justices dissenting). 
"Mr. Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
"This case presents the question of the constitutional 
validity of the minimum wage law of the State of Wash-
ington .... 
"The appellant conducts a hotel. The appellee Elsie 
Parrish was employed as a chambermaid and (with her 
husband) brought this suit to recover the difference between 
the wages paid her and the minimum wage fixed pursuant 
to the state law. The minimum wage was $14.50 per week 
of 48 hours. The appellant challenged the act as repugnant 
to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court 
of the State, reversing the trial court, sustained the statute 
and directed judgment for the plaintiffs. Parrish v. West 
Coast Hotel Co., r85 Wash. 581; 55 P. (2d) ro83. The 
case is here on appeal. 
"The appellant relies upon the decision of this Court in 
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 26r U. S. 525, which held 
invalid the District of Columbia Minimum Wage Act, which 
was attacked under the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment .... 
"The point that has been strongly stressed that adult 
employees should be deemed competent to make their own 
6 300 U. 8. 379 (1937). 
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contracts was decisively met nearly forty years ago in Holden 
v. Hardy, supra/ where we pointed out the inequality in the 
footing of the parties. We said (!d., 397): 
" 'The legislature has also recognized the fact, which the 
experience of legislators in many States has corroborated, that 
the proprietors of these establishments and their operatives 
do not stand upon an equality, and that their interests are, to 
a certain extent, conflicting. The former naturally desire to 
obtain as much labor as possible from their employees, while 
the latter are often induced by the fear of discharge to con-
form to regulations which their judgment, fairly exercised, 
would pronounce to be detrimental to their health or 
strength. In other words, the proprietors lay down the rules 
and the laborers are practically constrained to obey them. 
In such cases, self interest is often an unsafe guide, and the 
legislature may properly interpose its authority.' 
"And we added that the fact 'that both parties are of full 
age and competent to contract does not necessarily deprive 
the State of the power to interfere where the parties do not 
stand upon an equality, or where the public health demands 
that one party to the contract shall be protected against him-
self.' 'The State still retains an interest in his welfare, how-
ever reckless he may be. The whole is no greater than the 
sum of all the parts, and when the individual health, safety 
and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the State must 
suffer.' . . . 
"We think that the views thus expressed are sound and 
that the decision in the Adkins Case was a departure from 
the true application of the principles governing the regulation 
by the State of the relation of employer and employed. . . . 
"There is an additional and compelling consideration 
which recent economic experience has brought into a strong 
light. The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an 
unequal position with respect to bargaining power and are 
thus relatively defenseless against the denial of a living wage 
is not only detrimental to their health and well being but 
casts a direct burden for their support upon the community. 
What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called 
upon to pay. The bare cost of living must be met. We may 
7 Editor'snote: 169 U.S. 366 (1898). 
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take judicial notice of the unparalleled demands for relief 
which arose during the recent period of depression and still 
continue to an alarming extent despite the degree of economic 
recovery which has been achieved. It is unnecessary to cite 
official statistics to establish what is of common knowledge 
through the length and breadth of the land. While in the 
instant case no factual brief has been presented, there is no 
reason to doubt that the State of Washington has encountered 
the same social problem that is present elsewhere. The com-
munity is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy 
for unconscionable employers. The community may direct its 
lawmaking power to correct the abuse which springs from 
their selfish disregard of the public interest. . . . 
"Our conclusion is that the case of Adkins v. Children's 
Hospital, supra, should be, and it is, overruled. The judg-
ment of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington is 
cc Affirmed." 
This decision gave judicial sanction to the legislative 
recognition of a social interest in minimum wages. How 
would you characterize this interest? How is it to be recon-
ciled with the policy of free contract expressed in the Four-
teenth Amendment? 
Sec. 7-22. Social interests in human stock. With Alex-
ander Pope, the policy maker can say that the proper study 
of mankind is man. Almost everything that has been said 
from the beginning of our story has told how the policy 
maker concerns himself with ways of controlling and pro-
tecting an existing generation of men. But the policy maker 
may also be confronted by basic population problems. He 
may consider the future of the human stock. He may face 
problems which relate to the quantity and quality of tomor-
row's population; he may take measures to control the 
number and kind of individuals who will make up the 
community. 
As regards quantity, the dangers of overpopulation have 
been most often suggested by theoretical writers. For ex-
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ample, Malthus and others have stressed the tendency of 
population to outgrow the available food supply. Practical 
policy makers have occasionally made overpopulation an 
excuse for an aggressive foreign policy in which additional 
Lebensraum was sought. For the most part, however, prac-
tical policy makers have worried rather about the possibility 
that the human stock, or the particular branch of it to which 
they happened to belong, would die out. Occasionally in 
world history, some policy maker, like Hitler or Mussolini, 
has sung both songs at the same time, without any real regard 
for consistency. He has demanded more room and encouraged 
the production of more cannon fodder at the same time. In 
this country, government has, on the whole, pursued a policy 
of laissez faire in this area as in many others. While this 
policy can hardly be identified with a definite purpose to 
foster an increase in population, the net effect of laissez faire 
has been just that. The population of our country has 
increased, through births and immigration, many fold in the 
one hundred and seventy years of its independent existence. 
Most of us take pride in our rising population figures, na-
tional and local. Certainly, there is no indication yet of a 
serious legislative purpose to check or limit the number of 
persons who are to inhabit our country; and so far, there has 
not been any occasion for legislators to consider offering 
positive incentives for a population increase. 
As regards the quality of our population, more concern 
has been manifested in recent decades and has found expres-
sion in governmental measures. Eugenists have been telling 
us for several decades that the human stock is rapidly 
degenerating in quality. They ascribe the degenerative trend 
to reverse selection in the processes of human reproduction. 
They declare that this reverse selection is due to wars which 
kill off the better, stronger men and thereby leave the next 
generation to be fathered by the less fit members who are 
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not taken for military service; that it is due to reckless 
procreation by unfit persons, such as the feeble-minded, as 
compared with restraint and birth control exercised by the 
better stock, thereby increasing the proportion of the unfit 
in each succeeding generation; and that it is due to our 
general humanitarian measures, such as hospital and mater-
nity care, sanitation, etc., which keep the unfit and weak alive 
so they can reproduce their kind, instead of allowing them 
to be eliminated by the operation of disease, starvation, and 
other natural causes. Not all scientists agree that this picture 
of degeneration is an established fact; 1 but many of our 
legislatures have accepted the statements of eugenists as 
correct and have made them the basis for laws to provide 
for the sterilization of unfit persons. The immediate purpose 
of this legislation is to check the downward trend of the 
human stock by preventing the further procreation of its 
inferior members. A secondary purpose is to reduce the bur-
den of weak and unfit persons which future generations will 
have to care for and support.2 
Query: The same persons who support the sterilization 
program also aid in the establishment of birth control clinics 
in many of our cities, to furnish contraceptive information and 
devices to the poor. Why? These same persons are also 
opposed to legislation prohibiting the dissemination of contra-
ceptive information and devices; they claim that such legis-
1 And some religious groups are strongly opposed to the eugenic program 
of sterilization as well as birth control clinics to aid in cutting down the birth 
rate among the poorer classes. Such measures are held to be contrary to divine 
law. See ENCYCLICAL OF PoPE Pms XI, "On Christian Marriage," Dec., 1930 
(Paulist Press). 
2 Of late years also, more and more concern has been expressed about the 
increasing proportion of the aged in our population. This increase is ascribable 
chiefly to improvement in living conditions and to advances in medicine. The 
net effect of the increase in the percentage of elderly people will obviously 
be felt in the pension burden of the future, and probably in other ways which 
affect the taxpayers. However, thus far no policy makers have shown any 
indication of a desire to cut down the length of life, though perhaps some 
policy makers, in granting old age pensions, have been troubled by the prospect 
of an ever-growing burden. 
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lation operates as an adverse qualitative measure. Why do 
they say that this is its effect? In form, such legislation is 
merely a prohibition of individual checks on the quantity 
of population. 
Sec. 7-23. Social interests in transm-zttmg knowledge. 
Man's creative efforts as regards his environment do not stop 
with his immediate physical surroundings. Man develops a 
social environment as well. 
"On top of the natural physical environment such as the 
ape-man and his kind had to deal with, our bigger brains 
have built an artificial environment made up of ideas, tools, 
customs, institutions, skills, techniques of all kinds, man-made 
and absolutely essential to our well-being. This is the social 
heritage, or culture." 1 
This artificial or man-made environment is transmitted from 
one generation to another. Each new generation is indoctri-
nated with the learning of the past. Thus, each new genera-
tion of men is enabled to begin with the fruits of the 
experience of its predecessors and not start with a clean sheet. 
It is possible to leave the transmission of the cultural 
heritage wholly to the efforts of individuals. Much of the 
work of transmitting does occur in this way; parents instruct 
children, age instructs youth, and friend instructs friend. But 
this method can be modified and formalized by the organiza-
tion of schools. The earliest schools in Anglo-American 
history were church schools or private schools. However, 
the fathers of our country cherished, and undertook to 
realize, an ideal of public education.2 The states early as-
1 CoOLEY, ANGELL and CARR, INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY 6 ( 19 3 3). 
2 Interestingly enough, the fathers of our country adopted an exactly op-
posite policy as regards religion, and embodied that policy in our constitutions. 
They explicitly forbade the establishment of a state religion by the First Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution and by many of the state constitutions. This 
prohibition was the outcome of unfortunate experiences with established 
religions, both in Europe and in the American colonies. Religion was to be 
left to the free choice of the individual, or to groups voluntarily formed. 
Government was not to exercise any preference among religions, or to con-
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sumed the task of bringing the knowledge which had been 
accumulated in past ages to our entire population. We who 
are committed to the tenets of democracy can hardly doubt 
the soundness of what Lowell once said: "But it was in mak-
ing education not only common to all, but in some sense 
compulsory on all, that the destiny of the free republics of 
America was practically settled." 8 
The educational function is, of course, primarily concerned 
with the maintenance of schools for children. However, today 
we also find public agencies furnishing education to adults, 
sponsoring musical and artistic programs, furnishing instruc-
tion in farming methods, and providing informational radio 
broadcasts of many types. In some parts of the country, public 
or semi-public agencies also provide artistic and physical 
training, and furnish information regarding health and care 
of children. Indeed, I believe we can see in present trends a 
greater public interest in positive moral training. For ex-
ample, a systematic sex education is now being given in some 
of our public schools, and ideas of fairness, sportsmanship, 
and proper social behavior are being stressed there in more 
definite form than they have ever been before. 
Query: Why does the state undertake the task of educa-
tion? Why not leave education of each individual to his own 
initiative or to that of his family? Why not leave education 
to the initiative of persons who start private schools? Why 
not leave education to such agencies as the church? 
Sec. 7-2 4· Social interests in growth of knowledge-free-
dom of opinion and expression. The state may take account 
of the need to develop new ideas as well as the need to 
tribute to their support. Jefferson and Madison were among the early protag-
onists of these views, and were largely responsible for their general adoption. 
For an interesting discussion of this whole problem as it stands today, see 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947). 
3 AMONG MY BooKs, "New England Two Centuries Ago" Z37 (1877). 
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disseminate the knowledge which has been handed down 
from the past. Our American governments have always put 
great stress on the need for progress in knowledge.1 They 
have adopted progress as a major objective to be pursued, 
and have recognized freedom of thought and expression as 
the primary means of achieving it. 
New ideas originate with individuals, hence opportunity 
must be allowed to individuals to invent them. As Mill says, 
the function of liberty is to encourage "different experiments 
of living," which is another way of saying that individual 
liberty is the means of developing new ideas. As a state policy 
we find this objective of developing further knowledge 
expressed in constitutional provisions which guarantee free-
dom of the mind in the form of free thought and free 
opinion.2 We find it expressed in the clause of the Federal 
Constitution which empowers Congress "to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries." 3 The one type of 
clause shows government guaranteeing freedom to think out 
new ideas; the other shows it offering positive encouragement 
for the use of this freedom along socially useful lines. 
But new ideas have to be tested. Free discussion is recog-
nized by our governments as the principal method of testing. 
It is recognized as the sieve through which new ideas must 
pass in order to become accepted. Accordingly, freedom of 
discussion is to be encouraged. As a state policy we find this 
1 Among social interests may be counted progress in various other respects, 
especially progress in regard to the material conditions of life. Several such 
social interests have already been mentioned, though the name "progress" has 
not heretofore been used. Thus, better peace and order in the community, 
greater security for acquisitions, enhanced security of transactions, better 
utilization of natural resources, more adequate production of needed goods, are 
all forms of progressive development. 
2 The First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and 
similar provisions of state constitutions. 
3 Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 8. 
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objective expressed in constitutional clauses which guarantee 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of 
assembly. Our governments pursue a definite policy of lais-
sez faire in this regard. Justice Holmes has expressed this 
policy in a passage which is one of the finest in our legal 
literature: 
"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me 
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or 
your power and want a certain result with all your heart you 
naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all 
opposition. . . . But when men have realized that time has 
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even 
more than they believe the very foundations of their own 
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by 
free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the 
, theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is 
an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wage 
our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect 
knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system, I 
think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts 
to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe 
to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten 
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes 
of the law that an immediate check is required to save the 
country. . . ." 4 
This policy of free trade in ideas is still maintained by our 
governments, especially by the federal government. Al-
though the policy of laissez faire has suffered serious inroads 
in the sphere of economic activity (business, property and 
contracts), the collectivist trend has not been effective to cut 
markedly into the sphere of freedom of opinion and freedom 
of expression. One finds these freedoms as rigorously upheld 
4 Dissenting opinion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 at 630 
(1919). 
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in the recent decisions of the Supreme Court as they ever 
were in the early days of our history. 
Sec. 7-25. Inventory as check list. The items mentioned 
in the last section complete our inventory of social interests. 
Before I leave the subject of social interests, however, I want 
to say a few words about the utility of such an inventory. 
The inventory is primarily useful to the policy maker. It 
consists of actual objectives pursued, adopted, or professed 
by policy makers of the past. It serves the policy maker of 
today as a list of possible objectives to consider. Like the 
list of purchases that I intend to make on a trip to town, an 
inventory of social interests serves the policy maker as a check 
list. With such a list in hand, the policy maker is insured 
against the possibility of overlooking or forgetting any item. 
Two special dangers of overlooking social interests accen-
tuate the need for a check list such as this inventory. The 
first danger inheres in the one-sided emphasis on the claims 
of the individual which has characterized our legal tradition 
from the beginning down to the present time. This emphasis 
invites a neglect of social interests which can result in some 
rather radical miscarriages of justice. You will remember, for 
example, the Ross case, where individuals were allowed to 
defend their liberty, even to the point of killing a peace offi-
cer who was attempting to arrest them without proper author-
ity.1 It is possible that not even a check list of social interests 
would have changed the results in that case, decided under 
the influence of frontier conditions. Nevertheless, an explicit 
notice of countervailing social interests would at least have 
prevented an inadvertent conclusion like that c;>f this case.2 
1 See sec. 7-11, problem 2. 
2 This is the purport of a frequently quoted critical comment by Holmes, 
relative to the individualist slant of our judges at the end of the last century: 
"I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize their 
duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable, 
and the result of the often proclaimed judicial aversion to deal with such 
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The second danger inheres in the fact that social interests 
have to be asserted by officials acting as the representatives 
of the general good. Individual interests are asserted ordi-
narily by persons motivated by their own selfish wants; 3 
officials only enter the picture in the sense that they grant 
or withhold recognition to what the individual claims. But 
as regards social interests, officials not only grant recognition, 
but executive officials, e.g., prosecutors, are charged with the 
burden of asserting these interests as well. Their motives for 
asserting them are not so strong on the whole as the motives 
of individuals for asserting their own interests. If these social 
interests are not clearly stated or announced, it is easier for 
the public official to neglect or lose sight of them. 
The inventory also provides a check list for the scholar 
and the student who try to understand, to predict, or to criti-
cise the operation of the legal system. The social interests 
enumerated are basic objectives for all the legal processes; 
for the process of creating law, the process of applying or 
interpreting it, the process of repealing or changing it. If you, 
as students, attempt to explain or predict a particular statu-
tory enactment, a particular judicial decision, or a particular 
type of official action, you will do so predominantly in terms 
of social welfare. If you approve a particular provision of 
statute, a particular judicial decision, or a particular type 
of individual or official action, your basic reason for approval 
will be that the provision, decision, or action harmonizes 
with one or more of the listed social interests or conduces to 
the achievement of one or more of such interests. If you 
disapprove a particular provision of statute, a particular deci-
sion, or a particular type of individual or official action, your 
basic reason for disapproval will be that the provision, deci-
considerations is simply to leave the very ground and foundation of judgments 
inarticulate, and often unconscious, as I have said." Holmes, "The Path of the 
Law," 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 at 467 (1897). 
3 Trustees, guardians, executors and administrators, however, assert claims 
on behalf of others. 
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sion, or action runs counter to one or more of the listed 
interests, or that it fails to take account of all the legal ends 
that ought to be considered in the situation where the pro-
vision, decision, or action operates. In other words, this inven-
tory gives you a set of basic factors to use in explaining and 
predicting all types of activities which fall within the frame-
work of the legal system, and a set of recognized criteria 
for judging the soundness of these activities.4 
Sec. 7-26. Conflicting policies--necessity of choice. But 
policies conflict with one another; they overlap and cut across 
one another. The policy maker must choose between them. 
He cannot give effect to an~ of them without limit. The 
pursuit of each and every one of the policy objectives in our 
inventory has to be qualified by the pursuit of other cross-
cutting objectives. Even a man's right to life, or the com-
munity's interest in having his life continue, cannot be treated 
as absolute; the policy maker ordinarily calls upon the indi-
vidual to risk his life in defense of the state, and often 
provides for the forfeiture of the individual's life as a punish-
ment for crime. Similarly, the objective of maintaining the 
security of acquisitions may have to be qualified by the fiscal 
needs of the state. The owner of property will not be allowed 
to hold it without obligations. The man who has a large 
income may have the lion's share of it taken away under 
4 It is well to remember that different authors make different inventories of 
state policies and social interests. They classify objectives in various ways, and 
emphasize different aspects of the general welfare. I mention this point because 
I do not want to suggest that my inventory is anything more than a convenient 
one, one of many possibilities. I certainly do not regard this inventory as 
necessary, final, or complete. Compare, for example, Pound's inventory to be 
found in his Outline of Jurisprudence (sth ed.) 96 et seq. ( 1943). 
Furthermore, variant names are used by different writers for what I have 
called "policies" and "interests." Judges often refer to them as "rights" and 
"public policies." Pound sometimes calls them "legal ends." More often, he 
refers to them as "social interests." The name which is chosen is not too im-
portant. It is important, however, to realize that substantially the same thing 
may be meant by different names. If this fact is not appreciated one may fail 
to recognize the rose when someone chances to call it by another name. 
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present legislation in the form of income taxation. The con-
firmed bachelor may be charged a heavy school tax to educate 
the children of others. The security of acquisitions is qualified 
by other public needs such as the need to support the state 
itself and all its varied undertakings. 
So a mere inventory of policies is not enough. It will not 
resolve these conflicts. Even when he has an inventory before 
him, the policy maker must choose between conflicting and 
cross cutting interests. He still has the problem of weighing 
one interest against another, and deciding which is to be 
preferred where both cannot receive recognition. Can we 
offer the policy maker any guidance in making his choice? 
Do we give him any landmarks to go by in steering between 
conflicting social interests? 
We can offer the policy maker a general picture of what 
he is trying to do. We can remind him that his over-all objec-
tive is to serve the welfare of the community; or, in line 
with the old tradition, to secure the claims of the individual. 
Or, we can give him a general picture in somewhat more 
detail, such as the following by Pound: 
"For the purpose of understanding the law of today I 
am content with a picture of satisfying as much of the whole 
body of human wants as we may with the least sacrifice. I 
am content to think of law as a social institution to satisfy 
social wants-the claims and demands involved in the exist-
ence of civilized society-by giving effect to as much as we 
may with the least sacrifice, so far as such wants may be 
satisfied or such claims given effect by an ordering of human 
conduct through politically organized society. For present 
purposes, I am content to see in legal history the record of 
a continually wider recognizing and satisfying of human 
wants or claims or desires through social control; a more 
embracing and more effective securing of social interests; a 
continually more complete and effective elimination of waste 
and precluding of friction in human enjoyment of the goods 
LEGAL POLICIES AND POLICY MAKING 499 
of existence-in short, a continually more efficacious social 
engineering." 1 
Here, Pound views the law "as a social institution to 
satisfy social wants." This is its grand objective. It is intended 
to further the general welfare by recognizing and satisfying 
as far as possible "the whole body of human wants." The 
task of legal regulation is one of "a continually more effica-
cious social engineering." While these ways of defining the 
policy maker's problem are as good as any I have seen, they 
are chiefly valuable for the purpose of perspective. They 
define a point of view for the policy maker. They do not 
furnish him any easy criterion for resolving conflicts between 
social interests. He is merely admonished to bear in mind 
social wants and to try to satisfy as many of them as he can. 
Such suggestions to the policy maker are about on a par 
with the common admonition to an individual, "Be good." 
Nevertheless, they do define a social approach for the policy 
maker. In this sense they have significance in guiding his 
determinations. 
Beyond such general pictures, one is not able to offer the 
policy maker much guidance in making his choice. Particular 
policy makers may be helped and controlled by rules and 
presumptions of various sorts, as we shall find in the next 
subtopic. But on the whole, the guidance which previous 
policy makers and theoretical writers can offer is not great. 
The reason is not far to seek. Social interests and individual 
interests are not quantitative ideas which can be measured 
in terms of size or heaviness. They cannot be reduced to 
units, laid on two sides of a scale, and weighed. The weighing 
of interests is rather a metaphor than a description of an 
actual process. Competing interests are incommensurable, and 
yet the policy maker must choose which interest to secure 
1 INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 98 (19~z). 
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and how far to secure it. The weighing of interests reminds 
of Bentham's hedonistic calculus of happiness factors. In fact, 
Bentham's formula of justice, the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number, is not very different from Pound's general 
picture "of satisfying as much of the whole body of human 
wants as we may with the least sacrifice." Both schemes 
involve essentially the same problems of trying to measure 
the immeasurable. In the last analysis, much is left to the 
policy makers' unguided judgment and his unconscious reac-
tions; the policy makers' choice is affected more by personal 
and social factors than by instructions regarding the method 
of choice. 
Sec. 7-2 7. Problems. r. Consider the relation to the growth 
of knowledge of such governmental projects as the recently 
developed research in atomic physics, the government sup-
ported program of research in medicine ~nd general science, 
and the long-established research of the Department of Agri-
culture. Are these governmental measures consistent with 
the policy described in section 7-24? On what basis can such 
measures be justified? 
2. What is the significance of the extensive research pro-
grams carried on by large industrial enterprises, such as 
General Motors, General Electric, and United States Rubber, 
which engage large numbers of experts as employees to work 
out problems of improving their respective products? How 
is this method of producing new ideas related to the policies 
described in section 7-24? 
3· Brown: 
"As the student has doubtless long since discovered it is 
frequently impossible for the law to mete out exact justice. 
Often contending parties each present claims which in them-
selves are worthy of recognition and protection, but which 
unfortunately so conflict that both cannot be satisfied. In such 
a situation the law has no other alternative than to make a 
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choice, recognizing that in so doing one of the parties must 
be made to suffer in spite of his freedom from any fault. 
Such an occasion is presented when one who has no title to 
a specific chattel, and no right to sell it, nevertheless does 
so sell it to another who in good faith pays full value therefor 
to the wrongful vendor. Either the rightful owner must lose 
the goods, which are retained by the bona fide purchaser, 
or the bona fide purchaser must surrender the goods to the 
rightful owner and lose the price which he has paid to the 
wrongful seller. The recognition of the original owner's 
claim as against that of the innocent purchaser is moreover 
injurious to the interests which society has in fostering trade 
and commerce. Business will suffer if purchasers cannot be 
assured of the title to the goods which they buy. In this 
dilemma the common law, as well as the civil law, has chosen 
to prefer the claims of the rightful owner, though as will be 
seen considerable of a compromise has been made. . . .1 
"The most notable exception to the rule that no title to 
property can be passed by one who is himself without title, 
is in the case of money and of negotiable commercial paper 
such as promissory notes, bills of exchange and bank checks. 
It is obvious that this exception is due to the exigencies of 
trade and commerce which demand that the media in which 
payment is made shall circulate freely from hand to hand 
without placing upon the recipient the burden of determining 
the state of the title of him who offers the money or com-
mercial paper in payment, usually an impossible task .... 
"This principle fully established in the common law is . 
now codified in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act in 
force in every state of the United States." 2 
How far does Brown work out the solution here in terms 
of individual interests? How far in terms of social interests? 
Specifically, what are the conflicting social interests here? 
Which interest is preferred and why? 
1 As a matter of fact, Brown is in error in his statement of the civil law. 
French law, as well as the law of Germany and other continental countries, 
has adopted the proposition that possession is the equivalent of title (possession 
vaut titre), and accordingly any possessor can confer legal title on a bona fide 
purchaser for value; only the thief and the finder are unable to give the 
purchaser a good title. 
2 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY, sees. 67, 69 (1936). 
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4· Suppose the legislature of state X is considering the 
enactment of a compulsory vaccination law, and realizes that 
a large group of persons in the community adheres to the 
Christian Science faith and is opposed to vaccination. Which 
of the governmental policies mentioned in our inventory are 
involved? Which would probably be preferred in this situa-
tion? Why? 
5. In Gitlow v. New Y ork,S the Supreme Court of the 
United States upheld a New York statute punishing those 
who advocate, advise, or teach the duty, necessity or propriety 
of overthrowing or overturning organized government by 
force, violence or any unlawful means, or who print, publish, 
or knowingly circulate any book, paper, etc., advocating, ad-
vising or teaching the doctrine that organized government 
should be so overthrown. The majority opinion declared that 
this statute did not penalize the utterance or publication of 
abstract doctrine or academic discussion having no quality of 
incitement to any concrete act, but denounced the advocacy 
of action for accomplishing the overthrow of organized gov-
ernment by unlawful means. And the majority opinion held 
the statute to be constitutionally applied in prosecuting de-
fendants for printing and publishing a "MANIFESTo" advo-
cating and urging mass action which should progressively 
foment industrial disturbances and, through political mass 
strikes and revolutionary mass action, overthrow and destroy 
organized parliamentary government; even though the ad-
vocacy was in general terms and not addressed to particular 
immediate acts or to particular persons. 
Mr. Justice Holmes dissented; he said: 
"Mr. Justice Brandeis and I are of opinion that this judg-
ment should be reversed. . . . I think that the criterion 
sanctioned by the full Court in Schenck v. United States, 
3 268 U. S. 625 (1925). See accord, Dennis v. United States, 71 S. Ct. 
857 (195J). 
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249 U. S. 47, 52, applies. 'The question in every case is 
whether the words are used in such circumstances and are 
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that 
they will bring about the substantive evils that [the State] 
has a right to prevent.' ... If what I think the correct test is 
applied, it is manifest that there was no present danger of 
an attempt to overthrow the government by force on the 
part of the admittedly small minority who shared the defend-
ant's views. It is said that this manifesto was more than a 
theory, that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. 
It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless 
some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy 
stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between 
the expression of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower 
sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence 
may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of the 
redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a 
present conflagration. If in the long run the beliefs expressed 
in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the 
dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free 
speech is that they should be given their chance and have 
their way." 4 
What are the conflicting objectives herd Where does the 
majority opinion draw the line between them? 
Where would Holmes and Brandeis draw the line between 
these conflicting policies? What do you think of Holmes' 
suggestion about allowing a proletarian dictatorship to have 
its way? What has been the policy as regards change and 
progress of the dictatorships which we have known in recent 
years? Should their known policy on this point have any 
bearing on the question whether a dictatorship should be 
allowed to have its way? 5 
4 /bid. 672-673. 
5 "Democracy ought to instruct its citizens in its own values instead of 
feebly waiting until its system is wrecked by private armies from within. 
Tolerance does not mean tolerating the intolerant." MANNHEIM, MAN AND 
SOCIETY IN AN AGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 3 53 (I 940). 
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PoLICIES REGARDING ORGANIZED GROUPs 
Sec. 7-28. The state and other social institutions. One 
finds in human society a multitude of organizations which 
formulate standards of behavior and exercise control over 
behavior. The state, the school, the church, the club, the 
labor union, the professional association, the stock exchange, 
and organized baseball, are examples. These agencies are 
called social institutions. 
Of the role and nature of social institutions Park and 
Burgess say: 
"Every society and every social group, capable of consistent 
action, may be regarded as an organization of the wishes of its 
members. This means that society rests on, and embodies, 
the appetites and natural desires of the individual man; but 
it implies also, that wishes, in becoming organized, are neces-
sarily disciplined and controlled in the interest of the group 
as a whole. 
"Every such society or social group, even the most ephem-
eral, will ordinarily have (a) some relatively formal method 
of defining its aim and formulating its policies, making them 
explicit, and (b) some machinery, functionary, or other ar-
rangement for realizing its aim and carrying its policies into 
effect. Even in the family there is government, and this 
involves something that corresponds to legislation, adjudica-
tion, and administration." 1 
Each of these institutions exists in a world of men where 
other institutions exist. All are organizations, more or less 
complete, of one subject matter, to wit, the members of the 
human race. The state is more prominent and fully devel-
oped than any of the other organizations. It embraces an 
entire community. Most of the other groups are merely 
partial organizations of a community of which the state is 
the all-inclusive organization. It is inevitable that the state 
and these other control institutions should interact and com-
1 INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY 4 s-s 6 (I g J o). 
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pete with one another in various ways. The coexistence and 
activities of other control institutions within the community 
pose policy problems for the state. The state and its officials 
orient themselves in defined ways toward the activities of 
other groups organized within the community. Moreover, 
the state itself is an organization of men. The maintenance 
of this organization and the definition of its functions present 
policy problems for the state and its officials; the latter adopt 
definite policies regarding the continued existence and the 
functions of the state. And finally, the state and its officials 
must face policy problems regarding its relations to other 
states, i. e., politically organized communities. These policies 
regarding organized groups, within and without the com-
munity, are to be the matter for our attention in the present 
subtopic. They will be taken up in three subsequent sections, 
entitled as follows: 
Policies regarding subordinate groups (sec. 7-30). 
Policies regarding the state's own organization and func-
tions (sec. 7-3 I). 
Policies regarding other states (sec. 7-3 2). 
Sec. 7-29. (Optional.) Features and functions of social 
institutions. You will appreciate better these problems of the 
orientation of the state toward organized group activities if 
we pause to compare the state and its functions with other 
social institutions and their functions. The state and other 
developed institutions involve these common features: 
I. Group of members. A group such as the labor union 
or the American Medical Association has a definite but lim-
ited membership. The membership of the state embraces the 
entire population of a community. 
2. Division of members into two functional parts: Con-
trollers and controlled. In some of the simpler institutions 
such as the family, control may be exercised by a small 
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number of controllers or even by a single person. In the 
state, control is always exercised by many persons. We can 
for the present purpose refer to these controllers in the state 
as officials. There is a higher degree of specialization and 
subdivision of function among state controllers than among 
the controllers of any other institutions. State officials may 
be subdivided on a functional basis into legislative, executive, 
judicial, etc. They may be subdivided on a hierarchal basis 
into superior and inferior officials. They may be subdivided 
on a territorial basis between counties and other geographical 
units. 
3· Standards of behavior for members (the controlled). 
The institution through its controllers establishes standards 
of behavior for its members. For example, the American 
Medical Association maintains its standards of right behavior 
commonly known as medical ethics. The labor union prohibits 
its members from working in a nonunion establishment, or 
from crossing a picket line. The state has special agencies, 
i.e., the legislature, the courts, etc., which formulate stand-
ards, and it has a more complete and detailed array of 
standards prescribed for the control of the behavior of its 
membership than any other institution. 
4· Machinery and methods for effectuating its standards. 
Each institution develops its own machinery and methods 
for making its standards effective. A medical society, for 
example, can expel or suspend a member who is guilty of 
an infraction of its rules, or can deprive him of access to 
hospital facilities which are controlled by the association or 
its members. Similarly, a labor union can expel members or 
mete out lesser forms of disciplinary penalties to them. The 
church in a similar way can exclude from membership and 
can discipline members in various ways. It can threaten per-
sons with what Ross calls ccother-world sanctions," i.e., 
penalties in afterlife. But such sanctions are, I fear, less 
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effective today with the general population than they used 
to be. The state, in comparison with these other institutions, 
has a more complete arsenal of sanctions and control devices. 
It uses criminal prosecution, official supervision, the private 
lawsuit, the reward for individual action, and other methods 
which have been more fully considered at an earlier point.1 
In addition, it employs education through its public school 
system to mold the young and develop habits and attitudes 
which will insure the effectiveness of its standards. 
5· Standards of behavior for the controllers (officials). 
The institution maintains standards for the behavior of its 
controllers. The controllers are the persons through whose 
acts standards of the institution are made effective; and the 
controllers, like those whom they control, need standards 
to guide their actions. Such standards define the times when 
control is to be exercised and the manner of its exercise. 
Collectively, they may be said to make up an institutional 
constitution. Every well-developed institution has a set of 
standards which define official operations in this sense. In 
the state, such standards apply to all persons who exercise 
its authority. 
6. Devices and methods of controlling the controllers. 
In most social institutions machinery and methods of effec-
tuating the obligations of controllers are rather indefinite 
and undeveloped. In the main, the pressure of group opinion 
upon those who are in charge of group affairs is relied upon 
to hold the controllers in check. In many institutions it is 
hardly worth while to establish more potent sanctions. How 
much difference does it make whether the president of the 
ladies' literary club misuses her power? But in other institu-
tions, such as the labor union or the professional association, 
the consequences of abuse of power may be serious, and the 
need for restraints on controllers may be very real, since they 
1 See sees. z-I 5 to z-z8. 
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exercise on behalf of the association power over the bread 
and butter of members, and since they affect the welfare of 
many persons outside the group as well. In the state, first 
reliance is put upon schemes of organization which establish 
one official agency in a position of supervisory authority over 
another. The weakness of such schemes is that there is no 
agency to check the top agency. To meet this difficulty, the 
modern democratic state relies upon the creation of co-
ordinate official agencies which check one another, a scheme 
of checks and balances which sets off one group of controllers 
against another.2 
7. Institutional policies or objectives. The institutional 
group pursues certain objectives as such. Medical practitioners 
are organized to promote the welfare of their profession. 
The labor union aims to improve the economic and social 
conditions of its membership. The objectives of the state are 
broader and more varied. The state is expected to secure the 
general welfare-the welfare of all the people within its 
sway, not a particular. kind of good for a limited group; at 
least, that is the professed aim of American government in 
all its forms and parts. To analyze the state and its functions 
thus, in institutional terms, reduces to a common denominator 
the state and other social control agencies. I think you will 
find this helpful in understanding the interactions of the 
state with other institutions, and the policies of the state 
toward other institutions-about which I now want to speak. 
Sec. 7-30. Policies regarding subordinate groups. Within 
wide limits, the state does not concern itself with the forma-
tion or activities of other organized groups, e.g., a ladies' 
literary club or a neighborhood ball team. It neither favors 
nor opposes them; its policy is, on the whole, one of indiffer-
ence toward them. Its policy-making agencies discover no 
2 See sees. 3-22 et seq. 
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special benefit and no special harm in the existence or be-
havior of these groups, and accordingly, they adopt a neutral 
position in regard to them. This area of indifference or neu-
trality parallels the area of liberty for the individual. There 
also government adopts a neutral or hands-off attitude. Here, 
government allows individuals to form groups and allows 
groups to act without interposing any restraints and without 
affording any support for their aims and activities. 
But some organized groups serve highly useful functions 
in the community. The state, acting through its policy 
makers, recognizes in their existence and operations definite 
social interests. Such groups the state tries to foster in various 
ways and in varying degrees. For example, the state tradi-
tionally extends its protection to the family; it encourages 
the formation of families and safeguards family relationships 
against outside interference.1 It establishes forms and require-
ments for entering into the marriage relation, and methods 
for terminating that relation by divorce or annulment; it 
penalizes adultery and fornication; it creates legal liability 
for the support of wife and child. And economic groups 
receive the state's blessing, too. The state encourages the 
formation of groups to carry on trade and business. It pro-
vides for the creation of business corporations and other 
business associations; it provides for the establishment of 
banks, insurance companies, transportation companies, etc. 
The state protects the operations of these groups and gives 
effect to their acts. To certain business groups, the state may 
give subsidies; to some groups, it may extend protection by 
enacting tariff laws to safeguard against foreign competition. 
In recent years, labor organizations have been strongly sup-
ported by our federal government and by many of the states. 
These governments have sought to guarantee to labor groups 
1 See the earlier discussion of individual interests of family members in 
sec. 7-07. Here we are concerned with the family group as a recognized social 
entity. 
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the opportunity to form and maintain unions without inter-
ference by persons on the outside. The formation of these 
unions has been encouraged in order to equalize the bargain-
ing power of workmen in dealing with the large employer 
on whom they depend for a livelihood. Finally, the state 
encourages the organization of groups for charitable, social, 
and other nonprofit purposes. These, like business corpora-
tions, are invested with powers of acting as a legal unit, 
powers of owning property, powers of making contracts, etc. 
Charitable and religious and educational institutions fall un-
der this head; they are often given exemptions from taxation 
and other fiscal advantages. All these different group organ-
izations are alike in that they perform needed community 
services. They are encouraged and protected by regulative, 
fiscal, or administrative measures of the state because they 
serve the interests of the community. 
Besides the specific functions which organized groups are 
intended to serve, they also serve the community in a regu-
lative capacity. They set up standards of behavior for their 
members and enforce them through their own institutional 
machinery. This regulative function of other social institu-
tions is especially important in relation to the regulative 
function of the law. So far as these institutional standards 
coincide with legal standards, and so far as they are institu-
tionally effectuated, a part of the load of enforcement is taken 
off the legal machinery. Thus, for example, organized medi-
cine is not only important to the community because it aids 
in the provision of medical services, it is also significant 
because it maintains canons of ethics for its practitioners to 
control their dealings with one another and with the public. 
If these canons are in accord with the general welfare, the 
state can well afford to back them up, wholly or in part, and 
give aid to the organized medical profession in enforcing 
them. Similarly, the state may find definite social interests 
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in protecting such institutions as the family and the church, 
not only because of the primary functions that they perform, 
but also because these institutions create and enforce stand-
ards which regulate the behavior of members of the com-
munity.2 I have in mind such standards as those regarding 
truth telling. The church by its standards enjoins truthful-
ness and forbids lying. Similar standards are inculcated by 
training in most families. Such standards coincide generally 
with standards and objectives, recognized as desirable by the 
state. Our organized educational institutions, the public 
schools, normally support the same standards. And the legal 
machinery of the state is directed to the enforcement of the 
same standards. As regards testimony in court, the state 
enjoins truth telling and punishes perjury. As regards busi-
ness transactions, the state requires correct statements of fact 
and backs up this requirement by threats of actions or pen-
alties for fraud. As regards the dealings of officials with 
officials, involved in the operation of the legal system, the 
reliance of each official on the correctness of statements of 
others is taken for granted. Indeed, it is hard to imagine 
what the practices regarding truth telling would be in our 
community, and how legal machinery would be created 
adequate to carry the burden if these other social institutions 
were not in the picture, and were not enforcing standards 
substantially coincident with the standards of the law.3 
On the other hand, groups may be organized whose activ-
ities run counter to state policies. The general ends of certain 
groups are so far opposed to state policies that the state 
attempts to prohibit their formation entirely. In this sense, 
2 We can, to use Pound's terminology, refer to the state's interest in main-
taining these extralegal standards as the social interest in the general morals. 
3 In an analogous way, one might point to the regulative utility of family 
and church in many other respects. The standards of these institutions normally 
coincide with the standards of the law in regard to acts of theft and acts 
of sex intercourse outside the marriage relation. To the extent that these insti-
tutions work effectively in the processes of training and enforcement, the task 
of the law in these respects is reduced. 
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the state may try to prevent the organization of a gambling 
syndicate, or of a society whose purpose is to overthrow the 
government by force. Or the conflict with governmental 
policies may arise rather out of the methods commonly used 
by an organized group such as the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan 
may profess to work for good ends, but it operates secretly 
and employs violent means, both of which are ordinarily 
disapproved by organized government. The result may be 
an outright prohibition of this organization, intended to 
strike at the unlawful methods usually employed by it. 
As regards other subordinate groups, the hostility of the 
state may be not complete, but partial. The state may only 
undertake to prevent certain acts of these groups which are 
injurious to persons who are inside or outside the group. 
Suppose, for example, that an association of merchants 
attempts to fix prices. From the point of view of the mer-
chants, this may be regarded as a justifiable and desirable 
act; it may be intended by them to insure reasonable profits. 
But the fixing of prices in this manner is a practice which is 
or may be harmful to others; it leads to injury to the buying 
public, and is definitely prohibited by law. Similarly, labor 
organizations may resort to violence in labor disputes, or, 
in regard to persons outside their membership, may attempt 
to enforce demands by boycotts. These acts may be quite 
justifiable from the point of view of labor organizations, and 
may accord fully with the standards which the organization 
itself recognizes. But both acts may affect injuriously persons 
outside as well as inside their membership, and the state 
may adopt a policy of prohibition or restriction. The theory 
behind governmental interference in such cases is that the 
state as the representative of the whole community must 
move to suppress the activity of any group which seeks to 
promote its own interests at the expense of injury to an 
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individual, injury to another group, or injury to the public 
as a whole. 
Sec. 7-3 r. Policies regarding the state's own organization 
and functions. No less important than the policies which the 
state adopts regarding subordinate groups in the community 
are the policies which the state maintains regarding its own 
organization and functions. One can speak of them as policies 
of the state regarding itself.l In one aspect, all the policies 
which we have heretofore considered relate to the state; they 
are policies of the state in the sense that they are pursued 
by the state or in its name. But thus far we have considered 
only policies which were directed to an objective external 
to the state itself. The policies with which we are here con-
cerned are those whose objectives are the state's own organ-
ization and some of the state's functions. 
One basic policy question for the state relates to the change 
of its organization. Is this organization to be subject to 
change? The American governments are established under 
constitutions, and these constitutions provide definite ma-
chinery for the change and amendment of governmental 
organization. vVhat about change by revolution? What about 
efforts of individuals or groups to overthrow the government 
by force? So far as I know, no government here or elsewhere 
has ever recognized this as a permissible form of change. 
Where such an overthrow has occurred, it has been accom-
plished despite the state. In countries where dictatorships are 
in power, usually revolution represents the only possibility 
for change. The policy of the established dictatorship is op-
posed to change of any kind. Democratic and liberal groups 
1 Also, we must not forget that policies of the state regarding its own organ-
ization and functions are really the policies or attitudes of its officials regarding 
the state's operations. This is one of the places where it is especially important 
for clarity of thinking, to realize the connection of policies with actual 
policy makers. See sec. 7-oz, and note ** thereto. 
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are necessarily revolutionary groups, and the full power of 
the state is exerted to suppress them. They have no oppor-
tunity under such a state policy to bring about change in a 
lawful manner. 
Other basic policy questions for the state relate to the use 
of the state's powers for its own support. I think it is proper 
to say that the state itself is a state-supported institution. By 
supporting itself and its own functions, the state serves indi-
rectly to secure the various interests which it protects and 
fosters. Subordinate policy questions concern the means which 
the state will use in supporting itself: What tax sources will 
it draw upon? How far will it make exactions from the rich? 
How far from the poor? How will it distribute its available 
funds between one undertaking and another? 
Government in the United States can deal appropriately 
with acts of individuals or groups which threaten its destruc-
tion. It can penalize the acts of those who advocate its 
overthrow by force. The federal government punishes 
treason, espionage, trading with the enemy, and acts of 
sabotage. All our governments restrain and punish acts of 
individuals and groups which interfere with the performance 
of governmental functions. They protect public property 
against theft or injury, and they accord special protection to 
government officials while they are acting in the performance 
of their duties. 
Another important type of policy question concerns the 
functions which the state itself is to assume. The state may 
assume only a few and narrow functions. This was the tradi-
tional policy of our governments until relatively recently. 
Instead of assuming functions itself, the state may adopt a 
policy of encouraging individuals or organized groups to 
perform needed social services. In the last section I showed 
how the state may stop short of assuming functions itself and 
aid subordinate group organizations which perform social 
functions. Thus, the state has encouraged universities and 
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colleges, privately endowed, to perform educational func-
tions, and helped them in various ways, as by subventions and 
tax exemptions. 
Or the state may assume many and wide functions. It may 
create organs of its own, designed to take over functions 
previously performed by private agencies, or create govern-
ment agencies to render services not theretofore performed. 
I have already referred to the tendency of the modern state 
to take on more and more functions, exemplified by what 
has been done by governments in Europe as well as by our 
own governments, state and federal. These have created a 
multitude of agencies to perform social services. I do not 
refer here merely to government corporations, such as the 
Home Owners' Loan Corporation, though these are to be 
included, too. I have in mind organizations such as our system 
of public education, extending from elementary schools to 
universities. These represent the governmental assumption 
of the chief role in education. Public education is hardly a 
century and a half old. At an earlier time, education was the 
function of the family or the church, or was given in private 
schools. These schools are still, to a large degree, encouraged 
by our government. Nevertheless, the public schools an~ 
universities have now taken over the greater share of the 
burden of education in this country. And the public educa-
tional institutions of the American state are now as completely 
incorporated into its structure as are the courts and the organs 
of taxation.2 
2 The established church is historically important and still exists in many 
parts of the world, though it is no longer possible in this country to create 
such an establishment because of constitutional prohibitions. Usually the state 
furnishes the established church with most of its funds, and combines with it 
in a close union of members and enforcement machinery. Yet the established 
church is not merely an organ of the state. Accordingly, the established church 
falls between the complete assumption of government control and the inde-
pendent group organization which is merely subsidized. 
Under the recent fascist regimes of Italy and Germany, major business or-
ganizations and labor unions were, as I understand the matter, converted into 
semipublic agencies along lines similar to that of an established church. 
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Sec. 7-32. Policies regarding other states.1 If we had in 
the world a superstate, it might be endowed with authority 
to control the relations of one state to another, and to fix 
the policies which each state should pursue in relation to other 
states. But no such central international power exists.2 Each 
state asserts practically unlimited authority over its external 
affairs. One of the normal functions of every state is to deal 
with foreign states and their subjects. Through some agents 
or agencies each state determines what is commonly called 
its "foreign policy." In the United States, this role is assigned 
by the Constitution to the federal government,3 and more 
specifically, to the President and Senate.4 
The most aggressive policies regarding other states are 
represented by war, offensive and defensive. War is the 
crudest and most radical method of dealing with other 
nations. For the purpose of prosecuting war, armed forces 
are prepared and kept ready. Many of the acts and measures 
of our federal government are actuated by this war policy. 
The government creates and maintains an army, navy, and 
air force; it regulates by law the internal activities of the 
military forces as well as the relations of the individual 
citizen to them. 5 
1 I have not overlooked the fact that some supernational institutions, such 
as the Catholic Church, bear both internal and external relations to the state. 
Such an institution organizes persons within the community, but its sway also 
extends beyond the community. Such organizations pose no new type of policy 
problems for the state. From the state's point of view, these problems are of 
two types; internal relations, like the relations to subordinate groups in the 
community, and external relations, like the state's relations to other states. 
I have not felt that an additional heading was needed in order to cover the 
policies involved in such double relationships. 
2 The League of Nations was a beginning. And the United Nations is an-
other start; but so far its authority has not attained very considerable sig-
nificance. 
3 The individual states are explicitly excluded from action in this area by 
several provisions of the Federal Constitution. See Art. I, Sec. 9· 
4 However, the House of Representatives also has a hand in shaping foreign 
policy. The influence of the House is exerted chiefly through its control over 
taxing and spending. But the House also makes its views felt by its participa-
tion in the lawmaking processes. 
, 5 You can see in the organization and maintenance of the military establish-
ment an excellent illustration of the intermixture of fiscal, administrative, and 
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Alongside control over warfare stands federal control over 
the importation and exportation of goods. Benefits and harms 
may accrue to the people of the United States through these 
acts as well as through acts of war. Benefits have been invited 
by a policy of free trade in articles needed by domestic econ-
omy.6 Harms to the domestic population, e.g., from opium 
or from diseased food products, have been combated by 
restrictive or prohibitive legislation. Injuries to the domestic 
economy, e.g., hurtful foreign competition with domestic 
goods, have been met by restrictive laws or by protective 
tariffs. 
A parallel control is exercised by the federal government 
over immigration and naturalization. 7 For more than a cen-
tury of our national life, the federal government pursued 
a policy of laissez faire as regards immigration; almost un-
limited entry to this country was allowed to foreigners, and 
immigrants were readily admitted to citizenship. These pol-
icies were based on a felt need to fill up the vast open spaces 
of our West with people, especially with farmers from 
Europe. The first departure from these policies was repre-
sented by the Chinese Exclusion Acts, intended to protect 
American labor against the importation of cheap competitive 
labor from the Orient. Since the turn of the century, restric-
tions on immigration have multiplied enormously, so that 
now we have many restraints on both the quality, e.g., phys-
ical and mental health, occupation, moral character, etc., and 
quantity of immigrants, e.g., the quota system which fixes 
the number of persons of each nationality who can enter the 
United States. And naturalization is hedged about by many 
regulative measures in governmental undertakings. See further on this point, 
sec. 7-1 7· 
6 Though this policy has sometimes been offset by the financial requirements 
of government, imports have been subjected to tariffs in order to raise 
revenue. 
7 Emigration and loss of citizenship are also subjects for possible federal 
attention. Emigration has received little if any notice; loss of citizenship is 
covered fully by federal laws dealing with nationality. 
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safeguards, calculated to prevent incompetent and undesirable 
persons from acquiring the status of citizens. 
To a very limited extent, relations of governments to one 
another are covered by international law. This law professes 
to fix the patterns of behavior which states should follow in 
regard to one another and one another's nationals. However, 
the policies of international law are narrow and limited. 
International law is directed primarily to the policy of main-
taining order between states; secondarily, it seems to be 
aimed to mitigate the harshness of war when peace is not 
kept. Moreover, there are no well-defined agencies for mak-
ing international law, as there are for creating domestic 
law.8 International law has developed chiefly through the 
voluntary adherence of independent states to common usages. 
These usages, by express or tacit acceptance, have taken on 
something of the general character of legal standards. In 
addition treaties can be constitutive of international law .9 
But there are no well-defined methods or agencies of enforce-
ment to back up the standards of what is called international 
law. And the behavior patterns of international law are by 
no means complete and explicit. The result is that in practice 
the acts which any government will undertake and the pol-
icies it will pursue are, in the main, self-determined and not 
actually controlled by externally prescribed standards or 
policies. 
Sec. 7-33. Problems. 1. In a note in the Michigan Law 
Review in 1934 appears the following statement of a 
problem: 
8 In this connection it is also worth noting that our Federal Constitution 
makes a treaty entered into by the federal government a part of the internal 
law of the United States. Art. III, Sec. 2. Such a treaty operates on persons 
and property in the United States essentially as federal statutes operate. 
9 At once the analogy to a contract between individuals comes to mind; 
this contract establishes obligatory lines of action for the parties who enter 
into it. But a treaty between states can do more. It can serve as the adoption 
of a constitution, and in this sense set up a frame of international government 
and determine policies and standards for the operation of that government. 
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"In April of this year a Minnesota physician, Dr. Clayton 
E. May treated for gunshot wounds a certain undesirable 
person, John Dillinger, very much in demand by the police. 
He further neglected to inform the police concerning his 
ministrations, and as a result, was tried in a federal court on 
a charge of harboring a fugitive wanted under a federal 
warrant, found guilty, and sentenced to serve two years in a 
penitentiary and to pay a fine of $1 ,ooo. Said a prominent 
English medical journal in commenting on the case' ... col-
leagues in every country will applaud his action in not 
betraying a professional trust.'" 1 
After this statement of the problem, the note writer dis-
cusses it and concludes that there is no legal justification for 
the position taken by the English medical journal.2 
How is this question related to our discussion of state 
policies toward organized groups? Do you agree with the 
note writer or with the English medical journal? Why? 
2. A few years ago a group of employees of the Home 
Owners' Loan Corporation organized an association in the 
District of Columbia called Group Health Association, for 
the purpose of providing medical service on a prepaid insur-
ance basis to its members and their families. This group 
undertook to ~mploy licensed physicians to render the med-
ical services which its agreement with its members called for. 
The activities of such voluntary health associations were 
strongly opposed by the American Medical Association and 
its subsidiary societies on the ground that the organization of 
these associations and their employment of doctors on salary 
were inimical to the best interests of the medical profession. 
In order to prevent the operations of Group Health Asso-
ciation, the American Medical Association and the Medical 
Society of the District of Columbia threatened any doctors 
who affiliated with, or served Group Health Association, with 
expulsion from membership. They also denied to doctors who 
1 Note, 226 THE LANCET II83 (1934). 
2 3Z MICH. L. REV. II64 (1934). 
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became affiliated with Group Health Association all privileges 
of consultation with members of the American Medical Asso-
ciation or the Medical Society, and finally they undertook 
through their control of hospitals of the District of Columbia 
to exclude all affiliated doctors and their patients from the 
use of such hospitals. The American Medical Association and 
the Medical Society were prosecuted and convicted for enter-
ing into a conspiracy to restrain trade. The conviction was 
sustained in the Supreme Court of the United States.3 
The technical form of the charge and the specific argu-
ments pro and con are not important for our purpose. How 
would you interpret this conviction in relation to our present 
subtopic? 
Incidentally, it should be noted that the American Medical 
Association has completely reversed its position on this point 
and now promotes the organization of voluntary health asso-
ciations as an antidote for the more feared "state medicine." 
What would be the significance of state medicine (a system 
in which the state employs doctors to furnish medical service 
to its population) in terms of the present subtopic? 
3· The power of correction, vested by law in parents, is 
founded on their duty to maintain and educate their offspring. 
In support of that authority, they must have a "right to 
the exercise of such discipline as may be requisite for the 
discharge of their sacred trust." 4 And this power, allowed 
by law to the parent over the person of the child, "may be 
delegated to a tutor or instructor, the better to accomplish 
the purpose of education." 5 
"The better doctrine of the adjudged cases, therefore, is, 
that the teacher is, within reasonable bounds, the substitute 
for the parent, exercising his delegated authority. He is 
vested with the power to administer moderate correction, 
with a proper instrument, in cases of misconduct, which ought 
3 A.M. A. v. U.S., 317 U.S. 519 (1943). 
4 z KENT's CoMM.*zo3 (1896). 
5 /d. *zos1 1 BL. CoMM. *so7 (1941). 
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to have some reference to the character of the offense, the 
sex, age, size, and physical strength of the pupil. When the 
teacher keeps within the circumscribed sphere of his authority, 
the degree of correction must be left to his discretion, as it 
is to that of the parent, under like circumstances. Within this 
limit, he has the authority to determine the gravity or hei-
nousness of the offense, and to mete out to the offender 
the punishment which he thinks his conduct justly merits; 
and hence the parent or teacher is often said, pro hac vice, 
to exercise 'judicial functions.' " 6 
What does this judicial declaration suggest as to the basis 
for family discipline? How is the sphere of family discipline 
related to the sphere of law? How is the sphere of discipline 
in the schools limited by the law? 
4· The State of Oregon passed a Compulsory Education 
Act which required every parent, guardian or other person 
having control of a child between the ages of 8 and I 6 years 
to send him to the public school in the district where he 
resided, for the period during which the school was held 
for the current year. The validity of this act was challenged 
before the United States Supreme Court by the Society of 
Sisters and by a private school. The Supreme Court of the 
United States held the act invalid. It declared that the act 
constituted an unreasonable interference "with the liberty 
of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing . . . of 
children. . . ."The court also declared that: "The funda-
mental theory of liberty upon which all governments of this 
Union repose excludes any general power of the State to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction 
from public teachers only." 7 
What does this case signify in terms of competing insti-
tutional ends and areas of control? A statute which requires 
parents to send their children to some school until sixteen 
6 Boyd v. State, 88 Ala. 169 at 171 ( 1889). 
7 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 at 535 (192.5). 
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years of age would be held constitutionally valid. What is 
the difference? 
5· United States v. Schwimmer.8 A fifty-year-old woman 
applied for naturalization as an American citizen. At the 
hearing on her application, and in the preliminary question-
naires, she indicated an unwillingness to bear arms in defense 
of this country. The Supreme Court affirmed the district 
court's denial of naturalization. Holmes, J ., dissenting, said: 
" ... if there is any principle of the Constitution that 
more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is 
the principle of free thought-not free thought for those 
who agree with us but freedom for the thought we hate. 
I think we should adhere to that principle with regard to 
admission into, as well as to life within this country. And 
recurring to the opinion that bars this applicant's way, I 
would suggest that the Quakers have done their share to 
make this country what it is, that many citizens agree with 
the applicant's belief and that I had not supposed hitherto 
that we regretted our inability to expel them because they 
believe more than some of us do in the teachings of the 
Sermon on the Mount." 
This decision and a similar decision in United States v. 
Macintosh/ have been regarded as mere constructions of 
the intent of Congress. In Girouard v. United States/0 both 
these cases were overruled and an interpretation essentially 
like that which Holmes urged was adopted. 
Under the majority opinion of the Schwimmer Case, what 
policy is ascribed to Congress? Under Holmes' opinion, what 
policy is ascribed to Congress? 
DETERMINANTS oF PoLICIES 
Sec. 7-3 4· More specifically about policy makers-the 
popular will. We have now listed a great variety of possible 
8 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929). 
9 283 U.S. fios ( 1931). 
lO J28 U.S. 61 ( 1946), 
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policies, and have considered the ways in which they may 
be interrelated and adjusted with one another. We have yet 
to deal with the processes through which these policies are 
formulated and determined. We have yet to consider more 
specifically who the policy makers are, how their choices are 
influenced and controlled, and where their policy notions 
come from. These questions remain for treatment in this final 
subtopic on the operation of our legal system. 
All American governmental institutions rest on the funda-
mental assumption that "Governments are instituted among 
Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed." 1 This assumption was part and parcel of social 
contract theories prevailing at the time when the federal 
government was founded. In terms of this fundamental 
assumption, the governed are entitled to fix the policies which 
government is to serve, and the methods and machinery 
through which these policies will be effectuated.2 No one 
who had been brought up in the midst of the American 
tradition would ever think of questioning either of these 
propositions. 
However, the popular will is, for the most part, inarticu-
late and unformulated; its practical effect on the operations 
of government is indirect and roundabout. The popular will 
1 Declaration of Independence, unanimously passed by the Congress of the 
thirteen United States of America, July 4, 1776. 
2 Indeed, the proceedings by which the federal government was established 
could well be viewed as the making of a popular compact. While the original 
naive conception of a popular compact has been discarded, the basic conception 
of popular sovereignty has not. This conception not only appears in the 
Declaration of Independence and the writings of various founding fathers, 
it lives on unchallenged and vigorous as ever; it is definitely announced in the 
Federal Constitution. The preamble to that instrument declares: 
"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common 
defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty 
to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for 
the United States of America." 
And the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides: "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 
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can rarely be said to originate and carry through a policy 
determination of its own. Normally, the popular will is 
expressed through various agencies which profess to act as 
its representatives: the framers of constitutions, the legis-
latures, the courts, and other officials. To some extent, the 
popular will is expressed through the choice of officials who 
announce their advocacy of proposed programs. In some 
states, it can be expressed through the use of the initiative 
and referendum. In the main, however, the popular will is 
expressed only indirectly through measures formulated and 
proposed by official agencies, such as a constitutional con-
vention or a legislature. 
The limitations on the choice of policies which the people 
(popular will) may adopt by establishing constitutions or 
replacing or amending those it has, are theoretically negligi-
ble. If the people chooses, it can adopt any kind of govern-
ment or any kind of policy whatever.3 If unlimited power 
is to be found anywhere in our legal systems, analogous to 
the power of the British Parliament, this power is vested 
in the people. To be sure, such power is more a theory than 
a practical fact. The people is a rather inert body, as I have 
already pointed out. The people is governed by personal and 
social factors, which will be discussed in later sections. It is 
amenable to suggestions and advice; it is restrained, like 
every other agency of government, by traditional standards.4 
Sec. 7-35. Framers of constitutions as policy makers. The 
framers of constitutions are obviously in a position to deter-
mine and formulate the policies to be pursued by the govern-
3 This is definitely indicated by the preamble to the Constitution, which 
declares that it is adopted by the people of the United States, and by the 
Tenth Amendment, which reserves powers not given to the federal government, 
to the states and the people (see next preceding note). As Justice Holmes 
suggested in Gitlow v. New York (see sec. 7-25, problem 5) there is nothing 
in our Constitution to prevent the adoption of communism in this country if 
our people should want it. 
4 See also the discussion in sec. 7-4 5 of the question whether there are 
superhuman criteria of justice to guide policy makers. 
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m~nh which they establish. And, like the people, the framers 
are not subject to any immediate restraints on their choices. 
They are checked only by personal and social factors.1 
To a substantial extent, the framers of our constitutions 
have laid out the policies for governmental agencies to 
pursue. For example, the framers of the Federal Constitution 
declare in the preamble thereof that the federal government 
is ordained and established "in order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide 
for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and to our Pos-
terity." Again the framers of the Federal Constitution confer 
on Congress the power to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, 
Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for 
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States. . . ." 2 Such expressions of policy are explicit but they 
are very general. The government is intended to act for the 
general welfare, to provide for the common defense, and so 
on. Like other inventories of governmental policy heretofore 
mentioned, such formulations do not mean much as guides, 
unless they be broken down and stated in more specific terms. 
However, explicit declarations of policy are not usually 
found in constitutions any more than in statutes. The framers 
are content to establish the principal organs of government 
and to define their powers. The ends for which these powers 
shall be used, the policies which the organs of government 
shall pursue, are not explicitly and specifically stated; they 
are left to implication from the powers given. Congress is 
given power to regulate interstate commerce. The purposes 
for which the power can be used are not defined. Is the use 
of this power limited to the protection and promotion of the 
flow of commerce? Can the power be used for the moral 
1 I refer here to the checks by human acts, ways, and institutions; the ques-
tion whether there is a "higher law" beyond human control, which guides 
policy makers and others, is reserved for discussion in sec. 7-45. 
2 Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. r. 
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betterment of the community by preventing the shipment of 
lottery tickets across state lines? Can Congress use its control 
over commerce to improve working conditions and prevent 
child labor in industry? All these questions of policy in the 
use of the commerce power had to be answered, but all of 
the answers had to be found outside the specific language 
of the Constitution; and so of the purposes for which most 
of the powers conferred on the federal government by the 
Federal Constitution and on the state governments by their 
respective state constitutions. Powers are granted, but the 
purposes and policies for which the powers are to be used 
are left undefined. 
Now while the framers of our constitutions have not been 
inclined to state the purposes for which powers might be 
used, they have taken great pains to prohibit their use for 
certain purposes. The framers have been concerned to pro-
hibit acts of government which interfere with individual 
rights and liberties. These prohibitions of governmental 
action definitely limit the policies which government may 
pursue; they restrict the methods by which policies may be 
carried out. The federal government is expressly forbidden 
to abridge freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly. 
Feder.U aild state governments are forbidden to pass ex post 
facto laws and other retroactive legislation, and to deprive 
persons of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law. The state is forbidden to "pass any ... law impairing 
the obligation of contracts," or to "make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States," or to "deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The state and 
federal constitutions contain imposing arrays of provisions 
which guarantee jury trial in civil and criminal cases, 
which safeguard the individual against arbitrary arrests and 
searches, and which secure for his use the writ of habeas 
corpus. But the reasons for all these guarantees and pro-
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hibitions are not stated out. They are taken for granted. 
They are implied and not expressed. Why is the liberty of 
the individual given all these forms of protection? The 
Declaration of Independence and the early constitutions 
indicated that these liberties were regarded as natural en-
dowments of the Creator, and required no justification other 
than that fact. This point of view has gradually changed. 
Today liberties of the individual are justified in terms of 
utility or policy. Even if we talk of them as natural rights, 
we try to find practical reasons for free speech, for the indi-
vidual's right to hold property, for the guarantee of jury 
trial in criminal and civil cases, for the writ of habeas corpus, 
etc. Maybe these reasons or policies were implicit in earlier 
theories of natural rights and liberties. Maybe these reasons 
or policies are merely the invented rationalizations of our 
time. In any event, the need is strongly felt nowadays to 
invoke the policies behind the constitutional guarantees, as 
aids in applying and limiting them. This fact has put upon 
courts and theoretical writers, even more than upon legis-
latures, the burden of formulating and stating the policy 
considerations behind constitutional provisions, which the 
constitutions themselves do not express. 
Sec. 7-36. Legislatures as policy makers. In actual fact, 
the legislatures (and I include the Congress of the United 
States) deal with policy matters more frequently and settle 
more policy questions than any of the other policy makers. 
They are, in practice, the chief agencies to determine the 
policies of government. They determine policies whenever 
they exercise any of their powers; when they enact statutes, 
when they create offices, when they impose taxes, and when 
they appropriate money. The legislatures act in these various 
ways with purposes in view, and to say that they determine 
policies is simply to say that they do have ends in view when 
they act. 
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But the legislatures must act within the constitutional 
framework. In this respect, these bodies are limited in their 
function as policy makers. They are checked by the express 
provisions of the constitutions, and by the policies of these 
instruments which are read into them by the courts. In this 
respect, the legislatures are in a different position from the 
people and the constitution maker. The latter are outside 
the constitutional framework, and free from constitutional 
limitations.1 They might, for example, abolish private prop-
erty, which the legislatures definitely could not do. The 
subjection of the legislatures' activity to constitutional limita-
tions is what gives their policy making its peculiar character. 
How do these constitutional limitations affect the policy 
making of the legislatures? 
The positive grants of power to legislate are usually so 
broad and general that they permit the legislative body to 
do almost anything that it chooses. In this regard, the grants 
of legislative power to the federal government are typical. 
What Congress can do in the exercise of its commerce power, 
its power to tax, its power to spend, its war powers, and its 
control over the currency, is almost unlimited. Under the 
decisions of the Supreme Court in the last fifteen years, there 
is practically no way to challenge the necessity for using any 
of these powers or the purpose for which any of them is 
used.* 
The prohibitions of particular types of legislation and the 
guarantees of individual rights are more seriously limitative. 
1 The general idea here expressed is correct. I do not feel that it is necessary 
to clutter up the text with such qualifications as: I, the proposition that even 
the popular will, as for example in amending a constitution, must follow the 
prescribed constitutional procedures for adopting an amendment; and z, the 
proposition that even the framers of a state constitution cannot transcend 
the limitations of the Federal Constitution. 
* (I.R.) See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel 
Corporation, 30I U.S. I (I937); United States v. Darby, 3I2 U.S. IOO 
(194I); Steward Machine Company v. Davis, 30I U. S. 548 (I937); 
Helvering v. Davis, 30I U.S. 619 (1937). 
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Offhand, these prohibitions and guarantees might seem to 
stand in the way of any legislative regulation or control 
whatever. When the Federal Constitution (and likewise 
those of the states) makes such declarations as that Congress 
shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or the 
press, that no state shall pass a law impairing the obligation 
of contracts, and that no state shall deprive any person of 
life, liberty or property without due process of law, the 
declarations leave no room, if literally read, for legislative 
qualification or limitation. But our courts have definitely held 
from the beginning that these prohibitions and guarantees 
are not absolute. They do not stand in the way of some 
legislative regulation and limitation. 
The character and amount of permissible legislative control 
varies with the subject matter.2 As regards freedom of the 
mind and the guarantees of personal liberty, the Supreme 
Court and the state supreme courts have held the reins on 
legislation rather tight. They have stressed the importance 
of freedom of the mind and freedom of the person as the 
foundation for all our other rights and liberties. Any govern-
mental interference in these areas has to be definitely justi-
fied. A law restricting liberty of mind or person must be 
predicated on actual social need. The presumption is in favor 
of liberty and against any type of restriction. The burden of 
proof is on the lawmaker (or on any one who relies upon 
such a law) to show that a real need exists. And the Supreme 
Court is prepared to examine the question of policy for itself. 
In short, the opportunity of the . legislatures to introduce 
restrictive policies and measures in these areas is strictly 
limited.** 
2 The statements in this and the next succeeding paragraph are somewhat 
oversimplified, but they suffice for the purpose in hand. If anyone desires a more 
detailed and accurate conception of the law, he can obtain it by consulting the 
authorities cited in the next two notes addressed to the initiated reader. 
** (I.R.) These views are indicated in the following cases: Schenck v. 
United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 
(1923); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931); Grosjean v. American 
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On the other hand, the legislatures enjoy a much wider 
latitude for policy determination in the economic sphere. 
Down to the advent of the New Deal, the so-called "con-
servative" majority of the Supreme Court was ready to treat 
all clauses of the Constitution alike. It took the position that 
liberty is the rule and restraint the exception in all spheres, 
whether economic or personal. It was ready to require that 
legislation controlling property and contract be sustained by 
adequate social reasons and to indulge a presumption in favor 
of liberty and against restriction of property rights and free-
dom of contract.3 But the "liberal" minority of the Supreme 
Court (Holmes, Brandeis and Stone) insisted on a different 
presumption in this sphere. It wanted to presume that 
Congress or the legislature had acted with sufficient warrant 
and was justified in limiting individual economic interests. 
And this former minority view is the one which has prevailed 
with the majority of the New Deal Supreme Court. The 
effect of this view has been to place the burden of proof on 
those who challenge legislation in the economic sphere, and 
this burden is not easy to support. This means that the consti-
tutional protection for economic interests has been largely 
taken away. The legislative policy makers are practically free 
to prefer what interests they choose, individual or social, in 
the economic sphere.*** 
Press Company, 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 
296 (1940); Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941); Edwards v. 
California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); 
Adams v. United States, 3 I 7 U. S. 269 ( 1943); West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 
U.S. 105 (1943); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); McNabb v. 
United States, 318 U. S. 332 (1943); Pollock v. Williams, 322 U. S. 4 
(1944); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 
322 U.S. 143 (1944); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. p6 (1945); McCollum 
v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 
U.S. I (1949). 
3 See Adkins v. Children's Hospital, quoted above in sec. 7-21, problem 3· 
*** (I.R.) These views are indicated by the following cases: West Coast 
Hotel Company v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Railroad Commission of 
Texas v. Rowan and Nichols, 310 U. S. 573 (1940); Federal Power Com-
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Sec. 7-37. Courts as policy makers. Courts are established 
for the immediate purpose of handling litigation. They are 
intended to apply legal provisions prescribed by the various 
formulating agencies above mentioned: the popular will, the 
framers of constitutions, and especially the legislatures. Such 
legal provisions include not only rules and principles of 
behavior for individuals and officials, they include also legal 
policies and methods. The courts are intended to effectuate 
policies and employ methods which have been predetermined 
by these formulating agencies; they are not expected to lay 
out policies by judicial fiat or to devise methods or machinery 
to carry them out. As Cardozo said, "When the legislature 
has spoken, and declared one interest superior to another, the 
judge must subordinate his personal or subjective estimate 
of value to the estimate thus declared. He may not nullify 
or pervert a statute because convinced that an erroneous 
axiology (here: judgment of policy) is reflected in its 
terms." 1 
This does not mean, however, that the courts have not had 
a large part in shaping legal policies and methods over the 
long pull. Most of the important policies of our legal system 
have had their first explicit formulation in judicial decisions. 
Legislation was relatively rare in the Anglo-American legal 
systems until the last few decades; both specific legal man-
dates and declarations of policies could be found only in the 
cases, and even today, many of the principal policies of the 
law of property, contract, and tort have to be sought for in 
the case law. For example, the whole of the doctrine of con-
sideration and the policies behind it must be sought in judicial 
declarations. The same is true of the basic principles accord-
ing to which compensation is awarded for tortious injuries, 
mission v. Hope Natural Gas Company, 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Sage Stores 
Company v. Kansas, 323 U. S. 32. (1944); Carolene Products Company 
v. United States, 323 U. S. r8 (r944); and see generally ROTTSCHAEFER, 
THE CONSTITUTION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE (Cooley Lectures, 1948). 
1 THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 94-95 (192.4). 
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e.g., the principle that liability must be based on fault; the 
principles regarding protection of the individual's reputation 
against defamation; and almost all the other policies of tort 
law. So that we are quite justified in saying that while the 
courts are bound to accept the policy determinations of the 
legislatures whenever these policy determinations are dis-
tinctly made, the courts themselves, through the slow proc-
esses by which litigation is settled in case after case, have built 
up and formulated many of the accepted notions of what our 
law is for and what our legal system is trying to achieve.2 
Indeed, these common law policy notions constitute a very 
considerable part of the items in our inventory of legal 
policies. 
Moreover, in the processes of statutory interpretation, the 
courts are often required to embark on an exploration of 
the uncertain sea of policy. Not infrequently, legislative 
declarations of policy are absent or indistinct, as I have 
already said. Legislatures have not been prone to state 
explicitly what policies lie behind their acts. They have been 
inclined, on the whole, to limit themselves to more or less 
specific directions to individuals and officials. The courts are 
left to infer what the legislative objectives of these directions 
are. And when these objectives cannot be inferred with 
certainty, the courts are really called upon to declare a policy 
themselves. To be sure, the courts do not arbitrarily select 
this policy; they do not conjure a legal policy out of thin 
air. As Cardozo says in a later part of the passage above 
quoted, "Even when the legislature has not spoken, he (the 
judge) is to regulate his estimate of values by objective 
rather than subjective standards, by the thought and will of 
the community rather than by his own idiosyncrasies of 
2 In developing policies, courts regard themselves as bound by constitutional 
limitations, similar to those which apply to the legislatures. In addition, they 
recognize the binding force on their actions of such common law doctrines 
as the doctrine of precedent. See STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF 
LAW soo (1946). 
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conduct and belief." 3 In other words, even when the judge 
must supplement the policy determinations of legislation, he 
is limited by the ordinary canons of legislative interpretation 
and judicial lawmaking. 
Lastly, and probably we must say most important of all, 
the courts under the American doctrine of judicial review 
are the final interpreters of the constitutions. In this capacity, 
they expound not only the specific provisions, but the policies 
and methods which are prescribed by these documents. The 
framers of the constitutions, like other Anglo-American legis-
lators, have not usually stated the policies which their legis-
lative declarations are intended to serve. They have left 
policies to implication. The consequence has been that the 
courts have filled in the policy factors which were lacking. 
A good example is the development which the clause regard-
ing free speech and free press has received at the hands of 
the Supreme Court. The clause itself declares simply that 
Congress shall not pass any law abridging freedom of speech 
or of the press. The reasons for this provision are not stated. 
Justice Holmes, in various opinions, states what he regards 
as the policy reasons behind this clause: "that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas," "that 
the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market," that these free-
doms are not to be limited unless there is "a clear and present 
danger" of a speaker's bringing about substantive evils which 
the state has a right to prevent, and that "if there is any 
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls 
for attachment than any other, it is the principle of free 
thought. . . ." 4 These views ascribe to freedom of thought 
and expression a superlative importance and a preferred 
standing. They have been definitely adopted by the Supreme 
3 See note I above. 
4 See previous references to these views of Holmes in sees. 7-z4, 7-z7, prob-
lem 5, and 7-33, problem 5· 
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Court. They define the nature, the strength, and the limi-
tations of the policy of free speech and free press. They 
operate just as effectively in the world of practical affairs 
as if they were written into the Constitution itself. And it 
goes almost without saying that a similar filling-in of policy 
notions has occurred in the interpretation of the commerce 
clause, the due process clauses, and all of the other important 
clauses of the Federal Constitution, not to speak of similar 
significant clauses of the state constitutions. 
The practical bearing of this process of filling policy terms 
into the constitutions lies in its effect on the scope of govern-
mental powers. The courts strike down as invalid legislative 
as well as other governmental action which runs contrary to 
the policies that they read into the constitutions. The courts' 
own policy in this regard may vary considerably. The courts' 
interpretive role may be performed in various ways; and the 
way they choose involves an important policy determination. 
Thus, for instance, the Supreme Court of the United States 
might originally have adopted a policy of favoring state's 
rights and local autonomy. Or, it could lean on the side of 
federal powers, as it actually did. Here was a policy deter-
mination of basic importance. Again, as regards the relation 
of government and individual, the courts can adopt widely 
differing policies.5 The courts can regard themselves as bound 
to protect the individual in every way possible, as they have 
in effect done in regard to free speech and the guarantees 
of personal liberty. If the courts adopt this attitude and 
follow a policy of close supervision and scrutiny as regards 
governmental action, the scope of governmental powers is 
5 Compare the discussion here with that in the last two paragraphs of the 
next preceding section; see also the cases and other authorities there cited. 
Also it is at the point where courts undertake to fill in policy notions that 
their answer to the question whether there is a superhuman criterion of justice 
becomes most significant. If the courts accept the postulate of a superhuman 
law which controls policy makers, the courts can invoke this law as a basis 
for limiting or striking down policy determinations by the legislature and 
others. See further discussion of this point in section 7-45. 
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necessarily narrowed. On the other hand, the courts can adopt 
a policy of deciding all questions of doubt in favor of govern-
mental action, even where it impinges upon individual free-
dom. The practical effect of such a judicial attitude is to 
expand the powers of all the other agencies of government. 
It matters not whether the courts positively recognize the 
powers of these other agencies, or whether they simply 
permit the exercise of powers by a refusal to review cases 
where they are exercised. The practical importance of the 
supreme courts lies in their limitative function, their function 
as a restraint on the other organs of government. Their 
refusal to review governmental acts withdraws this limiting 
effect and serves as a license to other organs of government 
to expand the areas of their activities. 
Recently we have witnessed a change in the Supreme 
Court's attitudes which has permitted the expansion of 
governmental powers along the lines just suggested. The 
Supreme Court has swung over to a policy of lai:ssez faire 
in regard to the acts of other organs of government in our 
federal system.6 This policy has been variously called a policy 
of judicial self-limitation, a laissez-faire policy, and a hands-
off policy. However designated, this policy represents a 
reduction in the role of the Supreme Court as a check on the 
activities of other branches of government. The hands-off 
policy was a cardinal tenet of the Holmes constitutional 
philosophy. Its adoption by the "reconstituted Supreme 
6 The reasons for this hands-off policy cannot be better stated than in the 
words of Justice Holmes in his first opinion as a member of the Supreme 
Court: 
"While the courts must exercise a judgment of their own, it by no means 
is true that every law is void which may seem to the judges who pass upon 
it excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end, or based upon conceptions of morality 
with which they disagree. Considerable latitude must be allowed for differences 
of view as well as for possible peculiar conditions which this Court can know 
but imperfectly, if at all. Otherwise a constitution, instead of embodying only 
relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally understood by all English-
speaking communities, would become the partisan of a particular set of ethical 
or economic opinions, which by no means are held 'semper ubiqu~ et ab 
omnibus.'" Otis v. Parker, 18 U. S. 6o6 at 6o8-6o9 ( 1903). 
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Court" furnishes the explanation of most of the changes in 
the meaning of the Federal Constitution which have occurred 
since I937· The policy extends to the organs of the federal 
government and also to those of the states. It extends to 
legislative, executive, and administrative agencies alike. Only 
in regard to freedom of the mind and the personal guarantees 
has the opposed policy of close and strict interpretation of 
governmental powers been maintained. In the economic 
sphere, the hands-off policy prevails. Correlative to this 
hands-off policy of the Court, the powers of federal and 
state governments have expanded or been permitted to 
expand. Especially noteworthy has been the expansion of 
federal powers and functions; but the change has affected 
state powers significantly, too. The change has permitted a 
vastly increased governmental control over property, busi-
ness, and all forms of economic activity.7 
Sec. 7-38. Problems. I. Consider the following decision, 
rendered in I 87 5, in which Jessel, M. R., a famous English 
judge, works out the solution of a policy problem: 
"Now, it was said on the part of the Defendant, that such 
a contract as that which I have mentioned, a contract by which 
an inventor agrees to sell what he may invent, or acquire a 
patent for before he has invented it, is against public policy, 
and it was said to be against public policy, because it would 
discourage inventions; that if a man knows that he cannot 
obtain any pecuniary benefit from his invention, having al-
ready received the price for it, he will not invent, or if he 
does invent will keep it secret, and will not take out a patent. 
It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily 
those rules which say that a given contract is void as being 
against public policy, because if there is one thing which more 
than another public policy requires it is that men of full age 
and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty 
of contracting, and that their contracts when entered into 
. 
7 For the authorities on these various points, see the three notes for the 
Initiated Reader, attached to sec. 7-36. 
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freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and shall be 
enforced by Courts of justice. Therefore, you have this para-
mount public policy to consider-that you are not lightly to 
interfere with this freedom of contract. Now, there is no 
doubt public policy may say that a contract to commit a crime, 
or a contract to give a reward to another to commit a crime, 
is necessarily void. The decisions have gone further, and 
contracts to commit an immoral offence, or to give money or 
reward to another to commit an immoral offence, or to induce 
another to do something against the general rules of morality, 
though far more indefinite than the previous class, have 
always been held to be void .... Does any one imagine that 
it is against public policy for an artist to sell the picture which 
he has never painted or designed, or for the sculptor to sell 
the statue, the subject of which is to be hereafter given to 
him, or for the author to sell the copyright of the book, the 
title of which is even as yet unknown, or, more than that, that 
a contributor to a periodical may agree that he will devote 
himself to the exclusive service of a certain periodical for a 
given period, for a given reward? These examples are, to my 
mind, entirely repugnant to the argument that there is any 
public policy in prohibiting such contracts. On the contrary, 
public policy is the other way. It encourages the poor, needy, 
and struggling author or artist .... This appears to me to 
apply as much to a patent invention as to any other subject 
which the intellect can produce. A man who is a needy and 
struggling inventor may well agree either for a present pay-
ment in money down, or for an annual payment, to put his 
intellectual gifts at the service of a purchaser. I see, there-
fore, not only no rule of public policy against it, but a rule of 
public policy for it, because it may enable such a man in com-
parative ease and affluence to devote his attention to scientific 
research, whereas, if such a contract were prohibited he would 
be compelled to apply himself to some menial or mechanical 
or lower calling, in order to gain a livelihood." 1 
What three primary policies enter into the court's thinking 
here? How would you characterize these three policies m 
1 Printing and Numerical Registering Company v. Sampson ( 1 8 7 5) 1 9 
L. R. Eq. 462 at 465-466. 
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terms of social interests? Which of them receives the court's 
nod? Why? 
What is the practical bearing of this judge's statements 
that, "if there is one thing which more than another public 
policy requires it is that men of full age and competent 
understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting," 
and that "you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom 
of contract"? 
What different choice is made by a legislature which fixes 
statutory minimum wages and maximum hours; or by a 
legislature which prescribes the terms and provisions which 
shall and shall not be written into a fire insurance policy or 
a life insurance policy? 
2. In the following case, Mackay, J., of the Ontario High 
Court concluded that a particular kind of contractual clause 
was ineffective. Note the method which this judge followed 
in arriving at a principle of public policy to apply in the 
case before him. Where did he find this policy declared? In 
effect, who made the policy determination regarding race 
discrimination which Mackay, J., applied? 2 
"Application ... for a declaration that a certain restric-
tive covenant is void ... . 
"Mackay, J.: The restrictive covenant which is the subject 
of this proceeding and which by the deed aforesaid the 
grantee assumes and agrees to exact from his assigns, reads 
as follows: 'Land not to be sold to Jews, or to persons of 
objectionable nationality.' Counsel for the applicant seeks the 
discharge and removal of this covenant on these alternative 
grounds: first, that it is void as against public policy; ... 
The matter before me, so defined, appears to raise issues of 
first impression because a search of the case law of Great 
Britain and of Canada does not reveal any reported decision 
which would be of direct assistance in this proceeding .... 
"The applicant's argument is founded on the legal prin-
ciple, briefly stated in 7 Hals. (2nd ed.), pp. 153-4, that: 
2 Re Drummond Wren [1945] 4 D. L. R. 674. 
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'Any agreement which tends to be injurious to the public or 
against the public good is void as being contrary to public 
policy.' ... 
"It is a well-recognized rule that Courts may look at 
various Dominion and Provincial Acts and public law as an 
aid in determining principles relative to public policy: See 
Walkerville Brewing Co. v. Mayrand, [I929] 2 D. L. R., 
63 0. L. R. 573· 
"First and of profound significance is the recent San 
Francisco Charter, to which Canada was a signatory, and 
which the Dominion Parliament has now ratified. The pre-
amble to this Charter reads in part as follows: 
"'We the peoples of the United Nations determined to 
save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which 
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, 
and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the 
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights 
of men and women and of nations large and small ... and 
for these ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace 
with one another as good neighbors. . . .' 
"Under Articles I and 55 of this Charter, Canada is 
pledged to promote 'universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
. distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.' 
"In the Atlantic Charter to which Canada has subscribed, 
the principles of freedom from fear and freedom of worship 
are recognized. 
"Section I of the Racial Discrimination Act provides: 
" '1 . No person shall,-
" ' (a) publish or display or cause to be published or dis-
played; or 
" '(b) permit to be published or displayed on lands or 
premises or in a newspaper, through a radio broadcasting 
station or by means of any other medium which he owns or 
controls, any notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other represen-
tation indicating discrimination or an intention to discriminate 
against any person or any class of persons for any purpose 
because of the race or creed of such person or class of persons.' 
"The Provincial Legislature further has expressed itself 
in the Insurance Act, R. S. 0. I937, c. 256, s. 99, as follows: 
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'Any licensed insurer which discriminates unfairly between 
risks within Ontario because of the race or religion of the 
insured shall be guilty of an offence.' 
"Moreover, under s. 6 of the Regulations passed pursuant 
to the Community Halls Act, now R. S. 0. 1937, c. 284, it 
is provided that 'Every hall erected under this Act shall be 
available for any public gathering of an educational, fraternal, 
religious or social nature or for the discussion of any public 
question, and no organization shall be denied the use of the 
hall for religious, fraternal, or political reasons.' 
"Proceeding from the general to the particular, the argu-
ment of the applicant is that the impugned covenant is void 
because it is injurious to the public good. This deduction is 
grounded on the fact that the covenant against sale to Jews 
or to persons of objectionable nationality prevents the par-
ticular piece of land from ever being acquired by the persons 
against whom the covenant is aimed, and that this prohibition 
is without regard to whether the land is put to residential, 
commercial, industrial or any other use. How far this is 
obnoxious to public policy can only be ascertained by project-
ing the coverage of the covenant with respect both to the 
classes of persons whom it may adversely affect, and to the 
lots or subdivisions of land to which it may be attached. So 
considered, the consequences of judicial approbation of such 
a covenant are portentous. If sale of a piece of land can be 
prohibited to Jews, it can equally be prohibited to Protes-
tants, Catholics, or other groups or denominations. If the sale 
of one piece of land can be so prohibited, the sale of other 
pieces of land can likewise be prohibited. In my opinion, 
nothing could be more calculated to create or deepen divisions 
between existing religious and ethnic groups in this Province, 
or in this country, than the sanction of a method of land 
transfer which would permit the segregation and confinement 
of particular groups to particular business or residential areas, 
or conversely, would exclude particular groups from par-
ticular business or residential areas. The unlikelihood of such 
a policy as a legislative measure is evident from the contrary 
intention of the recently enacted Racial Discrimination Act, 
and the judicial branch of government must take full cog-
nizance of such factors. 
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"Ontario, and Canada too, may well be termed a Province, 
and a country, of minorities in regard to the religious and 
ethnic groups which live therein. It appears to me to be a 
moral duty, at least, to lend aid to all forces of cohesion, and 
similarly to repel all fissiparous tendencies which would im-
peril national unity. The common law Courts have, by their 
actions over the years, obviated the need for rigid consti-
tutional guarantees in our policy by their wise use of the 
doctrine of public policy as an active agent in the promotion 
of the public weal. While Courts and eminent Judges have, 
in view of the powers of our legislatures, warned against 
inventing new heads of public policy, I do not conceive that 
I would be breaking new ground were I to hold the restrictive 
covenant impugned in this proceeding to be void as against 
public policy. Rather would I be applying well-recognized 
principles of public policy to a set of facts requiring their 
invocation in the interest of the public good. 
"That the restrictive covenant in this case is directed in the 
first place against Jews lends poignancy to the matter when 
one considers that anti-semitism has been a weapon in the 
hands of our recently-defeated enemies and the scourge of 
the world. But this feature of the case does not require 
innovation in legal principle to strike down the covenant; it 
merely makes it more appropriate to apply existing prin-
ciples .... 
"My conclusion therefore is that the covenant is void 
because offensive to the public policy of this jurisdiction. This 
conclusion is reinforced, if reinforcement is necessary, by the 
wide official acceptance of international policies and declara-
tions frowning on the type of discrimination which the cove-
nant would seem to perpetuate .... 
"An order will therefore go declaring that the restrictive 
covenant attacked by the applicant is void and of no effect. 
"Order declaring covenant void." 3 
3 A similar result was reached by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U. S. 24 ( 1948). The court based the result on a con-
struction of the Civil Rights Act as well as on a public policy of the United 
States. See also Shelley v. Kraemer, 3 34 U. S. r ( 1948), where the court held 
that enforcement of such covenants by state courts was prohibited by the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See discussion of these cases 
in 46 MICH. L. REV. 978 (1948). 
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3· Miller v. Schoene.4 By statute of Virginia, an adminis-
trative officer was authorized to order the destruction of red 
cedar trees as a means of preventing a disease called "cedar 
rust" which grows at one stage on cedar trees, and which 
infects, and injures apple trees at another stage. The cedars 
were valuable for ornament and for lumber. Apple-growing 
was one of the principal businesses of the state. The owner 
of some cedar trees, ordered to be destroyed, challenged the 
validity of the statute and the order made thereunder. The 
Supreme Court held that the statute and o'rder were not 
invalid under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Stone, J ., delivered the opinion of the Court. In part he 
said: 
"On the evidence we may accept the conclusion of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals that the state was under the 
necessity of making a choice between the preservation of one 
class of property and that of the other wherever both existed 
in dangerous proximity. It would have been none the less a 
choice if, instead of enacting the present statute, the state, 
by doing nothing, had permitted serious injury to the.apple 
orchards within its borders to go on unchecked. When forced 
to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional 
powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of 
property in order to save another which, in the judgment of 
the legislature, is of greater value to the public. It will not 
do to say that the case is merely one of a conflict of two 
private interests and that the misfortune of apple growers 
may not be shifted to cedar owners by ordering the destruc-
tion of their property; for it is obvious that there may be, and 
that here there is, a preponderant public concern in the 
preservation of the one interest over the other." 
Here the legislature makes the primary choice between 
competing policies; and then what follows? What is the role 
of the Supreme Court? How does it enter the picture? 
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4· Hoff v. State of New York. 5 Read again the report of 
this case as set out in section 5-13, problem 3· 
What is the principal policy which the court works out 
here? Where does the court discover this policy? In Article I, 
Section 4, of the Constitution of New York? In the statutes 
referred to? Outside of either constitution or statute? 
What bearing upon the decision of the case has the court's 
view that "Our constitutional guarantees of liberty are 
merely empty words unless a person imprisoned or detained 
against his will may challenge the legality of his imprison-
ment and detention"? 
What is the role of the writ of habeas corpus in relation 
to this policy? What is the role of the action in the present 
case? What is the relevance of the judge's view that "The 
writ of habeas corpus is the process devised centuries ago for 
the protection of free men. It has been cherished by genera-
tions of free men who had learned by experience that it 
furnished the only reliable protection of their freedom."? 
Sec. 7-39. Effects of policy-makers' attitudes. In our time, 
there has been much talk about the attitudes of the individual, 
and about the sum total of his attitudes, which is commonly 
called his "personality." This kind of talk has been a natural 
consequence of the current scientific interest in social psy-
chology. The purport of this talk is that the actor's attitudes 
are determinative of everything he does, explain what he 
does and, if known, put one in a position to guess what he 
will do. In this connection, I am reminded of a popular story 
about the late laconic Calvin Coolidge. He had been to 
church and was asked what the sermon was about. He an-
swered, "About sin." When further pressed to know what 
the preacher had said about this interesting subject, he 
answered tersely, "He was agin it." This last was enough 
to describe the preacher's general readiness to act by word 
5 
"79 N.Y. 490 (1939). 
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or deed in opposition to sin; it gave a good idea of the kind 
of man he was and what to expect from him. 
Analysis in terms of attitudes and personality has been 
especially common in discussions of the judicial process. It is 
urged that the judge's personality shapes and determines the 
ways in which he decides cases.1 And, of course, the same 
type of analysis can be applied to the policy maker. His own 
attitudes can be viewed as prime determinants of the policies 
and methods as well as the specific patterns of behavior which 
he puts into the form of law. I have already referred to the 
importance of the attitudes of the Supreme Court and their 
effects on the determination of policy.2 Other instances in 
which the attitudes of individual officials have counted in 
the determination of policy come readily to mind.3 Chief 
Justice Marshall's views and attitudes played an enormous 
part in shaping our federal government and the role which 
it was to play. He believed firmly in the need to maintain 
a strong central government. He dominated the Supreme 
Court, and through its decisions made possible the widest 
exercise of federal powers and functions. One can hardly 
imagine what the present condition of this country would 
be if Roane or some other strong protagonist of state's rights 
had sat on the Supreme Court instead of Marshall. As 
Professor Ross has said, personal ascendancy is not yet a 
neglectable quantity "even in the rigid articulated mechan-
ism of the 'legal state.' Despite its statutory framework, an 
office bulges when filled by the man of command, shrinks 
when occupied by mediocrity." 4 In our own recent history 
we have an outstanding instance of what Ross has in mind. 
1 See FRANK, LAW AND THE MoDERN MIND (1930). 
2 See sec. 7-3 7, ad fin. 
3 Jefferson's views, and Jackson's likewise, strongly affected the course 
of American policy, and the attitudes and beliefs of various legislators have 
been equally influential. 
4 SociAL CONTROL 289 ( 19oo). To much the same effect is Emerson's 
dictum, "An institution is the lengthened shadow of one man." (THE EssAY 
ON SELF-RELIANCE 19 (1905).) 
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Whether or not one likes the policies pursued or the methods 
used by the late President Roosevelt, one can hardly deny 
the importance of his contributions both in promoting new 
policies and in putting them into effect. He not only fathered 
important legislation, but by appointing judges to the Su-
preme Court whose views coincided with his own, he com-
pletely changed the Court's attitudes on the interpretation 
of the Federal Constitution and insured the great mass of 
New Deal legislation against the threat of constitutional 
attack. 
But not every would-be policy-maker's attitude is decisive 
in this way. To say that the policy-maker's attitude is decisive 
of policies adopted can lead to a gross misunderstanding. In 
our system, more than one person, and usually more than 
one agency, normally participates in any policy-making act. 
To say that we have a communist in Congress does not 
mean that his attitudes result in the adoption of communist 
policies by the government. The fact that we have a con-
servative or a radical member of the Supreme Court does 
not necessarily mean that his policy views will attain recog-
nition in the decisions of the whole court. Justice Holmes 
was for many years vainly urging on the court the adoption 
of policies which the majority of his brethren could not share. 
Only after he had left the Court, and after the President 
had "reconstituted" it, did Holmes' views receive a majority 
sanction.5 So that when we speak of the policy-maker's atti-
tude, as determinative of policy, we must always remember 
that this means some policy-makers' views, not every policy-
maker's view, and that the policy maker whose views are 
5 It seems to me that not infrequently the assertion that the judge decides 
as he chooses is made by persons who overlook or neglect this collective aspect 
of his work. His judgment must not only satisfy the individual judge himself, 
but be rationalized in a form which will receive the approval of enough of his 
brethren to constitute the majority of a court. (However, see what is said in 
the sixth paragraph of sec. 3-r 8 regarding the possibility of "one-man" 
opinions.) Only relatively minor matters are decided by the single judge, and 
usually any decision is subject to the scrutiny of some larger group. 
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expressed in binding form must usually have the concurrence 
of a substantial number of his brethren in order to make his 
views operative. 
Sec. 7-40. Influence of others on policy makers. No one 
can deny that what an actor does depends on what he is. 
But some writers seem inclined to use the explanation in 
terms of existing attitudes as if it were final and complete. 
As a matter of fact, attitudes do not serve as a final explana-
tion; they merely explain action in terms of readiness to act. 
They are like the old explanation of gravitation in terms of 
a quality of heaviness. Such explanations only invite further 
investigation. Existing attitudes can be explained in terms of 
the general experience and background of the actor; they 
can be explained in terms of his native endowment. Together, 
these factors make the actor what he is and determine his 
present: attitudes. Furthermore, action is aroused by specific 
experiences, and these large! y determine the direction of 
action; so that the actor's attitudes do not furnish a com-
plete explanation. Not only is it important to realize that 
an actor is prepared to act in a certain way, it is also 
important to realize that his action requires some specific 
new experience to set it off, and determine its direction. 
The actor's readiness to act may be compared to a pistol 
that is loaded. The pistol is ready to shoot, but some other 
agency must pull the trigger and determine the direction of 
shooting. All of which brings us to the point to which I am 
leading: every actor's action and its course is determined 
partly by the kind of man he is, but it is determined also by 
the acts and suggestions of others. What others do and say, 
influence the actor both in regard to what he does and what 
he says. He receives from them both information and stimu-
lation. 
The policy maker obtains both information and inspiration 
from others. These others may be within the governmental 
LEGAL POLICIES AND POLICY MAKING 547 
system, as where the President suggests the passage of a law 
to Congress, or they may be on the outside of government, 
and simply offer ideas, as writers like Pound and Wigmore 
have done in our day. In a very broad sense, all persons who 
contribute either suggestions or knowledge which influences 
the policy maker can be regarded as sources of the policies 
which he adopts. 
I have already suggested several sources of this sort which 
may affect the policy maker's choice of policies. First is an 
inventory of policies, adopted by other policy makers. This 
can serve him as a source of suggestions upon which to draw 
if he chooses.1 Jefferson and Hamilton contributed more or 
less informal statements of this sort; they formulated the 
political policies and ideas which the fathers of our country 
later embodied in our Federal Constitution, and which Con-
gress and the courts later applied in its application and inter-
pretation. And behind these two writers stood others here 
and abroad, from whom they had borrowed their ideas. 
Second is a general picture of what the lawmaker should 
try to do. This kind of suggestion offers him a general point 
of view or approach, if he is seeking to orient himself with 
reference to his job. The general picture which I presented 
was that of Pound/ but many other such pictures have been 
developed and presented in the past by legal writers and 
legal philosophers. Third, there are more or less specific 
criteria of choice to be found in the writings of persons inside 
and outside of government. One finds in judicial opinions and 
theoretical writings suggestions that moral considerations are 
to be placed above economic; that economic interests are to 
be preferred to aesthetic; that protection of the person is to 
be considered ahead of protection of property; and two such 
criteria of choice which we have already discussed, that free-
dom of the mind is more important than freedom in the 
1 See sec. 7-2.5. 
2 See sec. 7-2.6. 
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economic sphere, and that freedom is the rule and restraint 
the exception.3 None of these suggestions is really coercive 
as far as the policy maker is concerned.4 At most, a suggestion 
of this sort can serve as advice to him. The available forms 
of suggestion are so varied and take so many forms that 
the policy maker can make almost any choice he wants. He 
chooses a policy which accords with his attitudes provided 
he can find one. 
The reason why the policy maker relies on others to for-
mulate and suggest policies is not hard to understand. Not 
many policy makers are prepared to do this kind of work 
for themselves. Ideas originate with individuals as all inven-
tion does. Invention may consist in the development of new 
methods and ideas. It may consist of a new and better formu-
lation of what is implicit in existing methods and ideas. But 
originality is a rare commodity among us; it is not given 
to many to invent new policies or methods. One can hardly 
expect the average legislature to contain legal philosophers, 
or the average court to be manned by creative geniuses. As 
a rule, busy legislatures and courts have no time to think 
out new policies or ends. As Lord Halsbury said, "I deny 
that any Court can invent a new head of public policy." 5 
And even more, it holds true that one cannot expect much 
in the way of novelty or invention from the legislative law-
3 See sees. 7-3 6 and 7-3 7. 
4 We have already considered coercive suggestions. These are the legal pat-
terns for his act, such as the constitutional framework which controls the 
legislature's choices, and the rules of judicial lawmaking and constitutional and 
statutory interpretation which control the choices which a· court may make. 
5 Janson v. Driefontien Mines [1902] 2 K. B. 311. Probably Lord Halsbury 
meant by this statement that courts lacked the legal power rather than the 
factual ability to invent new policies. On the other hand, however, Stone 
expresses the view that courts can and do exercise this power when it is 
necessary, only he thinks the necessity to invent is very rare because of the broad 
scope of the policies which have already been recognized. He says: 
"If 'heads of public policy' be understood, as Lord Wright has hinted, to 
refer merely to the kind of interest protected, the wide scope of such heads 
will help us to see why he thought that the invention of new heads was almost 
'inconceivable.'" STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 501 (1946). 
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maker. All our lawmaking agencies derive almost all their 
ideas regarding policies and methods either from the legal 
tradition or from the suggestions of nonofficial individuals or 
writers of today. 
Sec. 7-4r. Group influence on policy makers. Just as the 
policy maker may borrow ideas from preceding policy makers 
and from individuals and writers, he may borrow from the 
usages of some other institutional group. Acting on the state's 
behalf, the policy maker makes the policy or standard of a 
nonlegal group a state policy. This process of borrowing 
standards often occurs in the case of practices of business and 
professional groups. The legal ways of dealing with com-
mercial paper, for example, have for the most part been 
drawn from the usages of bankers and businessmen. The 
latter serve as sources of law, to use a conventional phrase, 
and thus a coincidence of standards results. Or the legal 
system may undertake to effectuate a policy which prevails 
in many churches and families-it may forbid dealings in 
intoxicants; it may pass a prohibition law. One of the most 
common instances in which our law has borrowed its policies 
and standards from other social institutions, such as the 
church and the family, has been the case of proper sex 
behavior. Here one finds many laws enforcing socially estab-
lished standards of behavior, such as laws prohibiting sex 
intercourse between unmarried persons, penalizing acts con-
tributing to the delinquency of children, forbidding the 
dissemination of obscene literature, and forbidding indecent 
exposure of the person. 
An organized group, such as an association of farmers, 
workmen, manufacturers, professional men, or war veterans 
may do more than suggest policies to the policy maker or 
offer him ideas for adoption; it may exert a positive political 
pressure on the policy maker and exert a decisive control 
over the policies which the policy maker and other officials 
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pursue.1 This can be done by democratic methods, as by put-
ting representatives in the "seats of the mighty," or by exert-
ing political pressure on those who occupy such seats. Or it 
can be done by methods which are illicit, as by bribery or 
corrupt bargains. Either way the group's policy becomes the 
policy of the state. The governmental machinery is made to 
serve as an instrument for effecting the particular policies 
of the dominant group. The latter can enact laws in its own 
interest, apply and enforce existing laws in a self-serving 
manner, or spend public funds for its own advantage. Usually 
this type of domination is partial only; a group merely obtains 
certain laws or other measures through its influence over the 
legislature or other officials. Up to a certain point we look 
upon the exertion of group influence as a normal phenomenon 
in our democracy. In fact we rely upon the conflicting and 
countervailing selfish interests of different groups to offset 
and check one another through democratic processes. But 
beyond a certain point, we regard the exertion of political 
pressure and the exploitation of influence with governmental 
agencies as a misuse of power for particular group advantage. 
It is not easy to make the distinction in practice. For our 
present purpose we need do no more than suggest that the 
distinction can be made and that it is a matter of degree. 
A more radical kind of group domination appears where 
a military clique, or a popular mob, or a patriotic group 
forcibly seizes political power by revolution.2 We have had 
only one such revolution in this country, that by which our 
ties with Great Britain were severed. This kind of change 
usually involves some important alterations of policies and 
methods, and a sweeping displacement of top officials. But 
1 Of course individuals as such may do all these things; but usually indi-
viduals lead or organize groups and, through control of the latter, exercise 
control over larger organized groups like the state. 
2 The slaveholding group of the southern states seized power therein at the 
outset of the Civil War, and attempted to sever connections between the Con-
federate States and the United States; but this group was ultimately vanquished 
by the power of the United States. 
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even the promoters of revolution do not usually attempt to 
destroy the going state and create another in its place.3 
Instead, they substitute new pilots who will steer the ship 
of state on a different course. 
Sec. 7-42. Social and historical determinants-stability 
in state policies. The great mass of behavior patterns in any 
community, including methods of doing things and policy 
notions, are handed down from the past. They are passed 
along from generation to generation. In this sense, our ways 
and policies of today are fixed and determined by our fore-
fathers. We have many of ours, for example our notions of 
the importance of liberty and personal security, from our 
colonial ancestors and their English forebears. Our ways and 
policy notions are explainable in terms of the evolution of 
the civilization in which we live.* They represent the expe-
rience of previous ages in regard to ways of living and the 
ends of various kinds of activity. 
These traditional patterns of behavior and traditional no-
tions of policy are built into each individual by training and 
education. They become part of the individual's habits of 
action and modes of thought. Aristotle, one of the greatest 
political thinkers of all time, accepted slavery as an institution, 
3 Occasionally a revolution has aimed to obliterate an existing state organiza-
tion and to replace it with a new organization of its own. This was true of the 
Communist Revolution in Russia, which aimed to make a complete change 
and was successful in so doing. The first French Revolution also made, tem-
porarily, an almost complete substitution. In this instance, however, the old 
state organization was restored after a time; later revolutionary changes of 
government in France have been of the character mentioned in the text. 
* ( I.R.) This fact was built up into a complete theory of legal development, 
by a "historical school" of jurists of the nineteenth century. According to their 
view law is nothing but "the jural form of the habits, usages and thoughts 
of a people" (Carter). "Throughout, it (law) is the product of silently work-
ing forces, not of the arbitrary will of a law giver" (Savigny). "Law is 
conceived as self-generative, evolving its rules in the form of customs without 
the interposition of conscious human agency or choice" (Dickinson). See 
critical discussion of this view by Dickinson, "The Law Behind Law," 2.9 
CoL. L. REV. 113, 285 (1929) and items by Pound and Cardozo, cited therein; 
and extensive analysis of views of the "historical school" by STONE, PROVINCE 
AND FUNCTION OF LAW 42. I et seq, ( 1946). 
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and concluded that it was based on a sound policy. He main-
tained that: 
"He who by nature is not his own but another's and yet 
a man, is by nature a slave. . . . But is there anyone thus 
intended by nature to be a slave, and for whom such a con-
dition is expedient and right, or rather is not all slavery a 
violation of nature? There is no difficulty in answering this 
question, on the grounds both of reason and of fact. For that 
some should rule, and others be ruled, is a thing, not only 
necessary, but expedient; from the hour of their birth, some 
are marked for subjection, others for rule." He concluded 
that "some are by nature free, and others, slaves." 1 
Human slavery depends on a complex set of legal arrange-
ments. Can anyone doubt that Aristotle's opinions of human 
slavery and the legal arrangements connected with it would 
have been different, if he had been brought up in the United 
States today? 
What is true of individuals generally is, of course, true 
of the individuals who happen to become policy makers. It 
is true of the individuals collectively who constitute smaller 
groups, and true of the members of the all-inclusive group 
which we call a community or society. Behavior patterns of 
past generations become the behavior patterns of today. They 
represent habits and points of view common to the members 
of the community, and common to the present community 
and its predecessors. 
When we put the contribution of today's lawmaker along-
side this mass of traditional patterns of behavior and tradi-
tional notions of policy, his accomplishments appear relatively 
small. His creative role seems to be almost negligible. The 
great stream of behavior patterns, standards, and policies, 
flows by the lawmaker almost untouched and unchanged; 
his acts are like bursting bubbles on the surface of the stream. 
1 JoWETT, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 7-9 (1885). 
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He takes for granted most of his social heritage, and tacitly 
accepts it; even when he undertakes to make changes, he 
weaves his innovation out of old material. The traditional 
material which forms his cultural background embraces three 
elements which it will be useful for our purpose to differ-
entiate: the folkways, the mores, and the legal traditions of 
the community. 
The first of the traditional patterns of behavior are the 
folkways, to use the now familiar terminology of Sumner.2 
These patterns of behavior are habitual and common to a 
group of persons. As Sumner observes, folkways are habits 
for the individual and customs for the group. Examples of 
folkways are the practice of sleeping in beds, of sitting in 
chairs, of wearing buttons on coat sleeves, of having notches 
on men's coat collars, and so on.3 These common modes of 
behavior grew up unplanned and unnoticed by those persons 
whose behavior conforms to them. Neither the lawmaker 
nor anyone else has anything to do with their origin.4 Since 
they arise and are followed without intention and without 
thinking, they do not involve any policy factors. 
The second traditional factor consists of what are called 
mores.5 These develop out of the folkways. 
"People are caught in the folkways before they know it. 
Whenever they become aware of the fact that they are 'in' 
the folkways, and criticize them and approve them, and 
continue to follow them, these folkways become 'mores.' 
2 See generally on the subject matter of this and the following paragraph, 
SUMNER, FOLKWAYS (1906). 
3 COOLEY, ANGELL, and CARR, INTRODUCTORY SOCIOLOGY 94 (1933). 
4 Lumley thus summarizes the doctrine of Sumner regarding the origin 
and nature of folkways: "People have similar individual needs and begin to 
satisfy them in similar ways in the same environment. This procedure makes 
folkways. The people did not intend to make folkways; they intended to 
satisfy their personal needs. But in doing this, they acted uniformly, repeti-
tiously; they made mass action." (MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 5, 6 (I 9Z 5). 
5 
"Mores" is the plural of a Latin word whose singular is mos, meaning 
custom. 
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The mores are those folkways which have been examined, 
judged useful and beneficial, and made into approved activity 
patterns." 6 
These differ from the folkways simply in the sense that 
individuals or groups discover a purpose or policy behind 
these ways, and accept this purpose or policy as the reason 
for following them. But, as with the folkways, one cannot 
point to any definite person or place of origin; their begin-
ning is like that of ancient hymns and folksongs, cloaked by 
the veil of anonymity. The important feature of the mores 
is that they stand as guides for action. They are standards 
of behavior. And as the need for observance comes to be 
felt more strongly, these mores are adopted and backed up 
by various social institutions. At this point, our lawmaker 
may enter the picture. He may draw legal standards from 
the mores. The recent prohibition law stands as a good 
example of the fact that laws can be built on the ways of 
behavior (abstinence) which are regarded as right by a sub-
stantial part of the community, and be imposed on the rest 
of the community as the legally approved and sanctioned 
way of behavior. And the lawmaker may overrule the mores 
in part, as he did by the prohibition legislation which cut 
across the established ways of persons inclined to imbibe. 
For the most part, however, he does not disturb the mores. 
They are significant simply as aids in the job of social control, 
created and kept going by agencies entirely outside the legal 
system. 
Finally, established law and legal ends constitute part of 
the traditional background of the policy maker. Here, I 
would include the constitutions, the statutes, the common 
law, established rules of method, and notions of what all 
these legal devices are for. 7 I would include also the works 
. 
6 LUMLEY, MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 6 (1925). 
7 As regards the nature and functions of the established legal context or 
background, see sees. 5-12, 5-16, 5-17, and 6-oi et seq. 
LEGAL POLICIES AND POLICY MAKING 555 
of text writers and legal theorists. But someone may ask, 
are not the first mentioned items binding law, and not merely 
tradition? That they are binding cannot, of course, be denied, 
but that they are also part of the legal tradition is no less 
true. That they are binding simply means that they are a 
special part of the tradition to be accepted by Tom, Dick 
and Harry, and not disregarded as lightly as other traditional 
material may be. Our Constitution was adopted over a century 
and a half ago, and with a few changes is still operating. 
Many statutes have a like age, and normally, statutes continue 
to operate until changed. The common law is a continuous 
body of legal ideas, legal rules and legal methods, beginning 
in England and running down to today. The lawmaker of 
the present does not create or change any substantial part 
of his legal background; he accepts it and takes it for granted. 
It constitutes his stock of legal ideas. 
When the lawmaker does undertake to create novel stand-
ards or strike out on new paths of policy, he cannot depart 
far from the traditional. Especially the judicial lawmaker 
hesitates to reach beyond the old material; his traditional 
methods require him to stick to hallowed principles and create 
as little as possible. And the legislative lawmaker is definitely . 
a child of his day. He enacts standards and pursues ends 
which are already well known and commonly recognized. 
He reworks and clarifies traditional ideas. He introduces 
novelty in detail or manner of statement. He combines old 
elements in a new way. He borrows a novel idea from some 
thinker. But this modern Aristotle is himself limited by 
the notions of methods and policy of the community in which 
he lives. Neither he nor the legislator who follows him can 
raise himself far above the traditional ideas with which he 
has been indoctrinated.8 
8 But our appreciation of the import of the traditional factors in the shaping 
of policies and standards must not lead us to deny entirely the creative contribu-
tions of legislator and judge. These are most important, too. See chapters 4, 
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It is this traditional element, this legal lore, inert and 
built into members of the community, which gives stability 
to law, to legal institutions, to legal policies. Like habits 
generally, this built-in element is stable and hard to change. 
It represents the cumulative contributions of past generations 
to the ways and the ideals of the present. It adds certainty 
to your calculations and mine because we know how other 
people think and feel; and we know because we think and 
feel the same way as they do, having been trained in the 
same legal culture. 9 
Sec. 7-43. Change in state policies. Generally, policies 
are inherited, as we have just seen. But conditions change, 
and different policies become necessary. It is not only impor-
tant to appreciate and formulate the policies that have been 
handed down from the past, it is important to see the need 
5, and 6, and also the next section. On this point Justice Cardozo has well said: 
"Savigny's conception of law as something realized without struggle or 
aim or purpose, a process of silent growth, the fruition in life and manners 
of a people's history and genius, gives a picture incomplete and partial. It is 
true if we understand it to mean that the judge in shaping the rules of law 
must heed the mores of his day. It is one-sided and therefore false in so far as 
it implies that the mores of the day automatically shape rules which, full-
grown and ready made, are handed to the judge. • • . The standards or 
patterns of utility and morals will be found by the judge in the life of the 
community. They will be found in the same way by the legislator. That does 
not mean, however, that the work of the one, any more than that of the other 
is a replica of nature's forms." NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 104-105 
(1921). 
And Dickinson adds that the judges "do not create the materials out of which 
the new rule is built, but they use them, select, reject, combine, emphasize, 
in short give form and life to them, as their personality and intellectual equip-
ment dictate; and if this is not creative activity, no creative activity is per-
formed by human beings." "The Law Behind Law," 29 CoL. L. REV. 2.84 
at 305 (1929). 
For a full discussion of the point here made, see the items by Cardozo and 
Dickinson here cited as well as the items by Pound and Stone referred to in 
note * above. 
9 Of course, the legislator or judge may leave the existing order untouched 
because he does not think of the possibility of changing it; or he may leave 
it untouched because he regards stability as a desirable end. These two atti-
tudes must not be confused. The intentional support of stability is involved in 
the recognition of social interests in peace and order, in security of acquisitions, 
and security of transactions. 
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for changes in them. This is normally the work of individual 
theorists and writers. Such men are the first to appreciate 
that certain policies need to be served and are not being 
served, or that existing standards do not serve the needs 
that they are intended to serve. They formulate new policies 
and measures to meet the needs of the day. They study past 
lore in order to learn what changes need to be made. 
The state and other social institutions have special agencies 
to formulate, declare and effectuate their policies. One of 
the prime functions of these agencies is to make changes, 
when, as and if policy changes are needed. In the words of 
Cardozo, "Through one agency or another, either by statute 
or by decision, rules, however well established, must be 
revised when they are found after fair trial to be inconsistent 
in their workings with an attainment of the ends which law 
is meant to serve." 1 And I would add that these agencies 
are intended to act no less when it is necessary to change 
the ends which law has served in the past. To some extent, 
the changes in policies and methods are made without a full 
awareness of what is occurring. The policy maker passes a 
new statute, for example, to meet a specific need, and does 
not realize that he is departing from the policies of the past. 
The policy maker only realizes the direction he is following 
when some individual thinker becomes aware of the discrep-
ancy between the traditional formulation of policy and the 
actual policies which are being pursued. Such a writer calls 
the discrepancy to the attention of the policy makers, and 
reformulates the policy of the time. But usually the function 
of the writer who studies policy changes is not merely to 
call attention to a change which has already come about. It 
is rather to call attention of policy makers to changes which 
need to be made in order to meet changed conditions. For 
example, the inequality of bargaining power in employer-
1 THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 120 ( 1924), 
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employee relations was first talked about by theoretical 
writers and social reformers. It was thereafter recognized 
by many legislatures in social legislation, and lastly recog-
nized by the judiciary which held a restraining hand on the 
policies that could be adopted under our constitutions. 
It takes time for new policies to pass through this process 
of discovery, formulation, and adoption. There is always a 
strong tendency to adhere to the old. This is just another 
way of saying that habit and custom are strong. It is always 
hard to break their shackles. The leader in the policy field 
must overcome blind inertia and the tendency to adhere to 
what has always been done. Policy makers are not ready to 
accept forthwith suggested changes. There is always a space 
of time between someone's perception of a need and the 
recognition of this need by the policy makers of society. This 
period of delay is commonly called the cultural lag. Changes 
in law, like changes in all other forms of control in society, 
are subject to this lag. Law and legal policies always tend 
to fall behind the times. 
However, policies are never completely stable. No list of 
policies is good for all time. Not only does any list of policies 
change with circumstances, but the emphasis on particular 
policies shifts as different social conditions develop. The 
history of our Western civilization shows striking changes 
in the policies professed by government. Four stages in the 
conscious thinking about the end of law are differentiated 
by Pound.2 
Primitive government has acted chiefly to keep order. Its 
primary function has been the preservation of public peace. 
Its aim, explicit or implicit, has been to prevent open fighting 
among clans and other groups. In our attempts to regulate 
employee-employer relations, we are today in approximately 
this primitive stage of legal control. We have not yet reached 
2 INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 72 et seq. (1922). 
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the stage where other ends than the· public order weigh 
heavily in the solution of conflict. In general, the victory is 
allowed to go to the side with the greater economic power-
so long as violence does not occur.3 Much the same observa-
tions can be made regarding efforts to regulate the field of 
international relations.4 Conflicts in this sphere are not settled 
on the basis of fairness but on the basis of power and danger 
to the public peace. There is no effective superstate, and 
whatever check is exerted in the name of law is put forth 
chiefly to forestall open warfare between states. 
At another stage in political development, peace and order 
are expanded to include the security of acquisitions and the 
security of transactions.5 But even in this stage the state does 
not look far beyond considerations of stability and security. 
The general function of the state and its legal system may 
be summed up in terms of security, or of preservation of the 
status quo. 
At a later stage, at least in the history of western European 
and Anglo-American legal systems, the emphasis shifts to 
the individual life, and particularly to individual liberty. The 
role of the law is conceived in a negative way. The function 
of the state is supposed to be to secure to each individual the 
maximum of liberty consistent with the like liberty of all. 
This was the period of history in which our American republic 
was born. This conception of state and legal function dictated 
many of the clauses of our constitutions; these instruments 
are replete with guarantees of individual liberty and security, 
all framed under the influence of the general idea that gov-
ernment is a necessary evil to be kept within fixed and narrow 
limits. 
3 Brandeis, J., dissenting in Duplex v. Deering, 2.54 U. S. 443 at 488 
(I 9 2 I), refers to this aspect of labor disputes, and suggests that it is possible 
"to substitute processes of justice for the more primitive method of trial 
by combat." 
4 See sec. 7-3 2.. 
5 See sees. 7-oS, 7-I4, and 7-I5. 
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Since the turn of the century our ideas of state policy have 
taken on a more social color. This does not mean that former 
conceptions of state objectives have been abandoned. It only 
means that they have been qualified and supplemented by 
a new stress on the general welfare. In the last century, the 
United States was predominantly rural and largely undevel-
oped. Goods were usually produced and consumed in the 
same locality; problems of transportation and marketing were 
relatively simple. The main objective of the government was 
to encourage the settlement and development of the country. 
Individual initiative could be relied upon to bring this about; 
the philosophy of liberty was an excellent philosophy for an 
age of discoverers and colonizers, as Pound has said. But the 
situation today is radically different and a different philos-
ophy is required. Our country has become predominantly 
urban, highly industrialized, and overcrowded in major areas. 
Account has to be taken of the integrated processes of produc-
tion, the complicated and extended lines of transportation, 
the delicate balance between markets and the supply of goods, 
and the effects of these complexities on the persons involved 
in them and on the community at large. There has been 
accordingly a shift of emphasis from problems of develop-
ment to problems of evolving fair methods of producing 
goods and fair methods of distributing them. In putting more 
stress on these problems and in expressing this in the objec-
tives which it attempts to achieve, the state today is simply 
responding to the conditions of our time.6 
The policy maker must be always on the alert to make 
changes in our legal system as they are needed. History needs 
to be studied for what it can teach, but the hand of the past 
should not hold us to a helpless adherence to what is out-
6 There are the questions, too, how far and how fast to go in substituting 
social effort for individual effort. Many lawyers, judges, and other solid 
thinkers believe that we have been moving too far too fast lately in the 
direction of socialization. 
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dated. Holmes has expressed this notion in the following 
felicitous language: 
"The rational study of law is still to a large extent the 
study of history. History must be a part of the study, because 
without it we cannot know the precise scope of rules which 
it is our business to know. It is a part of the rational study, 
because it is the first step toward an enlightened scepticism, 
that is, toward a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of 
those rules. When you get the dragon out of his cave on 
to the plain and in the daylight, you can count his teeth 
and claws, and see just what is his strength. But to get him 
out is only the first step. The next is either to kill him, or 
to tame him and make him a useful animal. . . . It is revolt-
ing to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so 
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind 
imitation of the past." 7 
But stability has its importance too. "The revision is a 
delicate task, not to be undertaken by gross or adventurous 
hands, lest certainty and order be unduly sacrificed. . . ." 8 
It is always a nice question for the policy maker to decide 
whether the advantages of change outweigh the advantages 
of continuity. Change must not be made too rapidly and 
without consideration of consequences. Not always is change 
for the better. Just as there are some persons who are tem-
peramentally inclined to assume that whatever is, is good, 
there are also those who are temperamentally inclined to 
assume that whatever is new, is better. 
Sec. 7-44. Problems. 1. In an address to Congress, Jan-
uary 6, 1941, President Roosevelt spoke of the "basic things 
expected by our people of their political and economic sys-
tems." It goes without saying that Hitler would not have 
mentioned the same basic things on the same date. I quote 
7 
"The Path of the Law," 10 HARV, L. REV. 457 at 469 (1897). 
S CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW no (1924), 
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Roosevelt's remarks and ask that you explain how his remarks 
illustrate the general points made in section 7-40. What is 
the purpose of this inventory? 
"The basic things expected by our people of their political 
and economic systems are simple. They are: 
Equality of opportunity for youth and for others. 
Jobs for those who can work. 
Security for those who need it. 
The ending of special privileges for the few. 
The preservation of civil liberties for all. 
The enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress m a 
wider and constantly rising standard of living." 1 
2. Explain how group influence on the policy maker is 
illustrated by the discussion of the whaling customs in section 
7- I 6, problem 4· 
3· What do you make of the statement by Holmes that: 
"The law, so far as it depends on learning, is indeed, as 
it has been called, the government of the living by the dead. 
To a very considerable extent no doubt it is inevitable that 
the living should be so governed. . . . But the present has 
a right to govern itself so far as it can; and it ought always 
to be remembered that historic continuity with the past is 
not a duty, it is only a necessity."? 2 
What does Holmes mean by the statement that "Con-
tinuity with the past is not a duty"? What does he mean by 
the suggestion that such continuity is a necessity? 
4· Consider the following news item in relation to the 
traditional patterns of behavior mentioned in section 7-42: 
folkways and mores. Note particularly the word "custom" 
italicized in each of the first five paragraphs. Which of the 
two types of behavior patterns is meant by the word "custom" 
in each instance? The distinction turns particularly on the 
point at which a policy factor is appreciated. 
lg7 CoNe. REc. 46 (1941). 
2 Speech at a dinner in honor of Professor Longdell, June 2.5, 1895· 
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"WHY PASS ON THE RIGHT. The Conestoga wagon, 
the farmers' freight-hauling vehicle of the early days, is 
responsible for the present custom of vehicles passing on t~e 
right in the United States, according to the bureau of pubhc 
roads. 
"Before the extensive use of the Conestoga wagon it was 
the custom to pass vehicles on the left, following the earlier 
English rule. 
"In England in the days when men traveled armed on 
horseback, it was the custom to pass to the left so that the 
sword or pistol arm would be on the side of the man passed. 
Later, in travel by coach or wagon, the driver sat on the 
right side to give his right arm free play in wielding the 
whip, and passing to the left he was better able to avoid 
entanglements with the wheels of passing vehicles. Traffic 
passes to the left to this day in England. 
"On the continent-in France, Germany, and Italy-the 
postillion system of driving, by which the driver sat on the 
left wheel horse, existed in the early days for both coaches 
and wagons. To a man riding the left wheel horse passing 
to the right gives a better view of the passing vehicle. In 
these countries, passing to the right has always been the 
custom. 
"In Italy, until the time of Mussolini, vehicles in the 
cities, where postillions were customary, passed to the right; 
in the country, where box wagons were much used vehicles 
passed to the left. Mussolini made passing custom uniform 
by decreeing that all should pass to the right. 
"The drivers of the Conestoga wagons rode the left wheel 
horse. Passing to the right was more convenient in spite of 
the fact that it was the custom to pass to the left, as in 
England. Drivers riding the 'lazy board' of the Conestoga 
wagon-a board between the two left-side wheels that pulled 
out and could be ridden when driving from the side of the 
wagon-preferred passing to the right, and traffic was passed 
on that side. 
"The deep wagon ruts in the singletrack roads made by 
the Conestoga wagon drivers were followed by other traf-
fic." 8 
3 Ann Arbor Daily News, Feb. 7, 1934. 
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5. During the latter part of the fifteenth century, between 
1464 and 1470, Sir John Fortescue wrote a famous tract 
entitled De Laudibus Legum Angliae. Fortescue was for 
many years Chief Justice of England. He espoused the 
Lancastrian cause during the latter part of the Wars of the 
Roses and went into exile when the Lancastrian party was 
defeated. He wrote this tract for the benefit of Edward, 
Prince of Wales, eldest son of King Henry VI, during his 
exile in Barrois. In chapter I7 he says: 
"The realm of England was first inhabited by the Britons; 
afterwards it was ruled and civilized under the government 
of the Romans; then the Britons prevailed again; next, it 
was possessed by the Saxons, who changed the name of 
Britain into England. After the Saxons, the Danes lorded it 
over us, and then the Saxons prevailed a second time; at last, 
the Normans came in, whose descendants retain the kingdom 
at this day: and during all that time, wherein those several 
nations and their kings prevailed, England has nevertheless 
been constantly governed by the same customs, as it is at 
present: which if they were not above all exception good, 
no doubt but some or other of those kings, from a principle 
of justice, in point of reason, or moved by inclination, would 
have made some alteration or quite abolished them, espe-
cially the Romans, who governed all the rest of the world 
in a manner by their own laws. Again, some of the aforesaid 
kings, who only got and kept possession of the Realm by the 
sword, were enabled by the same means to have destroyed 
the laws and introduced their own. Neither the laws of the 
Romans, which are cried up beyond all others for their an-
tiquity; nor yet the laws of the Venetians, however famous 
in this respect, their Island being not inhabited so early as 
Britain; (neither was Rome itself at that time built;) nor, 
in short, are the laws of any other kingdom in the world so 
venerable for their antiquity. So that there is no pretence 
to say, or insinuate to the contrary, but that the laws and 
customs of England are not only good, but the very best." 4 
4 DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE, translated from the Latin by Francis 
Gregor, so et seq. (1874). 
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Do you think Fortescue's assumption that if the English 
customs "were not above all exception good" the English 
kings would have altered or abolished them, is a safe assump-
tion? 
Can you find an easy explanation for his view "that the 
laws and customs of England are not only good, but the 
very best"? 
6. Does the family serve the same functions, socially 
speaking, in America at the present time as it did a century 
ago? Does it serve the same functions in an industrial society 
as in a primitive society? Various writers have observed that 
changes in family life resulting from the transition from 
home industry to the factory system have created new social 
problems. They have stressed the point that modern economic 
changes have largely destroyed the effectiveness of the family 
as a social disciplinary agency, and a great increase in juvenile 
delinquency has resulted. 
How do these facts affect the social role of the state, the 
school, and law? 
Sec. 7-45. Basic criteria for policy makers--nature and 
consequences. The foregoing sections of this chapter have 
been intended to describe various legal policies which find 
expression in all or part of our American legal systems and 
to explain how such policies are formulated and determined. 
Our account has shown, first, what the major policies have 
been, and now are; second, what human agencies make or 
contribute to policy determination; and third, what factors, 
such as habit, inertia, and mere lack of imagination, serve 
as limits on policy determination. This account of the process 
of policy determination-which I shall hereafter call the 
"empirical" theory 1-is predominant in the judicial opinions 
1 The theory takes a variety of directions, each of which carries a different 
emphasis. The general method is the same in all. "Empirical" is the adjective 
which I have chosen to use. Other adjectives sometimes applied to the theory 
are: "scientific," "realistic," "pragmatic," and "positivistic." The adherents 
of the theory are prone to use the first two adjectives, scientific and realistic, 
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and legislative declarations of American policy makers today. 
It finds expression in the writings of Holmes, Pound, Wig-
more, Llewellyn, and other leading thinkers. It adopts essen-
tially the philosophical position of men like James and 
Dewey.2 
The gist of the "empirical" theory is that our basic criteria 
of justice, our notions of policy, as well as our methods of 
resolving policy problems, are the work of human agencies. 
The theory holds that criteria of justice are derived from 
human experience. It avers that man, individually and collec-
tively, standardizes his contacts with the world about him. 
According to this theory man systematizes his experiences in 
prescriptive terms (for direction and guidance) as well as in 
descriptive terms (for information); 3 he builds up goals and 
methods of action from his experiences, including his internal 
experiences, or feelings and felt needs. These goals and 
methods are merely grand inductions or generalizations which 
will organize his activities and dealings with the inanimate 
world and with his fellows. And, as these basic guides are 
created by man to serve his purposes, they are subject to 
revision and change by him as he finds that his needs or 
purposes change. Nevertheless, it is observable that man 
does not change these basic guides very often or very rapidly. 
They have a considerable degree of stability as a result of 
inertia and the fixity of man's habits. They are like buildings 
as they carry rather favorable implications; those who are not friendly to the 
"empirical" theory are inclined to use the latter two adjectives, which have 
acquired in their hands a definitely unfavorable connotation. 
2 As a recent writer well says: 
"The fundamental legal philosophy in America today is still pragmatism. 
Its best known instance is of course sociological jurisprudence as developed 
by Roscoe Pound. In a revolt against nineteenth century idealism Pound 
imported European ideas of the nature of law, fitted them to current prag-
matic theories of philosophy, and with their aid gradually reworked the whole 
structure of American legal thought." 
Cowan, "A Report on the Status of Philosophy of Law in the United States," 
so CoL. L. REv. ro86 at 1092. (195o). 
3 See again the discussion of the important uses of language, directive and 
informative, in sees. r-07 et seq. 
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which have been constructed and which for a long time 
endure unchanged. The buildings can be torn down and 
replaced by others when they cease to meet the needs of 
those who use them. So, the guides and criteria for proper 
action, built by man, are observed to be quite solid and 
lasting, and yet, they are also subject to be revised or dis-
carded when they prove inadequate or cease to serve as 
satisfactory guides for man's activities. 
But I would be leaving my account of the factors which 
enter into policy determination in an incomplete and one-
sided form if I did not present another theory in regard 
to basic criteria of justice. This theory, which I shall call 
the "higher law" theory/ has always been represented in 
our American legal thinking. It declares that the "empirical" 
theory does not tell the whole story; in fact, it does not 
tell the most important part of the story about criteria of 
justice. The "higher law" theory postulates criteria which 
are outside human experience and are not created by man. 
This theory "has had a longer, continuous history than 
perhaps any other which still finds enlightened adherents 
in any field of thought." 5 It has been consistently main-
tained by Christian doctrine, and notably in the doctrine of 
the Roman Catholic Church, from St. Augustine and St. 
Thomas Aquinas to the modern neo-scholastics. The theory 
was accepted by the founders of our republic, who gave 
definite expression to it in the Declaration of Independence 
and the Preamble to the Constitution. In its secular form, 
4 Other names applied to the various forms which the "higher law" takes 
in the writings of its different adherents are "law of nature," "natural law," 
"moral law," and "Divine Law." 
5Dickinson, "The Law Behind Law," 29 CoL. L. REV. 113 at 114 (1929). 
Actually, the "higher law" theory takes various forms. But for our purposes 
only two are important: x, the secular form or theory of natural law, and 
2, the religious form, of which the best known type is neo-scholasticism. Other 
forms, illustrated in modern writing, such as the theories of Stammler, Kohler, 
and others, have had no marked influence on current American thinking, and 
are therefore not to be specifically discussed herein. For a discussion of them, 
see STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW (1946). 
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as a theory of "natural law," the theory can count among 
its supporters a substantial share of the best-known philos-
ophers, moralists, and legal thinkers, from Plato and Aris-
totle, through Kant and Hegel, to writers of the present day. 
A full exploration of these two theories and their impli-
cations would call for an extended voyage into the perilous 
seas of legal philosophy. In fact, a full exploration would 
furnish ample subject matter for a course for advanced 
students of our legal system. I am sure I am not justified 
in going far in the examination of these theories in this intro-
ductory survey; but I do think I am warranted in presenting 
here an abbreviated comparison of the two theories, together 
with their implications, because both theories figure prom-
inently in American thinking about the fundamentals of 
law.* My statement will be aimed to explam problems and 
* (I.R.) Suggestions for further reading on the matter of this section: 
Cahn, E., The Sense of Injustice (1949). 
Cohen, F., Ethical Systems and Legal Ideals ( 19 3 3) • 
Cook, "Scientific Method and the Law," 13 A. B. A. J. 303 (1927). 
Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law," 
42 Harv. L. Rev. 149, 365 (1928). 
Cowan, "A Report on the Status of Philosophy of Law in the United States," 
so Col. L. Rev. ro86 (1950). 
Dickinson, "The Law Behind Law," 29 Col. L. Rev. n3, 285 (1929). 
Fuller, L., The Law in Quest of Itself ( 1940). 
Haines, C., The Revival of Natural Law Concepts, Harvard Studies in 
Jurisprudence ( r 9 3 o) . 
Hall, J., Living Law in Democratic Society (1949). 
Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies (Essays in Honor of Roscoe 
Pound) (r947). 
Mermin, "The Study of Jurisprudence-A Letter to a Hostile Student," 
49 Mich. L. Rev. 39 (1950). 
My Philosophy of Law (By Sixteen American Scholars) (1941). 
Patterson, "Pragmatism as a Philosophy of Law" (in The Philosopher of 
the Common Man) (1940). 
Pound, R., Interpretations of Legal History, chapter VII, "An Engineering 
Interpretation" ( 1930). 
Pound, R., Law and Morals (znd ed., 1926). 
Radin, "Natural Law and Natural Rights," 59 Yale L. J. 214 (1950). 
Yntema, "The Implications of Legal Science," ro N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 
279 (1933). 
See bibliography on this subject in Cowan, cited above; POUND, OUTLINE 
01' JURISPRUDENCE 48-59 (5th ed., 1943); and STONE, THE PROVINCE AND 
FUNCTION OF LAW 215 note (1946). 
An exposition of Roman Catholic doctrine is furnished by FRIEDMANN, 
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positions without taking sides on the basic issues involved.6 
It will be as nearly objective as I know how to make it; 
though as an adherent of the "empirical" theory, I may 
manifest an unintentional bias for that theory. In any case 
I have no notion that the "empirical" theory is demonstrably 
right and the "higher law" theory can be shown to be wrong. 
When we get through this section of the text and the prob-
lems in the next section, I do not expect that anyone of you 
will have found occasion to change from the "higher law" 
view to the "empirical," or vice versa. At most I hope that 
some of you will have gotten clearer notions of the impli-
cations of the theory you adopt and that all of you will have 
acquired a tolerant attitude toward the theory you do not 
accept.7 
The "higher law" theory holds that there are criteria of 
justice which lie beyond human reach. These criteria consti-
tute "a system of independently existing and inherently valid 
law having its source wholly outside of government." 8 The 
LEGAL THEORY, chapter 2Z (zd ed., 1949) and LE BUFFE and HAYES, 
THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (1947). 
One of the principal writers to reject the "higher law" view is Justice 
Holmes. See Collected Papers 310-316 ( 1920), an article entitled "Natural 
Law," first published in 32 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1918). A highly sympathetic 
statement of Holmes' philosophy and views is presented by LERNER, THE 
MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES (1943). For a critical analysis of 
Holmes' views by a Catholic writer, see Ford, "The Fundamentals of 
Holmes' Juristic Philosophy," a paper included in an appendix to the work 
by Le Buffe and Hayes, above cited. 
6 It is with great diffidence that I attempt such a statement. A simple state-
ment on this subject is not easy to prepare. It is apt to turn out to be oversimple 
and unsatisfactory to all parties. Indeeed, I have tried hard to convince myself 
that it is unnecessary, and to find a rational basis for avoiding the task. I make 
the statement only because I have found that each time that I take up the 
matter of policy determination with a class, the discussion leads invariably 
into questions regarding "higher law" criteria of justice; to pass over this 
subject entirely, leaves many of the most earnest members of the class quite 
unsatisfied. 
7 Much of the writing in favor of each theory is polemical in character. 
This seems to me both unfortunate and unnecessary. Each theory can be 
stated in tenable form and each is entitled to respectful treatment by those 
who do not accept it. 
8 Dickinson, "The Law Behind Law," 2.9 CoL. L. REV. IIJ at 114 (192.9). 
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"higher law" is ascribed to a superhuman source, to Nature 
or more specifically to man's nature, or to Divine Legislation. 
The "higher law" is absolute, immutable, and final. It re-
quires no demonstration or proof, as it is self-evident, like 
the axioms of mathematics.9 It is revealed to man by intuition 
or reason. The "higher law" stands, accordingly, like a super-
constitution above human policy makers, as our Federal 
Constitution stands above the acts of federal and state offi-
cials.10 It affords limitations on governmental actions. It is 
a barrier against unreasonable policies and methods. In addi-
tion, the "higher law" serves as source for legislative ideas 
and policies. It furnishes a positive basis from which to deduce 
or derive particular policies, such as the policy of protecting 
the individual's personality, from the intrinsic value of hu-
man life, and the policy of free contract, from the funda-
mental doctrine favoring individual self-assertion.11 In the 
words of a recent writer, the functions of the "higher law" 
are "to guide, to criticize, and to measure the law as made 
by legislators and applied by judges so as to keep it in reason-
able and just channels." 12 
Now with these two theories in mind, it will be worth 
while to compare them and their implications. 
9 Though the untrained and unenlightened may have unclear, imperfect 
or mistaken perceptions of the "higher law" as they may of the axioms of 
mathematics. 
10 As a matter of fact, I think it is evident, from the various pronounce-
. ments of the founding fathers, that they believed they were embodying princi-
ples of the "higher law" in the constitutions which they framed, notably, in 
their declarations regarding popular sovereignty, the separation of powers, 
and the rights of the individual. (Bill of Rights, adopted in the form of the 
first eight amendments.) 
11 Perhaps it is fair to say that the two lines of theory, "higher law" and 
"empirical," lay emphasis on different aspects of the thinking process. The 
"higher law" theory puts greater stress on the deductive side of thinking; it 
is more concerned with what it can derive from its premises. The "empirical" 
theory is more concerned with the way it derives its premises and accordingly 
lays more stress on the inductive procedures. Of course, all thinking involves 
both generalization (induction) and the use of general premises (deduction); 
neither can really be ignored. I refer merely to the matter of focus of interest 
and corresponding emphasis. 
12HAINES, REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 306 (1930), 
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The "higher law" theory seems to enjoy a substantial 
advantage in its proffer of stable and permanent criteria. But 
this advantage, it is argued by the "empirical" theorist, is 
really illusory. Criteria of right, and of right governmental 
policy, have not in fact remained constant throughout human 
history. Not only does history show that laws and usages have 
varied and changed among mankind, but that such funda-
mental criteria as have been propounded by "higher law" 
theorists, have also varied and changed. Almost any practice 
which would be condemned today as violative of a "higher 
law," from polygamy and promiscuous sex relations to ruth-
less treatment of individuals and groups, has, at many times 
and stages in the history of mankind, been pursued as an 
approved policy.13 The way the "higher law" theorist of to-
day meets this difficulty is to say that the criteria which he 
now accepts have existed always and to treat the deviations 
from his criteria as aberrations.14 He does not admit that his 
criteria are affected by what persons of any age, or by what 
"higher law" theorists before him, have accepted. This, for 
example, is what the advocate of "higher law" does when he 
speaks of human slavery as contrary to natural, i.e., "higher," 
law. But Aristotle, one of the most illustrious supporters of 
the "higher law" theory, did not so regard the institution of 
slavery, as I have already pointed out.15 Slavery was uni-
versal in his day and he justified it as consonant with prin-
ciples of natural law. No "higher law" theorist today would 
so define his criteria of justice as to permit slavery.16 To the 
extent that the "higher law" theory takes the form of a 
13 SUMNER, FoLKWAYS ( I9o6), chapters 6, 7, 8, 9, Io, and IS· 
14 Christian doctrine meets the problem of finding a stable and permanent 
"higher law" by deriving it from a single source, the Holy Scriptures. Chris-
tianity is said to be a part of the common law; it has strongly influenced 
American legal thinking. See PoUND, THE SPIRT OF THE CoMMON LAW, 
chapter II: "Puritanism and the Law" (I 92 I). Doctrines of the Jewish and 
other religions need not be considered here as they have not exerted immediate 
influence on notions of criteria of justice. 
15 See sec. 7-42 and note I thereto. 
16 See Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, quoted in sec. 7-46, problem 4· 
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natural law, its protagonists reach unanimous agreement only 
on two points, to wit, that there are fundamental criteria 
of justice, and that these criteria are beyond human control. 
In regard to the content of the criteria themselves the "higher 
law" theorists have never been able to agree.17 
The "empirical" theory offers a ready account of variety 
and change in criteria of justice. These are relative, so it 
declares, to man's knowledge and his needs. General criteria, 
such as the welfare of the individual or the community or 
the group, are more or less emphasized at different times 
and places; and the specific forms of criteria of justice which 
are recognized, e.g., the individual and social interests which 
are protected, also vary with times and circumstances. In 
short, criteria of justice are relative and changing, not abso-
lute and permanent. But, in opposition to this account, it is 
argued that the "empirical" theory abandons any real criteria 
in order to reach this logical result. Indeed, it is argued that 
the "empirical" theorist, when he derives his criteria from 
human sources, is faced with the dilemma of choosing criteria 
on a mere count of noses, or else of finding no criteria at all. 
What makes a policy or an act wrong according to the "em-
pirical" theory? Is it the fact that the policy or act runs 
counter to a generally received opinion of the community? 18 
17 After speaking of the long and fruitful history of the ideal of natural 
law, Felix Cohen says: 
"It is not remarkable, then, that in so long and adventurous a history the 
doctrine of natural law should have been subject to widely divergent interpre-
tations. In general, we may distinguish two main ingredients in this concept, 
ingredients which have been mixed in all proportions. There is first the notion 
of value. Natural law is primarily the law that ought to be. The second 
ingredient in the concept of natural law is the element of universality. Not 
only have these two elements been united in various ways, but occasionally 
one or the other has appeared alone in the natural law doctrine. It is with 
these extremes that our analysis of the theory can best begin." ETHICAL SYS-
TEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 101-102 (1933). 
18 Theories of a social compact and of a general will once propounded as 
the bases for governmental authority, also served as intellectual devices 
through which to establish general or objective criteria of justice. Since the 
unreality of the supposed compact and general will have been made apparent, 
criteria resting on these bases have vanished from the practical scene. 
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Are criteria matters of majority opinion? Are they matters 
of the transitory opinions of rulers and policy makers? If 
so, what criteria does one have to oppose to the Nazi policy 
of exterminating Jews, or to the Soviet policy of utilizing 
slave labor? In fine, the "empirical" theory seems to be 
caught between a choice, on the one hand, of majority views 
in the world community or in smaller communities, and a 
choice, on the other hand, of the views of some governing 
minority, such as the officialdom of the time and place or 
an elite group such as the Fascist leadership which purports 
to know what is best for the community. 
To these criticisms of his relativist views, the "empirical" 
theorist makes two answers. First, he says that variety of 
criteria and relativity of criteria cannot fairly be treated as 
a lack of any criteria at all; that, in fact, community criteria 
and opinions, and group criteria and opinions, do furnish 
real ideals; and that, though these ideals may manifest dif-
ferences and variations, they also manifest a considerable 
degree of agreement among the communities of the world, 
or at least among those communities which we would call 
the civilized world. The acts of the Nazis and of the Soviet 
government are opposed by a real world opinion, and the 
spearhead of the opposition, the governments which led to 
the public condemnation and punishment of the Nazi crimes 
against humanity which now stand against the ruthless pol-
icies of Russia, are the British Commonwealth and the United 
States, in both of which the "empirical" theory of justice is 
now predominant. Second, the "empirical" theorist answers 
that if this welter of variant criteria is all that we have, we 
may as well admit the fact; that even the criteria which any 
"higher law" theorist proposes are but community or group 
ideals decorated with honorific adjectives; that what makes 
his criteria seem final, natural, and necessary to the "higher 
law" theorist is the fact that these are the criteria which he 
has been brought up with. Accordingly, so runs this answer, 
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when we talk of a "higher law" as a basis for a policy, for 
a piece of legislation, or for a decision, "we are merely 
applying our own social standards and the mores of our own 
'chosen' people and asserting for them the quality of univer-
sality and perfection." 19 
The obvious reply of the "higher law" theory to this last 
assertion is that the "higher law" and man's rational nature 
(not his experiences), are what fix in him the criteria he 
calls natural. Hence, English and American officials, in assert-
ing human claims and rights against Nazi and Soviet tyran-
nies, are really expressing and responding to their perceptions 
of the "higher law." And so we wind up here in a sort of 
impasse: the one theory attributing basic criteria to human 
inductions, the other attributing them to a "higher law" 
implanted in man by Nature or the Divine Will. 
Is there any solution to this impasse? I believe not. The 
two lines of theory start with different articles of faith and 
there is no way to settle the difference of basic beliefs. No 
theory undertakes to prove the soundness of all the premises 
on which it stands. As regards the "higher law" theory, the 
acceptance of certain premises on faith is obvious.20 But I 
think it is sometimes assumed by those who accept the 
"empirical" theory-and assumed with a sort of smug com-
placence-that "empirical" theory takes nothing for granted. 
This, of course, is not true. The "empirical" theory, like the 
19 Corbin, "Rights and Duties," 33 YALE L. J. sox at 504 (192.4). 
20 Thus, a recent neo-scholastic writer says: 
"Realism certainly makes a truthful point when it contends that It IS 
essentially skeptical while scholasticism relies heavily upon faith. True it is 
that scholasticism has faith in traditional law, in man, in his power to reason, 
in his free will, and in the capacity of the judge to decide legal problems 
according to rules and principles. Scholasticism does not contend that man 
is free from prejudice or emotion; that he never acts instinctively. Far from it. 
But the scholastic jurist believes that it is within the nature of mankind 
generally to subordinate these emotional factors especially when the problem 
at hand is the determination of the rights and duties of individuals according 
to law." KENNEDY, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (By Sixteen American 
Scholars) I 53 (I 94 x) • 
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"higher law" theory, postulates basic propositions on faith 
and without proof. For example, in the field of action it 
assumes that effective action is possible and worth while; that 
man is able to control men and things through his acts and 
standards. In the field of know ledge, it has faith in the 
efficacy of investigative procedures and of experiment and 
observation as tests for truth. Can one demonstrate that 
experiment is a better way of arriving at conclusions than 
intuition is? Perhaps many of us believe that it is, but this 
is only an assumption, though a basic one. It seems, therefore, 
that both "empirical" theory and "higher law" theory accept 
many propositions on faith and cannot avoid it. On this point 
the two theories are alike, not different. The difference, as 
regards their articles of faith, lies in the fact that the "higher 
law" theory accepts its articles of faith as final, whereas the 
"empirical" theory treats those things which are accepted 
on faith and those which are regarded, at any particular time, 
as proven, as subject to rejection and revision if experience 
at a later stage shows them to be untenable. Its unproven 
assumptions, as well as those which are proven, are only 
provisionally accepted. 
Among the articles of faith common to the "higher law" 
theory and the "empirical" theory, as they are developed 
in this country, are the major tenets of our democratic creed. 
This creed constitutes a system of policy assumptions and 
beliefs. The most important are the assumptions regarding 
equality of men, regarding liberty of the individual, and 
regarding popular participation in the determination of gov-
ernmental measures. Opposed to these assumptions can be 
constructed an equally complete and systematic group of 
premises, coupled with the aristocratic way of life. Such 
assumptions were part and parcel of Plato's political creed. 
Often, those of us who have had a democratic upbringing 
naively assume that no other political creed than ours can 
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be entertained by any reasonable person. Quite the contrary 
is true. Our democratic beliefs are not only wines of recent 
vintage, but they have not been accepted as generally as the 
aristocratic kind. The aristocratic creed is, both, more ancient 
and more prevalent in practice, even today. I do not mean 
to challenge your faith in democracy. I share the same faith. 
I do mean to say that many persons, groups, and govern-
ments, in the course of history, have not shared our beliefs, 
and many even today do not share our "enlightened" point 
of view. 
As is suggested in the last paragraph, the two major 
theories we are discussing are able to get together on the 
essentials of our democratic creed. This suggests a further 
important observation-the criteria of justice which are pro-
pounded by the adherents of the two theories are not too 
far apart. Regardless of how they are said to originate and 
regardless of whether they are viewed as final and absolute 
or as provisional and relative, the criteria which are offered 
are not very different and do not lead to widely divergent 
practical applications.21 Both lines of theory find room for 
all the main individual and social interests which we have 
previously discussed. Only in two areas are the practical dif-
f~rences of any consequence. These are the areas of individual 
life and personality and of family relationships. Some "em-
pirical" theorists might make a place for euthanasia and 
abortions, and for radical changes in legally approved sexual 
relationships. Practically all "empirical" theorists support 
sterilization, birth control, and liberal provisions for divorce. 
Certainly, all these measures and the policies they represent 
run counter to the basic tenets of Roman Catholics, the 
largest group in our American community which adheres to 
the thesis of a law above human law. According to these 
tenets, human life has a divine origin and marriage is a divine 
21 This fact is somewhat obscured by the tendency of adherents of both 
views to argue in an emotional and polemic fashion. 
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institution; and legislative policies along the lines mentioned 
are violative of the "higher law" and do not bind the con-
sciences of individuals or officials.22 
Part of the explanation of the fact that the two theories 
wind up in positions which are not too far apart is found 
in the fact that the two theories start with important common 
articles of faith; both take for granted the free will of actors, 
both take for granted that man can control his environment, 
both take for granted that human behavior can be guided 
by standards, by prescribed methods, and by idealized goals. 
But another part of the explanation of the similarity of the 
criteria propounded by the two theories inheres in the fact 
that the "higher law" theorist recognizes the validity of the 
"empirical" method in wide areas. He recognizes that there 
are fields in which his basic criteria are not involved. He 
recognizes the possibility of scientific study of human behavior 
in these areas and the propriety of applying the lessons of 
science therein. For example, the "higher law" theory would 
not purport to offer a solution of all problems regarding 
legal methods or legal machinery. It would not decide 
whether it is better to have written or oral pleadings in law-
suits, or whether it is better to provide for trial by jury or 
trial by judge. Furthermore, the "higher law" theory would 
recognize that there are areas in which its criteria would not 
determine what goals the policy maker may pursue. The 
"higher law" theory does not purport to cover all choices 
of the policy maker any more than human laws cover all 
choices of individuals and officials. In these uncovered areas, 
criteria of expediency apply, or, as I would prefer to say, 
"empirical" criteria.23 So, in these areas, the policy maker 
22 Roman Catholic doctrine on this general subject is fully and explicitly 
stated in the ENCYCLICAL OF PoPE PIUs XI "On Christian Marriage," Dec., 
I 9 3 o (Paulist Press). 
23 Probably advocates of the two theories would not fix areas where 
"empirical" criteria apply in quite the same manner. It is even possible that 
I exaggerate the size of the area which neo-scholastics would concede to be 
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is guided at most by the kind of criteria which science can 
provide. In other words, both lines of theory come together 
in these areas where the "higher law" theory concedes that 
policy determinations are beyond its sway. Here, both lines 
of theory come together in recognizing that "empirical" 
criteria are applicable to policy determinations, and also in 
recognizing the privilege and discretion of human agencies 
freely to determine policies. Both lines of theory would agree, 
for example, that the human policy maker is competent to 
deal as he will with most problems in the fields of contract 
and property; that he may, in the light of human experience, 
expand or retract the area of free contract; that he may, on 
this basis, foster monopoly or restrict it; that he may, on the 
same basis, change the incidents of the ownership of property, 
and change the types of private property which are allowed 
and disallowed.24 Indeed, I would say that these areas where 
the policy maker can look to experience and use his own 
judgment include most areas in which human law is appli-
cable. 
Both lines of theory recognize the possibility of actual 
policy determinations which deviate from the criteria which 
they propound. The "empirical" theory explains such devia-
tions merely as typical divergencies of the actual from the 
ideal, found in all human affairs. The "higher law" theory 
condemns such deviations more emphatically, but neverthe-
less recognizes the possibility of "unjust" policy determina-
uncovered by "higher law." Perhaps, too, I do not put my points in just the 
way that neo-scholastics would put them. I cannot claim to have a complete 
understanding of their doctrine. However, I regard all of the possible reserva-
tions I have mentioned as beside my main point and believe that all "higher 
law" theorists would grant that point. 
24 The text states the present condition of both law and theory. It is worth 
noting, however, that every important legislative change in the fields of 
contract and property, made during the last century, has had to run the 
gauntlet of serious challenges. Statutes changing rights of inheritance, statutes 
restricting permissible uses of property, statutes fixing hours of labor and wages, 
statutes fixing prices of goods, have all been attacked (and sometimes success-
fully) as unconstitutional, or contrary to natural law, or both. 
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tions. From early Greek times down to the present day those 
who have maintained the "higher law" theory have recog-
nized that human governments can make and enforce unjust 
laws. As an individual may violate the provisions of human 
and "higher law," governmental agencies can pursue policies 
such as Hitler's policy of destroying the Jews, which run 
counter to the "higher law." Sometimes the "higher law" 
theorist insists, with St. Augustine, that "a law that is not 
just, seems to be no law at all." 25 But St. Thomas Aquinas 
and the neo-scholastics do not deny that unjust laws can be 
and are made. The purport of their theory is, simply, that 
such laws ought not to be made.26 
25 At this point we can easily fall into what Cardozo calls mere "verbal 
disputations." NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 133 (1921), We can become 
involved in an equivocation about the definition of law. Two definitions are 
important for the present purpose. First is a definition which would include 
human laws and the "higher law" in one category, but which would give 
the "higher law" a superior status. In this sense, it would be said, in line with 
the dictum from St. Augustine, that human law which runs counter to the 
"higher law" is no law at all, just as we say in the United States that a statute 
which violates a constitutional provision is not law. In other words, within 
the hierarchy of legislation, one law is inferior to, and must give way to, 
another, in case of conflict between them. But, second, law may be used more 
narrowly to include only the standards, goals, and methods formulated and 
promulgated by human government. This is the sense in which I have used 
the term law up to the beginning of the present section, where we began 
our discussion of criteria of justice. In this sense, a law may be created 
by governmental agencies which is unjust and contrary to the criteria of 
justice postulated by the "higher law" theory or worked out by the "empirical" 
theory. Indeed, if we resolve to define law in this narrower sense, it is better 
to call these extrinsic criteria by the name of morals. In that case, I believe 
that not a few adherents of the "empirical" theory would be prepared to 
assert that there are principles of morals which are superior to human law 
and further that these principles are stable and permanent. 
26 St. Thomas Aquinas says: 
"Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the 
power of binding in conscience, from the eternal law whence they are derived, 
according to Prov. viii. 15: By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just 
things. Now laws are said to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are 
ordained to the common good,-and from their author, that is to say, when 
the law that is made does not exceed the power of the lawgiver,-and 
from their form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to 
an equality of proportion and with a view to the common good." The Summa 
Theologica, part II (first part). Literally Translated by Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province, Third Number, 69 ( 1927), as quoted in HALL'S 
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 39 (1938). 
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Human sanctions to effectuate criteria of "higher law" 
or of "social justice" are not numerous or widely operative. 
Religious sanctions can be effective within the range where 
believers are affected. But legal sanctions are not ordinarily 
available for the very reason that the persons to be controlled 
are themselves in control of the legal system. The result is 
that neither the "higher law" theory nor the "empirical" 
theory undertakes to define very specifically what will happen 
by way of retribution or correction when, for example, the 
Nazis determine on a policy of exterminating Jews, or the 
Soviets on a policy of slave labor. The "higher law" theorist 
states consequences in terms of conscience; the policy maker 
violates the dictates of conscience when he acts, and persons 
supposed to be bound are not bound in conscience. And the 
"empirical" theorist offers nothing more definite by way of 
human sanctions to effectuate his criteria of "social justice"; 
he relies on public opinion of some sort. Obviously, public 
opinion does not interpose any serious practical barrier to 
measures which are pursued by a government entrenched 
in power and possessed of control over the agencies of propa-
ganda and education that operate in the community. How-
ever, it is worth remembering that in the United States the 
Supreme Court is in a position to effectuate criteria of justice 
as it sees them. The Court can make its criteria effective 
against policy determinations and acts of other organs of our 
government. As Haines says: "The United States is prac-
tically alone in placing supercensors over its legislative cham-
bers with often nothing more than the elusive rule of reason 
as a standard." 27 This means that the Supreme Court's 
policy notions supply the need for criteria of justice; it also 
means that the Court is able to effectuate its notions. Its 
policy notions represent collectively the criteria of an elite 
27 THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CoNCEPTS 343 (1930); and as this 
writer says further: "The ultimate standard of what is reasonable or fair is 
the judicial conscience.'' Ibid. 344• 
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group. The Constitution itself was framed by an elite group 
of men at a time when belief in liberty and equality of indi-
viduals stood at the highest level in history. And unquestion-
ably the criteria of justice which the Supreme Court reads 
into the Constitution are more exacting than most parts of 
our community would recognize. The fact that the Supreme 
Court is in a position to, and does, effectuate its criteria 
of justice serves in part to explain the relatively lesser interest 
in "higher law" in this country than in Europe. There has 
not been the strongly felt need here for a superhuman law 
to restrain human policy makers.28 
The criteria propounded by the two lines of theory we 
are comparing are alike in another way; both lines of criteria 
are very general. Both lines fail to offer much in the way 
of direct guidance to the policy maker. For example, 
Bentham, who may be classified as an "empirical" theorist, 
lists four "subordinate" ends to be pursued by the legislator: 
subsistence, abundance, equality, and security for the indi-
vidual; he offers the greatest happiness of the greatest num-
ber as an over-all criterion. Pound, a modern "empirical" 
theorist, lists individual and social interests essentially like 
those we have listed in our inventories in the earlier parts 
of this chapter, and then offers a general criterion of the 
"most efficacious social engineering," or, as he also says, a 
picture of giving effect to the maximum of human wants 
with the least sacrifice of other wants. The criteria offered 
by "higher law" theorists are essentially similar, though cast 
in different terms, and are likewise indefinite and general.29 
None of the programs offered by "empirical" or by "higher 
28 European countries have had recent bitter experience with dictators' acts 
and have not had any effective barriers to oppose against them. 
29 See, for example, the passage from St. Thomas Aquinas quoted in note 26 
above. See, also, the discussion of Kohler's criteria by Pound, "Interpretations 
of Legal History," Chapter VII. Kohler talks in terms of maintaining existing 
values of civilization and creating new values. He says the goal of law is the 
"furthering of civilization through a forcible ordering of things." 
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law" theorists provides the policy maker with a simple guide 
for selecting policies to pursue, or a ready method for solving 
conflicts such as the conflict between the social interest in 
free speech and the social interest in the safety of the state. 
Both programs are so general that they leave opportunity 
for widely divergent interpretations and for disputes regard-
ing applications.30 Without an authoritative interpreter to 
tell the policy maker just what these criteria mean as applied 
to the specific policy determinations which he has to make, 
they cannot control his determinations in any direct sense.31 
Nevertheless, the criteria of justice propounded by the 
two groups of theorists have real importance. They estab-
lish attitudes toward problems of policy determination. They 
adjure the policy maker to look beyond immediate ends, to 
goals which might not so readily be thought of. They call 
his attention to enduring, as against transitory, advantages. 
They involve a stress on, and a generalization of, the complex 
factors that enter into policy determination. In short, the 
invocation of a "higher law" and the reliance on "social 
justice" alike represent methods of dealing with legal prob-
lems in a wide perspective. And what is just as significant, 
both theories rest on a clear and definite faith in man's 
ability to shape his affairs according to ideals. Both involve 
a belief in the efficacy of man's efforts to control his relation-
30 Indeed, it is a common observation in human affairs that the best princi-
ple can be misconstrued and used for an improper purpose. As Shakespeare 
says, "The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose." (The Merchant of Venice, 
Act I, Scene 1, line 9.) And we hardly need to be reminded of the pious-
sounding doctrines which the Nazis cited to cover some of their worst misdeeds. 
Of course, in these cases, the citations were usually accompanied by actual 
misrepresentations of fact. 
31 N eo-scholastic doctrine does provide an authoritative interpreter to make 
interpretations so far as they involve the Word of God; final and infallible 
interpretive authority belongs to the head of the Roman Catholic Church. 
A comparable authority to interpret criteria of justice, so far as they are 
embodied in our Federal Constitution, can be said to belong to the Supreme 
Court. But the interpretations of these two agencies would only be recognized 
within limited spheres. There is no agency with universally accepted interpre-
tive authority to construe the criteria of justice propounded by "higher law" 
theory or by "empirical" theory. 
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ships by standards. Both involve a faith in human progress.32 
The two theories may diverge from one another in their 
accounts of the origin and nature of our ideals. This diver-
gence is important; and I see no way to erase it. But, 
practically, the difference is not as important and significant 
as the fact that both lines of theory stand together in postu-
lating man's ability to shape his destiny according to his 
ideals of justice. 
Sec. 7-46. Problems. r. The Declaration of Independence 
(1776) begins with this sentence: "We hold these truths to 
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, 
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi-
ness." 
How would an "empirical" theorist state essentially these 
same points? 
32 It may be argued that the "higher law" theory is not as progressive in 
tendency as the "empirical" theory inasmuch as the "higher law" theory 
postulates fixed and final criteria of justice. Of course, the "higher law" 
theory does not allow for change in its criteria, and this may mean that its 
criteria are not as adaptable as "empirical" criteria. But in fact, criteria of 
"higher law" are so general that they are adaptable to most changes of condi-
tions. Thus, "higher law" theory has been invoked quite as often by those 
who advocated change to conform to ideals, as by those who opposed change 
and maintained that existing conditions were just what they ought to be. 
"Higher law" criteria have served again and again as revolutionary battle 
cries; that was their function when they were asserted at the beginning of our 
Republic against the pretensions and arbitrary acts of the British Government. 
And "higher law" theorists have been found quite as often in modern times 
among the advocates of social reform as "empirical" theorists. As one neo-
scholastic writer says: 
"It may surprise realist reformers to be informed that thirty years before 
the United States Supreme Court declared the Minimum Wage Law of the 
District of Columbia to be unconstitutional, Pope Leo XIII vehemently de-
fended the right of the worker to a living wage in his famous encyclical, 
RERUM NoVARUM, and argued for such economic reform on the ground 
of natural law and natural justice. Incidentally, in this same encyclical will 
be found a plea for social and economic laws to improve the health, strength, 
housing, and factory conditions of wage earners, with particular regard to 
women and children-all proposed and defended in accordance with the law 
of God and the nature of man." KENNEDY in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 159 
(1941). 
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2. In his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States/ 
Holmes, J ., expresses the following views on the subject of 
freedom of speech and opinion: 
"Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me 
perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or 
your power and want a certain result with all your heart 
you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away 
all opposition. . . . But when men have realized that time 
has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe 
even more than they believe the very foundations of their 
own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached 
by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power 
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which 
their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the 
theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life 
is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to 
wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imper-
fect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system 
I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts 
to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe 
to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten 
immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes 
of the law that an immediate check is required to save the 
country." 
What basic premise does Holmes adopt here? How far 
would you say he adopts it on faith? How far on the basis 
of experience? 
Does he recognize the possibility of adopting another basic 
premise? 
Does his position here accord with the "empirical" theory 
of the basis for criteria of justice? 
3· Loan Association v. Topeka.2 
Miller, J.: 
"It must be conceded that there are such rights in every 
free government beyond the control of the State. A govern-
1zso U.S. 616 at 630 (1919), 
2 zo Wall. (U.S.) 655 at 662 (1874). 
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ment which recognized no such rights, which held the lives, 
the liberty, and the property of its citizens subject at all 
times to the absolute disposition and unlimited control of 
even the most democratic depository of power, is after all 
but a despotism. It is true it is a despotism of the many, of 
the majority, if you choose to call it so, but it is none the 
less a despotism. It may well be doubted if a man is to hold 
all that he is accustomed to call his own, all in which he has 
placed his happiness, and the security of which is essential 
to that happiness, under the unlimited dominion of others, 
whether it is not wiser that this power should be exercised 
by one man than by many. 
"The theory of our governments, State and National, is 
opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The 
executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of the 
governments, are all of limited and defined powers. 
"There are limitations on such power which grow out of 
the essential nature of all free governments. Implied reserva-
tions of individual rights, without which the social compact 
could not exist, and which are respected by all governments 
entitled to the name. No court, for instance, would hesitate 
to declare void a statute which enacted that A. and B. who 
were husband and wife to each other should be so no longer, 
but that A. should thereafter be the husband of C., and B. 
the wife of D. Or which should enact that the homestead 
now owned by A. should no longer be his, but should hence-
forth be the property of B." 
On what does Miller, J., predicate the "higher law"? 
4· The Antelope.3 An American privateer harassing Span-
ish ships during the South American revolts against Spain 
seized slaves from Spanish and Portuguese vessels. The 
Supreme Court held that on the facts proved, all of the 
slaves should be disposed of according to United States law, 
except those shown to have been the property of Spanish 
claimants, which should be turned over to those claimant 
owners. As to the contention that these slaves should not 
3 10 Wheat. (U.S.) 66 at uo-Iu (1825). 
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be returned, since the slave trade was contrary to the law 
of nations, Marshall, C. J., said: 
"The question, whether the slave trade is prohibited by 
the law of nations, has been seriously propounded, and both 
the affirmative and negative of the proposition have been 
maintained with equal earnestness. 
"That it is contrary to the law of nature will scarcely be 
denied. That every man has a natural right to the fruits of 
his own labour, is generally admitted; and that no other 
person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and appro-
priate them against his will, seems to be the necessary result 
of this admission. But from the earliest times war has existed, 
and war confers rights in which all have acquiescerl. Among 
the most enlightened nations of antiquity, one of these was, 
that the victor might enslave the vanquished. This, which 
was the usage of all, could not be pronounced repugnant to 
the law of nations, which is certainly to be tried by the test 
of general usage. That which has received the assent of all, 
must be the law of all. 
"Slavery, then, has its origin in force; but as the world has 
agreed that it is a legitimate result of force, the state of things 
which is thus produced by general consent, cannot be pro-
nounced unlawful. 
"Throughout Christendom, this harsh rule has been ex-
ploded, and war is no longer considered as giving a right 
to enslave captives. But this triumph of humanity has not 
been universal. The parties to the modern law of nations 
do not propagate their principles by force; and Africa has 
not yet adopted them. Throughout the whole extent of that 
immense continent, so far as we know its history, it is still 
the law of nations that prisoners are slaves. Can those who 
have themselves renounced this law, be permitted to par-
ticipate in its effects by purchasing the beings who are its 
victims? 
"Whatever might be the answer of a moralist to this 
question, a jurist must search for its legal solution, in those 
principles of action which are sanctioned by the usages, the 
national acts, and the general assent, of that portion of the 
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world of which he considers himself as a part, and to whose 
law the appeal is made. If we resort to this standard as 
the test of international law, the question, as has already 
been observed, is decided in favour of the legality of the 
trade. Both Europe and America embarked in it; and for 
nearly two centuries, it was carried on without opposition, 
and without censure. A jurist could not say, that a practice 
thus supported was illegal, and that those engaged in it 
might be punished, either personally, or by deprivation of 
property." 
Here, Chief Justice Marshall distinguishes three kinds 
of law: the law of the United States, the law of nations, 
and natural law. How does he relate them to one another? 
Which law prevails when there is a conflict between natural 
law and either of the other types of law? 
5· State v. Malusky.4 On May 28, 1928, Joe Malusky 
entered a plea of guilty to a charge of engaging in the liquor 
traffic as a second offense. He was sentenced to serve a term 
of one year and six months in the state penitentiary. The 
statutes of North Dakota provided for an increased penalty 
upon conviction of a second offense involving moral turpi-
tude. On appeal, Malusky contended that a violation of 
the state prohibitory act was not an offense involving moral 
turpitude. The Supreme Court of North Dakota, speaking 
through Nuessle, J., held that the violation of the prohibitory 
act was such an offense within the meaning of the statute. 
He said, in part: 
"The fourth section of the act above quoted is that on 
which the appellant grounds this appeal. His first and chief 
contention is that the violation of the state prohibitory act, 
on account of which he was sentenced, though a felony, is 
not an offense involving moral turpitude. 
"The term 'moral turpitude' is not new. It has been used 
in the law for centuries. It connotes something which is not 
clearly and certainly defined. See note in 43 Harvard L. 
4 State v. Malusky, 59 N. D. sor at sos-so6 ( 1930). 
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Rev. p. I q. Generally it may be said that moral turpitude 
is evidenced by an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in 
the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow 
man or to society in general. ... Many cases may be found 
in the books dealing with the meaning of the term and 
attempting to apply it under varying facts and circumstances. 
Most of the cases seek to make a distinction between offenses 
mala prohibita and mala in se, and hold that only offenses 
mala in se involve moral turpitude. If this be the test it avails 
us little for the difficulty then is to discern the line between 
the two. History discloses that all offenses were at some time 
merely mala prohibita and as civilization advanced and social 
and moral ideals and standards changed they became one 
after another mala in se. Moral turpitude 'is a term which 
conforms to and is consonant with the state of public morals; 
hence it can never remain stationary.' Drazen v. New Haven 
Taxicab Co. 9 5 Conn. soo, I I I Atl. 8 6 I. At one time the 
wilful killing of another was not considered evil in itself, 
and this is so among some savage peoples todayo At one time 
honor was vindicated and guilt and innocence determined by 
mortal combat between factions or individuals. Even now 
killing is justified in time of war. Larceny became an offense 
only as property rights were defined and society sought to 
benefit itself and protect the individual by penalizing the 
appropriation of property by those who could not justify 
such appropriation by the prescribed rules. Sexual crimes 
became such only as man progressed in civilization. At one 
time, not so greatly remote, prostitution was not regarded 
as immoral and in some countries is not even now banned 
by the law. However much every man may be answerable 
for his acts to his own conscience, society cannot permit each 
individual to say for it what is moral and what is immoral. 
To him who deliberately kills, murder is not immoral. To 
him who steals, larceny is not immoral. To him who lives 
only for the gratification of his appetites there is no im-
morality in doing so. Some standard must exist according to 
which the determination as to whether act or conduct is moral 
or immoral is to be made. That standard is public sentiment-
the expression of the public conscience. It may be manifest, 
unwritten, and more or less nebulous, as legend, as tradition, 
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as opinion, as custom, and finally crystallized, written as the 
law. Thus the standard is fixed by the consensus of opinion, 
the judgment of the majority. When the majority is slight 
there is, of course, greater opposition on the part of the 
minority to the standard. The majority may become the 
minority and the standard change. But so long as it is estab-
lished, measurement must be made according to its terms. So 
we must say that those things which are discountenanced and 
regarded as evil and accordingly forbidden by society, are 
immoral and that the doing of them contrary to the sentiment 
of society thus expressed involves moral turpitude, and this 
regardless of the punishment imposed for their doing." 
Reversed on other grounds. 
How does Nuessle, J., establish a standard of moral turpi-
tude? Does he reject "higher law" criteria of right and 
wrong? 
6. In Hoff v. State of New York,5 Lehman, J., said 
regarding the remedy of habeas corpus: 
"Our constitutional guarantees of liberty are merely empty 
words unless a person imprisoned or detained against his will 
may challenge the legality of his imprisonment and deten-
tion. The writ of habeas corpus is the process devised cen-
turies ago for the protection of free men. It has been 
cherished by generations of free men who had learned by 
experience that it furnished the only reliable protection of 
their freedom." 
What assumption regarding the goals of our legal system 
does Lehman, J., make? Obviously a dictator (or an official 
acting on his orders) would not make the same assumption. 
For what purpose does Lehman, J., have recourse to 
experience? 
7· Buck v. Bell.6 Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the 
opinion of the Court: 
"This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia, affirming 
5 279 N.Y. 490 at 492 (r939), quoted at length in sec. s-IJ, problem 3· 6 274 U.S. 200 at 205, 207 (r927). 
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a judgment of the Circuit Court of Amherst County, by 
which the defendant in error, the superintendent of the State 
Colony for Epileptics and Feeble Minded, was ordered to 
perform the operation of salpingectomy upon Carrie Buck, 
the plaintiff in error, for the purpose of making her sterile. 
143 Va. 310. The case comes here upon the contention that 
the statute authorizing the judgment is void under the Four-
teenth Amendment as denying to the plaintiff in error due 
process of law and the equal protection of the laws. . . . 
"The attack is not upon the procedure but upon the sub-
stantive law. It seems to be contended that in no circumstances 
could such an order be justified. It certainly is contended that 
the order cannot be justified upon the existing grounds. The 
judgment finds the facts that have been recited and that 
Carrie Buck 'is the probable potential parent of socially 
inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, that she may be sex-
ually sterilized without detriment to her general health and 
that her welfare and that of society will be promoted by her 
sterilization,' and thereupon makes the order. In view of the 
general declarations of the legislature and the specific find-
ings of the Court, obviously we cannot say as matter of law 
that the grounds do not exist, and if they exist they justify 
the result. We have seen more than once that the public 
welfare may call upon the best citizens for their lives. It 
would be strange if it could not call upon those who already 
sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often 
not felt to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent 
our being swamped with incompetence. It is better for all the 
world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring 
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society 
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing 
their kind. The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination 
is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. I 1. Three generations of im-
beciles are enough." 
What does this opinion determine? Does it pass on the 
social desirability of sterilization? Does it decide the question 
whether sterilization is morally right? 
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Would a Roman Catholic judge be justified in issuing 
an order to sterilize a woman like Carrie Buck, pursuant to 
the provisions of a statute like the one involved here?* 
8. At the conclusion of a record of his life, Henry L. 
Stimson appends an afterword which reads in part as follows: 
"This book has recorded forty years spent largely in 
public life; from this record others may draw their own 
conclusions, but it seems not unreasonable that I should my-
self set down in a few words my own summing up .... 
"No one can dispute the progress made by the man of 
today from the prehistoric man-mentally, morally, and 
spiritually. No one can dispute the humanitarian progress 
made more recently, since those times before the age of 
steam and electricity, when man's growth was limited by 
sheer starvation, and the law of Malthus was an immediate 
reality .... 
"I have always believed that the long view of man's 
history will show that his destiny on earth is progress toward 
the good life, even though that progress is based on sacrifices 
and sufferings which taken by themselves seem to constitute 
a hideous melange of evils. 
"This is an act of faith. We must not let ourselves be 
engulfed in the passing waves which obscure the current of 
progress. The sinfulness and weakness of man are evident 
to anyone who lives in the active world. But men are also 
good and great, kind and wise. . . . 
"I think the record of this book also shows my deep 
conviction that the people of the world and particularly our 
own American people are strong and sound in heart. We 
have been late in meeting danger, but not too late. We have 
been wrong but not basically wicked. And today with that 
* (I.R.) As to conflicts between conscience and the human law, see Rey-
nolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (religious belief in polygamy); 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 ( 190 5) (religious belief opposed to 
vaccination); United States v. Schwimmer, 2.79 U. S. 644 (192.9) (belief 
opposed to bearing arms); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) 
(belief opposed to bearing arms); Hamilton v. Regents of University of 
California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (conscientious objection to military service). 
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strength and soundness of heart we can meet and master 
the future." 7 
What important articles of belief does this faithful public 
servant adopt? 
How would his views take shape in criteria of justice? 
What would be his attitude toward improvement of the law? 
9· Sir Austin Henry Layard quotes the following letter 
written by a Turkish Cadi to a friend of Layard's in response 
to "inquiries as to commerce, population and remains of 
antiquity of an ancient city, in which dwelt the head of the 
law:" 8 
"My illustrious Friend, and Joy of my Liver! 
"The thing which you ask of me is both difficult and use-
less. Although I have passed all my days in this place, I have 
never counted the houses, nor inquired into the number of 
the inhabitants; and as to what one person loads on his mules 
and another stores away in the bottom of his ship, that is no 
business of mine. But, above all, as to the previous history 
of this city, God only knows the amount of dirt and confusion 
that the infidels may have eaten before the coming of the 
sword of Islam .... Listen, o my son! There is no wis-
dom equal unto the belief in God! He created the world, 
and shall we liken ourselves to him by seeking to penetrate 
into the mysteries of his creation? Shall we say, behold this 
star spinneth round that star, and this other star with a tail 
goeth and cometh in so many years! Let it go l He from 
whose hand it came will guide and direct it. . . . Thou 
art learned in the things I care not for, and as for that which 
thou hast seen, I defile it. Will much knowledge create thee 
a double belly, or wilt thou seek paradise with thine eyes? ... 
"The meek in spirit ( El Fakir), 
"Imaum Ali Zadi" 
7 STIMSON AND BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 671-672 
(1948). 
8 NINEVEH AND BABYLON, A NARRATIVE OF A SECOND EXPEDITION TO 
AssYRIA 1849-1851, 401-402 (1867). 
LEGAL POLICIES AND POLICY MAKING 593 
What kind of position would you expect the Cadi to adopt 
toward changes and improvements in existing law?** 
Compare his general attitude with Stimson's. What is the 
essential difference? 
Sec. 7-47· General summary.1 This completes our picture 
of the American legal system and its operation. The picture 
has been developed in terms of acts and standards for acts. 
In the first chapter, the role of language in the processes of 
legal control has been explained. In the second, the legal 
standards which serve as patterns for acts of the individual 
have been described, and we have seen how these standards 
are effectuated through acts and used in acts. In the third, 
legal standards for the guidance of official acts have been 
taken up and treated in a similar manner. In the fourth 
chapter, entitled Legislation, I have tried to show how 
standards are created by the legislature and by analogous 
subsidiary agencies; how these standards are stated; and 
when and where standards operate. In the fifth chapter, 
I have given an account of the processes by which legislative 
standards are interpreted; I have depicted the role of the 
judicial interpreter and the functions of rules of interpreta-
tion. In the sixth chapter I have offered an analysis of the 
procedures through which judges apply and make and un-
make case law (precedents). And in the final chapter I have 
listed the recognized objectives or policies of American law; 
have described the modes in which governmental and other 
** (I.R.) Compare what Pound says about the "give-it-up" philosophy, in 
SociAL CoNTROL THROUGH LAW 101 (1942); about belief in the futility of 
legislation, in THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 46 (1931); and about 
juristic pessimism, in INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 66 (1930). 
1 The first paragraph of sec. 7-45 constitutes a resume of the main points 
made in chapter 7. For this reason I dispense with the final section entitled 
"Summary" which I have appended at the conclusion of each of the other 
chapters. In its place I substitute a general summary to cover the entire work. 
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human agencies contribute to policy formulation; and have 
indicated how tradition and habit, and, according to one 
view, a "higher law" limit the determination and pursuit of 
policies. 
From the beginning to the end of this portrayal, we have 
viewed the legal system as a going concern; we have ex-
amined the various uses that are made of standards and of 
prescribed methods to guide the behavior of individuals and 
officials; we have put stress on the instrumental character 
of the legal system and treated it as a mass of devices created 
by man to serve his needs. 
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Empirical Theory, of basic cri-
teria for policy makers. See 
Standards for Policy Makers. 
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visions, e.g., Commerce 
Clause. 
"government" (and "state") 
defined, 3-0 I, n. I. 
regulative function of govern-
ment, 3-0I; 7-05 to 
7-08; 7-I I; 7-I 3 to 
7-24; 7-2 7, pro b. I ; 
7-44, prob. 6. 
significance of A's act to state 
and officials, 3-02. 
rights, powers, duties, etc. of 
"state," 3-02; 3-03. 
acts of "state," 3-03. 
Federal Government-role 
and powers, 3-03, n. 2; 
4-09; 7-I3· 
separation of powers in federal 
government, 3-20; 3-23. 
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to 7-21; 7-27, prob. 4; 
7-3s to 7-37. 
security for individual; see 
property interests above, 
contract interests above, 
and 7-os to 7-1 1. 
alternative classifications and 
names for individual In-
terests, 7-09. 
conflicting interests-necessity 
of choice, 7-10 to 7-11; 
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4-31; 4-33; s-21; 7-34 
to 7-38. 
Information (Criminal), filed by 
prosecutor, 3- I o. 
Informative Acts. See Verbal 
Acts. 
Injunctions 
in equitable actions, 3-1 5. 
in labor disputes, 4-19. 
In Pari Materia Doctrine. See 
Rules of Interpretation. 
Institutions, as organized groups. 
See Groups. 
Instrumental Approach. See 
Law. 
Interests. See Groups; Indi-
vidual Interests; Social In-
terests. 
International Law, character, 
7-32. 
Interpretation of Legislation. See 
full list of Section Titles on 
this topic in Table of Con-
tents, Chapter 5. See also 
Interpreter; Language; 
Legislation; Verbal Acts. 
when interpretation is needed, 
s-o I. 
role of interpreter, 5-02 to 
s-o8. 
sources and standards of inter-
terpretation, s-09 to 5-17. 
context used in interpretation, 
5-09 to 5-15; 5-17 to 
5-27. 
general context-popular, sci-
entific, historical knowledge, 
5-ro, 5-11. 
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Interpretation of Legislation 
(continued) 
legal context, S-I2; S-I3· 
history and circumstances of 
enactment: extrinsic aids, 
s-I4; s-IS; s-I7. 
rules of interpretation-as 
rules of method, S-I2; 
s-I6; S-I]; S-I9 to 
S-2I; s-27. 
typical interpretive problems, 
S-I8 to s-26. 
incomplete statement-supple-
mentation, 4-22; s-09 to 
S-IS; S-I8 to s-27; 
7-3S· 
resolving ambiguity, s-os to 
s-o6; s- I 9 to S-20. 
interpretation of popular and 
technical terms, 4-20 to 
4-2I; S-I], prob. I; S-I9 
to s-20. 
reconciling inconsistent and 
conflicting provisions, 4-3 I ; 
4-33; s-21. 
filling in details of general pro-
visions, 4-23 to 4-24; 
s-22; s-24; 7-37· 
consequences of alternative in-
terpretations to be consid-
ered, s-24. 
restrictive interpretation of 
general provisions, s-23 to 
s-24. 
extensive interpretation of gen-
eral provisions, S-2S to 
s-26. 
distinguish extensive interpre-
tation of constitution and 
statute, s-2s. 
distinguish extensive interpre-
tation of code and ordinary 
statute, S-2S, n. I. 
analogical interpretation, S-2 S 
to s-26; compare 6-I 7. 
continuous reinterpretation, 
S-I 7; prob. 2. 
policies in interpretation, 
]-03; 7-37· 
compare interpretation of case 
law, 6-os; 6-17. 
Interpreter. See also Interpreta-
tion of Legislation; Lan-
guage; Lawmaker; Legis-
lation. 
when interpretation is needed, 
S-OL 
who interprets, S-02. 
three theories of interpreter's 
role, s-03. 
legislative intent theory, 
s-o3; s-o4. 
verbal meaning theory, s-os; 
s-o6. 
free interpretation theory, 
s-o]; s-o8. 
sources and standards of in-
terpretation, S-09 to s-I 7. 
interpreter's act-creative as-
pect, s-02 to s-o9; s-2 7. 
interpreter's act-resources 
s-09 to S-I]. 
general context, S- I 0; S- I I. 
legal context, S-I 2; S-I 3· 
history and context of enact-
ment: extrinsic aids, S-I4; 
s-Is. 
nature of rules of interpreta-
tion, s-I6 to S-I7· 
typical interpretive problems, 
S-I8 to s-27. 
Interstate Commerce. See Com-
merce Clause. 
Introduction to Law. 
for whom this course is in-
tended, Preface topic 4· 
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Introduction to Law (continued) 
material herein presented, 
Preface topic 3; I -o I to 
I-03. 
method of study, I-03. 
need for introduction, Preface 
topic I. 
possible kinds, Preface topic 2. 
Inventions, encouraged, 7-24. 
Judge. See also Actions; Com-
mon Law; Courts; Jury; 
Legislation; Interpretation 
of Legislation; Law; Law-
maker; Officials. 
trial functions--generally, 
3-09. 
functions in criminal trial, 
3-I I. 
functions in civil trial, 3-I4. 
admission of evidence, 3-I I; 
3-I4; 3-27. 
instruction of jury, 3-I I; 
3-I2, prob. I; 3-I4 to 
3-27. 
comment on evidence, 3-2 7. 
control of jury, 3-27, 3-29. 
directing verdict, 3-2 7. 
use by judge of standards for 
A to guide decision, 2-45. 
use of standards for 0, 3-3 I; 
3-34, prob. I. 
standards for judges, 3-08; 
3-09; 3-II; 3-I2; 3-I4 
to 3-I 8; 3-26; 3-28 to 
3-29. 
selection, tenure, compensa-
tion, and removal of judges, 
3-26; 3-28; 3-29. 
control and supervision of 
judges, 3-26; 3-28; 3-29. 
judges not liable for torts, 
3-26. 
judicial control of persons and 
estates, 3-I 6. 
Judicial Lawmaking 
as element in interpretation, 
5-02 to s-o9; 5-27; 
7-37· 
creation of case law by deci-
sions, 6-02 to 6-o8. 
Jurisdiction (of Courts) 
original, 3-09, n. 3, n. 4· 
trial, 3-09. 
appellate, 3-I8. 
petty, 3-09. 
territorial, 3-09. 
subject matter, 3-09. 
person and subject matter, 
3-09, n. **· 
equitable, 3- I 4· 
judicial control of persons and 
estates, 3-I6. 
advisory opinions, 3-I9. 
declaratory judgments, 3-17, 
prob. 4; 3-I9. 
Jury 
criminal cases, 3-1 I; 7-35. 
civil cases, 3-I4; 7-35. 
instruction by judge, 3-1 I; 
3-I2, prob. I; 3-27. 
comment on evidence by 
judge, 3-2 7. 
control by judge, 3-2 7; 3-29. 
verdicts-general and special, 
3-27. • 
directing verdict, 3-2 7. 
setting verdict aside, 3-2 7. 
verdict of acquittal is final, 
3-27, n. 6. 
selection and qualifications of 
jury, 3-27. 
trial without jury in equity, 
3-I4. 
trial without jury by admin-
istrative agencies, 3-20. 
Jus Tertii, 7-I6, prob. 3· 
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Justice of Peace, functions, 
3-09. 
Knowledge 
transmitting. See Education; 
Social Interests; Verbal 
Acts. 
growth of. See Social In-
terests. 
Language. See full list of Section 
Titles on this topic in Table 
of Contents, Chapter I. 
See also topics Lawmaker; 
Legislation; Verbal Acts in 
this index. 
place of language in legal 
work, I-04 to I-I6. 
lawmaker's messages, 2-01. 
individual's acts are physical 
and verbal, 2-I3; 2-I4. 
lawmaker's statement of stand-
ards, 4-1 S to 4-27. 
communication of legislative 
message, 4- I S. 
statement in popular and tech-
nical terms, 4-20; 4-2 I; 
S-I7, prob. I; S-I9 to 
s-20. 
incomplete statement, 4-22; 
s-09 ~ S-IS; S-IS to 
s-27; .7-3S· 
ambiguity of statement, s-os; 
s-o6; s-19; s-20. 
statement in general terms, 
4-23; 4-24; S-22 to 
s-27; 7-3S· 
statement in inconsistent terms, 
S-21. 
when interpretation of legisla-
tive message is needed, 
s-ox; S-IS to s-27. 
role of interpreter, S-02 to 
s-oS. 
text as starting point, s-os; 
s-o6; s-o9; s-17, prob. 
I; S-27. 
sources and standards of inter-
pretation, s-09 to 5-17. 
varied meaning of words, 
I-os; s-os; s-o6; 5-19; 
s-20; 7-09; 7-14, n. 4; 
7-25, n. 4· 
change in meaning of words, 
5-06, prob. 2; 5-I 7, prob. 
2. 
usages of language as part of 
general context of use and 
interpretation, 5-10; 5-1 I. 
typical interpretive problems, 
s-x s to 5-27. 
statement of law in cases, 
6-os. 
digesting and restatement of 
law in cases, 6-os. 
social interest in transmitting 
knowledge, 7-23. 
social interest in free expres-
sion, 7-24. 
multiple classifications and 
names of legal policies, 
7-04; 7-09; 7-14, n. 4; 
7-25, n. 4· 
verbal arguments, 1-05; 
7-45, n. 25. 
Larceny 
use of definition, 2-45. 
policy behind, 7-16, prob. 2. 
Law 
questions of, 3-oS; 3-12, 
prob. I. 
"law in action"-divergence 
from "law in books," 2-30; 
2-46; 3-24; 3-32; 3-33; 
3-34, prob. 2. 
law as means-instrumental 
approach, 1-07 to I-10; 
1-13 to I-I6; 2-01; 
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Law (continued) 
2-II; 2-I5; 2-29; 4-04; 
4-05; 6-02; 6-I 7; 7-0I 
to 7-44· 
law in "diversity" cases-Ju-
diciary Act, 6-I I, prob. 4· 
common law and statute as 
background for interpreta-
tion of legislation, 5-I 2; 
5-I3; 5-I6; 5-I7; 5-I9; 
5-20. 
common law-as law, 6-oi to 
6-o8. 
meanings of "common law," 
6-0I. 
basic criteria for legal policy 
makers-"higher law" the-
ory and empirical theory, 
?-45· 
ends of law, ?-Io; ?-I2; 
7-26; compare generally 
Legal Policies and Policy 
Making. 
Lawmaker (L). See also Com-
mon Law; Interpretation 
of Legislation; Language; 
Legislation; Verbal Acts. 
who are lawmakers, 4-0I; 
4-15; 5-09; 5-27; 6-02; 
6-03; 7-34 to 7-38. 
L uses standards to control 
individual (A), 2-4 3; 
4-05. 
L must consider problem of 
effectuation, 2-29 to 2-32; 
3-22. 
use of standards to control 
officials (0), 3-30; 4-05. 
standards also apply to L, 
4-08 to 4-14. 
where these standards are 
found, 4-08. 
grants of power to legislate, 
4-09; 4-I2, prob. 4· 
formal requirements, 4-10; 
4-I2, probs. I, 2; 4-18; 
4-24, prob. 4· 
prohibitions of legislation, 
4-II; 4-12,probs. I, 2, 3· 
standards for subsidiary law-
maker, 4-I7. 
effectuation of standards ap-
plicable to L, 4-13; 4-14; 
7-37; 7-45· 
legislative inertia-law revision 
commissions, 4-14. 
Law Merchant 
reception, 6-03, n. 2. 
Legal Standards. See Standards 
for the Individual's Acts; 
Standards for Official Acts. 
Legislation. See full list of Sec-
tion Titles on this topic in 
Table of Contents, Chapter 
4· See also Common Law; 
Interpretation of Legisla-
tion; Language; Law-
maker; Verbal Acts. 
legislation as all enacted law, 
4-0I. 
emphasis herein on statutes, 
2-01, n. *; 4-02. 
process of enactment, 4-03 to 
4-14. 
occasion, purpose, and policy, 
4-04; 4-07, probs. I, 2; 
5-09 to 5-17; 7-0I to 
7-04; 7-34 to 7-38. 
recital of occasion, etc., 4-04; 
?-35· 
legislative provision as means, 
4-05; 4-07,probs. I, 2. 
sources of legislation, 4-06; 
4-07, probs. I, 2. 
standards for lawmaker, 4-08 
to 4-14; 4-I 7; compare 
5-I6; 6-03; 6-09; 6-10. 
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Legislation (continued) 
where standards are found, 
4-08. 
grants of power to legislate, 
4-09; 4-I2, prob. 4· 
formal requirements, 4-Io; 
4-I2, probs. I, 2; 4-I8; 
4-24, prob. 4· 
prohibitions of legislation, 
4-I I; 4-I 2, probs. I, 2, 3· 
effectuation of standards for 
L, 4-I3; 4-I4. 
legislative inertia-law revision 
commissions, 4-I4. 
lawmaker's statement of stand-
ards, 4-I8 to 4-27. 
promulgation and publication, 
4-I8. 
parts of statute, 4-I9. 
use of popular and technical 
language, 4-20; 4-21. 
incomplete statement of L's 
message, 4-22. 
statement in general terms, 
4-23; 4-24. 
codification, 4-25; 4-27. 
compilation, consolidation and 
annotation of statutes, 4-26. 
interpretation of legislation, 
Chapter 5· 
significance of legislation, 
4-28 to 4-34. 
territorial operation, 4-29. 
time of operation, 4-30; 
4-32; 4-34· 
constitutional provisions and 
other legislation, 4-3 I. 
repeal and amendment of stat-
utes, 4-32; 4-34· 
federal versus state legislation, 
4-33· 
legislative policy making, 7-0I 
to 7-04; 7-34 to 7-36. 
Subsidiary lawmaking, 4-15 
to 4-17. 
judicial lawmaking, 6-02 to 
6-oS; 6-12; 7-37. 
Liabilities 
liability to effects of another's 
act, 2-23. 
in relation to prohibited acts, 
2-04· 
in relation to obligatory acts, 
2-06. 
problems of classifications and 
usage, 2-25. 
Liberty. See Individual Inter-
ests; Permitted Acts; Priv-
ileges; Social Interests. 
Martial Law, declaration of, 
3-06. 
Medical Ethics. See also Doctor 
and Patient. 
medical profession maintains 
canons of ethics, 7-30. 
canons may conflict with legal 
rules, 7-33, probs. I, 2. 
Mores, origin, nature, and func-
tions, 7-28 to 7-33; 7-42; 
7-44, prob. 4· 
Murder, by verbal act--statute, 
2-14, prob. 1. 
Naturalization, judicial, 3-17, 
prob. 2. 
Natural Law. See Standards for 
Policy Makers. 
Nobility, titles of, prohibited, 
3-03. 
Obligatory Acts 
of individual, 2-06; 2-1 3· 
by law and by agreement, 
2-06. 
of officials, 3-04 to 3-07. 
of legislature, 4-09; 4-13; 
4-14. 
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Offer and Acceptance. See Con-
tracts. 
Officials ( 0). See also Courts; 
Executive; Judge; Jury; 
Prosecutor; Significance of 
Official Acts; Social Inter-
ests; Standards for Official 
Acts. 
effectuation of standards for 
individual through official 
acts, 2-29 to 2-.p; 3-0I 
to 3-07. 
use of standards for individual 
by officials, 2-4 5. 
effectuation of standards for 
officials ( 0), 3-22 to 
3-2 9· 
need for effectuation against 
0-devices, 3-22; 3-24. 
checks and balances-separa-
tion and integration of 
powers, 3-23. 
control of inferior executives, 
3-24· 
control of chief executive, 
3-25· 
control of trial judge, 3-26; 
3-29. 
control of trial jury, 3-2 7 ; 
3-29. 
control of appellate judge, 
3-28; 3-29, prob. 2. 
use of standards for officials 
by various persons, 3-30 to 
3-34· 
use by executive officials, 3-30. 
use by courts, 3-3 I ; 3-34, 
prob. I. 
Order 
significance of temporal order 
of acts, 2-27; 2-28. 
peace and order. See Social 
Interests. 
Overruling Precedents. See 
Common Law. 
Party Presentation. See A~tions. 
Peace and Order. See Social In-
terests. 
Penalties. See Individual Actor. 
Permitted Acts 
of individual, 2-05; 2-08; 
2-I3. 
why legally defined, 2-05. 
contractual permission, 2-05, 
n. 2. 
relation to prohibited acts, 
2-os; 2-05, n. **· 
Persons, judicial control of per-
sons and estates, 3-I6. 
Physical Acts. See also Verbal 
Acts. 
distinguish control by force 
and by verbal acts, I-09. 
physical acts, 2-13; 2-13, 
n. 2; 304, n. 2. 
Policies. See Law; Lawmaker; 
Legislation. 
Popular Terms. See Interpreta-
tion of Legislation; Language. 
Population, social control of, 
7-22. 
Powers 
generally, 2-22; 3-02. 
various meanings of, 2-22. 
relation of powers and liabil-
ities, 2-23. 
effective acts and powers, 
2-09 to 2-10; 2-22. 
problems of classification and 
usage, 2-2 5. 
powers of officials, 3-03; 
3-05 to 3-21; 4-01 to 
4-os; 4-28 to 4-34; 
5-02; 5-16; 6-02; 6-03; 
7-02 to 7-03; 7-34 to 
7-38. 
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Preamble 
of Constitution, 7-34, n. 2, 
n. 3· 
of statute, 4-I9. 
Precedent Doctrine. See Com-
mon Law. 
recognition in constitutional 
cases, 7-37, n. 2. 
Preface 
need for introductory work on 
law, topics I, 2. 
material herein presented, topic 
3· 
for whom this work IS In-
tended, topic 4· 
President. See Executive. 
Press, freedom of. See Social 
Interests. 
Privileges 
generally, 2-20; 7-09; 7-IO. 
as significance of permitted 
acts,2-o5; 2-I3. 
privileged communications, 
2-I4, prob. 3; 2-25, prob. 
IS. 
problems of classification and 
usage, 2-25; 7-09; 7-Io. 
privileges,iof officials, 3-04; 
3-05. 
Probate Courts, administration of 
estates, 3-I6. See also Courts. 
Procedure. See Actions; Crim-
inal Prosecution; Effective 
ActL . 
Production, of goods and serv-
ices. See Social Interests. 
Progress. See Social Interests 
(growth of knowledge). 
Prohibited Acts 
of individual, 2-04; 2-I 3· 
crimes and torts distinguished, 
2-04· 
prohibited by law and by 
agreement, 2-04. 
interrelation with other kinds, 
2-II to 2-I4· 
of officials, 3-04 to 3-07. 
of legislature, 4-1 I; 4-1 3· 
Prohibition (Liquor) Law, 
2-29; 2-30; 2-3I; 2-36; 
3-24, n. 4; 3-29, pro b. I ; 
4-04. 
Promulgation, of legislation, 
4-IS, n. 4· 
Property. See Effective Acts. 
protection of economic inter-
ests of individual, 2-04; 
2-09; 2-25; 7-08; 7-14 
to 7-2 I ; 7-2 7; 7-35 to 
7-37· 
Prosecutor 
functions, 3-Io. 
discretion, 3-24. 
Publication 
of legislation, 4- I 2, pro b. 2; 
4-18. 
of defamatory matter-priv-
ilege under statute, 2-q, 
prob. 3; 2-25, prob. IS. 
of defamatory matter-effect 
of bona fide mistake, 7-I I, 
prob. I. 
Punishment. See Individual 
Actor. 
Purpose 
of law. See Law and Law-
maker. 
of legislation, see Legislation. 
Race, discrimination, 3-29, n. 2; 
7-38, prob. 2. 
Redress. See Actions. 
Reinterpretation, of legislation-
method of continuous redating 
suggested, 5-17, prob. 2. 
Religion, separation of church 
and state, 7-23, n. 2. 
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Repeal, of legislation, 4-32; 
4-34· 
Restraint, of trade. See Con-
tracts. 
Restrictive Interpretation. See 
Interpretation of Legislation. 
Revision, of statute-publication 
requirement, 4-I2, prob. 2. 
Rewards. See Individual Actor. 
Rights. See also Acts; Duties; 
Individual Interests; Privi-
leges; Powers. 
rights of another against actor, 
2-I9; 3-02. 
rights as correlative of duties, 
2-I9. 
rights in relation to acts, 2-I9 
n. *· 
rights to acts of another, 
2-o6; 3-04; 3-05. 
rights that another do not act, 
2-04; 3-04; 3-os. 
problems of classification and 
usage, 2-25; 3-07. 
rights in relation to interests, 
7-09; 7-IO. 
Robbery, prevention of, 2-45· 
Rules of Interpretation. See also 
Interpretation of Legislation. 
rules of method-to be dis-
tinguished from material 
interpreted, S-I6. 
types of rules, 5- I 2; 5-I 7; 
5-I9 to 5-21. 
rules for interpreting case law, 
6-I7. 
Search and Seizure Clause, 
Fourth Amendment, 3-07, 
prob. 2; 7-35. 
Security. See Individual Inter-
ests; Social Interests. 
Self Defense, 2-28, prob. 2. 
Separation of Powers 
doctrine of, 3-04; 3-I2, 
prob. 5; 3-20; 3-23. 
mixture of powers in admin-
istrative agencies, 3-20. 
checks and balances-separa-
tion and integration of 
powers, 3-23. 
Significance of Acts. See also spe-
cific kinds of significance 
under titles: Discretion and 
Discretionary Acts; Duties; 
Liabilities; Powers; Privi-
leges; Rights. See also sig-
nificance of specific types of 
acts under titles: Discretion 
and Discretionary Acts; Ef-
fective Acts; Ineffective 
Acts; Obligatory Acts; 
Permitted Acts; Prohibited 
Acts. 
significance generally, 2-I5. 
"significance" as preferred 
term, 2-I5, n. *· 
standard forms of significance, 
2-I6; 3-02; 3-03; 3-05. 
significance of (A's) acts in 
relation to others, 2-I 7 to 
2-23; 2-25. 
significance of acts to actor 
himself, 2-24. 
distinguished significance of 
events, 2-26. 
significance of another's (B's) 
acts, 2-27. 
significance of temporal order 
of acts, 2-2 7; 2-28. 
significance of A's acts to state 
and officials, 3-02. 
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Significance of Acts (continued) 
significance of official ( O's) 
acts, 3-0 3 ; 3-0 5 ; compare 
3-06 to 3-2 I; 4-0I to 
4-05; 4-28 to 4-34; 
5-02; 5-I6; 6-02; 6-03; 
7-02; 7-03; 7-34 to 
7-38. 
significance of executive acts, 
3-06; 3-07· 
significance of judicial acts, 
3-08 to 3-I9; 3-26 to 
3-29; 5-02; 6-02; 6-I2; 
7-37· 
significance of jury verdict, 
3-2 7· 
significance of legislative acts, 
4-0I to 4-I7; 4-28 to 
4-34; 7-36. 
significance of interpreter's 
acts, 5-02. 
significance of various policy-
making acts, 7-34 to 7-46. 
Slavery, status in law and natural 
law, 7-42; 7-45; 7-46, 
prob. 4· 
Social Interests. See also Acts; 
Officials; Legal Policies and 
Policy Making; Significance 
of Acts; Standards for Offi-
cial Acts. 
social interests defined, 7-I2. 
policies regarding social (com-
munity) welfare, 7-I 2 to 
7-27· 
present-day stress on social 
welfare, 7-I 2; 7- I 7 to 
7-I8; 7-26; 7-42; 7-43. 
social and individual interests, 
7-I2 to 7-27. 
interests in peace and order, 
7-IOj 7-II, prob. 2; 
7-I3; 7-14; 7-16; 7-42; 
7-43· 
interests in security of acquisi-
tions, 7-I4; 7-I5, n. I; 
7-I6; 7-27, prob. 3; 
7-34· 
interests in security of trans-
actions, 7-I5; 7-I6; probs. 
I, 5; 7-27, prob. 3· 
interests in natural resources, 
7-I8; 7-2I, prob. I. 
interests in production of goods 
and services, 7-I9; 7-21, 
prob. 3· 
interests in distribution of 
goods, 7-20; 7-2 I, pro b. 
2. 
interests in human stock, 7-22. 
interests in transmitting 
knowledge, 7-23; 7-27, 
n. 2. 
interests in growth of knowl-
edge, 7-24; 7-27, prob. 5; 
7-33, pro b. 5; 7-36; 
7-37· 
interests in free speech, press, 
opinion, and assembly, 
2-05; 2-08, prob. 5; 
3-07, prob. 4; 4-12, prob. 
3i 7-06; 7-24; 7-27, 
prob. 5; 7-33, prob. 5; 
7-35 to 7-37 · 
inventory of social interests-
as check list, 7-25. 
general ends of law, 7-Io; 
7-26. 
Solicitation, to crime, 2-14, prob. 
2. 
Sources, of law, see Common 
Law; Legislation. 
Special Legislation, prohibited, 
4-24, prob. 4· 
Speech, freedom of. See Social 
Interests. 
Stability, of policies. See Legal 
Policies and Policy Making. 
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Standards for Group Acts, 2-02, 
n. I; 7-28 to 7-33; 7-.p. 
Standards for the Individual's 
(A's) Acts. See full list of 
Section Titles on this topic 
in Table of Contents, Chap-
ter 2. See also Acts and 
other specific topics in this 
index. 
standards as legal units, 2-0 I. 
kinds of standard acts, 2-03 
to 2-I4. 
effectuation of standards for 
A, 2-29 to 2-42. 
use of standards (for A) as 
guides, 2-43 to 2-48. 
significance of standard acts, 
2-15 to 2-28. 
Standards for Officials ( O's) 
Acts. See full list of Section 
Titles on this topic in Table 
of Contents, Chapter 3· See 
also acts and other specific 
topics in this index. 
standards-kinds of acts, 
3-03; 3-04; 3-06 to 
3-21. 
significance of O's acts, 3-05 
to 3-21. 
effectuation of standards for 
0, 3-22 to 3-29. 
use of standards for 0, 3-30 
to 3-34· 
standards for lawmaker (L ), 
4-08 to 4-14. 
effectuation of standards for 
L, 4-13; 4-I4. 
standards for subsidiary law-
maker, 4-I7. 
standards of interpretation, 
5-I6; 5-I7. 
standards for judicial law-
making, 6-03; 6-09 to 
6-II. 
policies as guides, 7-03. 
basic criteria for policy makers, 
7-45· 
Standards for Policy Makers 
basic criteria for policy mak-
ers-"higher law" theory 
and empirical theory-dis-
cussion of nature and con-
sequences of these theories, 
7-45· 
problems regarding applica-
tions of these theories, 
7-46. 
"natural law," see "higher 
law" theory, above. 
Stare Decisis. See Common Law. 
States. See Government and titles 
of specific constitutional pro-
visions, e.g., Due Process 
Clauses. 
Statute de Donis, 4-04, n. 3· 
Statute of Frauds, 2-10; 2-25, 
prob. IS; 2-42, prob. 2; 
5-22. 
Statute of Uses, 4-04, n. 3· 
Statutes. See also Interpretation 
of Legislation; Lawmaker; 
Legislation. 
statutes on following topics are 
herein cited or discussed 
(see titles in this index) : 
Administrative Procedure; 
Child Labor; Chinese Ex-
clusion Act; Deeds; Fair 
Labor Standards Act; For-
gery; Injunctions (in labor 
disputes); "Law" (in di-
versity cases); Murder; 
Prohibition; Publications 
(Privileged); Statute de 
Donis; Statute of Frauds; 
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Statutes (continued) 
Statute of Uses; Statutory 
Construction; Wagers; 
White Slave Traffic; 
Workmen's Compensation. 
Statutory Construction Act, of 
Pennsylvania, 5- I 6, n. 2; 
5-2!. 
Sterilization. See Population. 
Student of Law (S) 
meaning of term "student," 
2-47· 
use of standards for individual 
(A) by student of law, 
2-47; 2-45, n. 3· 
importance of hypothetical ap-
plications, 2-4 7; 3-33. 
use of standards for officials 
( 0), 3-33; 3--J4, pro b. 2; 
3-35· 
academic and practical train-
ing, 3-33; 3-34> prob. 2; 
3-35· 
Suicide, enforcement of prohibi-
tion, 2-37, prob. 3· 
Supervision and Removal of Offi-
cials, 3-2 2 to 3-2 9. 
Supremacy Clause, of Federal 
Constitution, 4-33; 6-10, 
n. I; 7-32, n. 8. 
Table of Contents, preceding 
first chapter-contains full list 
of subheads and section titles. 
Taxation 
as means of effectuating stand-
ards, 2-36; 2-37, prob. 4· 
fiscal and other nonregulative 
functions of government, 
2-39; 3-2I; 7-I7 to 
7-27. 
federal power of taxing and 
spending for general wel-
fare, 3-23; 4-09, n. 4; 
7-35; 7-36. 
Technical Terms. See Interpre-
tation of Legislation; Lan-
guage. 
Temporal Operation 
of individual acts, 2-2 7; 
2-28. 
of legislative acts, 4-30; 
4-32; 4-34, probs. I, 2. 
Tenth Amendment, reserving 
powers to states and people, 
7-34, n. 2, n. 3· 
Tenure, of officials, 3-22; 3-24 
to 3-26. 
Territorial Operation, of legisla-
tion, 4-29. 
Theory, importance, I-02. 
Title Clauses 
constitutional requirement re-
garding title and subject of 
statute, 4-10; 4-I2, prob. 
I. 
interpretation of legislation-
importance of title, 5- I 7, 
prob. I. 
Transactions. See Effective Acts; 
Social Interests. 
Treaties 
treaty power of federal gov-
ernment, 7-32. 
states forbidden to make trea-
ties, 3-03. 
treaties as internal law, 7-32, 
n. 8. 
president's power to negotiate, 
3-06. 
Trial. See Courts; Jury. 
Trusts, administration of trusts, 
3- I 6. See also Effective Acts. 
United States. See Government 
and titles of specific constitu-
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United States (continued) 
tional provisions, e.g., Com-
merce Clause. 
United States Commissioner, 
functions, 3-09, n. 4; 3-09, 
n. 7· 
Use, of standards, see titles: 
Counselor; Executive; Indi-
vidual Actor; Judge; Law-
maker; Officials; Student of 
Law. 
Verbal Acts. See also Language; 
Lawmaker; Legislation. 
analysis in terms of, I-os. 
parties to communication, 
I-o6; 4-I8. 
directive acts, I-o8 to I-Io; 
2-0I. 
informative acts, I-I I; 7-23; 
compare S-IO; S-I I. 
distinguish control by force 
and by verbal acts, 1-09. 
distinguish directive and in-
formative acts, I-I I; I-I 2. 
verbal acts in discourse, I-14· 
mixed message, I- I 3; 2-0 I. 
indirect message, I-IS. 
metaphorical use of language, 
2-04, n. *. 
verbal and physical acts, I -09; 
2-13; 2-13, n. 2; 3-04. 
lawmakers' messages as direc-
tive acts, I-08; I-I3; 
I-IS; 2-0I; 2-43; 4-os; 
4-18. 
need for interpretation of 
verbal acts, s-ol; s-o9; 
S- I 8 to S -2 7 ; 6- I 7. 
statement of law in cases, 
6-os; 6-12; 6-xs; 6-x6. 
vVagers 
statute of Michigan, 2-42, 
prob. 6. 
self-help, 2-42, prob. 7. 
White Slave Act, 4-07, prob. I; 
s-17,prob. I. 
Wills. See Effective Acts. 
vVorkmen's Compensation 
Wisconsin statute, 4-07, prob. 
2. 
workmen's compensation com-
mission, 3-20. 
